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Political situation in Oslo still obscure. Quisling Govt has no response from the Norwegian people. The old Govt has not resigned. Hamar, seat of the fleeing Government, occupied by German troops. Further flight by the Govt. Discussion between the King of Norway and German Ambassador Brauer fruitless. King not prepared to yield. Nyggardsvold, the head of the Govt, declared before the Storting that Norway is resolved to continue the struggle for her integrity. Hambro, the President of the Storting, gave a speech over the radio in Sweden, calling foi- action, and is recruiting volunteers. The Norwegian people's resistance has been stiffened by British propaganda and assurances. Young men fit for military service are apparently prepared to offer the most stubborn resistance and to commence sniping activities. The population is everywhere passive, negative.
Denmark
No resistance, effort to comprehend the German action. Statement by Prime Minister Stauning "The King and his Ministers have resolved, relying on Germany's assurance that she does not plan to infringe Denmark's integrity and political independence by the steps taken, to attempt to order conditions and the occupation. This course has been selected In order to spare land and people
the consequences of war.
Railroad communications to Bergen and Trondheim destroyed, telephone lines interrupted. Norwegian naval forces hostile and prepared for actions. Groups and Commanding Admiral, Submarines therefore ordered to destroy Norwegian forces not in our hands or laid up in port. Further, it is pointed out to Commanding Admiral, Norway (Admiral Boehm) that it is urgently necessary for the new Govt at once to recall the Norwegian forces at sea. Appropriate safety measures in view of our submarine positions are to be arranged with the Norwegian Government. The directive is issued because of an inquiry from the Group - that all captured Norwegian naval vessels are to be commissioned with German crews.
At 0651 a corrupt "Most Immediate" radio message in clear was received from Narvik about an attack made by British destroyers
on Narvik. Later reports, still incomplete at first, show that in the early hours of the morning, in fog and drifting snow, enemy
destroyers protected by a heavy cruiser carried out a surprise Attack on our destroyers lying in Narvik. The attack was
warded off; three enemy destroyers were sunk or destroyed (HUNTER, HARDY, HOTSPUR).
It is necessary to concentrate anti-submarine defenses in the Kattegat and eastern Skagerrak because of the acute submarine
situation in these areas. At the request of Group Baltic, the 1st MSW Flotilla and Ships "35", "40", "37", "26" and "47" have been placed at its disposal. Group West is at present considering the transfer of a further subchaser flotilla.
U 49 was in contact with 2 large cruisers from 0159 to 0229. They disappeared from sight at high speed on a southerly course. U 50 and 52 were detailed to attack but did not sight them
English destroyers attempted at dawn in mist weather and snow flurries to penetrate the Westfjord as far as Narvik. They were detected with losses to both sides. The U-boats disposed in the Westfjord could not, it seems, prevent the penetration. The reason for this will be clear when the boats put in. Without a doubt, their task is very tricky, especially opposed to destroyers which force their way through at high speed using depth charges, and twice as difficult in misty weather. The operation shows though that one cannot be strong enough for such tasks. In the course of the forenoon Naval War Staff ordered the dispatch of two boats to Trondheim and 4 to Narvik. This order crossed with a relevant suggestion of mine to the Group. There, the center point of the operation appears to have moved.This would be especially attractive to the English as an area for counter-attacks as it would be more difficult for us to be reinforced from home. This situation is tricky for our own forces, as supplies have not arrived - the destroyers are for the most part unready to sail and their putting out is now questionable owing to the enemy - one small boat has been assigned to patrol the Kors Fjord
A new distribution of boats in the northern North Sea is necessary as a result of this movement. One has the impression that the English fleet has withdrawn in a northerly and southwesterly direction. The Naval War Staff does not believe that a counter-landing on the southwest of Norway is imminent; in this connection they see no necessity for the enemy to operate near German bases from where apparently successful air attacks were carried out on 9.4. In view of the considerable losses of surface craft and the return of units still lying in the landing ports, in the near future, they (SKL) consider the U-boat's main task to consist not so much in searching for targets as in the patrol of the recently occupied areas. The new disposition shows here a concentration in the eastern section of the Shetland/Norway Straits. The Narvik boats, to whom the very difficult and decisively important task at the moment calls - that of protecting these ports against every pursuing enemy - have received orders to penetrate still deeper into the fjord so that all boats are disposed in the narrowest possible positions, abandoning outer sections which are difficult to patrol.
The decrees relating to the Pan American neutrality zone hurt the Allies moreso than the Axis powers, but they did work to isolate Germany and had long term economic impacts.Roosevelt has issued a proclamation forbidding U.S. ships to enter all Scandinavian waters. The war zone laid down in the Neutrality Law is extended by the decree. According to it, U.S. ships may not traverse Scandinavian territorial waters from Bergen along the west coast of Norway up to the point 44° E, 77° N. Archangel and Murmansk are also included in this zone.
