This Day in the Battle of Britain

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Not sure what you mean. The numbers came from....

Peter G. Cooksley The Battle of Britain Ian Allan 1990

But thats 302 Luftwaffe missng.
 
1 August 1940 Thursday

GERMANY: Hitler's Directive No. 17 for the Conduct of Air and Sea Warfare Against England was signed and issued. The planned invasion of England was given the codename 'SEELOWE' (Sea Lion);

HyperWar: The Battle of Britain--A German Perspective [Addendum/Appendices]

During the first few days of August 1940 the pilots of both the Royal Air Force and the Luftwaffe were taking each day as it came, and one day was not that different as the day previous. Up until now it appeared that Germany had no real plan of action. Göring, Räder, Kesselring and Hitler all had their own ideas regarding the preparation of an invasion of England and likewise the time that it should take place. Not being stretched to any sort of limits the pilots had periods when they had time to themselves, the Luftwaffe content on attacking the British convoys that were constantly plying the Channel route. Bomber Gruppen were quite content on mine laying duties along the eastern and southern coastline of Britain, while usually during the hours of darkness, the odd Heinkel or Junker's penetrated inland to bomb a factory or industrial target.

The outline of the air attack against England was given by Göring as early as 21 July, when Hitler had placed all his confidence in the Reichsmarschall in the destruction of the RAF prior to the invasion at a date yet to be fixed. Admiral Räder, the commander of all German Naval operations had little to do in actual operations during the Battle of Britain, but played an important part in German naval aggression in the North Sea, the Atlantic Ocean and the English Channel. The three Luftflotten commanders, Albert Kesselring (Luftflotten 2), Hugo von Sperrle (Luftflotten 3) and Hans-Jürgen Stumpff (Luftflotten 5) were responsible for their own Air Fleets and areas, and had to take all orders from their superior, the Reichsmarschall Herman Göring. The only person who could make any decision regarding the actual date of the invasion was Adolf Hitler himself.

The day previous, Hitler had informed Göring to have all his Air Fleets ready at twelve hours notice for air attacks on England. This was a sign that plans were now under way for the impending invasion and that Hitler had made a decision. Göring called an urgent meeting with his Luftflotte commanders at The Hague. It is believed that Göring stated at the meeting, that in the recent attacks on Channel convoys the Luftwaffe had failed to draw the British fighters into the air. The RAF was prepared only to send small waves of fighters and replenish them with new waves when the others returned to refuel and re-arm. He went on to say that his intelligence sources had informed him that Britain had only 500 fighters available to defend their island in the south, and that the air offensive against England would be nothing but a simple operation. It was true that AVM Park was only sending in small numbers of aircraft to defend the convoys, but in stating that Fighter Command only had 500 fighters to defend themselves with was rather an under estimation. They had not taken into account that Dowding could call on nearly twice that many in total from his other groups.

The German Navy was not satisfied with the mission assigned to the Luftwaffe by Directive No. 17 and the Naval Operations Staff war diary reflected that. . . but, also recognized that. . .
". . .it will be necessary to wait until the first phase of the air operation is over."
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Certain naval records also indicate that Hitler had agreed, during a July conference, that if the Luftwaffe had failed to seriously damage the Royal Air Force within the first eight days that the operation would be postponed until May 1941.

At the conference with his pilots and Luftwaffe officials, Reichsmarschall Göring was told by a pilot about how well built and maneuverable the British Spitfires were. The Reichsmarschall, responding to the complaints and in front of Generalluftzügmeister Ernst Udet, commented;
"If that is so I would have to send my Luftzügmeister before the firing squad!"
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Udet did not respond to the slight. Göring continued; The lead up to the planned invasion began.

UNITED KINGDOM: The morning period was exceptionally quiet, but thick overnight mist in low lying regions aborted most of the minelaying that the Luftwaffe usually carried out during the hours of darkness. But a Spitfire from one of the Photographic Reconnaissance Units, on patrol over the north of France noticed heavy aircraft concentration at Cherbourg. He circled round, capturing the airfield on film and headed back to base. Fighter Command was notified at once of the build up, and they decided that the German held airfield should be bombed before they were committed in any offence against Britain.

After the low cloud and mists of the morning disappeared, the Luftwaffe sent out bombers to attack the British convoys "Agent" and "Arena" in the Channel just off of the Yorkshire coast. RAF No. 607 Sqd (Hurricanes) and RAF No. 616 Sqd (Spitfires) were scrambled to intercept the bombers. Both squadrons took a little time in locating the German bombers but eventually sighted a Ju 88 and a Dornier Do 17 out to sea just below the cloud base. The RAF fighters were observed and the German bombers gained height and disappeared into the protection of the cloud after a short exchange of gunfire from both sides. One Spitfire of RAF No. 616 Sqd was damaged by gunfire from the Ju 88 but landed safely at base. About this time a Ju 88 of 9./KG 4 crashed into the North Sea while on operational duties, but it was unclear if it was a result of the action between the two RAF squadrons.

At 1430 hours several raids of three plus aircraft flew towards Dungeness. The Hurricanes of RAF No. 145 Sqd were scrambled to intercept and about eight miles off the coast from Hastings the Hurricanes engaged a Henschel Hs 126 shooting it down into the sea. Other Hurricanes engaged a Ju 88, and one of the Hurricanes that attacked the Hs 126 was seen to crash into the Channel, Sub/Lt I.H.Kestin being listed as missing. The Junkers tried to make good his escape, but became damaged in doing so. It managed to land at its base, but Feldwebel Kohl on board was seriously injured and was to die two weeks later of his injuries.

By 1530 hours a number of combat actions were taking place up and down the Essex coast. Thirty He 111 bombers approached the Norfolk coast and for some reason no RAF fighters were sent to intercept them. They continued on towards the city of Norwich where they attacked the Norwich Railway Station inflicting minor damage, but doing far greater damage at the Boulton-Paul Aircraft Works on the outskirts of the city. A railway pedestal crane was destroyed and steel erectors belonging to Messrs Dawney and Co. were damaged. Also receiving direct bomb hits were a timber yard, and a factory. A total of six people were killed and nearly sixty injured in this bombing raid. Two Dorniers were intercepted off the east coast near Harwich. One was shot down while the other headed home trailing thick smoke. Two Spitfires got entangled in a small skirmish over the Channel just off the Sussex coast near Worthing.
 
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(1 August 1940 continued....)

It was about this time that British Bomber Command were ready with a response to the photos taken that morning. The task to bomb the airfield near Cherbourg was given to RAF No. 56 Sqd (Coastal Command) based at Thorney Island using Blenheim IV bombers, and these would be escorted by RAF No. 236 Sqd (Long range Blenheim fighters). Ground crews loaded up the thirteen Blenheim bombers with the required bomb loads while ten Blenheim fighters were prepared and placed at readiness. The Blenheims of RAF No.236 Sqd were now taking off. The Blenheim bombers of RAF No.56 Sqd had taken off a little earlier and the Blenheim fighters were to rendezvous with them just prior to the French coast and strafe the Cherbourg aerodrome after the bombs were dropped by the bombers. The forecast given to the crews was that conditions would be fine with good visibility. The Blenheim fighter escort was to take off in three waves, with five minutes separating each wave and the last wave of four was to stay clear of the target area and stay off the French coast covering the withdrawal of the others. But all was not to go according to plan. The forecasters had got it all wrong as heavy low cloud covered the entire French coast around Cherbourg. The leading three Blenheims led by F/Lt R.M. Power missed the Cherbourg Peninsular completely and overtook the Blenheims of RAF No.56 Sqd and flew deeper into German-held territory before deciding to return to base.

