Top 3 mistakes per country, in field of military aviation

[Shortround6]

What is puzzling that if that was the condition/s in Feb 1942 when Harris took over (and I am most certainly not saying those were not the conditions) then what had the RAF been doing during the 30s and 1940/41 to solve the navigation problem for a Force/Service whose primary purpose (according to many of it's leaders/proponents) was the long range destruction of the enemies ability to wage war.

It doesn't matter what airframe was being used if the "details" like navigation and crew survivability are ignored.
It becomes the aerial equivalent of "going over the top" in WW I. Large losses (unsustainable) for little gain.

 

[stona]

They were supposed to operate in daylight. Navigation is relatively easy when you can see the ground and land marks. The RAF called this type of navigation 'Bradshawing' after a famous railway guide which is revealing. They simply followed railway lines.
They might have to fly across the North Sea, but on making a landfall somewhere on the coast of the Low Countries if they were heading for the Ruhr, they would easily be able to re-orientate themselves for the on going flight.
Even for daylight operations there were difficulties. Harris was one of the few who appreciated this. When he took over 4 Group in 1937 he instituted a program of night and long distance flying. His superior, Ludlow Hewitt was still expressing reservations.

"...the rapid expansion of the numbers of aircraft had been at the expense of crew training and navigation aids."

Harris' successor at 4 Group, Coningham, made the prescient comment that successful night operations would amount to

"the never ending struggle to circumvent the law that we cannot see in the dark".

He was not the only one who anticipated problems. Bomber Command issued a report on 10th April 1940 in which it stated

"Our general opinion is that under war conditions the average crew of a night bomber could not be relied upon to identify and attack targets at night except under he very best conditions of visibility, even when the target is on the coast or on a large river like the Rhine...
if the target has no conspicuous aids to its location, very few inexperienced crews would be likely to find it under any conditions."

Within days the Air Ministry ordered Bomber Command to concentrate on night time operations! What exactly it was expecting the bomber crews to find, let alone hit, given the Command's own pessimistic view of its abilities nobody seems to have asked.

The mistake, in the context of this thread has already been mentioned. It was the belief that the bombers would reach their targets without prohibitive losses in daylight. This was not a British mistake, just about everyone made the same mistake.
The problem of navigation at night was identified early. The problem was it took time to develop the sophisticated aids and training to overcome them. There was no magic wand that could have been waved in 1940 for a solution in 1941/2.
By 1945 Bomber Command was able to fly deep into Germany and concentrate its bombers in time and space with terrible consequences for Germany. In February 1945 all 240 aircraft of 5 Group, in the initial attack on Dresden, dropped their bombs, accurately, in fifteen minutes. That's better than one bomb load dropped every four seconds. The 881 tons of bombs that fell in the city in that fifteen minutes had well documented results.

Cheers

Steve

 

[yulzari]

Shortround The Soviets had escort fighters for the distances needed but chose to use them as low level battlefield cover.

Keeping a railway going under regular air and special forces/partisan (properly both are 'partizan' in 18th century terms) attacks is like herding cats and you quickly run out of specialised rails and joints. Also the specialist repair rolling stock is rare and vulnerable. The aim is to prevent the route providing resources in adequate quantity. 1,500 km of railway x the number of E-W lines takes a huge number of troops etc. which themselves need to be supported by the railway and thus drain it's utility. The Germans were known to have to try to sweep areas in tens of thousands of all arms troops. The lines were at peak use. Any delay could not be made up. Time lost meant supplies did not arrive. The German army was a horse based one. Lorries were in short supply and roads were unmetalled and vulnerable to rain and ice. Rail support was the only way operations in Russia could be carried out. 24 hours is a meaningful shortfall in supplies and only needs to happen once a day over a length of hundreds of kilometres. Never mind bridges and tunnels. Damaging both is best done with a train in situ.

However, all this is matters of opinion so we had best agree to differ.

Ah yes. The magic .50" HMG. That solved the problem.........................

 

[Shortround6]

They were supposed to operate in daylight. Navigation is relatively easy when you can see the ground and land marks. The RAF called this type of navigation 'Bradshawing' after a famous railway guide which is revealing. They simply followed railway lines.
They might have to fly across the North Sea, but on making a landfall somewhere on the coast of the Low Countries if they were heading for the Ruhr, they would easily be able to re-orientate themselves for the on going flight.
Even for daylight operations there were difficulties. Harris was one of the few who appreciated this. When he took over 4 Group in 1937 he instituted a program of night and long distance flying. His superior, Ludlow Hewitt was still expressing reservations..........

