8 August 1940 Thursday
THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN: PHASE TWO
UNITED KINGDOM: During the opening phase of the Battle of Britain the Luftwaffe conducted what they called Kanalkampf - attacks on shipping in the English Channel. The forces committed by the Germans were nowhere near their full potential, as they were still building up to full strength after the wear, tear and attrition of the Battle of France. Only when their bases were fully prepared and their units back up to strength would the assault on England itself begin. With the focus now on the destruction of the RAF, the Luftwaffe tried to lure the RAF up to battle with its fighters. For their part, Fighter Command refused to be drawn into what would have been a battle of attrition over the Channel, and likewise husbanded their available forces for the inevitable onslaught that was to come. The Admiralty were made fully aware that their convoys could not expect anything but token protection from Fighter Command, but still they continued to demand more and more cover from the RAF.
The 25 ships of the convoy CW9 (code-named 'Peewit'), was finally observed by the Germans. However, the convoy's scattering worked in its favor, as it made it difficult for the Luftwaffe to locate them all in order to plan their attacks. Another factor that prevented a complete disaster was the German command structure. They were confused as to whether the ships were in Luftflotte 2 or Luftflotte 3's area of responsibility, and so both Luftlotten initially did nothing, giving the ships several hours grace to collect themselves into some sort of order. German shore radar detected the convoy during the early morning hours and E-boats attacked, sinking two coasters ('Holme Force' and 'Fife Coast') and damaging others.
Finally Generalmajor von Richthofen of Fliegerkorps VIII, part of Luftflotte 3, ordered all his dive-bombers along with the fighters of I. and III./JG 27 for escort to attack the convoy.
"This convoy must be wiped out!"
he stated.
They launched their first attack at 09.00 hours, with two raids escorted by the Bf 109s. The cloudbase that morning was only 2,000 feet, and the convoy was especially equipped with barrage balloons in an attempt to discourage attempts at dive-bombing. British radar detected them and five 11 Group squadrons and one from 10 Group were sent up to tackle the raiders. Between 08:49 and 09:43 two assaults each of 100-plus raiders attacked the convoy (15 miles west of the Isle of Wight), which lost SS 'Conquerdale' and SS 'Empire Crusader'.
Meanwhile, fighter sweeps over south-eastern England by elements from JGs 3, 26, 51, 53 and 54 had drawn some attention, being met by Spitfires from RAF Nos.41, 64, 64 and 610 Squadrons. Shortly after 1100 hours the Bf 109s of JG 51 engaged Spitfires from RAF No. 64 and 610 Squadron. Five Luftwaffe pilots claimed victories including Hptm. Hannes Trautloft of Stab III./JG 51 and Oblt. Josef Fözö of 4./JG 51. Four Spitfires were lost (with three of their pilots killed), one force-landed and two others badly damaged. Luftwaffe losses were one shot down, four crash-landed in France, and one badly damaged.
At about 12:48 the second assault on CW9 developed, just east of the Isle of Wight with a force of fifty-seven Ju 87 Stukas from StG 2, StG 3 and StG 77, again escorted by about thirty Bf 109s from JG 27, and a further twenty Bf 110s of LG 1. After disposing of the balloon cover the Stukas dive-bombed and scattered the ships. But Hurricanes of Nos. 43, 145, 238 and 257 Squadrons and Spitfires of 609 Squadron - over 50 fighters - arrived. The Stukas still managed to get through, sinking four ships and damaging seven others. Sqn. Ldr J.A. Peel of No. 145 Squadron fired the first shots of this, for some the first official day of the Battle of Britain. Three Stukas were shot down and four damaged along with an escorting Bf110 of V./LG 1 and three Bf109s, three more '110s and a '109 were damaged.
Determined to sink the entire convoy, Fleigerkorps VIII returned in force at about 15.00 hours, mustering eighty-two Ju 87s in another attack to the south of the Isle of Wight, escorted by sixty-eight Bf 109s of II./JG 27, whose twenty-four hour stand down from the pervious day was rescinded, and Bf 110s. 10 and 11 Groups responded with seven squadrons. Amongst these was RAF No. 145 Squadron, returning for its third battle over the convoy for the day. Between them, RAF No. 145 and RAF No.43 Squadrons accounted for most German losses on the day. Unfortunately, even their effort was not enough. Six damaged ships limped into the nearest port; only four of the original convoy arrived at their intended destination of Swanage, Dorset.