A break in the cloud appeared just as the Blenheims of RAF No.56 Sqd neared the coast. They were on course and the aerodrome on the peninsula could be seen and they commenced their bombing run. Not far behind were the second wave of three Blenheim fighters led by S/L P.E. Drew. RAF No. 56 Sqd managed to drop their bombs successfully causing considerable damage amidst heavy flak and machine gun fire from aerodrome gun emplacements. S/L Drew led with Australian P/O B.M. McDonough and Sgt R.C. Smith at about 50-70 feet strafing the airfield and gun batteries. Many of the batteries were hit, fires started to follow explosions as hangars and buildings were hit, aircraft in the open were either destroyed or damaged. For the RAF the mission seemed to be a success. But it was short lived.

Some of the Blenheim bombers of RAF No. 56 Sqd were hit as they pulled out of their bombing run. Sgt Smith's aircraft received a number of hits as his low level strafing run sustained further damage to the aerodrome. He pulled out on completion, turned and headed back across the Channel losing contact with the others. One of the Blenheims of RAF No. 56 Sqd failed to return. It was piloted by the squadron commanding officer Wing Commander Weld-Smith. Two Blenheims of RAF No.236 Sqd also failed to return. A number of Bf 109's of III./JG 27 and JG 54 got into the air and several claims were made. Confirmed Blenheim kills were awarded to Ofw. Michael Hauer of 4./JG 54, Oblt. Franz Eckerle of 6./JG 54, Oblt. Walter Adolph of 8./JG 27, Ofw. Hans Richter of 8./JG 27 and the first victory of the war for Oblt. Erwin Düllberg of 8./JG 27.

S/Lt I.H.Kestin of RAF No 145 Sqn was shot down and killed at 15:00hrs. He was on patrol in his Hurricane P3155 South of Hastings and was hit by return fire from a Heinkel Hs 126.

By night, mine laying continued in north east Scotland and near Scapa Flow and also in the Thames Estuary. The first of an unusual tactic by the Luftwaffe was carried out when four He 111s of II./KG 55 targeted the Bristol and Southampton areas for dropping of fourteen packets of leaflets carrying Hitler's "Last Appeal to Reason" speech from 19 July. Bad navigation and poor visibility caused the bombers instead to drop the leaflets over South Wales and Somerset falling in open pasturelands amongst grazing cattle and sheep. Two He 111s of II./KG 55 targeted the Parnall Aircraft Plant at Yale for leaflet dropping but could not locate their target. Instead the two twin-engined Heinkels dropped bombs on searchlights near Bristol.

At 0015 hours, RAF No 29 Squadron night-fighters claimed an enemy bomber. But the shot-down aircraft proved to be a Fairey Battle of No 1 Group, highlighting the difficulties of IFF at night.

The Luftwaffe lost five aircraft over England while the RAF lost one Hurricane and two Blenheims with the crews killed.

WESTERN FRONT: Along the Channel coast Fahnenjunker Gerhard Barkhorn was transferred from 3./JG 2 to 6./JG 52 and was promoted to Lieutenant and Lt. Günther Rall, Staffelkapitän of 8./JG 52, was promoted to Oberleutnant. 6./JG 52 at that time was stationed at the channel. Major Alexander von Winterfeldt was promoted to Gruppenkommandeur of III./JG 52 in place of Hptm. Von Houwald who was killed a week earlier. Major von Winterfeldt was a pilot during the First World War. His place as Staffelkapitän of 8./JG 2 was taken by Oblt. Karl-Heinz Metz. Major Adolf Galland was awarded the Ritterkreuz, the first of many awards. Hptm Erwin Röder replaced Hptm Bernd von Brauchitsch as Gruppenkommandeur of IV.(Stuka)/LG 1.

Movements included ObLt. Karl Vieck's,Stab./JG 3 moving from Le Mans to Colembert joining Hptm Günther Lützow's I./JG 3 who moved from Grandvilliers.

The RAF bombed the airfield at Leeuwarden, Holland at night and damaged three aircraft from II./JG 27.
 
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2 August 1940 Friday

UNITED KINGDOM: A generally quiet day, mostly because of very low cloud and drizzle over much of the southern part of the country but there were a few shipping convoys in the Channel and along the east coast that were attacked. The Luftwaffe made scattered bombing attacks, but no serious damage was recorded. One attack was made on an area near to the Forth Bridge in Scotland. while Halton and Christchurch in Hampshire suffered small bombing raids. Mine laying and reconnaissance along the east coast continued and a number of German bombers failed to return from their missions, while most of the RAF casualties were non combat related. A Spitfire was destroyed as the pilot crashed on take off at Hornchurch, a Hurricane of RAF No. 504 squadron Castletown came in too fast and it flipped over on landing. Then a Blenheim from RAF No. 219 Squadron based at Catterick airfield, Yorkshire, overshot the runway at Leeming during practice landings without flaps at 15.15. The undercarriage was deliberately raised to avoid running into the Great North Road. PO W.G.M. Lambie and Sgt R. Bell were unhurt, the aircraft was damaged but repairable. Another Spitfire crashed on take off on night patrol from Rochford Airfield and exploded in flames, killing S/L H.C.Sawyer.

Late morning brought a small raid of He 111s over the Thames Estuary and Essex which was attacked by Spitfires of RAF No. 19 Squadron, scrambled from Duxford. Off Haisborough the section of Spitfires armed with cannon attacked, but lost the German aircraft in cloud. This raid ineffectually bombed shipping off Yarmouth. RAF No. 19 Squadron began using the cannon-armed Spitfire Mk 1b, but the restricted space for the cannon mounts made them extremely unreliable in the first versions. Only 30 were produced, intended as a solution to the increasing amount of armour plate fitted to Luftwaffe aircraft.

The most interesting and unusual event of the day was when a formation of German bombers attacked the steamship SS 'Highlander', six miles south of Stonehaven. In trying to defend herself, the 'Highlander' managed to hit one of the Heinkel's and it crashed into the sea. Earlier bombs had missed the ship and by all accounts the bombers started to come in low and began to strafe the ship. One of them, a Heinkel He 115 came in, just above the waterline and with a banking turn one of the wings almost touched the white capped waves of the sea. The gunners on the 'Highlander' tried desperately to fire at the sweeping aircraft, when it tried to pull up and one of its wings hit one of the lifeboat davits in the deck. It was unclear as to whether the 'Highlander' had hit the bomber with gunfire, but as it hit the davits, it swung round crashing onto the deck of the ship. According to German records, two He 115 bombers failed to return to their base, and all crew were reported as missing. English records do not state whether the crew were killed or were taken prisoner. The 'Highlander', obviously only suffering minor damage sailed into the harbour at Leith Scotland delivering the wrecked Heinkel to the authorities.

By night activity was not heavy, although attacks were widespread. The usual visits were paid to South Wales, coming in over the Weymouth area, and some of these raids penetrated up as far as Sealand, Liverpool and Lancashire. One continued across to Hartlepool, turned back and flew home via Liverpool, Wales and the south coast to Cherbourg. Several raids crossed in over East Anglia, (a searchlight post north of Bury St Edmunds was reportedly machine-gunned) and penetrated to the Midlands. Bombs were reported at Ternhill but the nearest fell four miles away from the aerodrome.

A raid which crossed in near Beachy Head came north to North Weald and circled the London Artillery Zone. This was later joined by a further raid which came in near North Foreland, up the Estuary and also circled in the London Artillery Zone. Swansea was bombed at 2330 hours when house property and motor vehicles sustained considerable damage. There were five casualties. Ju 88s of II./KG 51 dropped bombs on the Bristol Aeroplane Company at Filton and on searchlights near the city of Bristol. An East coast convoy was attacked by German aircraft and a trawler was sunk.

