Matt308
Glock Perfection
Especially with the newly developed hydorogen bomb. That thing was, what about 35,0000lbs or some ridiculousness. I would love to hear a high fidelity recording of the B-36. That must have been awesome to hear.
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I read the they tried "treads" to minimize load bearing to acceptable levels. But I have never seen pics of these bogies.
Agreed good post. However, I dispute that some assumptions regarding GCI capability around primary targets may offset your loss suppositions. The B-36 flew for most of the 50s, was (initially at least) a maintenance nightmare whose sortie rate was severely curtailed. Given that most aircraft would be unable to fly at max altitude with a heavy load out, the altitude defense seems much less effective, and perhaps very unlikely to avoid performance envelopes of Soviet interceptors.
FlyboyJ is exactly right that the whole Soviet GCI doctrine was developed during these years and based upon western tactics. However, I think we tend to underestimate the effectiveness border radar may have had, coupled with target defences. Certainly this is a multi-element problem, but the following were working against a successful overall mission assumed to be total annihilation -
- B-36 aircraft fleet size, reduced by sortie rate and aircraft geographic capability
- B-36 loadout (weapon effectiveness) for max range operations. They weren't flying 10,000nm at FL500 with the thermonuclear bomb of the era. They likely were carry a weapon of SIGNIFICANTLY less yield.
- B-36 defensive weapon capability were marginally effective as evidenced by their ultimate removal
- Targets necessary to declare mission success (mutual assured destruction accomplished) were large in numbers.
- Target diversity in a 8.7Million square mile geography meant few B-36s per target and likely only one
- Sheer number of interceptors scrambled to seek out aircraft whose inbound run was likely 4 to 5 hours
- Ability to obtain target run altitudes under max range + weapon loading that exceeded max altitude of interceptors was unlikely
- Effectivity of ECM by individual aircraft elements would likely have been counterproductive to minimizing detection.
Surely some would have gotten through and caused horrific destruction, but recall that the Russians had moved the majority of war production facilities to deep internal locations as part of the lessons learned from WWII. Thus targets were diverse and geographically isolated. I stick with my conclusion that the B-36 fleet would be decimated and unable to cripple the Soviet war machine.
I recognize that our conclusions are based upon our hypothetical scenarios, but again I am under the impression that we are talking about a super-long range penetration bomber over hostile territory with no friendly support. The classic SAC mission that was used to sell the B-36 to begin with. Just don't believe it would have ever lived up to the hype. Thank God for submarines.
Agreed good post. However, I dispute that some assumptions regarding GCI capability around primary targets may offset your loss suppositions. The B-36 flew for most of the 50s, was (initially at least) a maintenance nightmare whose sortie rate was severely curtailed. Given that most aircraft would be unable to fly at max altitude with a heavy load out, the altitude defense seems much less effective, and perhaps very unlikely to avoid performance envelopes of Soviet interceptors.
FlyboyJ is exactly right that the whole Soviet GCI doctrine was developed during these years and based upon western tactics. However, I think we tend to underestimate the effectiveness border radar may have had, coupled with target defences. Certainly this is a multi-element problem, but the following were working against a successful overall mission assumed to be total annihilation -
- B-36 aircraft fleet size, reduced by sortie rate and aircraft geographic capability
- B-36 loadout (weapon effectiveness) for max range operations. They weren't flying 10,000nm at FL500 with the thermonuclear bomb of the era. They likely were carry a weapon of SIGNIFICANTLY less yield.
- B-36 defensive weapon capability were marginally effective as evidenced by their ultimate removal
- Targets necessary to declare mission success (mutual assured destruction accomplished) were large in numbers.
- Target diversity in a 8.7Million square mile geography meant few B-36s per target and likely only one
- Sheer number of interceptors scrambled to seek out aircraft whose inbound run was likely 4 to 5 hours
- Ability to obtain target run altitudes under max range + weapon loading that exceeded max altitude of interceptors was unlikely
- Effectivity of ECM by individual aircraft elements would likely have been counterproductive to minimizing detection.
Surely some would have gotten through and caused horrific destruction, but recall that the Russians had moved the majority of war production facilities to deep internal locations as part of the lessons learned from WWII. Thus targets were diverse and geographically isolated. I stick with my conclusion that the B-36 fleet would be decimated and unable to cripple the Soviet war machine.
I recognize that our conclusions are based upon our hypothetical scenarios, but again I am under the impression that we are talking about a super-long range penetration bomber over hostile territory with no friendly support. The classic SAC mission that was used to sell the B-36 to begin with. Just don't believe it would have ever lived up to the hype. Thank God for submarines.