The RAF in general may have been expecting to operate in daylight but during the 30s there was always a least one "night" bomber squadron and may pre-war references to the Whitley refer to it as a "night bomber". The problems, at least some of them (navigator being a poor career choice might not have been known), should have started showing up in 1937-38 if not before.
And once again, lessons from WW I were either forgotten or ignored. There had been 8 squadrons Flying Handley Page O/400s at night by the time of the Armistice, let alone other night bomber squadrons.

 

[Shortround6]

Shortround The Soviets had escort fighters for the distances needed but chose to use them as low level battlefield cover.

Keeping a railway going under regular air and special forces/partisan (properly both are 'partizan' in 18th century terms) attacks is like herding cats and you quickly run out of specialised rails and joints. Also the specialist repair rolling stock is rare and vulnerable. The aim is to prevent the route providing resources in adequate quantity. 1,500 km of railway x the number of E-W lines takes a huge number of troops etc. which themselves need to be supported by the railway and thus drain it's utility. The Germans were known to have to try to sweep areas in tens of thousands of all arms troops. The lines were at peak use. Any delay could not be made up. Time lost meant supplies did not arrive. The German army was a horse based one. Lorries were in short supply and roads were unmetalled and vulnerable to rain and ice. Rail support was the only way operations in Russia could be carried out. 24 hours is a meaningful shortfall in supplies and only needs to happen once a day over a length of hundreds of kilometres.

The specialized rolling stock is pretty much a few flat cars carrying spare rail (no special rail needed unless a switch/points was hit)
perhaps a gondola carrying gravel and few cars/wagons of some sort to carry the guys with the shovels. In good weather it was not unheard of for large crews to lay 8-10 miles of single track on prepared (or semi prepared) roadbed in a single day while building 19th century trans-Continental railways with about zero power assist. Most if not all rail at the time in question was in lengths of around 10 yds/meters and joints were pretty much standard. Modern rail is continuously welded and rather different.

Bombing rail lines in Poland was beyond the escort capability of most Russian fighters until 1944/45.

Conscript labor works rather well as shovel brigades. Not a lot training needed for filling in bomb craters or shoveling/raking gravel/pounding in spikes. Not a lot of opportunity for sabotage either.

See this video for a rather theatrical rendition of track laying.


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IgVWf0S_mog

 

[stona]

The RAF in general may have been expecting to operate in daylight but during the 30s there was always a least one "night" bomber squadron and may pre-war references to the Whitley refer to it as a "night bomber". The problems, at least some of them (navigator being a poor career choice might not have been known), should have started showing up in 1937-38 if not before.
And once again, lessons from WW I were either forgotten or ignored. There had been 8 squadrons Flying Handley Page O/400s at night by the time of the Armistice, let alone other night bomber squadrons.

True, but one night bomber squadron does not an offensive make. Harris had 4 Group flying night time exercises before the war as well. The general expectation was to fly by day.
Between the outbreak of the war and 9th April 1940, close to when the switch to night time bombing commenced, there were only three nights on which bombs were dropped. There were obviously many other restrictions in place during this period, bombs were dropped on only eighteen daytime raids.
By May-June 1940 the number of night time sorties was more than double those in daytime (3,848 and 1,601).
By the June-October period the RAF Bomber Command was operating largely by night. The sortie numbers are now 8,804 to 1,185.
Cheers
Steve

 

[tomo pauk]

Good list; some comments:

...
For US - 1.) not recognizing the limitations of unescorted bombers to prosecute daylight precision attacks on Strategic targets, 2,) failure to emphasize Range combined with high performance in Requests for Proposals in 1940, 3.) Failure to develop two speed/two stage in-line engine as competition to Allison, either by license to Rolls or parallel development, as a necessary first step to build escort fighters to protect AAF high altitude bomber doctrine...

Re. 2): That failure really cut P-47's potential too much, leaving many LW pilots to live another day and score kills on heavies in the process.
Re. 3): Failures in engine 'policy' were not starting up the 2-stage program with V-1710 earlier. There was 2-stage R-2800 in volume production, early enough (January 1942, ie. earlier than 2-stage Merlin?), that USAF never made any use in day fighters.
The P-38s and P-47s were 1st steps in escort capability, having the P-47s without suitable drop tanks and not having the 2nd source for the P-38 (hence not enough of them for all 3 theaters USAF fought) meant that B-17s/24s in ETO were without maeningful escort in 1943.
The P-51 with 1-stage V-1650 would've been a great asset in 1943, unfortunately it was not meant to be.