Minelaying was in the Thames Estuary, off East Anglia, Tees to St Abb's Head, Aberdeen and North East coasts.

The only claims for the Luftwaffe during the day were a Blenheim shot down near Le Havre by Oblt. Paul Temme of Stab I./JG 2 at 1100 hours and two Blenheims destroyed by Uffz. Hans Schätzel of 4./JG 54 and Fw. Fritz Oeltjen of 7./JG 54 over the Zuidersee, Holland about an hour later.

On this day the now famous Polish No. 303 Squadron, was formed at Northolt. Two of its most outstanding pilots were the Flight Commander, a Canadian named John Kent and a Czech pilot, Sgt. Josef Frantisek who achieved the highest score during the Battle of Britain. Sir Hugh Dowding strongly opposed forming Polish fighter squadrons - for which the Polish government in exile pressed very hard - but in view of the rapidly deteriorating military situation during the Battle of France, with Britain's very survival depending on the few fighter pilots it could muster, an agreement was finally reached. John Kent later remarked,
"All I knew about the Polish Air Force was that it had resisted the Luftwaffe for about three days."
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While it wasn't exactly the truth, it was generally thought that after two lost campaigns (Polish and French) the pilots' morale must have been low, and their skills remained largely an unknown. But the ever increasing casualties and insufficient supply of new pilots finally forced the RAF to accept into service foreigners, of whose Poles were the largest group.

Squadron Leader Henry Cecil 'Sam' Sawyer of RAF No. 65 Sqn was killed on taking off just before midnight for night patrol from Hornchurch, He was not very experienced at night flying and was probably blinded by the glare from the exhaust and climbed too steeply. He stalled and crashed his Spitfire R6799, which was burned out. He was only 25 and had been with the squadron for just a matter of weeks


R.A.F. Losses: 4 aircraft damaged or destroyed (through accidents) and 2 pilots killed.

Luftwaffe Losses: 14 aircraft damaged or destroyed with 19 pilots aircrew killed or missing.

 
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3 August 1940 Saturday

UNITED KINGDOM: The Luftwaffe General Staff issued the plan for the destruction of the RAF, starting the campaign for the Battle of Britain. The plan for Adlerangrif or 'Eagle Attack' consisted of three phases:

Phase One: First 5 days: Attacks made in a semicircle starting in the west and proceeding south and then east, within a 90- to 60-mile radius of London.

Phase Two: Next 3 days: Radius from London reduced to between 60 and 30 miles.

Phase Three: Final 5 days: Attacks concentrated within a 30-mile radius centered on London.

The major Luftwaffe forces committed to Adlerangrif were Luftflotte 2, under Kesselring; Luftflotte 3, under Sperrle; and Luftflotte 5 (in Norway), under Stumpff. The spearhead would be Luftflotten 2 and 3, operating from locations in France, Belgium and Holland, supported by Luftflotte 5, operating from locations in Norway. The Luftwaffe simply drew a line through the center of England dividing the majority of the airspace between Luftflotten 2 and 3

There was widespread fog over most of Southern and Eastern England and in the Midlands during the morning. Once this cleared it gave way to heavy low cloud which would be down to 3,500 ft in places with restricted visibility. German activity was again confined to reconnaissances of shipping off the south and south east coast, and only a few raids approached near coasts; of these only two crossed inland. All recorded incidents took place in the north of England and in Scotland. Four raids approached the coast between Swanage and Land's End in the morning and one of these crossed the coast at St Alban's Head. It flew to Bristol and Cardiff by the usual route and returned on the same track. This aircraft was reported to have bombed a trawler which claimed to have shot it down off St Alban's Head. Bradford, Liverpool. The Firth of Forth near Edinburgh and Crewe were bombed and suffered slight damage. Because of the weather only a few enemy aircraft were detected and these were mostly over the Channel. A few raids took place over Falmouth and Swansea but generally because of the weather it was a quiet day for both sides. RAF Interceptions were attempted but none were successful. One nuisance sortie included a Ju 88 which flew so low by Wembury Cliff searchlight site that gunners fired down upon it. Low cloud and poor visibility was prevalent up to midday.

RAF fighters made two successful interceptions, shooting down a He111 off Montrose and a Bf110 off Southwold. Attacks were reported on convoys off Orfordness, Clacton and Harwich. RAF No. 85 Sqn shot down one Bf110, 10 miles east of Southwold at 1532 hrs. Five raids were plotted during the course of the day between Flamborough Head and the Orkneys, one of which was reported to be a meteorological flight. Another of these raids was identified as a He111 and was shot down by RAF No. 603 Sqn off Montrose at 1212 hrs.

Although German raids were again widespread at night there was not an exceptional number of Luftwaffe aircraft involved. At 2135 hours a raid came in via Southend to North Weald, and a split off this raid turned towards Chelmsford. More bombs fell on the Bristol Aeroplane Company at Filton when two He 111s of I./ KG 55 raided the factory at 2216 hours. At 2245 hours the usual activity developed along the East Anglian coast and some raids crossed inland. Similarly the usual raids crossed in over Weymouth area and proceeded to South Wales. As on the previous night some of theses passed on to Crewe, Liverpool, Manchester and Bradford areas. At about 0100 hours a further raid was on the same course to Crewe and Liverpool. It then turned east to Leeds and flew over Digby, North Weald and out over Beachy Head. Heavy fog was reported between the Thames and Duxford, which made interception by the RAF difficult. Further dropping of leaflets of Hitler's recent speech were reported from Epping, Tonbridge and Waltham Cross (Essex).

Fighter Command strength was 708 aircraft serviceable with 1,434 pilots. British defenses also included some 1,200 heavy and 650 light anti-aircraft pieces. And, although the Germans considered these insufficient for the defensive task, anti-aircraft fire would account for about 12 percent of the German losses in the coming battles.

Losses: Luftwaffe 4 : Fighter Command 0.


WESTERN FRONT: The personnel of I./JG 52 moved from Bönninghardt led by Hptm. Siegfried von Eschwege to new fields at Cocquelles. ObLt Karl Vieck's Stab./JG 3 transferred to Colembert, joining I./JG 3 who arrived the day before.
 
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4 August 1940 Sunday

UNITED KINGDOM: Even though the weather was fine early and the cloud was higher with sunny breaks, there were no recorded incidents. It was a very quiet day for both sides.

A number of German reconnaissances were made over the sea, mainly along the south coast and in the Bristol Channel area. Several raids approached the Isle of Wight during the day, of which four flew towards the convoy at anchor at the entrance to Spithead. These turned back when RAF fighter patrols were dispatched. Two raids crossed the coast; one near Poole passed over Southampton and out to sea again over Portsmouth; the other near Bournemouth, passing Middle Wallop and Upavon, re-crossed the coast near Poole, fading in the Baie de la Seine. One raid was plotted 50 miles east of Kinnaird's Head, approached to within 15 miles of the of the coast, and then turned back. Several of the raids approaching the south coast were probably concerned with a convoy which was anchored in St Helen's Roads, Isle of Wight, owing to fog.

At approximately 1100 hrs a convoy was attacked off Manston by 1 Dornier escorted by 10 Bf109s but in consequence of timely action by two RAF fighter squadrons, the German aircraft were driven off. They suffered losses of 1 Bf109 confirmed and 4 Bf109s probable. At 1325 hrs a large force of about 120 enemy aircraft collected behind Calais and approached a convoy between Dover and Dungeness. Fighter interception by 5 squadrons resulted in 6 Bf110s, 1 Bf109, 1 Do17 and 1 Do215 being confirmed as having been shot down, and 2 Bf110s, 5 Bf109s and 4 Do215s as probable casualties.

