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AIR 20/1883 Fighter Command Losses for 1943, but my copy is missing November.(Off topic, but relevant to just how out of their depth by 1943 Hurricanes were, they were cruelly employed against 'Festung Europa',
an account of the 'withering losses' they suffered is well related by another Spitfire pilot, P. Clostermann, perhaps for another thread).
Having a look at The Empire Strikes South by Lewis, the 20 June 43 JAAF raid against Darwin comprisedI went back and looked, it doesn't seem to mention any Japanese losses except the three Ki-48s. I guess he left that part out.
Maybe so, but his personal account relates to December 1943, with heavy Hurricane losses to both flak & fighters for no useful resultAIR 20/1883 Fighter Command Losses for 1943, but my copy is missing November.
Hurricane squadrons 17 in battle (4 in September peak losses), 15 in accidents, other Fighter Command units lost 5 Hurricanes, the OTU under Fighter Command lost 86, for all of 1943 excluding November. Also the Hurricane operations were fighter bomber, not air superiority.
Clostermann is in the camp of when the truth contradicts the legend, report the legend.
AIR 20/1883 Fighter Command Losses for 1943, but my copy is missing November.
Hurricane squadrons 17 in battle (4 in September peak losses), 15 in accidents, other Fighter Command units lost 5 Hurricanes, the OTU under Fighter Command lost 86, for all of 1943 excluding November. Also the Hurricane operations were fighter bomber, not air superiority.
Clostermann is in the camp of when the truth contradicts the legend, report the legend.
Having a look at The Empire Strikes South by Lewis, the 20 June 43 JAAF raid against Darwin comprised
18 Ki-49's from the 61st Sentai
9 Ki-48's from the 75th Sentai
22 Ki-43's from the 59th Sentai
Known Japanese losses were
2x Ki-49's (Capt Katsuhiro Ohta and Lt Kenjiro matsuhara)
1 Ki-43 (Lt Shigeto Kuwata)
Anthony Cooper in Darwin Spitfires details that 3 Ki-49's were in fact shot down with several spitfire pilots witnessing three separate crashes - two into the sea and one on land (wreckage found). Japanese records allude to several losses. Cooper also corroborates (through Japanese records) that 2x Ki-48's never made base and force landed on Timor while a third, flying on one engine, belly landed at Lautem Airfield. This must be the 3 Ki-48's quoted in your book. Off the top of my head, I'm sure 31 sqn Beaufighters finished these off a day or two later while on the ground. As for Ki-43's, a Japanese POW stated that 3-4 Oscars were shot down on this day and another one crashed on its way to the target due to engine failure. Mawer's gun camera confirmed his kill (cannon strikes snapped off a wing and filmed crashing into the sea), gun camera recorded strikes on another Oscar while a third was filmed to drop its undercarriage while taking hits.
Potential Japanese losses
up to 5 Ki-43's
3 Ki-48's
3 Ki-49's
The 59th launched another sweep on June 22, losing Lt Kunihiko Kuroishi. This was most likely through mechanical failure as No.1 FW did not intercept, nor did AA engage.
All in all, an interesting (and potentially costly, engagement for the JAAF.
Indeed, as you've noted earlier in the thread, the RAF 'Brass' was in 'denial' over the hapless Hurricane situation, much earlier.
The late 1943 date mentioned was about the soonest the RAF could get a Spitfire with both the range & performance in the CBO.
Alan Peart does however state the impact the confident Spitfire VIII units had:
"In the Arakan... the Japanese suffered severe fighter losses, & lost a lot of their aggressiveness.
Until then, they appeared to roam at will over Allied territory."
(Off topic, but relevant to just how out of their depth by 1943 Hurricanes were, they were cruelly employed against 'Festung Europa',
an account of the 'withering losses' they suffered is well related by another Spitfire pilot, P. Clostermann, perhaps for another thread).
Having a look at The Empire Strikes South by Lewis, the 20 June 43 JAAF raid against Darwin comprised
18 Ki-49's from the 61st Sentai
9 Ki-48's from the 75th Sentai
22 Ki-43's from the 59th Sentai
Known Japanese losses were
2x Ki-49's (Capt Katsuhiro Ohta and Lt Kenjiro matsuhara)
1 Ki-43 (Lt Shigeto Kuwata)
Anthony Cooper in Darwin Spitfires details that 3 Ki-49's were in fact shot down with several spitfire pilots witnessing three separate crashes - two into the sea and one on land (wreckage found). Japanese records allude to several losses. Cooper also corroborates (through Japanese records) that 2x Ki-48's never made base and force landed on Timor while a third, flying on one engine, belly landed at Lautem Airfield. This must be the 3 Ki-48's quoted in your book. Off the top of my head, I'm sure 31 sqn Beaufighters finished these off a day or two later while on the ground. As for Ki-43's, a Japanese POW stated that 3-4 Oscars were shot down on this day and another one crashed on its way to the target due to engine failure. Mawer's gun camera confirmed his kill (cannon strikes snapped off a wing and filmed crashing into the sea), gun camera recorded strikes on another Oscar while a third was filmed to drop its undercarriage while taking hits.