Radio intelligence detects at sea CinC, Home Flt, Commanders, Battle Cruiser Squadron and CruSqns 1 2, also DesFlots 3, 4 and 6. The presence of CVL FURIOUS with the main force led by CinC, Home Flt west ana northwest of Trrondheim was confirmed by our air report and by the "B" Dienst. Planes attacked Trondheim harbor during the morning. The former Polish steamers CHOERI (11,500 tons) and BATORY (14,500 tons), now being used as troopships, have arrived in Scapa. An agent's report from Intelligence Center, Belgium, states that there was a Fr squadron consisting of the BCs STRASSEOURG and DUNXERQJJE and the CV BEARM, escorted by 2x DesFlots and 1xsubflot. (DAUPHIN class), in the entrance to the Channel early on 10 April en route for the North Sea. Time and position are considered improbable according to B Dienst monitoring. In spite of this, the presence of the French forces in the North Sea or northern waters must be reckoned with. SIGINT intercepted a British radio message from which it appears that an operation against the Norwegian coast between 58° and 59° (area Lindesnes to Skudesnes fjord) is planned on 12 April, probably in the afternoon because of the weather. All officers concerned have been informed. A landing at the points indicated is not considered probable. In Naval Staff's opinion, this is probably a ML operation off the south coast of Norway or a large air raid on
Stavanger / Be r gen.
4 DD are in complete readiness to proceed, 3 in limited readiness. The DIETER von ROEDER is not ready. (ROEDER' s radio station has been set up ashore as Narvik Naval Radio Station, guns are being dismantled for use as a barrage bty.) Commander, DesFlot 4 reports that he does not consider a break-through out of West Fjord possible as long as there are superior enemy light forces (cruisers and DDs) lying in West fjord. He considers return passage close to the coast to be unfavorable because of the joint
British and Norwegian patrol activity.
Narvik's primary requirements from Germany are supplies of heavy armament (mountain guns, machine-guns, mortars) and ammunition. OKW and CinC, LW have issued orders accordingly. LR recon planes, type Do 26, are to operate as transport planes for all goods which cannot be dropped. They are therefore not available for LR sea recon
CO, (Defenses-Baltic), has put sub-chasers into action to combat the great danger from subs in the entrance to Oslo Fjord. At 1800 a sub-chaser reported the alleged destruction by DCs of a sub at the sthn entrance to Oslo Fjord. CS LUTZOW, which had been recalled from Oslo to be prepared for the Atlantic, was torpedoed and severely damaged east of Skagen during the night of 10 April. She is unable to move and is being picked up by forces of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic and towed off by tugs. The torpedoing of the LUTZOW is the most severe loss DKM could suffer at the present moment. The ship's elimination
for some time results in the abandonment of raider operations warfare in the Atlantic at the very moment when a strong diversion would have been most useful. The ship's incorporation 'in "Weseruebung" and her despatch to Oslo have therefore turned out to be definite strategic errors . Naval Staff feels this all the more because it always recognized the despatch of the pocket battleship to the Atlantic as a strategic necessity and indicated it as such. The original plan of sending the ship into the Atlantic from Trondheim after executing her transport assignment could not be carried out since at the last moment she was reported not to be ready for the Atlantic because of trouble with her auxiliary engines. OKWs request that the troops already en route be brought to Oslo had to be fulfilled by Naval Staff, although with great misgivings. The fulfillment of this demand has proved a mistake strategically, from the point of view of naval warfare. It must be admitted, with regard to the execution of the Norwegian operation, that the presence of the troops embarked on the LUTZOW was of the greatest value for the Oslo operation, in view of the BLUCHEH's breakdown.
It can be stated in retrospect that both the use of the LUTZOW and of the latest cruiser BLUCHER in Oslo have led to extremely severe losses in naval fighting strength. It might also have been possible to carry out the landing in Oslo with a large number of small vessels (TBs, PVs, etc.) without great losses. A very large number of such vessels would, however, have been necessary
for the troops to be transported. In Naval Staff 's opinion the incorporation of powerful ships in the Oslo operation can on no account be judged as an operational error. The use of heavy ships guns was considered a basic requirement to break down resistance in Oslo and to cover the landing. Naval Staff also previously considered the use of the old BBs in Oslo. Apart from the fact that one of these ships was limited regarding maneuverability and ability to proceed and the other was operating on the Korsoer assignment, their fighting qualities as opposed to the coastal batteries were estimated as very slight (Pencilled marginal note by Chief of Staff, Naval Staff: "But surely greater than BLUCHER and LUETZOW?)"