At night widespread fog was covering most of southern England. At about 2300 hours two raids crossed the coast near Immingham; Hull and Grimsby. At the same time two raids crossed over Harwich, which went up through the Midlands as far as Derby, returned near London, and passed out over the Kent coast. At 0014 hours the military camp at Kennett (Cambridgeshire) was bombed which resulted in one soldier being killed and twelve being injured. Further leaflets of Hitler's speech were dropped during the early morning at Langstone, Raglan, Glais (near Swansea), Helmsley, Wass (Yorkshire), Elan Valley (South Wales), Clydach (Glamorgan), Rogerstone and Christchurch (near Newport, Monmouthshire). A He 111 from 7 / KG 55 went missing on a night mission to Manchester. It was believed the bomber crashed into the Channel.

Further leaflets of Hitler's speech were dropped during the early morning of the 4th August at Langstone, Raglan, Glais (near Swansea), Helmsley, Wass (Yorkshire), Elan Valley (South Wales), Clydach (Glamorgan), Rogerstone and Christchurch (near Newport, Monmouthshire).

Middle Wallop Sector came under the control of No 10 group at 1300 hours. RAF No 604 Squadron (Blenheims), No 238 Squadron (Hurricanes), No 609 squadron (Spitfires) and No 152 Squadron (Spitfires) were therefore now operating under No 10 Group control.

Sgt J.P.Walsh of RAF No. 616 Squadron was killed as he spun in his Spitfire N3271 in to the ground from 5,000ft in a practice dogfight near Kirton in Lindsey. The exact cause of the crash is unknown, Walsh was 20 years old and is buried in Harrow Cemetery, Middlesex. The aircraft was a write-off.

Losses: Luftwaffe 10: Fighter Command 1.
 
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5 August 1940 Monday

UNITED KINGDOM: With a return to better flying weather so does the Luftwaffe increase its flights to England.

Trawlers south of Selsey Bill were attacked early in the morning and small formations approached Beachy Head and the Isle of Wight, but turned away on the sighting of RAF fighters. At 0800 hours the Luftwaffe sent a formation of Ju 88's after a convoy during its passage between Hastings and the North Foreland. Four RAF squadrons were sent to intercept. One section from RAF No. 65 Sqn (Hornchurch) were four miles from Calais when they came across five Bf 109s from I./JG 54 returning from the convoy raid. Diving into the schwarm, two Bf 109s returned to France, damaged while Oblt. Reinhard Seiler of 1./JG 54 claimed a Spitfire from RAF No. 65 Sqd.

Off the East Coast four enemy reconnaissances for shipping were reported during the morning and three calls for help were received from convoys. Unfavorable weather prevented interceptions. Over the Kent coastline, six Spitfires from RAF No 64 Squadron battled more Messerschmitts from JG 54, resulting in one Spitfire from RAF No. 64 Squadron being destroyed. Sgt. L.R.Isaac of 64 Sqn was shot down and killed in his Spitfire L1029 by a Bf 109 off Folkstone at 08:50hrs. One Bf 109 was shot down and another made it back to France damaged.

German reconnaissances in the Channel extended to North-West of Cornwall in the afternoon. Around 1400 hours RAF No. 41 Sqdrn (Spitfires) and RAF No. 151 Sqdrn (Hurricanes) went after 30 ro 40 Luftwaffe aircraft seeking Channel shipping - Ju 88s escorted by Bf 109s from JG 51. Despite a partial interception because of the weather, RAF No. 151 Sqdrn. claimed another 109. This second battle over Dover with Bf 109s from JG 51 and RAF fighters increased several Experten victories. Those pilots given credit for British kills were Gefr. Paul Limpert who destroyed a Spitfire for his first victory, Lt. Hermann Staiger downed a Spitfire for his fifth kill and Hptm. Walter Oesau whose victory total increased to thirteen. All three pilots were from 7./JG 51. But the Geschwader lost a pilot when Karl Schmid was killed in action. He had ten victories in the air over the Allies.

Several raids of three plus aircraft flew towards Dungeness; one of these raids was intercepted at 1450 hrs by RAF No. 145 Sqn and one Hs126 and one Ju88 (both unconfirmed) were shot down, the RAF lost one Hurricane.

In the afternoon following several reconnaissances, a convoy was attacked off Yarmouth and RAF fighters contacted the Luftwaffe successfully. RAF No 242 Sqn shot down one Ju88 (confirmed) and one He111 (unconfirmed). RAF No 72 Squadron (Spitfires) intercepted one He 111 off Blyth (Northumberland) and chased it out to sea.

At 1512 hrs bombs were dropped on Norwich by one aircraft. Some damage was done in a railway goods yard and two timber yards were set on fire. The usual tracks were plotted off the coast between Cherbourg and Boulogne. Other bombs are reported at or near Brighton, Leighton Buzzard, Milford haven, Isle of Grain and Middlesborough. At 0010hrs in Northumberland. Eleven IBs exploded at Fisher Lane Road End (just off the old A.1 near the turn off to Cramlington). One house on fire, extinguished by a fire brigade unit from Gosforth UDC. Several HEs in a field at Seven Mile House Farm (One UXB).

Losses: Luftwaffe, 6; RAF 2.

WESTERN FRONT: At the airfield in Pihen, France, Hptm. Douglas Pitcairn, Staffelkapitän of 1./JG 51 collides with his wingman, Ofw. Erwin Fleig during takeoff. Hptm. Pitcairn is seriously injured and his wartime flying days done. Oblt. Hermann-Friedrich Jöppien takes his place as Staffelkapitän.

During the past few months Bomber Command had initiated a campaign of bombing various targets in occupied France with little return. But a Portuguese writes from Lisbon:
 
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6 August 1940 Tuesday

GERMANY: At Karinhall, outside Berlin, Reichsmarschall Göring called a meeting with his Luftflotte commanders to discuss how to implement Hitler's Directive 17. In attendance was the Inspector General, Generalfeldmarschall Erhard Milch, the commander of Luftflotte 5, Generaloberst Hans-Jürgen Stumpff, Luftflotte 2's Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring and Generalfeldmarschall Hugo Sperrle of Luftflotte 3. Generalfeldmarschall Sperrle suggested that since England was supplied by sea then the Luftwaffe should target the ports of the British Isles. Generalfeldmarschall Kesselring pressed his contention that one large raid on a central target, such as London was the way to bring England to the peace table. But Göring insisted that the airfields and personnel of the Royal Air Force should be destroyed before all other considerations. But, as Theo Osterkamp (a Fliegerkorps chief of staff during the battle and later a fighter commander) points out, As a prelude to the German invasion, the vital elimination of the RAF and its associated aircraft industry was scheduled to begin early in August, and the day for it's launching was given the code name of Adler Tag , or Eagle Day. The plan required that the fighter defenses be beaten down, while the total destruction of RAF Fighter Command should be achieved within four weeks, after which the invasion itself could begin. Meanwhile, as part of the same plan, a day and night bombing offensive was to be directed against the British aircraft industry and to assist in this the He 111's engaged in minelaying were temporarily switched to conventional bombing.