Potential Japanese losses
up to 5 Ki-43's
3 Ki-48's
3 Ki-49's
The 59th launched another sweep on June 22, losing Lt Kunihiko Kuroishi. This was most likely through mechanical failure as No.1 FW did not intercept, nor did AA engage.
All in all, an interesting (and potentially costly, engagement for the JAAF.
I noted potential losses because they can not be substantiated. Apparently, the JAAF records for this raid are incomplete and the potential losses come from a Japanese POW interrogation - not spitfire claims. Maybe the POW got his dates/actions confused- who knows.You'll have to forgive me but, I'm highly dubious of "potential" losses. Overclaiming by all parties in this theater was extreme. And a damaged plane that lands at an alternative base doesn't qualify as destroyed, for a variety of reasons. For that matter, I'm sure a few more Spitfires were also hit besides the two confirmed shot down.
I don't see any particular reason to assume that the three crashes witnessed were Ki-49s rather than the Ki-48s reported lost...?
Despite its short range, the Vengeance was an excellent dive bomber in both theatres. The RAAF was happy with them and only replaced them because General Kenney wanted them off New Guinea airfields to make room for more fighter bomber aircraft. They were excellent weapons and obtained excellent results against jungle-clad targets. The army boys seemed to appreciate their accuracy.By the way, I notice you have the Vengeance on your sig line. What is your take on the operational use on the Vengeance by the RAAF and RAF?
The Japanese .303's were more powerful, each one was equal to two 20mm Hispano's in regards to effect on target, you can't compare IJN .303's to the Commonwealth models.One other point worth noting, is US heavy bombers. It's abundantly clear from this history, that contrary to popular belief (and what I've read in many books, and been told repeatedly in this and other online venues), you do not actually need multiple 20 or 30mm cannon, rockets, special air to air mortars etc., to shoot down a B-17 or B-24, let alone a B-25.
It's clear that the Ki-43s, even the early -1 models, routinely shot down US heavy bombers with their two machine guns.
This is what I could find going back through the book as far as Hurricane engagements:
Page 22 - Summary of fighting between March and June 1942. 64th Sentai lost 11 x Ki-43 and ten pilots. The author specifically notes here that 10 of the 11 were lost to AVG P-40s and 1 to a Blenheim. Allied losses were also 11 aircraft - 1 x P-40, 6 x Hurricanes, 2 x Hudsons, 1 x Blenheim, and 1 x B-17E.
This disparity in outcomes at this point can probably be attributable to the 'boom and zoom' tactics* which AVG was using right out the gate, but RAF took a while to adapt.
Page 26 - 9 December 1942, Hurricanes from 135 and 136 Sqns intercepted 24 Ki-43-Ib from 8th 50th and 64th Sentai escorting 21 x Ki-48s. The RAF fighters were bounced, and 2 x Hurricanes were shot down. No JAAF losses indicated.
15 December 1942, "action over Chittagong" 50th Sentai claimed 6 x Hurricanes and lost 1 x Ki-43 (no confirmation from Allied records shown here).
16 December 1942 50th Sentai was escorting 20 x Ki-51s and intercepted by Hurricanes from 607 and 615 Sqns. 3 x Hurricanes from 607 and 615 RAF shot down, plus 1 Hudson, for 1 x Ki-43-Ib (pilot captured).
20 December 1942 RAF raid with 12 Hurricanes escorting 14 Blenheims, intercepted by 3 x Ki-43s that scrambled from the base. Lt Nakazaki was hit by 20mm shells but claimed two Hurricanes, whiel Sgt. Anabuki claimed 1 Hurricane and a Blenheim (don't know if these are confirmed).
22 December 1942 50th Sentai claims 2 x Hurricanes for no loss (don't know if confirmed)
24 December 1942 Hurricane IIC attack Magwe. Six Ki-43 scramble to defend. Two Ki-43s were damaged (trailing white smoke) but shot down 2 x Hurricane IIC (Sgt E. Kostromin of 607 Sq and Flg Off C.D. Fergusson are named as shot down). Sgt Anabuki had forgotten to retract the undercarriage of his Ki-43. No Ki-43s were shot down, although one wrecked while landing (pilot survived).
14 January 1943 50th Sentai claimed 2 Hurricanes for no loss (don't know if confirmed)
18 January 1943 16 x Ki-43 from 50th Sentai escort 18 x Ki-21 to Chittagong. 2 Oscars return with engine trouble, the top cover of 2 x Ki-43s are bounced by 8 x Hurricanes from 136 and 3 x Hurricanes from 136 Sqn. Lt. Nakazaki's aircraft was badly damaged by 20mm canon shells. He crashed his plane into an allied ship and died. 50th Sentai claimed 3 but only got 1 Hurricane.
