Was RAF Bomber Command Too Afraid To Fly Daylight Missions?

[Thumpalumpacus]

I read Middlebrook's Regensburg book 20 years ago and it's not in my library. Did they hit the factory or just the field?

This is an example of high precision, but it is not the same as accuracy. As the formation is tight and they all released their bombs with the bombing leader dropped his, precision is guaranteed. But if they weren't on target...

Let's remind ourselves about the differences between precision and accuracy...

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Jim

Agreed. My understanding, and I've yet to finish the book, is that much of it was on the airfield, and some of it wrecked a portion of the factory. I'll update this with specifics as I read further and get clarification on your point, which is -- no matter what Middleton reports either way -- very apt on the distinction between bomb-grouping and bombing accuracy.

I posted the photo mainly because I found the tight bomb-grouping astonishing.

None of this is to argue that daylight "precision" bombing was actually precise. I think that the precision mythos we Americans told ourselves was just that, a myth, in most cases.

 

[33k in the air]

None of this is to argue that daylight "precision" bombing was actually precise. I think that the precision mythos we Americans told ourselves was just that, a myth, in most cases.

It was 'precision' bombing by the standards and operational realities of the time.

 

[buffnut453]

It was 'precision' bombing by the standards and operational realities of the time.

I'd agree with you if every B-17 and B-24 flew with the Norden sight and each bombardier individually aimed at the target. However, that was not the case.

Often, only the lead aircraft and perhaps a couple of back-ups had the Norden sight. All other members in the formation simply watched for the lead to drop their bombs and then picked off their bombs without even looking at the target.

Given the spread of a box formation, there's no way the bombing could be precise, even by the standards of the time.

 

[33k in the air]

I'd agree with you if every B-17 and B-24 flew with the Norden sight and each bombardier individually aimed at the target. However, that was not the case.

Often, only the lead aircraft and perhaps a couple of back-ups had the Norden sight. All other members in the formation simply watched for the lead to drop their bombs and then picked off their bombs without even looking at the target.

Given the spread of a box formation, there's no way the bombing could be precise, even by the standards of the time.

The formation bombing method depended upon the skill of the lead crews. If the lead was on target, the rest of the formation would be too. If the lead wasn't, then the rest wouldn't be either.

This is not really that different from Bomber Command, which relied on the skill of the PFF crews to accurately mark the target for the main force — sometimes they did mark accurately, sometimes they didn't. If the PFF didn't do a good job, the result was usually an unsatisfactory operation.

The various electronic aids — Gee, Oboe, G-H, H2S, H2X, Micro-H, SHORAN — helped considerably in improving general accuracy. When everything functioned properly, that is. Electronics of the time had their issues.

 

[GrauGeist]

In an 8th AF bomber formation comprised of dozens of box formations involving at the very least, 100 bombers, how accurate is the pattern going to be when the aircraft are spaced out over a mile wide (or more) and trailing several miles back?

 

[wuzak]

No not quit. The Luftwaffe was made ineffective by the lack of fuel. The fuel shortage was so severe, that the training of new pilots was impossible, the aircrafts were not taxing to the runway but toed, the acceptance flights of new aircrafts were grinding to a hold. The aircraft production went on to the very end!


The fuel shortage was due to bombing of refineries' and transport systems.

The bulk of the attacks on Oil were after D-Day, as they were not the priority target in the lead up - transportation was.

The Luftwaffe was still very effective in the early months of 1944. But by June they had been weakened considerably, at least in the day, because a lot of their number had been shot down and a large proportion of their experienced fighter pilots had been lost.

 

[WARSPITER]

Another factor was the mining of the water transport system (Rhine and Danube etc) which forced the stoppage of river traffic for periods
in 1944 (mostly).

Minesweepers had to be brought in as these are long, wide rivers.

German oil from Romania had to go by train which was far less capable than sending by barges.
Germany needed ten thousand tons of oil per month just to maintain itself in 1944. Other operations
were impossible without more.

The ten thousand tons were sent by rail each month but from D-Day on they were scratching which is why
the Battle of the Bulge was such a stupid / desperate undertaking.

I would assume these rivers were hard to miss when dropping mines.