The major Luftwaffe forces committed to Alderangriff were Luftflotte 2, under Kesselring; Luftflotte 3, under Sperrle; and Luftflotte 5 (in Norway), under Stumpff. The spearhead would be Luftflotten 2 and 3, operating from locations in France, Belgium and Holland, supported by Luftflotte 5, operating from locations in Norway. 484 aircraft were available to the bomber formations of Luftflotte 3, comprising the Ju 88's of KG 51, KG 54, LG 1 and KGr 806 in addition to the He 111's of KG 27, KG 55 and KGr 100. This force was further bolstered by the arrival of the thirty-three Dornier Do 17's of KGr 606.

This having been decided on (or rather, ordered by Göring), the meeting ended and the commanders went to prepare their air fleets. Thus, over the objections of his field commanders, Göring was slowly beginning to take more and more direct control of the operations. Since no date had been set for beginning Alderangriff, the Luftwaffe simply continued with the Kanalkampf operations already in progress.

UNITED KINGDOM: Still reasonably quiet. This day was almost a repeat performance of the previous day. With the weather generally cloudy with fairly strong winds, there was little activity from the Luftwaffe. A number of individual raids were plotted along the South and East Coasts. Misty weather and cloud conditions made interceptions difficult. One enemy aircraft crossed the South Coast near Portland and flew to South Wales where it bombed the RAF station at Llandow. There was a ground fog in places and some haze; conditions which accounted for the failure to intercept. Damage caused to the station was slight and there were no casualties.

There were some attacks against shipping but until 1630 hours only three tracks were plotted, of which one approached to within 5 miles of Dover. At 1630 hours two raids amalgamated and flew towards Clacton and over a convoy which was well out of its area 10 miles north of Herne Bay. The convoy was bombed but seems not to have been damaged. A fighter squadron did not intercept. Between 1827 and 1853 hours, seven raids concentrated in the Calais - Boulogne area and flew various courses in the Straits of Dover. Four squadrons were detailed but did not make contact. In the Humber, a convoy was reported on by enemy aircraft, but no attack developed. Two sections of RAF fighters failed to contact. In a raid off Haisborough a section of Spitfires armed with cannon attacked, but lost the enemy aircraft in cloud. This raid ineffectually bombed shipping off Yarmouth.

Off East Anglia three RAF No.85 Sqn. Hurricanes led by Sgt. Geoffrey Allard shot down a Do 17 of III./KG 3. The Dornier was spotting a convoy east of Lowestoft. RAF No 72 Squadron (Spitfires) intercepted one He 111 off Blyth (Northumberland) and chased it out to sea.

The Dornier was the only casualty of the day for both sides.

P/O P.W.Horton a New Zealander of RAF No. 234 Sqn crashed on landing after a night patrol at St Eval flying Spitfire P9366. He survived the crash. A Spitfire from RAF No. 72 Sqn based at Acklington airfield in Northumberland, crash-landed following an uneventful patrol at 1240hrs. The pilot, Sgt R.C.J. Staples was unhurt but the aircraft was a write-off.

A Blenheim from RAF No. 219 Sqn based at Catterick airfield in Yorkshire, collided with HT cables and crashed into a river during a searchlight co-operation flight, Pilot Officer J.C. Carriere and Sgt C. Beveridge, both superficially injured, the aircraft was a write-off.

The following three Spitfires from RAF No 616 Sqn based, at Leconfield airfield near Beverley in Yorkshire, returned to base, damaged by return fire from the same Junkers Ju 88, engaged twenty miles NE of Flamborough Head at 1700 hrs. One was piloted by S/ L M. Robinson, the second by Sgt M. Ridley and the third by F/O R.O. Hellyer. The pilots were unhurt and the aircraft were repairable.

The first contingent of airmen from Southern Rhodesia arrived in Britain today to add its strength to the increasingly international air force which is waging war on Germany. The men join not only British and Polish pilots but also airmen from Canada, Australia and New Zealand - not to mention volunteers from Ireland and the USA. Throughout the Empire, towns, islands, colonies and even tribes are donating money for individual planes to the mother country. Soon more airmen will arrive from the colonies to pilot the planes that their fellow countrymen have donated. Already Canada is training hundreds of fighter pilots.

WESTERN FRONT: The Kanalfront Geschwaders were moved and transferred to numerous forward airfields in France. The I and II Gruppen of JG 52 moved after refitting from Nordholz in Germany to Peupelinge airfield on the Pas de Calais. The personnel of Hptm. Hubertus von Bonin's I./JG 54 transferred their Bf 109s from Eindhoven to a new airbase at Guines-en-Calaisis. A small detachment of the Gruppe moved to an airfield at Amsterdam. Hptm. Winterer's II./JG 54 moved their Bf 109Es from the field at Harlinghem to Campagne-les-Guines. Hptm. Fritz Ultsch's III./JG 54 joined the II Gruppe at Campagne-les-Guines, flying their Messerschmitts from Soesterberg in Holland. When they arrive at the airfield outside Calais they find that the sheep pasture being used as an airfield is so rutted and grooved that take-offs and landings were sometimes more dangerous than the missions they fly.

Returning from an operational mission, a fighter from JG 3 was damaged upon landing.

Hptm. Heinz Cramer was appointed Gruppenkommandeur of II./LG 1, taking the place of Major Kurt Dobratz. The unit used twin-engined Ju 88 bombers flying from the airfield at Orleans-Bricy. The Stuka unit of LG 1, IV(Stuka)./LG 1 received a new Gruppenkommandeur when Hptm. Erwin Röder took the place of Hptm. Bernd von Brauchitsch. Hptm. Röder's unit uses the Ju 87 Stuka for operations, flying from the Tramecourt airfield.
 
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7 August 1940 Wednesday

UNITED KINGDOM: There was very little Luftwaffe activity during the day. A few raids reconnoitered convoys and one convoy was bombed. One raid approached to within 30 miles of Aberdeen but fighters were unable to intercept. At 0635 hours, Hurricanes of RAF No 46 Squadron saw bombs bursting around a convoy off Cromer but interception by fighters from Coltishall was frustrated by thick cloud from 5,000 to 10,000 feet. In the evening, a raid of 9+ aircraft approached the Isle of Wight but turned south before a squadron from Tangmere and a flight from Middle Wallop which were waiting to intercept, could make contact.

Attacks on Dover harbour, and the sinking of two destroyers based there, had forced the Navy to rebase their remaining ships from Dover to Portsmouth before the end of July, and to temporarily halt convoy traffic. However, the Admiralty decided the convoys of colliers must continue - to stop them would be admitting they had lost control of the Channel. A group of merchant captains gathered for a briefing on 7 August were told this bluntly. German radio was claiming the Luftwaffe had closed the Channel to British shipping, and the Admiralty intended to prove this false.
"We don't give a damn for your coal, we'd send you through empty if we had to. . . It's a matter of prestige"
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. . . the merchantmen were told.

And so, on the evening of 7 August, a convoy of twenty merchant ships and nine escorts, code-named 'CW9' by the Navy but known as "Peewit" to the RAF, left the Thames. It was planned that this convoy would pass through the Dover Straits in darkness, and at first light it would pick up its fighter escort off the south coast. Unfortunately, the British were as ignorant of German radar as the Germans were of the British. The Freya radar set at Wissant, which unlike its British counter-parts was used for detecting shipping rather than aircraft, picked up the convoy in plenty of time. "Peewit" edged past Dover, hugging the shore, slowly heading westwards as daylight faded. Under the watchful eyes of the Germans, the large convoy had been seen from Cap Gris Nez and warning messages flashed to the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe. In the pre-dawn darkness, a flotilla of E-boats attacked like a pack of wolves into a flock of sheep. The German boats scattered the convoy and mayhem ensued until the E-Boats called off the attack in the gathering light. In the confusion two other ships collided, sinking one, and as dawn broke the convoy was no longer an orderly group but was scattered over several miles. The rest would be left to the Luftwaffe.