2 DDs of Gp1 attempted to put out of the West fjord. The attempt failed because they sighted a cruiser and a DDs when they were still in the narrow part of the fjord, and were unable to pass them in the clear night. They returned. On their report of the enemy, U 51 received orders to attack. The boat, however, did not apparently find the enemy. U 46 has has no contact with the enemy. U 51 was pursued by DDs - it fired 2 misses and 2 self detonators. U 25 reports having torpedoed 2 DDs last night in her position. The effect of the explosion not observed. Hydrophone search. Non report from U 64. Summing up the situation in the North Sea this afternoon, the Group said that imminent enemy battle fleet operations were not expected. For the time being, the enemy has withdrawn from the area apparently under the impression that there would be successful air attacks during the momentary favorable flying weather. The Gp is in favor of a concentration of U-boats around the Shetland area, in order to have reconnaissance independent of the weather, for the return of our own BCs. This task must not be underrated, it means, however, that the more promising disposition of small U-boats in the area around Scapa must be finally abandoned.
I intend to use contact detonators at least during the current operations, or at any rate in the areas momentarily especially endangered in the northerly zones. If premature detonation also occurs in the southerly areas, a general change over to contact detonators will be unavoidable if and when a return to magnetic detonators will follow depends on the results of research and trial shots.
"…the grave danger that we should find ourselves committed to a number of ineffectual operations along the Norwegian coast, none of which would succeed".
Situation in Oslo not yet clarified. The Quisling Govt is endeavouring to govern but probably cannot last since support from the people and Armed Forces is too slight. Position rendered very difficult by the first Govt's continuous counter-orders and orders to resist.
The German action has undoubtedly evoked the greatest consternation in Holland and Belgium, where anxiety about a German invasion has again come to the fore. In spite of this there is no inclination to accept the requests of the 'Western Powers to put
themselves under their protection. It is reported from the U.S.A. that the news of the German action was received calmly . Special importance was undoubtedly attached here to the fact that the British breach of neutrality by mine-laying in Norwegian waters preceded the German operation.
The publication of the German White Paper from the Polish documents is also contributing to lessen the Government's inclination to be biased against Germany. It is confirmed that the European situation cannot lead America to deviate from the maintenance of her neutrality.
In a broadcast speech the Swedish Foreign Minister emphasized that Sweden was still firmly resolved to pursue a course of strict neutrality. Demands from a belligerent to utilize Swedish territory for its operations would have to be refused. Extension of defensive readiness was necessary for the purpose of defending Swedish neutrality.
The Danish Govt has granted Iceland complete independence for the duration of the present emergency. The Faroes have been occupied by Britain. According to a report intercepted by radio intelligence, the attack on Narvik will probably take place on the afternoon of 13 April. Commander, CruSqn 2 detailed two DDs as escort for the CL SOUTHAMPTON, which is sailing from Scapa at noon today for Vaags Fjord ( north of Narvik).
This information, in conjunction with the sailing of the troopships BATORY and CHOBRI on 12 April from Scapa, indicates that troops will be landed in Vaags Fjord. According to a further report the landing is planned there for 15 April.
Trondhelm area ;
First British troops obviously landed in the neighborhood of Indre Foliar (about 64° 50' Nj in the afternoon. Commander,
Crusqn 1 reported operation carried out and the suitability of Namsos and Mosjoen for further landings according to recon by 1 DD.
Stavanger-Bergen area :
A DD flotilla was given a ML assignment in the area of Skudesnes Fjord. Execution not yet detected. No fresh reports of the British BB formation.
It follows from the steps so far taken by the enemy that he is at present ignoring ports occupied by us from the point of view of landings and is limiting himself to alternative points and accepting strategic disadvantages on land. From his almost undisturbed landing places the enemy obviously plans to out-flank the German strategically important points of Narvik and Trondheim and to attack them after preliminary raids by planes from the carrier. He plans to destroy in advance the naval forces still lying in the harbors. Troops are being carried on large, strongly escorted transports.
Simultaneously with the landing, the blockade of supply and approach routes for our naval forces will be commenced on a large scale by the combined Franco-British naval forces.
