Vietnam War architect Robert McNamara dies.

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Errrrr hang on a minute...
I didn't title this thread 'A time to rejoice' - I don't care what he's done, I wouldn't ask anyone to rejoice over a person's death

...and what's my Vietnam thread doing in Off Topic?

I have changed it for you. I removed the "Time to Rejoice part?"
 
I agree that McNamara got things wrong. That is not my problem with him. Everybody gets things wrong, comes with the territory. Failure to adapt, definitely his problem. But even that is something I don't hold against him. The guy was rigid, but most number guys are. If the math doesn't work, they have problems seeing other alternatives. He was an "X number of bombs dropped will get Y results and if we kill this many NVA/VC, we will win the battle" type of thinker. Again, not unusual, in the world and that I don't hold against him.

What bothers me is the guy pretty much ran the show for years, and then, in the late 60s, comes out and says the war can't be won and we probably should've never gone there in the first place. Where the hell was this thought in '62?

I'm not a big fan of Westmoreland either, but he never shied away from responsibility for the war. He owned it, knew it and died knowing it. He didn't always give the most accurate answers and was another bright bulb that lost it in the real world.

But McNamara tried to dodge the bullet when it was over. That has always bothered me.
 
I agree that McNamara got things wrong. That is not my problem with him. Everybody gets things wrong, comes with the territory. Failure to adapt, definitely his problem. But even that is something I don't hold against him. The guy was rigid, but most number guys are. If the math doesn't work, they have problems seeing other alternatives. He was an "X number of bombs dropped will get Y results and if we kill this many NVA/VC, we will win the battle" type of thinker. Again, not unusual, in the world and that I don't hold against him.

What bothers me is the guy pretty much ran the show for years, and then, in the late 60s, comes out and says the war can't be won and we probably should've never gone there in the first place. Where the hell was this thought in '62?

I'm not a big fan of Westmoreland either, but he never shied away from responsibility for the war. He owned it, knew it and died knowing it. He didn't always give the most accurate answers and was another bright bulb that lost it in the real world.

But McNamara tried to dodge the bullet when it was over. That has always bothered me.


I don't think McNamara tried to renounce his responsibility for the war...he just said he (we) made a mistake. Not the same thing, and IMO a far harder thing to admit.
 
Is it possible he relied on "intelligence" that was supplied to him to make his decisions and at that period of time IMHO the US Military was not all what it could be (that is not a blanket statement) .
 
"The Fog of War"

I thought it was so good I watched it again with my dad just hours after I had seen it the first time. The most chilling aspect of it was when he started rattled off the names of Japanese cites and the percent of each that were obliterated by LeMay's B-29's. But what really brought those figures home was when they equated each Japanese city to similar well known American cities by way of comparison. Chillingly systematic. War on (almost) an assembly line.
 
Thanks Vick, the name had totally gone out of my head. That section you referred to was particularly chilling - and as he reeled off the American cities, I was mentally trying to equate them to British cities as well. That mechanisation of warfare is incredibly harrowing, but I think it points to where McNamara might have gone wrong with Vietnam. It was a very different kind of war from WWII, and I think maybe MaNamara failed to appreciate that industrial output and crushing force would not have the same effect in Vietnam as they had in Japan.
 
Thanks Vick, the name had totally gone out of my head. That section you referred to was particularly chilling - and as he reeled off the American cities, I was mentally trying to equate them to British cities as well. That mechanisation of warfare is incredibly harrowing, but I think it points to where McNamara might have gone wrong with Vietnam. It was a very different kind of war from WWII, and I think maybe MaNamara failed to appreciate that industrial output and crushing force would not have the same effect in Vietnam as they had in Japan.

It would have had the same effect in N. Vietnam as it had in Japan in my opinion if the US forces were allowed to fight that type of war. It was a winnable conflict that was ruined by South Vietnameses and American politics.
 
Perhaps, but then how would carpet-bombing North Vietnamese cities affected the VCs ability to fight in the countryside? US air resources were, IMHO, much better employed in interdicting the Ho Chi Minh Trail, a masssive task in itself. The crux of the Vietnam debate, for me at leats, is whether a US military physically and doctrinally equipped to fight a large scale conventional or tactically nuclear war in NW Europe could adapt and find the means to fight a mostly guerilla war in the jungles of SE Asia. The historical record suggests that they could not - after all, the US left and South Vietnam fell. While it is true that political intervention from the US and the sometimes questionable effectiveness of ARVN forces were factor in this failure, I personally believe that the most important factor was what I perceive as a desire among US leaders to fight a war with the US's traditional strengths (superior technology and crushing application of firepower), against an enemy who could negate these advantages my melting away from the point of application into the jungle.
 
Perhaps, but then how would carpet-bombing North Vietnamese cities affected the VCs ability to fight in the countryside? US air resources were, IMHO, much better employed in interdicting the Ho Chi Minh Trail, a masssive task in itself. The crux of the Vietnam debate, for me at leats, is whether a US military physically and doctrinally equipped to fight a large scale conventional or tactically nuclear war in NW Europe could adapt and find the means to fight a mostly guerilla war in the jungles of SE Asia. The historical record suggests that they could not - after all, the US left and South Vietnam fell. While it is true that political intervention from the US and the sometimes questionable effectiveness of ARVN forces were factor in this failure, I personally believe that the most important factor was what I perceive as a desire among US leaders to fight a war with the US's traditional strengths (superior technology and crushing application of firepower), against an enemy who could negate these advantages my melting away from the point of application into the jungle.
The thing is, US troops beat them in the jungle warfare daily. But you have to attack the source of the problem. N. Vietnam. US policies would not allow that to be an option. So the communists simply slipped around or through the DMZ in force. The US did adapt to fighting the guerrillas and did a great job in eradicating the Vietcong. The main problem in my opinion was the crooked S. Vietnamese officials really made it difficult for their people to have any kind of loyalty to them. If the US military was allowed to crush the North and destroy the communists will to fight then who knows. I think the historical record shows that a one legged man in an ass kicking contest is going to lose.
 

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