There were widespread raids from the Thames to Aberdeen, from Poole to Cornwall and the North to Liverpool. There was a marked increase in night raids, with scattered nuisance missions up entire East Coast, and in the South West and over Merseyside.

The order to attack British airfields was given by Generalfeldmarchall Albert Kesselring on this day.

P/O R.A.D.Smith of RAF No 616 Squadron was killed while night flying at Leconfield in his Spitfire I.

Losses: Luftwaffe, 6. RAF 1.

WESTERN FRONT: At St. Omer airfield, the Staffelkapitän of 3./Epr.Gr 210 and a proponent of fighter-bomber tactics, Hptm. Valesi, crashed in his Bf 109E and was killed.

Major Werner 'Vati' Mölders, Kommodore of JG 51, returned from the injuries he suffered on 28 July, 1940. A pilot from JG 51 came to Major Mölders and asked the commander for leave so the pilot could marry. Major Mölders responded,
"Why marry now when there is only England left? Marry later to celebrate the victory."
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The leave was denied.

At their airbase outside Normandy, II./JG 27 Gruppenkommandeur Hptm. Werner Andres was given the word that his unit was to stand down for twenty-four hours. This came as welcome news for Hptm. Andres and his pilots who did not necessarily care for the cramped accommodations at the airfield.

Bomber Command attacked the Haamstede base of JG 54, destroying 2 Bf 109s and damaging 5 others on the ground.
 
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8 August 1940 Thursday

THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN: PHASE TWO
UNITED KINGDOM: During the opening phase of the Battle of Britain the Luftwaffe conducted what they called Kanalkampf - attacks on shipping in the English Channel. The forces committed by the Germans were nowhere near their full potential, as they were still building up to full strength after the wear, tear and attrition of the Battle of France. Only when their bases were fully prepared and their units back up to strength would the assault on England itself begin. With the focus now on the destruction of the RAF, the Luftwaffe tried to lure the RAF up to battle with its fighters. For their part, Fighter Command refused to be drawn into what would have been a battle of attrition over the Channel, and likewise husbanded their available forces for the inevitable onslaught that was to come. The Admiralty were made fully aware that their convoys could not expect anything but token protection from Fighter Command, but still they continued to demand more and more cover from the RAF.

The 25 ships of the convoy CW9 (code-named 'Peewit'), was finally observed by the Germans. However, the convoy's scattering worked in its favor, as it made it difficult for the Luftwaffe to locate them all in order to plan their attacks. Another factor that prevented a complete disaster was the German command structure. They were confused as to whether the ships were in Luftflotte 2 or Luftflotte 3's area of responsibility, and so both Luftlotten initially did nothing, giving the ships several hours grace to collect themselves into some sort of order. German shore radar detected the convoy during the early morning hours and E-boats attacked, sinking two coasters ('Holme Force' and 'Fife Coast') and damaging others.

Finally Generalmajor von Richthofen of Fliegerkorps VIII, part of Luftflotte 3, ordered all his dive-bombers along with the fighters of I. and III./JG 27 for escort to attack the convoy.
"This convoy must be wiped out!"
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he stated.

They launched their first attack at 09.00 hours, with two raids escorted by the Bf 109s. The cloudbase that morning was only 2,000 feet, and the convoy was especially equipped with barrage balloons in an attempt to discourage attempts at dive-bombing. British radar detected them and five 11 Group squadrons and one from 10 Group were sent up to tackle the raiders. Between 08:49 and 09:43 two assaults each of 100-plus raiders attacked the convoy (15 miles west of the Isle of Wight), which lost SS 'Conquerdale' and SS 'Empire Crusader'.

Meanwhile, fighter sweeps over south-eastern England by elements from JGs 3, 26, 51, 53 and 54 had drawn some attention, being met by Spitfires from RAF Nos.41, 64, 64 and 610 Squadrons. Shortly after 1100 hours the Bf 109s of JG 51 engaged Spitfires from RAF No. 64 and 610 Squadron. Five Luftwaffe pilots claimed victories including Hptm. Hannes Trautloft of Stab III./JG 51 and Oblt. Josef Fözö of 4./JG 51. Four Spitfires were lost (with three of their pilots killed), one force-landed and two others badly damaged. Luftwaffe losses were one shot down, four crash-landed in France, and one badly damaged.

At about 12:48 the second assault on CW9 developed, just east of the Isle of Wight with a force of fifty-seven Ju 87 Stukas from StG 2, StG 3 and StG 77, again escorted by about thirty Bf 109s from JG 27, and a further twenty Bf 110s of LG 1. After disposing of the balloon cover the Stukas dive-bombed and scattered the ships. But Hurricanes of Nos. 43, 145, 238 and 257 Squadrons and Spitfires of 609 Squadron - over 50 fighters - arrived. The Stukas still managed to get through, sinking four ships and damaging seven others. Sqn. Ldr J.A. Peel of No. 145 Squadron fired the first shots of this, for some the first official day of the Battle of Britain. Three Stukas were shot down and four damaged along with an escorting Bf110 of V./LG 1 and three Bf109s, three more '110s and a '109 were damaged.

Determined to sink the entire convoy, Fleigerkorps VIII returned in force at about 15.00 hours, mustering eighty-two Ju 87s in another attack to the south of the Isle of Wight, escorted by sixty-eight Bf 109s of II./JG 27, whose twenty-four hour stand down from the pervious day was rescinded, and Bf 110s. 10 and 11 Groups responded with seven squadrons. Amongst these was RAF No. 145 Squadron, returning for its third battle over the convoy for the day. Between them, RAF No. 145 and RAF No.43 Squadrons accounted for most German losses on the day. Unfortunately, even their effort was not enough. Six damaged ships limped into the nearest port; only four of the original convoy arrived at their intended destination of Swanage, Dorset.

By the end of the day's fighting,the Luftwaffe had lost 31 aircraft. Nine German fighters were lost and another eight damaged with II./JG 27 suffering most, having four aircraft lost and two damaged, including the Gruppenkommandeur of II./JG 27, Hptm. Werner Andres, who became a prisoner. Hptm. Andres described his bad luck, Hptm. Ernst Dullberg was appointed as acting Gruppenkommandeur of II Gruppe in Hptm. Andres place.

The British lost nineteen aircraft including a Blenheim from RAF No. 600 Squadron shot down into the sea off Ramsgate, and sixteen of their valuable and irreplaceable experienced pilots killed or missing, plus still others wounded. Two Spitfires were lost from RAF No. 65 Squadron over or near Ramsgate. One British pilot, S/L Harold Fenton, looking for two lost pilots over the Channel, was attacked and shot down by a German observation plane. Most of these losses (13 Hurricanes and a Spitfire) were protecting a strategically worthless convoy.

The Stuka losses were a cause for concern. The accuracy they achieved by dive-bombing naval targets was a lesson not lost on their Japanese allies-to-be, but in terms of Germany's current war against Britain, the loss of a few colliers and a score of fighters, most of which were regarded as an inferior type by the Luftwaffe, was not a balance against their own losses either. The heavy Stuka losses this day, added to those to be inflicted in the days to come, would ultimately lead to the type's withdrawal, but even this day's "victory" by the RAF did not alter the course of the Battle. While it was a fine close-support aircraft, and would have had a major part to play if "Sealion" had been launched, the Stuka was not suited to the strategic bombing role now being thrust upon the Luftwaffe, and its withdrawal was almost inevitable for this reason. Low-flying Dornier sneak-raiders proved to be just as effective against airfields without the same vulnerability.