A failure might also be not jumping into opportunity too have P-51 ASAP in production for USAF, even with V-1710 on board..

For USSR - 1,) The Stalin purge of his officer corps combined with his failure to comprehend the speed and ferocity of the combined air and ground forces of Germany to advance to point of defeat and control of Moscow in six months, 2.) not developing an equal or better fighter than the Bf 109 by 1941 despite the observed results of the Bf 109 in Spain, 3.) not developing a program to train skilled pilots in quantity when it was pretty clear during the Spanish Civil War that Germany posed a grave threat to the USSR, further emphasized by the demonstrated power of the LW during the invasion of Poland.
...

The failure here might've been not going with 'pre-Tu 2' bomber, with AM-38 engines.
As for a fighter better than Bf 109, too bad the MiG-1/3 was not outfitted with 2 syncronised cannons until too late, and that version with AM-38 was not perfected and put into production, and later with AM-39 on board.

Yes - I'm all for producing far less Il-2s (prime user of AM-38 engines) than it was the case.

 

[Shortround6]

For US - 1.) not recognizing the limitations of unescorted bombers to prosecute daylight precision attacks on Strategic targets, 2,) failure to emphasize Range combined with high performance in Requests for Proposals in 1940, 3.) Failure to develop two speed/two stage in-line engine as competition to Allison, either by license to Rolls or parallel development, as a necessary first step to build escort fighters to protect AAF high altitude bomber doctrine.

#1 might have to do with timing and basing your defense on your own offense and not what your enemy really has.
Part of the US bombing doctrine was that the US bombers would use their altitude advantage provided by turbo chargers to help evade enemy attacks, not just flak. The change from small formations to large ones may play into it too. Small formations being faster. Early B-17s could ( I am not saying did) operate at speeds at 25,000ft that made interception difficult for the allied fighters in use in 1940-41 in exercises/tests.
B-17E had initial contract placed Aug 30 1940 so I am not sure how much time had been allowed for lessons of the BoB to be absorbed and in any case comparing the defensive armament of a He 111 during the BoB to the defensive armament of a B-17E leaves room for hope on the part of the B-17. Germans took a different path to performance at 25,000ft than the US for fighters. Large engine in small airframe with limited fuel and armament.

#2 is a bit iffy. US fighters like the P-47 having double the range on internal fuel than the Spitfire or 109 had at "nominal" cruising speeds ( around 200mph). This turned out to be pretty much useless in the escort role but specifying a "nominal" range of 1200 miles or better in 1940-41? The P-47 might have come close by using the 370 gal internal fuel capacity from the beginning (early P-47 burned 65 gal an hour at 200mph IAS (248mph true?) at 12,000ft. for a "nominal" range of about 1120miles. Still would need drop tanks for actual escort missions. Get the Army to drop back to 4-6 guns and less ammo and the weight problem goes away even for planes with tooth pick props and no water injection.

#3 runs into Army philosophy of using turbochargers. Army had spent several million dollars by 1941 on the Continental V-1430 and Lycoming O-1230 projects which relied on turbos for the 2nd stage..
True they turned out to be major mistakes but many of the 1940-41 fighters were planned around the Continental engine at Army insistence. XP-49, XP-55, and others (including the P-39E which was switched to two stage Allison engines with the continued problems with the Continental.)
Having the basic Merlin in production in the United States was a stroke of pure luck rather than good planning.

 

[Shortround6]

True, but one night bomber squadron does not an offensive make. Harris had 4 Group flying night time exercises before the war as well. The general expectation was to fly by day.

One squadron certainly does not make for an offensive but for too many years that one squadron was a "night" bomber squadron in name only and did little to develop techniques or even highlight potential problems.