Don't patronize me with the "Matt disrespects SAC" bullshit.
You implied SAC palmed off a giant selling job on the B-36 Mission - which was to be THE deterrent to USSR by virtue of being able to reach central Russia with the biggest stick in the world... and then went on to 'thank god for submarines'.. so I took your meaning that it made far more sense to you to put faith in the deterrence capability of the sub.
If you take the comment I made that I thought you had little respect for SAC, well I have to say you are perceptive - that is exactly what I read into your comment.
But 'patronizing', no.. but it was not meant to be.
But let's take the 'sub analogy a little further, I'm wondering how frightened the Sov Planners were in 1953-54 (or 47-52) of fleet boats sinking the Kremlin in Red Square or T-54 factories in the Urals .. Is that the force threat you had in mind while blessing our Father for the 'submarine' (or did you mean Rickover?)
It would be some time before the Triad came into play, so I confess you confused me - Again - but you know I am easily confused!
We are trying to have a moronic discussion that is of necessity overly simplified with respect to our battleplan assumptions. If we want to contrast US and Soviet airforce's, battle doctrine and integration with land and sea assets, then I don't want to play. The solution space quickly becomes so complex and technical, that neither you nor I are qualified to make any meaningful statements.
Nah, its not really complicated at all. It's pure belief/disbelief w/o one shred of hard evidence. The only soft evidence is that we either believe SAC was an effective instrument of World Peace in the 47-54 time - or not. Ditto USN and/or 'submarines'
The only thing complicated is how many of the fleet has to get in to eliminate USSR ability to a.) make stuff that hurts, and b.) how quickly they starve to death - no matter how far the troops get in Europe - as a result of whatever number gets through with Nucs... and it's all SAC Matt- submarines don't contribute squat to the scenario (at least not any of ours). So if you don't believe that the B-36 could deliver you have every right to believe what you believe. Neither one of us will deliver facts in this discussion
BTW a shot down down B-36 crew that arms its weapons makes an ugly mess 'somewhere' in USSR even if it isn't what the strike planners had in mind
I believe that we can have a discussion of its role as a long range penetration bomber over hostile territory (its classic SAC role, as sold to congress)
But not bought by you..? I can see you might be too clever to be fooled by that LeMay rascal or the capability of those arrogant old SAC'sters- (he was a real laugh wasn't he) - but he sure could sell against all those brilliant admirals that just knew in their heart of hearts that the Carrier was the answer to USSR expansion notions.. You suppose the USSR was all that confident it was 'con job' over Congress?
BTW - if you aren't tuned into 1947-1954 in this discussion then I apologise for falling back 15-20 years from the timeframe when we actually had ballistic missiles and SAC wasn't the ONLY deep USSR delivery team
and as evidenced by the numerous desperate attempts to attach parasitic fighters all over the bloody thing (including one on each wingtip??). Anything beyond that and I suspect the US historical order of battle is probably still not available under the Freedom of Information Act.
Those dumb SOB's at SAC never could get it right, could they? Wonder if that is the reason so many clever (and workable) schemes for stand off launch capability of missles came about?? Try, and try again and someday you will succeed?? or just more dumb ideas
Let's both agree that the B-36 was an engineering marvel and contributed to our safety. And it did so without erroneous claims that it would be loaded with a 42,000lb Mk17 15MT thermonuclear bomb flying at night at 50,000ft with a full fuel load and 420kt max speed for 10,000nm in the late 1950s against soviet interceptors incapable of operations at night.
Agreed, and from the very beginning of my arguments if you want to go back. I was one of those that agreed with You that the jetless B-36 was a 200-230 TAS wonder with a MAX range - no refuel- no H-Bomb, in the 3500-4000 mile arena.. I am also aware that with the jet engine capability and it's radar that it was still a formidable adversary to the Mig 15/17 through 1954, in singles - at night and with any semblance of planning on striking at early defense capabilities... you wouldn't have to take out many airfields and radar sites to open a dark corridor.
Neither we NOR the USSR was particularly adept at stopping 50,000 ft 450-550 mph penetration over the North Pole until SAMs came into play with an integrated ADC.
See all is good in the world. The moronic comment was not aimed as a personal slight. Rather it was a description of two internet junkies discussing WWIII weapon systems and tactical doctrine. And you have to admit, that compared to real world planning and analysis, our contributions could very well be described as "moronic".
...off to another thread.