 

[buffnut453]

The formation bombing method depended upon the skill of the lead crews. If the lead was on target, the rest of the formation would be too. If the lead wasn't, then the rest wouldn't be either.

If the lead bombardier gets his bombs into the proverbial pickle-barrel, then there's a good chance the formation will bomb the target with relative accuracy. If he's off-target, then accuracy will (obviously) be lower.

However, regardless of the lead bombardier's accuracy, the simple size of the formation will result in low precision. The further away an aircraft is from the lead aircraft, the further that formating aircraft's bombs will be from the aim point.

Improving on the precision would require each bomber to attack individually which simply wasn't practical (plus it was against doctrine). Thus there were ways to be more accurate and precise but they weren't implemented.

 

[ThomasP]

Somewhere on the internet . . .

There are several documents/memos/reports that mention the pre-war realization by the USAAC/AAF that they could not reliably hit ~100 yd x 100 yd targets from more than about 12,000-13,000 ft. This was using the Norden bombsight from several different aircraft, including the B-17 and B-18. There was a note of consternation in some of the memos.

There is one document that gives the pre-war USAAC/AAF calculations defining the numbers of aircraft that would be required to provide different levels of probability of hitting/destroying a 100 yd x 100 yd industrial target. I do not remember the exact parameters or numbers but IIRC it was in the 200-300 sorties range for a single mission/operation when bombing from 20,000 ft in clear weather with no opposition. IIRC it was noted that less than 15% of bombs dropped would likely fall on the target.

There is another pre-war document that relays the USN opinion of the Norden. They said that precision level bombing of stationary targets was not feasible above 10,000 ft. I do not remember the parameters for the stationary target except that it was a shore target, not a ship target.

IOW, the US higher-ups knew that precision bombing of targets from high altitudes was not feasible, before they ever entered the war and therefor before they started the daylight bombing campaign.

I apologize for not being able to post said documents, but they were on my computer that unexpectedly crapped out a couple years ago and I have not taken the time to look for them since.

 

[EwenS]

This is not really that different from Bomber Command, which relied on the skill of the PFF crews to accurately mark the target for the main force — sometimes they did mark accurately, sometimes they didn't. If the PFF didn't do a good job, the result was usually an unsatisfactory operation.

And that was where the role of Master Bomber came in. Evaluating the position of the initial TIs and instructing the following bombers where to bomb in relation to them. Calling for additional target marking if required during the course of the raid. Preventing the later aircraft from bombing short as was found to be a habit.

The Master Bomber and his deputy would be over the target throughout the raid.

An early example was Guy Gibson during the Dams Raid, but the technique became firmly established a few months later by the Main Force, for example during the Peensmunde Raid 17/18 August 1943. On that occasion the Master Bomber, Group Captain Searlby, was able to tell the bombers of the second wave to ignore a group of markers misplaced by a PFF aircraft.

Gibson himself was killed while filling the role of Master Bomber in Sept 1944.

 

[mig2830]

The Jets were often moved from the ramp to the staging area with Schleppers in order to prevent overheating and to minimize time accrued on the engine(s).

Keep in mind that the various vehicles used to tow the jets back and forth used fuel, too.

Yes, but if you look at fuel consumption of a Kettenkrad and a ME262 you will see that fuel used to move the plane from bomb shelter to the runway was neglectable!

 

[wuzak]

Improving on the precision would require each bomber to attack individually which simply wasn't practical (plus it was against doctrine).

I believe that bombing individually was the doctrine when the 8th first started missions in the ETO. These were mostly short range raids into France against (relatively) lightly defended targets. And there weren't so many Luftwaffe fighters at the time.

But it soon became apparent that would lead to large loss rates, and the bombing on the leader system came into effect.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

It was 'precision' bombing by the standards and operational realities of the time.

I'd phrase it as "under the right circumstances it was more precise", myself. But if they're bombing through overcast using Mickey, there's no practical difference in USAAF and RAF accuracy, and the RAF may actually be more accurate for having colored markers etc.

We also see inaccuracy in the firestorms the Americans participated in as well, no? B-17s even had to divert to a secondary target in Hamburg due to inability to see the primary as a result of smoke.