 

[drgondog]

#1 might have to do with timing and basing your defense on your own offense and not what your enemy really has.
Part of the US bombing doctrine was that the US bombers would use their altitude advantage provided by turbo chargers to help evade enemy attacks, not just flak. The change from small formations to large ones may play into it too. Small formations being faster. Early B-17s could ( I am not saying did) operate at speeds at 25,000ft that made interception difficult for the allied fighters in use in 1940-41 in exercises/tests.
B-17E had initial contract placed Aug 30 1940 so I am not sure how much time had been allowed for lessons of the BoB to be absorbed and in any case comparing the defensive armament of a He 111 during the BoB to the defensive armament of a B-17E leaves room for hope on the part of the B-17. Germans took a different path to performance at 25,000ft than the US for fighters. Large engine in small airframe with limited fuel and armament.

SR - only 500+ B-17E's were built and most went to ETO. They incorporated many RAF lessons learned. The E with a full bomb load, in formation at 25000 ft in which 'slowest' is the formation speed, cruised at 150IAS/220 TAS in 1942 - 150mph below the 109G-2 and G-5 and the FW 190A-5. Ira Eaker was an attaché looking at BoB and understood what the potential issues were but always believed the 'bombers (With enough critical mass) could overwhelm LW defenses. The act that he doubled down with Arnold and Spaatz ensured his 'promotion' to run MTO and Doolittle taking over 8th AF. In fairness all the bomber mafia were pressing NAA and Republic and Lockheed for more range as early as Feb/Mar 1943.

#2 is a bit iffy. US fighters like the P-47 having double the range on internal fuel than the Spitfire or 109 had at "nominal" cruising speeds ( around 200mph). This turned out to be pretty much useless in the escort role but specifying a "nominal" range of 1200 miles or better in 1940-41? The P-47 might have come close by using the 370 gal internal fuel capacity from the beginning (early P-47 burned 65 gal an hour at 200mph IAS (248mph true?) at 12,000ft. for a "nominal" range of about 1120miles. Still would need drop tanks for actual escort missions. Get the Army to drop back to 4-6 guns and less ammo and the weight problem goes away even for planes with tooth pick props and no water injection.

The P-47C cruised at best Sfc (clean w/o tanks) about 300 at 25K and about 270 with 75 gallon externals. The P-38 was slower at 25K. The P-51-1 had straight line range (w/O ferry tanks) of about 1200 miles and an op radius of 350+. When the A-36 built in the bomb rack/fuel tank pylon in early 1943, the P-51A, then the B/C extended op radius to 350-400 miles for similarly equipped P-38 of 300-350 and P-47D 275- 300. (Mid 1943). The pressurized 75 gallon tanks (requiring mods to both the airframe and tank happened in early 1944.

#3 runs into Army philosophy of using turbochargers. Army had spent several million dollars by 1941 on the Continental V-1430 and Lycoming O-1230 projects which relied on turbos for the 2nd stage..
True they turned out to be major mistakes but many of the 1940-41 fighters were planned around the Continental engine at Army insistence. XP-49, XP-55, and others (including the P-39E which was switched to two stage Allison engines with the continued problems with the Continental.)
Having the basic Merlin in production in the United States was a stroke of pure luck rather than good planning.

Agree - but acceptance that bombers need escort immediately drives the range question - and the ARMY RFP process missed the P-51 and only gained the attention of Arnold, et al when the results (pushed by Tommy Hitchcock - carefully watching RAF/Rolls Rolls) in spring/fall 1942 - realized that the combination of internal fuel/in-line engine- two speed/tow stage supercharger - gave the AAF a great solution to an impossible problem.

Had the AAF Bomber Mafia been overcome with Prescience and fortune telling - AND had the political ability to drive Allison in 1940 orclose on RR migration to Packard, then maybe, just maybe the P-51B could have been jump started to enter combat ops before Black Thursday on October 14, 1943.

 

[GrauGeist]

Dave - I disagree to a degree. For both Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany. the prevailing leadership believed the US to weak and soft. Yamamoto was an exception and he was ignored. Speer was an exception and he was ignored.

Even Hitler knew of the industrial capacity and efficiency of American industry to the point of Hitler mentioning Henry Ford in his "Mein Kampf" and Henry Ford being awarded the Grand Cross of the German Eagle.
Several American automakers were involved in German industry (Ford and Opel, for example), there were also alot of other interactions between German and American industrialists.

Likewise, the Japanese were well aware of American industrial potential, as the Japanese and American industrialists interacted a great deal during the 20's and 30's.

Like I mentioned before, the Japanese were banking on the premise that the American public would have no stomach for war and a decisive blow (Pearl Harbor) would demoralize the public and increase the anti-war sentiment. If this didn't work, then a stunning victory of the weakened USN in a grand battle would drive them to the negotiating table.