.U 2 reports return passage owing to damage to hydroplane. U 48 regained contact unfortunately only temporarily, with 2 large cruisers with destroyers on a southerly course, medium speed. The enemy is then, in the area northwest of Trondheim. I do not now consider a new deployment of the boats proceeding to Narvik, which must be in the vicinity, advisable. If the enemy is in this area it only is a starting off point for operations against the neighboring areas. Narvik appears especially threatened. The boats are to proceed there with the utmost speed in order to be in position when the enemy arrives. A message from U 38 indicates a change in the situation, this boat sighted 2 freighters and an escorting destroyer on a northeasterly course. Convoys of ordinary merchant ships do not now sail in this area. These units were in all probability transport ships used in connection with an enemy operation - possibly transport of material for a landing. U 38 received orders to attack, or if that is not possible, to maintain contact. It is important to know where these steamers are going. At the same time the 1st U-boat Group receives permission to attack all ships (not just warships and troop transport ships as previously) as it is practically certain that no ordinary merchant shipping now proceeds through this area.
A reliable radio intelligence report relates to the putting out of an English cruiser with 2 destroyers from Scapa for Vaagsfjord. This confirms the conjecture that the enemy plans counter operation possibly landings north of Narvik after being beaten off in Westfjord. From this I see another situation. A disposition of U-boats is necessary and promising on the strength of this report. 3 boats from the group proceeding to Narvik are to be deflected to the Vaagsfjord.
2 other boats to protect Andalsnes and Namsos from possible landings are to be detailed. Only U 65, proceeding to Narvik is still available. The second boat will be taken from the Trondheim group which appears comparatively adequately safeguarded when the first coastal batteries there are ready for action. There is to be new distribution of positions for the Narvik boats (which U 48 joins today) and a supplementation of supplies by one boat, from the supply ship "Jan Wellem" is intended for the coming day. At the same time the boat is to hand over its small arms and machine guns to the Harbormaster for the use of the infantry. U 43 and U 61 have put out for Narvik with munitions.
Message from the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander to the Narvik Group, Major General Dietl, in the forenoon:
"Defend the Narvik area against attack under all circumstances. Ensure landing facilities on the Hartvig See. Aid the Air Force, weather permitting. If necessary effectively destroy the ore railroad in the mountains."
A H
Reports received in the evening provide the following picture of the British large-scale attack, about the proposed execution
of which it was possible to inform the Narvik Group in good time owing to the results of radio intelligence:
About noon 9 Br DDs and one heavy ship (WARSPITE?) penetrated in to Ofot and Rombaken Fjords. Heavy destroyer
engagement, the enemy using all his forces, until the destroyers - defending themselves and attacking to the last - were put out of
action. Simultaneously air raids by carrier-borne planes from the aircraft carrier lying off West Fjord.
A report of a new break-through by English forces in the Ofot Fjord and off Narvik, was received in the afternoon. There were 9 destroyers and a battleship. The report came from the Naval Signal Officer, Narvik, not from the U-boats who apparently were neither able to give warning nor prevent the penetration in spite of the fact that there were at least 3 boats one behind the other in the narrow channel of the fjord. I cannot, as yet, obtain a clear picture of events. One must wait for the boat's reports and messages, in order to explain the circumstances. One thing is certain, the boats did what they could.The protective duties assigned to them were tricky and it seems, too difficult, against a strong, well-equipped enemy prepared for U-boats and as a result of torpedo shortage only combated at a disadvantage.
All boats in Westfjord have received orders to proceed to Narvik and attack the enemy as a result of the news of the successful break-through. U 46 reported at 2000 that the enemy battleship had again put out. All boats off Narvik are requested to send a situation report. I must form a picture from closer information of the break-through and know which of the boats is still there. In Naval War Staff Most Secret 4432/40 the order is received to move all large boats up to U-50 to the north - to carry out supplying of small boats' consumable goods - if possible in Bergen and then to dispense them in all positions south of Westfjord. U 30, 34, 52, 65 received orders to proceed at high speed to the Lofoten Islands.
UBOATSThe critical situation in Narvik has caused the Fuehrer to review the question of abandoning our Narvik position in order to avoid further waste of forces - especially of the Air Force - for a doubtful success, and of undertaking a concentration of force in the Trondheim area. A determining factor in further considerations is the state of supplies and equipment for the rescued destroyer
crews. If the members of the crews, more than 2,000 according to available reports, can be equipped with the necessary items of clothing, hand and automatic weapons as well as food, this addition represents such considerable reinforcement of the fighting strength of the Narvik Group that the Narvik Division can be expected to hold out for a long time, considering the difficult terrain which favors defense. The more heavily and the longer the enemy is tied-down in the northern area, however, the greater must be the effect of the resultant relief on the situation in the endangered Trondheim area. Naval Staff therefore takes up the attitude - conditional on further news and deliberations - that it is correct to hold the Narvik position as long as possible and to fight a delaying defense. The Navy has the additional conviction that the great sacrifice of ten modern destroyers demands that the Narvik position hold out as long as supplies permit.