Loss Summary Dec 1942 - January 1943 50th Sentai claimed 40 victories. Actual Allied losses were 5 x Hurricane and 1 x P-40. 3 50th Sentai pilots were lost during this period.
12 February 1943 64th Sentai, now flying Ki-43-II are bounced by Mohawk IVs, CO Maj Masammi Yagi being killed.
13 February 1943 12 x Ki-43 escorting "light bombers" are bounced by 4 Hurricanes from No 261 Sqn. 2 x Ki-43-II were shot down, including 2nd Chutai leader Capt Jiro Seki. One Hurricane shot down (four claimed). On the way back to base they encounter 2 more Hurricanes from 79 Sqn, one Ki-43 engaged them and shot down one, pilot Sgt. R. North crash landing on a river beach.
20 February 1943 11 x Ki-43s escort 3 Ki-48. 3 x Hurricanes from No. 135 Sqn scrambled. 2 Hurricanes were destroyed, Plt Officer C Fox bailing out, Lt. G Booyson apparently killed. The third Hurricane was "badly shot up" but escaped. On 24 February 1943 the new 64th Sentai CO Major Akera shot down and killed by 51 FG P-40s.
28 February 1943 20 fighters from 50th and 64th Sentai both flying Ki-43-II attack a raid of 6 x Blenheims escorted by 7 Hurricanes from 136 Sqn. 2 x Hurricanes shot down (7 claimed), Sgt. P Kennedy and Sgt D Barnett bailing out. Sgt F Wilding belly landed back at Ramu airfield. No JAAF losses reported.
2 March 1943 50th Sentai claims 2 x Hurricanes, 64th Sentai later claims 2 more Hurricanes. I don't see any confirmation of these claims.
5 March 1943 64th Sentai engaged 136, 79 and 697 sqn escorting Blenheims. Claimed six, 1 Hurricane actually shot down for one Ki-43. In a second engagement with 135 Sqn 4 x Ki-43s were shot down for no RAF losses.
14 March 1943 64 Sentai fighter sweep of 15 Ki-43s encounters Blenheims escorted by 135 Sqn Hurricanes near Maungdaw. One Hurricane and one Blenheim shot down (author notes Kuroe fired 200 rounds at a Hurricane and it didn't go down, but his wingman finished it off. No JAAF losses reported here.
15 March 1943 14 x Ki-43 escorting 14 Ki-48 bombing Rathedaung. Had a 'meeting engagement' with a group of 12 Blenheims escorted by 136 and 607 Sqn. 4 x Hurricanes were shot down (Flg Officer F Pickard, Wt Off A Cruyenaeere (both 136 Sqn), and Flg W. Gibbs and Plot Off L. Main reported killed. One more Hurricane force-landed at Maungdaw. One Blenheim also destroyed. No JAAF losses indicated here.
17 March 1943 64th Sentai shot down a No. 79 Sqn Hurricane.
26 March 1943 50th Sentai claimes 3 x Hurricanes. (I did not see any Allied confirmation of this.)
27 March 1943 25 Ki-48s missed a rendezvous with 50th Sentai, and Hurricanes from 79 and 135 Sqn RAF shot down five of them for no loss.
28-30 March 1943 50th Sentai makes 38 claims but only 2 RAF planes are lost (1 x Hurricane and 1 x Mohawk IV)
31 March 1943 "Eight hand picked combat veterans" from 50th Sentai raid Allied airfield at Pataga. After strafing they climb to 19,000 ft and form "beehive" formation. Ten Hurricanes from 135 Sqn scrambled but are bounced. 50th Sentai claimed 8 shot down but actual losses were 3 x Hurricanes and one more "badly shot up".
2-4 April 1943 50th Sentai claims 8 victories (no confirmation here)
9 April 1943 16 x Ki-43-II from 64th Sentai bounced 9 x Hurricane II from 567 Sqn. 2 x Hurricanes shot down Sqn Leader J Bachmann killed.
Losses from 14 March - 11 April 1943. RAF claimed 20 victories and 20 probables. Actual JAAF losses were 9 aircraft - 5 x Ki-48, 3 x Ki-21, and 1 x Ki-36. No Ki-43s were lost in this period, though 23 were damaged. JAAF Ki-43 pilots claimed 416 aircraft. Actual RAF losses were 21 aircraft: 17 x Hurricanes, 1 x Mohawk IV, 1 x Beaufighter, 2 x Blenheims.