The problem is, Pearl Harbor had the exact opposite reaction that they were counting on. Additionally, the great showdown never happened. The IJN missed several opportunities to have that "grand battle" when the USN was in a precarious position and time was of the essence, because the U.S. industry kicked into high-gear on a war-wime footing and within a short time, overwhelmed the Japanese. Yamamoto knew this, but I can guarantee you that many others in the cabinet knew it as well, but would never admit it.

The He 162? who thought that up?

Late war desperation...went from napkin sketch to flyingprototype in less than 6 months...

Regarding the Me 262: Since jets were inevitable (the He 178 flew in 1939), the Germans would have been foolish not to develop it as quickly as possible (they started in 1939), and it did make more sense as an interceptor than as a "fast bomber". However, given the stage of jet engine development (Goering cut funding in 1940) and the fact that the Germans were massively outnumbered by 1943-44 anyway, it really makes little difference whether 262's were bombers, fighters, or a mix. Should they have focused on the He 280 instead? Hell no. Just look at the thing. Two jets slung under an airframe that looks more suited to 1939 than 1944. The Me 262 clearly would have had greater potential for development

As far as the He280, it was a fighter in the true sense of the word. According to pilots who flew it, it was responsive, light on the controls and handled remarkabley well. It was well armed, having 3 20mm MG151/20 cannon in the nose, which would have made it one of the heaviest armed fighters for that point in time. A far as having two "jets slung under an airframe"...the configuration of the engine nacelles were not much different than the Me262 and then again, same can be said for the Meteor.
In regards to the He280's timeline historically, it could have been available for production before the Me262's prototype was finished being tested and refined.
So like I've mentioned before, had the RLM had the foresight to embrace and fund the jet program (engines, airframes), the He280 could have been on hand as a fighter AND with the introduction of the Me262 as a heavy fighter (interceptor), it could have flown top cover and protected the Me262s as it attacked the bombers (the bombers were inevitable...there is no way Germany would escape that).

The only difference historically, is that if Germany had gone ahead with the jets early on, then Britain and the U.S. would have ramped up their programs as a priority (the P-59 first flew in 1942) and the air battles over Europe would have had a much different look.

 

[stona]

One squadron certainly does not make for an offensive but for too many years that one squadron was a "night" bomber squadron in name only and did little to develop techniques or even highlight potential problems.

Yep. When Harris took over Bomber Command in 1942, the third year of the war, he found serious deficiencies which he listed in his 'Despatch on War Operations'.

"These were, primarily, lack of suitable aircraft in sufficient numbers, absence of effective navigational aids, and a serious deficiency of trained crews. Moreover, the handicaps were not only due to a lack of material and trained personnel, as there were technical and tactical problems affecting the employment of the force which could only be surmounted by intensive research, continual experiment, and unshakable resolution."

It is easy to argue that these factors should have been addressed two years earlier. They were acknowledged, it just took time for the aircraft, technologies and training to be achieved. When Harris arrived all of this was on the verge of happening. It was the impetus and drive provided by Harris that ensured it happened as soon as possible. He did not start the process.

In the pre-war years the development schedule for a new bomber was an incredible 96 months (eight years!) including 43 months of official procedures including 13 months of tests at Martlesham Heath and 12 months in which alterations were incorporated into the design and production requirements discussed. Obviously this was much reduced in the immediate pre-war and wartime period, but it is relevant to understand how the Air Ministry and industry were accustomed to working. Any working culture takes time and effort to change, you can't just turn it upside down without a catastrophic loss of production.

The fact that Bomber Command became the force it was within eighteen months shows just how badly Harris has been treated by many popular historians, and how he has shouldered the blame for issues surrounding the Anglo-American bombing campaign which others ducked. Harris was always completely honest about what he was trying to do and what he was bombing. He urged others to do the same, he didn't feel that there was anything to hide or apologise for. This is in direct contrast to the Americans who never publicly admitted to anything other than precision bombing.