To compound the Luftwaffe's problems, although they - the Luftwaffe and Fighter Command - were unaware they were doing so, they both over-estimated their own air-to-air successes, and under-estimated the overall size of Fighter Command, both by a factor of two. Before the 8th, they had developed an impression that the RAF was short of planes due to the small numbers of fighters committed previously, and thought the combats on this day represented a "maximum effort" by the RAF. They also thought that the RAF had lost such a large portion of their force on the day that they would no longer have enough planes to defend the Channel, and that it would only take a few days more of clear weather to destroy the remainder of Fighter Command. The order to launch this major assault - Adlerangriff, the Attack of the Eagles, as soon as weather permitted - was issued as a result of the events on the 8th. In fact, Fighter Command had around a thousand Hurricanes and Spitfires available at units and in storage, and more coming off the assembly lines every day, and at no stage during the Battle was availability of planes a factor.

Adding to the Luftwaffe's sense of victory this day was the fact no more convoys sailed after 8 August. But this was not due to their efforts. The Admiralty "discovered" the vital coal being transported by sea could be moved by rail, and suddenly there was no longer any need to waste the lives of so many brave collier crews or fighter pilots on "prestige". Fighter Command was finally freed to do what it was meant to do - defend Britain.

A little after 2030 hours, He 111s from I./KG 55 bombed the Bristol Aeroplane Company at Filton. Later at 0230 hours Heinkels of II./KG 27 attacked areas near Bristol. He 111s of II./KG 27 returned over England at 0215 hours, attacking the Bristol searchlights.

Losses: Luftwaffe 31 : Fighter Command 20.

WESTERN FRONT: As the crew of Hptm. Kienitz's III./JG 3 arrived at their new airbase at Desvres, they found that instead of a prepared airfield they must operate from a local football field.

Oberleutnant Gustav "Micky" Sprick was appointed Staffelkapitän of 8./JG 26.

 
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I find a lot of the information contained in these postings to be fascinating. The accuracy of the bombing in this case and the use of E boats.

Many thanks
 
9 August 1940 Friday

UNITED KINGDOM: Heavy rain and squalls prevented most air operations over the Channel and England although I./JG 53 lost a Bf 109 when it hit a Flak emplacement while making an emergency landing on the Island of Guernsey. In the afternoon, several raids concentrated in mid-Channel but turned when British fighters were sighted.

At 1140 hours, one He 111H of KG 26 crossed the coast near Sunderland, but after being active over Sunderland was shot down by RAF No 79 Squadron (Hurricanes) at 1145 hours. There is a report that 1 boat was dropped by this aircraft. The crew were picked by a RN patrol boat, two of the crew were injured and two were unhurt. Four people were killed and seventy-eight injured, when a shipyard (Laing's), a railway bridge, some residential property (in Bonners Field) and Monkwearmouth Station Hotel was hit when bombing took place over Sunderland at by the Heinkel, dropping 14 bombs over shipbuilding and railway facilities. A Heinkel He 111H was shot down by AA gunfire during operations near Flamborough Head. The aircraft and the crew, listed as missing. By dawn in total 190 HE's had fallen in 24 hours, killing 7 and injuring 100

At 1650 hours, two Messerschmitts machine-gunned Dover Harbour. Fighters intercepted and fired at the enemy aircraft but without results.

But the weather didn't prevent night operations. KG 26 attacked Wearmouth, Northumberland, dropping 14 bombs over shipbuilding and railway facilities and injuring 73 people. Twelve He 111s of II./KG 27 dropped bombs and leaflets on the airfield at Filton at 2400 hours.

Sgt.R.D.Ritchie of RAF No 605 Squadron in his Hurricane I (L2103) died when he crashed into the sea 1 mile off Dunbar at 16:45hrs. He was picked up by a boat but his neck was found to be broken.

F/L S.P.le Rougetel flew with RAF No 600 Squadron. At night his Blenheim suffered engine failure and was attacked. To compound his problems, he came under fire from British A.A. fire. He and his radar operator/gunner (Sgt E.C.Smith) baled out of the Blenheim 1f BQ-O (L8679) over the Channel. They were both safe but Smith had to swim ashore at Westgate. Oblt. Karl-Heinz Metz from 8./JG 2 was credited with the kill.

Losses: Luftwaffe, 5; RAF 4.
 
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10 August 1940 Saturday

UNITED KINGDOM: The original date for 'Alderangriff', Reichsmarschall Göring's 'Attack of the Eagles' passes, as the Luftwaffe was not ready to carry out the objectives and weather was too poor over Britain for operations. Thundery conditions with line squalls; some bright intervals was the order of the day. The new date was set for August 13.

In the early morning, a raid reported a convoy at Swanage; the raid then turned and faded south of Shoreham. There were reports of machine-gunning off trawlers near Beachy Head and a little later, two further raids appeared in this area. Later, it was reported that an enemy aircraft had been active over a ship 40 miles south west of Pembroke. At about 0630 hrs, RAF No. 85 Sqn intercepted and claimed one Do17 (confirmed). This enemy aircraft had reported the position of a convoy east of Lowestoft. RAF No. 72 Sqn intercepted one He111 off Blyth (Northumberland) and chased it out to sea.

At 0730 hours, one raid crossed the coast at Pevensey and attacked the aerodrome at West Malling where AA guns went into action. Some HE bombs were dropped on or near Malling Aerodrome, Kent. Considerable damage was reported to old laundry block of the Institution and surrounding buildings. There were about ten civilian casualties. It is said that two sticks of bombs, 12 in all, were dropped, one stick in one direction and the other across it. A lone undetected Do 17 put 11 HEs close to RAF West Malling despite RAF No. 501 Squadron's attempts to stop it.

During the afternoon, several shipping reconnaissances were made off Yarmouth and Cromer and a Dornier was active over South Norwich. This raider was intercepted by a Spitfire which fired all its ammunition into it but the enemy aircraft turned out to sea and escaped.

Bf 110 pilots of Erpro 210 attempted a surprise evening strike on Norwich.

The bombers of II./KG 27 targeted the South Wales ports and the Bristol docks with bombs and leaflets a little past 2330 hours. During the night serious damage was done to the Llandore GWR (Great Western Railway) viaduct near Swansea where a direct hit on a shelter killed four.

RAF Coastal Command 608 Sqn. carries out its first operation with its new Blackburn Botha general reconnaissance aircraft.

No aircraft were lost from either side during the day.

Fighting alone, with their backs against the wall, the people of Britain decided that the most useful thing to do, the most practical and patriotic thing to do, would be to buy Spitfires to replace those that had fallen. And so in the summer of 1940 communities large and small, businesses, organisations, societies, clubs, trade unions and individuals started up "Spitfire Funds". As the poster showing a cheery RAF pilot suggested, their slogan was - "I'll fly it if you'll buy it!" In February 1940 a brand new Spitfire cost £8897.6s.6d. Airplane enthusiasts and those sad types who just like long columns of pre-decimal figures might enjoy the following price list…
Although it doesn't sound very much £8897.6s.6d was equivalent to about £255,608 today. Recognizing that it would be difficult for cash strapped organisations to raise such large sums Lord Beaverbrook, the Minister of Aircraft Production, decided to make the public an offer that it couldn't refuse. He dropped the nominal price of a Spitfire to just £5000, equivalent to £143,600 today. If your community or organisation could raise £5000 Lord Beaverbrook would build a Spitfire, stick your name on it and give it to the RAF. In reality the next Spitfire off the production line was simply accredited to the donating group.