By the end of the day's fighting,the Luftwaffe had lost 31 aircraft. Nine German fighters were lost and another eight damaged with II./JG 27 suffering most, having four aircraft lost and two damaged, including the Gruppenkommandeur of II./JG 27, Hptm. Werner Andres, who became a prisoner. Hptm. Andres described his bad luck,
"I was hit in the instrument panel and in the engine, thick white steam and plumes of black oil rushed past the canopy of my aircraft and much of it managed to enter the cockpit, maybe my controls had been shattered also as I had no control over the now fast descending aircraft. The waters of the Channel were fast coming towards me, I knew that the situation was hopeless. I managed to throw back the cockpit hood and took all the necessary precautions for a crash-landing in the water. It was my good fortune that I was approaching the water at an angle so as to make a belly landing – had I been diving straight down, it would not have been possible to survive. I prepared myself for the impact, then suddenly I was pushed forwards and my arms cushioned the impact as a wall of white water engulfed my Bf 109 and the icy waters seemed to cut me in half. I jumped from the aircraft almost before it had come to a standstill, and within one minute the tail of the aircraft rose dramatically and the Bf 109 slid head first to the bottom."
Hptm. Ernst Dullberg was appointed as acting Gruppenkommandeur of II Gruppe in Hptm. Andres place.
The British lost nineteen aircraft including a Blenheim from RAF No. 600 Squadron shot down into the sea off Ramsgate, and sixteen of their valuable and irreplaceable experienced pilots killed or missing, plus still others wounded. Two Spitfires were lost from RAF No. 65 Squadron over or near Ramsgate. One British pilot, S/L Harold Fenton, looking for two lost pilots over the Channel, was attacked and shot down by a German observation plane. Most of these losses (13 Hurricanes and a Spitfire) were protecting a strategically worthless convoy.
The Stuka losses were a cause for concern. The accuracy they achieved by dive-bombing naval targets was a lesson not lost on their Japanese allies-to-be, but in terms of Germany's current war against Britain, the loss of a few colliers and a score of fighters, most of which were regarded as an inferior type by the Luftwaffe, was not a balance against their own losses either. The heavy Stuka losses this day, added to those to be inflicted in the days to come, would ultimately lead to the type's withdrawal, but even this day's "victory" by the RAF did not alter the course of the Battle. While it was a fine close-support aircraft, and would have had a major part to play if "Sealion" had been launched, the Stuka was not suited to the strategic bombing role now being thrust upon the Luftwaffe, and its withdrawal was almost inevitable for this reason. Low-flying Dornier sneak-raiders proved to be just as effective against airfields without the same vulnerability.
To compound the Luftwaffe's problems, although they - the Luftwaffe and Fighter Command - were unaware they were doing so, they both over-estimated their own air-to-air successes, and under-estimated the overall size of Fighter Command, both by a factor of two. Before the 8th, they had developed an impression that the RAF was short of planes due to the small numbers of fighters committed previously, and thought the combats on this day represented a "maximum effort" by the RAF. They also thought that the RAF had lost such a large portion of their force on the day that they would no longer have enough planes to defend the Channel, and that it would only take a few days more of clear weather to destroy the remainder of Fighter Command. The order to launch this major assault - Adlerangriff, the Attack of the Eagles, as soon as weather permitted - was issued as a result of the events on the 8th. In fact, Fighter Command had around a thousand Hurricanes and Spitfires available at units and in storage, and more coming off the assembly lines every day, and at no stage during the Battle was availability of planes a factor.
Adding to the Luftwaffe's sense of victory this day was the fact no more convoys sailed after 8 August. But this was not due to their efforts. The Admiralty "discovered" the vital coal being transported by sea could be moved by rail, and suddenly there was no longer any need to waste the lives of so many brave collier crews or fighter pilots on "prestige". Fighter Command was finally freed to do what it was meant to do - defend Britain.
A little after 2030 hours, He 111s from I./KG 55 bombed the Bristol Aeroplane Company at Filton. Later at 0230 hours Heinkels of II./KG 27 attacked areas near Bristol. He 111s of II./KG 27 returned over England at 0215 hours, attacking the Bristol searchlights.
Losses: Luftwaffe 31 : Fighter Command 20.
WESTERN FRONT: As the crew of Hptm. Kienitz's III./JG 3 arrived at their new airbase at Desvres, they found that instead of a prepared airfield they must operate from a local football field.
Oberleutnant Gustav "Micky" Sprick was appointed Staffelkapitän of 8./JG 26.
