parsifal
Colonel
18th May - The BEF
The situation in front of the BEF and on its flanks had deteriorated to such an extent that it compelled Gort to issue his order requiring the immediate evacuation of all "useless mouths", undertaken principally from the ports of Boulogne, Calais and to a lesser extent from Dunkirk. By far the greatest numbers of these "useless mouths" were the sick and injured by then piling up in the hospitals and field stations.
Rundstedt issues orders, with Hitlers full support, for Kleist to restrain the formations under his spearhead command from advancing further than the Oise River, before the 18 May. This order for restraint is dutifully passed on by Kleist. Guderians response to this order is revealing of the mans brilliance as well as his temperament. He wrote in his autobiography "I neither would nor could agree to these orders which involved sacrificing the surprise we had gained, and giving away the success we had achieved. My conversation (with Von Kleist) became extremely heated….". Guderian claims in his memoirs that Von Kleist did agree to a 24 hour extension to the advance. Guderian then hurried back to Montcornet ordering his command to continue their advance. He met also with Reinhadt (XLI Korps commander) wherein the two men agreed to continue their advance until they ran out of petrol. Guderian wrote that he could not accept that Hitler who had promoted and supported Mansteins plan because of its boldness could now be frightened by "his own temerity and order the German advance to ber stopped"…..
He was wrong. The next day, he was ordered by Kleist to meet him at the designated XIX Korps airstrip. He was given a severe dressing down, to the point of offering his resignation. It required the intervention of List to partially resolve the impasse, where, importantly, Guderian was given permission to continue west of the Oise as a reconnaissance in force which was just enough for Guderian to continue as he had already been operating. .
Guderian in his command vehicle ( a modified sdkfz 251 halftrack) May 1940
The situation in front of the BEF and on its flanks had deteriorated to such an extent that it compelled Gort to issue his order requiring the immediate evacuation of all "useless mouths", undertaken principally from the ports of Boulogne, Calais and to a lesser extent from Dunkirk. By far the greatest numbers of these "useless mouths" were the sick and injured by then piling up in the hospitals and field stations.
Rundstedt issues orders, with Hitlers full support, for Kleist to restrain the formations under his spearhead command from advancing further than the Oise River, before the 18 May. This order for restraint is dutifully passed on by Kleist. Guderians response to this order is revealing of the mans brilliance as well as his temperament. He wrote in his autobiography "I neither would nor could agree to these orders which involved sacrificing the surprise we had gained, and giving away the success we had achieved. My conversation (with Von Kleist) became extremely heated….". Guderian claims in his memoirs that Von Kleist did agree to a 24 hour extension to the advance. Guderian then hurried back to Montcornet ordering his command to continue their advance. He met also with Reinhadt (XLI Korps commander) wherein the two men agreed to continue their advance until they ran out of petrol. Guderian wrote that he could not accept that Hitler who had promoted and supported Mansteins plan because of its boldness could now be frightened by "his own temerity and order the German advance to ber stopped"…..
He was wrong. The next day, he was ordered by Kleist to meet him at the designated XIX Korps airstrip. He was given a severe dressing down, to the point of offering his resignation. It required the intervention of List to partially resolve the impasse, where, importantly, Guderian was given permission to continue west of the Oise as a reconnaissance in force which was just enough for Guderian to continue as he had already been operating. .
Guderian in his command vehicle ( a modified sdkfz 251 halftrack) May 1940