And then factors like the introduction of togglers and creep-back also had negative effects on accuracy as well. I seem to remember something like only 20% of American bombs, on average, hit within 1000' of a target.

 

[GrauGeist]

Yes, but if you look at fuel consumption of a Kettenkrad and a ME262 you will see that fuel used to move the plane from bomb shelter to the runway was neglectable!

They used various vehicles to move the aircraft, not just the SdKfz.2, but even still, it had a 1.5L engine that used gasoline.

And they used more than one at a time.

 

[33k in the air]

I'd phrase it as "under the right circumstances it was more precise", myself. But if they're bombing through overcast using Mickey, there's no practical difference in USAAF and RAF accuracy, and the RAF may actually be more accurate for having colored markers etc.

It's hard to see target indicators through solid overcast. In that case skymarking was typically used, which was not particularly accurate given the indicator would be drifting in the wind.

I seem to remember something like only 20% of American bombs, on average, hit within 1000' of a target.

Given the logistical, operational, and technological limits of the time, that doesn't seem a terrible rate. We also benefit from hindsight, knowing which techniques and equipment worked best, whereas commanders at the time had to figure it out as they went (with the added complication of the occasional stubborn or uncooperative commander).

 

[33k in the air]

German oil from Romania had to go by train which was far less capable than sending by barges.
Germany needed ten thousand tons of oil per month just to maintain itself in 1944. Other operations
were impossible without more.

My understanding is that Germany's aviation fuel in 1944 came mostly from its synthetic fuel refineries.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

It's hard to see target indicators through solid overcast. In that case skymarking was typically used, which was not particularly accurate given the indicator would be drifting in the wind.

I can understand that. I'd thought PFF operated on a visual basis, but definitely open to correction given my paucity of knowledge on their ops.

Given the logistical, operational, and technological limits of the time, that doesn't seem a terrible rate. We also benefit from hindsight, knowing which techniques and equipment worked best, whereas commanders at the time had to figure it out as they went (with the added complication of the occasional stubborn or uncooperative commander).

You're right that this is partly hindsight, but the elephant in the room is how we are each defining "precision", which is why I posted my suggested rephrasing of "more precise".This acknowledges that daylight bombing could at times deliver more accurate results, while at the same time acknowledging that off-target impacts were the large majority of bomb-strikes in most cases with daylight raids.

By the way, I did find Middleton's description of that picture I posted above, but in the interest of accuracy will, rather than paraphrase here, post the picture I took of the passage in his book, along with page reference, so that the readership can read for themselves his (pardon the pun) precise wording. It'll be up before I retire for the evening.

Thanks for the good convo, bud.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

By the way, I did find Middleton's description of that picture I posted above, but in the interest of accuracy will, rather than paraphrase here, post the picture I took of the passage in his book, along with page reference, so that the readership can read for themselves his (pardon the pun) precise wording. It'll be up before I retire for the evening.

To follow up, here's the passage, from the 1983 Scribner's hardcover edition, p 138:

So addressing the points made above, it wasn't entirely accurate, but it was damaging.

 

[JDCAVE]

….but the elephant in the room is how we are each defining "precision", which is why I posted my suggested rephrasing of "more precise".

Precision is a statistical term that can be quantified, either absolutely from data, or relatively as in "this method was more precise than that method".

When you have a force of 500 bombers, precision is difficult to achieve for many reasons: variation in the skill set of individual crews and/or leaders, target obscured by smoke as the raid progresses, etc.

I am aware of only one heavy bomber unit that was actually achieved both accuracy and precision and that was 617 Squadron. It was a specialist unit, specifically trained in precision bombing and it achieved success repeatedly over its 2 year existence. It was remarkable, really of what it achieved With dumb, unguided ordnance. Perhaps there was a similar unit with the USAAF, but I am ignorant of the existence of such units.

Jim

 

[JDCAVE]

To follow up, here's the passage, from the 1983 Scribner's hardcover edition, p 138:

So addressing the points made above, it wasn't entirely accurate, but it was damaging.

So how did you like Middlebrook on this subject? I believe his books are the Gold Standard to which all historians should ascribe to attain.

Jim