Cheers

Steve

 

[stona]

Some perspective re: navigational aids.
The operational use of Gee was first the subject of a Bomber Command Operational Research Section report, Memorandum 23, titled 'Operational Use of Gee' on 1st December 1941.The document outlined various potential uses for T.R.1335/Gee.
The ORS was entrusted with drawing up plans for practical experimental use of Gee. The resultant paper was Memorandum 30 which was titled 'The Operational Use of Gee III. The use of flares in conjunction with Gee.' This paper presaged not only how Gee would be used but also sowed the seeds of what would evolve into the Pathfinder Force.
The first experimental attacks, code named 'Crackers I' and II' took place over the Isle of Man and Wales on 13th and 20th February 1942 respectively and confirmed the viability of the 'Shaker' attack. This was an attack in three waves, first Gee equipped flare dropping 'Illuminators', then incendiary dropping 'Target Markers' and finally the 'Followers' bombing on the marking.
Bomber Command had its first coordinated, electronically aided mode of attack just in time for Harris to take over. There was much development, notably on the pyrotechnics used for marking, but with relatively minor variations this sort of attack became the backbone of operations for the rest of the war. It didn't exist until February/March 1942.
Cheers
Steve

 

[mikewint]

The He 280 was plagued with engine problems. The HeS 8 sort-of worked and the aircraft was flown on 30 Mar 1941 for Udet who was unimpressed though the fact that it burned kerosene was a BIG plus. Here we can insert the big IF. Had Udet approved the 280 and Heinkel received full funding and the HeS 8's technical problem been solved…

With a smaller footprint, greater ease of maintenance and better reliability than the Me 262, the He 280could have become operational by mid-1942. At that point, although the Royal Air Force was bombing Germany at night, the Allies did not yet have a full-fledged air campaign over the continent. The fledgling U.S. Eighth Air Force was still struggling merely to come into existence.

The Americans were going to change everything with their own four-engine heavy bombers and with high altitude precision daylight bombing of military and industrial targets. Yet as late as October 1943, they lost 60 bombers on one mission and had not yet fielded a true escort fighter, the P-51 Mustang. General Eisenhower was telling anyone who would listen that the Allied air campaign would have to succeed or plans for the invasion of Europe would have to be put on hold. If hundreds of He 280s had been in the field before the bombing campaign even began, before the first P-51 arrived or even before the first American bombers reached Berlin in March 1944, B-17s and B-24s could have been swept from the skies.

Instead without government support Heinkel started another engine design the HeS 30 and built another prototype equipped with 6 Argus As014 pulsejets (V-1 style). The prototype never got to fire it's pulsejets as on 13 Jan 1942 it iced-up, freezing the controls, while being towed aloft and Helmut Schenk went down in history as the first pilot to eject from an aircraft. At this point the RLM orders Heinkel to abandon both the HeS 8 and the HeS30 and focus on yet a third engine design the HeS 011.

22 Dec 1943 – a 280 with redesigned HeS 8 engines competes head to head with an Fw 190. The 280 completes 4 laps of the course while the 190 is working on it's third. The RLM is finally impressed and orders 20 prototypes.

Even with this the HeS 8s were still not reliable and Heinkel decided to go with BMW003 engines, which were also having their own problems and delays. So Heinkel again switched engines to the bigger and heavier Jumo004s. Though the aircraft flew with the Jumos, the big Jumos were unsuited to the 280 and performance/efficiency suffered. On 27 Mar 1943 the 280 project was killed for good

From an engineering perspective, the He 280 was more complex (tail problems) and had less growth potential in its design. The Me 262 with good engines was better tailored for air defense.

Was the Heinkel effort deterred in part by Ernst Heinkel's misguided effort to develop an advanced four-engined bomber,the He 177? Was the effort deterred by Heinkel's personally falling into disfavor with Hitler and other Reich leaders?

We can only speculate.

 

[stona]

If hundreds of He 280s had been in the field before the bombing campaign even began,before the first P-51 arrivedor even before the first American bombers reached Berlin in March 1944, B-17s and B-24s could have been swept from the skies.

Swept from the daylight skies. The elephant in the room, rarely discussed, is the conversion of the USAAF to night time operations. They could have done it, not quickly, but an awful lot of the donkey work had already been done by the British.

The American bombing at night should have eventually matched Bomber Command's, considerably more accurate than their own 'radar' bombing in bad visibility by day.

Cheers

Steve

 

[tomo pauk]

Among 3 top mistakes that LW/RLM made might be a too late introduction of 2-stage supercharged engines, some 3 years later than RAF and 4 (four) years later than USN.