WESTERN FRONT: A new recruit was posted to combat status. Hans-Joachim Marseille joined I(Jabo)./LG 2 and began operations against the British over the Channel front.

In Vichy France, Laval offers Germany 200 pilots to help fight the Battle of Britain.
 
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There is one thing that I hadn't expected and that was the number of raids by one or two German bombers. Also the potential loan of 200 pilots to help with the attack on Britain was new to me. I have to wonder how many would have defected given the chance
 
11 August 1940 Sunday

UNITED KINGDOM: Luftwaffe reconnaissance aircraft that were daily flying on meteorological flights out into the Atlantic Ocean, reported that the barometric pressure was building up in the mid-Atlantic south-west off the Spanish coast and with the wind speed and direction were very confident that fine weather would prevail over the next few days in the Channel area, and in particular over the designated target areas. Göring lamented that provided the weather was in their favor, that the Luftwaffe would destroy the RAF within fourteen days. He had nearly 2,000 serviceable aircraft at his disposal, which consisted of some 800 medium range bombers, 700 Bf 109s, 250 Ju 87 dive bombers, and 160 Bf 110 twin engine fighters plus a number of reconnaissance aircraft. His pilots were well trained with even the newer pilots going through a strenuous training program, but the events of the previous month during Kanalkampf - the battle over the Channel - had taken its toll.

After France, the Luftwaffe thought that the RAF with its morale at an all time low and aircraft which many thought were antiquated, had pilots that flew them lacking the knowledge needed for fighting in combat. But they were caught by surprise at the skill of the RAF fighter pilots and the performance of the machines that they flew. In contrast, many of the Luftwaffe pilots were not only tired, but many of them were near to exhaustion.

In comparison, the RAF had just 650 fighter aircraft, and approximately 1,250 pilots and many of these lacked the proper training, in fact many of them had to complete their training on an operational airfield due to the fact that the RAF drastically needed....more pilots. But the pilots, it did not matter whether they were experienced or not, displayed great courage and determination in the July dogfights over the Channel. In the proposed next phase of the Battle of Britain this determination would be very much put to the test.

The 11th of August was a Sunday, and for the port of Dover in south-east Kent was just like any other Sunday morning. It was early, but many people were either getting ready to go to church or for those non-believers, were having their usual sleep in while the rest looked forwards to the usual good Sunday breakfast. That is until they heard the drone of bombers coming from the direction of the Channel. Many thought it unusual, others who had been making a study of the war so far stood in wonderment as up until now, all of Germany's attacks had been over the sea lanes; why now were they heading towards Dover and the coast of England? It was not long before they found out. Most thought that the enemy planes were on their way to the industrial centers along the Thames or even London itself. They were quite surprised when explosions started to erupt in the harbour, tall fountains of water spouted into the air as bombs landed, and many surrounding houses fell victim to the bombing. People ran screaming and shouting and running in all directions, even though the siren had sounded when the aircraft were first heard, many ignored the fact that this could well be an air raid because so far the Luftwaffe had not yet resorted to attacking land bases in Britain.

Fighter Command had been warned of the small build up that was moving in towards the coast at Dover at 0830 hours, radar had supplied the position and direction of the German formation, and the Observer Corps reported the type and strength. Park was informed that the formation consisted of about thirty Bf 110 and an equal number of Bf 109s. So the Bf 110s from Epr.Gr 210 and a couple of Bf 109 fighters had Dover all to themselves. Well, for a while anyway. A number of Luftwaffe Squadrons came over in quick succession and it looked as though something big could be building. AVM Park had no alternative but to allow some of his fighters from Hawkinge and Manston to "scramble". RAF No. 74 Sqd (Spitfires) operating out of Manston and RAF No. 64 Sqd (Spitfires) were the squadrons released to cover Dover. Official records state that only a few skirmishes took place and that Dover Harbour was the prime target of the German attack. Fires were caused at Dover as a result of the attacks on the British balloons, some which were shot down. Some slight damage was caused to houses and it was reported a gas holder was punctured by Messerschmitt shrapnel. But the Luftwaffe plan was to attract as many of the British fighters into the air as possible at Dover while the main strike of the day was to be concentrated much further west near Portland, this operation being laid on in place of the mass 'Adler Tag' assault which had been postponed.

Soon after the attack at Dover had ceased, Ventnor radar detected an excessive build up across the Channel just outside of Cherbourg. Park immediately put all of his squadrons in stand-by mode. As time went on, the build-up was getting bigger and bigger and it now looked as if it was the biggest armada of air power yet sent across the Channel. But fortunately the only build-up was coming in from the direction of Cherbourg. This now, was not an assortment of Ju 87s or Bf 110s, but fifty-six Ju 88 heavy bombers from I and III./KG 54, twenty Heinkel He 111s of KG 27, sixty-seven Bf 110s from II and III./ZG 2 and about thirty Bf 109s of III./JG 2. In total, about 170 German aircraft. Fighter Command relayed the information to the Operations Room at 10 Group and RAF No.145 Sqd (Hurricanes), RAF No. 152 Sqd (Spitfires), RAF No.213 Sqd (Hurricanes), RAF No.238 Sqd (Hurricanes), RAF No.601 Sqd (Hurricanes) and RAF No.609 Sqd (Spitfires) were scrambled to intercept.

Off the coast, and out over the Channel, the dogfights were fierce and numerous. Spitfires in high speed chases weaving over or under other dogfights that were in progress, were either chasing Bf 109's or being chased by them, sometimes a British pilot would abort an intended attack because once within identification range he found it to be a British fighter.

The attack by the formation that was heading towards the Portland Naval base and Weymouth was the biggest of the day, with destruction of a number of factories, the gasworks and oil storage tanks, all others being fairly minor and were really of nuisance value more than anything else, although the days losses were high. ASW Trawler HMS 'Hertfordshire' was in Admiralty floating dock (AFD19) which was holed and strained. The 'Hertfordshire' suffered some splinter damage. The Luftwaffe lost a total of 38 aircraft made up of two Heinkel He 59s, two Ju 87s, (one each from IV./LG 1 and II./StG 1), six Ju 88s, three Dornier 17Zs, ten Bf 110s from ZG 2 and fifteen Bf 109s. Further to that some fifteen aircraft either made forced landings or managed to make it back to their bases with considerable sustained damage. Hptm. Hans-Peter Kulbel was recently made acting Gruppenkommandeur of I./ZG 2 in place of Major Ernst Ott. But his promotion lasted only one day when he was lost in the day's action over Portland. Hptm. Christians was appointed acting Gruppenkommandeur the next day.

The personnel of JG 2 suffered the most Luftwaffe losses for the day with close to seven fighters lost including the Gruppe Adjutant of III./JG 2, Oblt. Adolf Steidle, along with the Staffelkapitän of 6./JG 2, Oblt. Edgar Rempel and Oblt. Heinz-Ewart Fricke of 9./JG 2. JG 27 lost Uffz. Siegfried Lackner and Uffz. Rudiger Menz.

Luftwaffe victors included Oblt. Hans-Karl Röders and Lt. Werner Kluge of 9./JG 2, each claiming a Hurricane and Rudolf Rothenfelder, the designer of the emblem for 9./JG 2, claiming a Spitfire. Oblt. Werner Machold of 1./JG 2 claimed a 'Tomahawk' over Portland for his eleventh victory. Oblt. Helmut Wick of 3./JG 2 described his action of the day;
 
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Old MacDonald
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Long term viability of the USA's warship museum ships?
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GreenKnight121
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Which tank is this ?
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Imagine if the Germans had Panthers of this quality of components and construction
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