The author notes that these wildly exaggerated claims by the JAAF were more aircraft than the RAF actually had in the Theater at that time. The RAF overclaiming was much less, and is quite understandable considering that they damaged quite a few Ki-43s that managed to limp back to base. JAAF also claimed a large number of P-40s in this period but didn't actually get any.
There is more of this, but I think this is enough to show the pattern. The Hurricane usually came out with losses about 3-1 or 2-1 against them. They had a couple of good days but the vast majority of encounters went against them, and this included when the tactical situation was in their favor. I.e. even when the Hurricanes bounced the Ki-43s, they still usually lost. I'm not sure when the RAF adopted the hit and run tactics.
* it's worth noting that this "Boom and Zoom" was a little bit more subtle than the terse description usually goes, since numerous times in the book AVG and then 23rd FG pilots routinely got into long extended dog fights with Ki-43s and still came out on top, or at least survived.
Those Nippon fliers were obviously fearless marksmen, in very 'handy' machines - which enabled such gun-aiming prowess - to hit vital spots.One other point worth noting, is US heavy bombers. It's abundantly clear from this history, that contrary to popular belief (and what I've read in many books, and been told repeatedly in this and other online venues), you do not actually need multiple 20 or 30mm cannon, rockets, special air to air mortars etc., to shoot down a B-17 or B-24, let alone a B-25.
It's clear that the Ki-43s, even the early -1 models, routinely shot down US heavy bombers with their two machine guns.
A key detail that's missing from many of those selected accounts are the respective numbers of airframes involved on both sides...but when they are included, it seems the Hurricanes were usually significantly outnumbered. IJAAF fighter Sentai numbered as many as 50 aircraft and so, size-wise, was more akin to a Wing in RAF parlance. I can't think of many instances in Burma where Hurricanes were operated in Wing strength.
Those Nippon fliers were obviously fearless marksmen, in very 'handy' machines - which enabled such gun-aiming prowess - to hit vital spots.
I don't think that explains it either. There were actually more Hurricane squadrons than Ki-43 squadrons I believe, and one side was just as likely to outnumber the other in a given situation. I could go on transcribing but you can read the history for yourself, in this one or in "Bloody Shambles". It's also the case that other aircraft types - P-40, P-38, Spitfire, P-51B, even Mohawk IVs got into scrapes with the Ki-43s and managed to do fairly well.
What is interesting to me is to ask why things did not go well for the Hurricane units, by and large. It could have be training in part. I'm not sure how long it took for the tactics to change, though I would assume they had done by mid 1943. I suspect it's also some traits of the aircraft - the speed (especially with the Tropical filter), roll rate, dive acceleration. The Hurricanes did not seem to be able to disengage. I think that was a big problem.
Well, the 8th AAF analysis of fighter effectiveness against its bombers didn't rate the Me 109F armament very highly as such,I think part of the reason may be having the heavier guns in the nose. That seems to correlate to more accurate shooting, also with types like the Bf 109F. Probably marksmanship training was part of it. And fearlessness, up to a point. Certainly their outcomes improved a lot after they had practiced special tactics, and specifically focused on head-on attacks. You can see that clearly both in Burma and New Guinea.
You can believe all you want about whether one side was more or less likely to outnumber another.
However, it would be good to tie down actual numbers rather than simply assuming. The simple fact is that the Sentai was a larger formation and the IJAAF typically sent out aircraft in larger groupings compared to the RAF. This was the case during the Malayan Campaign where the Ki-43s were essentially used as offensive counter air assets (the official Japanese term of the time was "aerial destroying action"). The IJAAF deliberately sent out large formations, often separated at different altitudes. Against a relatively small defending force, the results were entirely predictable. Going back to the Hurricane, look at the engagements on 13, 20, and 28 Feb 1943 where numbers for both sides are provided. In all 3 cases, the Hurricanes were significantly outnumbered. Hardly surprising, therefore, if they come off second best.
We must also look at the types of missions being undertaken. Were the other types you mention all used in the same role(s) as the Hurricane? If not, then that could drive differences in combat performance.
As to the tactics employed, the RAF Buffalo squadrons over Singapore were employing diving tactics in January 1942. Thus the use of energy rather than manoeuvre was known by the RAF relatively early on in the campaign. Not sure what the source is for the RAF being slow to adapt its tactics, except the oft-touted early engagements by Spitfires over Darwin.
Well, the 8th AAF analysis of fighter effectiveness against its bombers didn't rate the Me 109F armament very highly as such,
but the 4 cannon in the wings of the FW190 were a threat of a much higher league, in that instance.
Top Western Allies ETO fighter ace (all by Spitfire) J. Johnson in his book 'Wing Leader' quoted a USAAF B-17 skipper as telling him:
'The 109s come in head-on afiring - but those 190s come in - blazing like a neon sign!'
(You'd have to be real fearless, & a super-confident marksman, to go head-to-head 'chicken' with a 4-cannon Hurricane - in a Ki 43).