 

[GrauGeist]

The He 280 was plagued with engine problems. The HeS 8 sort-of worked and the aircraft was flown on 30 Mar 1941 for Udet who was unimpressed though the fact that it burned kerosene was a BIG plus. Here we can insert the big IF. Had Udet approved the 280 and Heinkel received full funding and the HeS 8's technical problem been solved…

And that's my point exactly...

The RLM saw the He178 demonstrated and did not realize the full potential and yawned it off.

The RLM saw the He280 and dismissed it and the technology yet again.

Had the RLM backed the engine development when they first saw the He178 (or sooner - when von Ohain successfully ran his prototype engine) and made it a priority, then the jet program would have been much more mature as the war got under way. I am a little surprised that when Udet finally backed the He280, he didn't insist on it being dive-bomb capable!

On the otherhand, Henschel DID actually make a jet powered dive-bomber (Hs132)! So perhaps someone was trying to stay ahead of the trend?

 

[mikewint]

#1 ERROR: Listening to Göring. Göring was courageous and brilliant but a drug addict. Hitler likely delayed the attack on Dunkirk as well as his invasion of Britain because of Goring's optimism about the power of the Luftwaffe. Hitler left his army in Russia because Göring told him he could resupply them by air. This cost him a quarter of a million soldiers. Göring's optimistic albeit misleading reports about the British air campaign may have led Hitler to keep losing planes and trained pilots longer than he might have otherwise. His Luftwaffe never recovered from the heavy losses suffered over England. Göring campaigned against developing a long range bomber. A decision that came back to haunt the Nazis. Goring may have single-handedly cost the Germans the war. Hitler eventually quit listening to Göring but by then it was too late.
Germany was never prepared for the war to be as long as it was. They were reliant on blitzkrieg as their main tactic and when this failed, the army faced a long war in which they were not prepared for. In his military thinking, Hitler believed in the importance of a short war. Germany had always planned for a quick war, and because of this they were not prepared for the long war that ultimately developed. Total war was not implemented until 1943, and by this time the Germans were already facing defeat. The military began to run out of resources, and began to collapse because the home front was not supportive enough of the campaigns. The general population that were not out fighting had no idea that Germany was losing, because they still had a high standard of living, and propaganda did not tell them otherwise. In February 1943, Goebbels finally called on the German people to wage total war, even though Germany was already facing defeat.
Most German factories did ramp up production, but did not go to full 3-shift production until after Albert Speer took over from Göring in 1942. The Germans did not at first understand the necessity because they thought they were in for a short war. But it is incredible that peak German production took place in 1944 after the war was strategically lost. What could have been done had they had such production when it was still conceivable to win in 1940 and 1941? More tanks & aircraft wisely used in 1941 and they might have been able to take Moscow. Instead Allied productivity outstripped the Germans. This oversight is a reflection of Göring's and Hitler's foolishness and lack of administrative ability.
Albert Speer said Hitler had a heat-seeking missile that could have turned back the Allied air invasion. Multiple sources confirm this. Instead of okaying development of this potential game changer Hitler squandered valuable resources (estimates range from half to twice the cost of the Manhattan project. One estimate is, inflation adjusted, $500 billion vs $25 billion for the Manhattan project) developing the V-2 rocket, a nearly useless tactical weapon that delivered a warhead only 15% larger than the V-1's for far greater cost.

 

[Shortround6]

Among 3 top mistakes that LW/RLM made might be a too late introduction of 2-stage supercharged engines, some 3 years later than RAF and 4 (four) years later than USN.

Part of that may be fuel related. You need high performance number fuel for the two stage superchargers to work. Could the Germans plan on enough C3 fuel to go around? Coordinating fuel production and engine development might have been difficult.

 

[Shortround6]

The Germans failure to develop/produce long range heavy bombers is often trotted out as a mistake but had the Germans followed that path it may have been a bigger mistake.
Substitute He 177s for B-17s or Lancasters and try to figure if that would have made any difference to the air war. The Germans simple could not produce enough 4 engine bombers to have any real impact on the war and if they tried they would have been in the same boat/s as the Americans and British. By day not having escort fighters needed for raids into Russia or even attacking Britain by daylight. By night the navigation problems over Russia would have been huge (bad enough by day). Perhaps the Germans could have stayed a step ahead of the British in night flying/bombing aids for use over Britain, perhaps not. External navigation aids (radio beacons on the ground) don't work (or work as well) at long range due to the curvature of the earth.
The American and British bombing campaigns worked to some extent but they were using bombers in quantities that the Germans could never hope to match.