Was RAF Bomber Command Too Afraid To Fly Daylight Missions?

[Thumpalumpacus]

In clear air over California, the Norden sight could indeed hit targets with extradonary precious, but…

I'm reading Middlebrook's book about the Schweinfurt/Regensburg fiasco, and it has one pic that is stunning -- the bombs hitting the test field at the Regensburg factory are packed so tight that for a few hundred yards there is no ground visible at all, only explosions. A truly amazing concentration of ordnance.

ETA: here's the pic, though not from the book as the caption is not Middlebrook's:

 

[pbehn]

In 125,000 mainly young men at war you will find examples of any type of behaviour, there were even some female ground staff who volunteered to go on a mission just to see what it was like.

 

[33k in the air]

Yes, fuel tanks were checked when you came back to catch out the ones who would fly out over the North Sea and circle until near home time and head back.
Ditto 'aborted mission due to < x > problem' - the CO would ask to see the engineers report.
Eventually, all bombers were fitted with a photoflash that captured a picture of your bomb drop over the target to catch out the ones bombing en countryside.

That did not catch those who dumped part of their bomb load over the North Sea in order to lighten the aircraft and allow it to gain better altitude. This is briefly discussed in Martin Middlebrook's The Berlin Raids — The Bomber Battle, Winter 1943–1944 when examining the performance differences between 1 Group and 5 Group during the Berlin campaign (p.384).

Once the RAF had refined their Pathfinder force, the main force was bombing targets with very good accuracy by night

True — when everything went according to plan, that is. There were ops on which the PFF did not perform well, putting down its markers in the wrong position or too scattered, was late in arriving at the target, or in a few cases, failed to appear at all.

The RAF flew quite a few heavy bomber daylight missions in direct support of ground troops after 6 Jun 1944. In at least one case a daylight mission to the Cherbourg area was escorted by Mossies. Later in the war the RAF heavies flew quite a few daylight missions.

Bomber Command flew many daylight missions in 1944 and 1945. In Bruce Robertson's book Halifax Special, in the section detailing the Halifax's operational statistics, he lists the number of bombing sorties by day and night (p.79). In parentheses is the percentage distribution of day vs. night.

1941 = 55 day | 413 night (18-82)
1942 = 27 day | 3,271 night (1-99)
1943 = 0 day | 14,685 night (0-100)
1944 = 16,288 day | 26,461 night (38-62)
1945 = 4,918 day | 7,194 night (41-59)

Some 38% of Halifax bombing sorties in 1944 were in daytime, and 41% in 1945. These are significant portions. I would expect similar distributions for Lancaster squadrons.

 

[EwenS]

The RAF flew quite a few heavy bomber daylight missions in direct support of ground troops after 6 Jun 1944. In at least one case a daylight mission to the Cherbourg area was escorted by Mossies. Later in the war the RAF heavies flew quite a few daylight missions.

In fact the RAF started flying Mustang III tactical missions over France in early in 1944. They could have flown escorts.

After the daylight missions in support of the ground troops in Normandy, Bomber Command flew 153 daylight raids between 27 Aug 1944 and 24 April 1945. See the attached article for a review of the effects of those raids.

As for the Mustang, the first RAF squadron received the Mk.III in Dec 1943 and by D-Day there were 6 with 2nd TAF and one in ADGB. The first Wing, 122 Wing consisting of 65,19 & 122 squadrons, became operational in mid-Feb 1944 and amongst its early operations were escort flights for the USAAF mediums and heavies, ranging as far afield as Berlin on occasion. In mid-April both 2nd TAF Wings were committed to operations over France in support of the forthcoming invasion.

The 3 squadrons of 133 Wing in 2nd TAF Mustang squadrons were withdrawn to ADGB in early July to fly anti-V1 Diver missions. And the other 3 squadrons were withdrawn at the end of Sept at which point these squadrons and other newly converted to the Mustang III began flying fighter cover for the Bomber Command daylight missions and also Coastal Command Strike Wing missions. By the end of the year there were 11 RAF Mustang III squadrons operating from Britain, with one usually detached to the north of Scotland to cover the CC Strike Wings based there. Mustang IV began to arrive with the squadrons in Jan 1945.

More squadrons continued to convert to the Mustang III/IV in 1945 reaching an eventual 17 in May, although not all were fully operational on the type

 

[GreenKnight121]

Blueberry eating vampires.

I thought they ate elderberries... and married hamsters.

 

[wuzak]

And even some British analysis have pointed out that the USAAF daylight raids were far more effective than the RAF night attacks because, regardless of the actual industrial damage done, they destroyed the Luftwaffe..

Well, fighters destroyed the Luftwaffe. Not the bombers, regardless of their effectiveness.

 

[MIflyer]

Well, fighters destroyed the Luftwaffe. Not the bombers, regardless of their effectiveness.

Yeah, well, you see, the Luftwaffe came up to intercept the bombers.

 

[33k in the air]

Well, fighters destroyed the Luftwaffe. Not the bombers, regardless of their effectiveness.

Depriving the Luftwaffe of vitally needed aviation fuel certainly helped.

 

[wuzak]

Depriving the Luftwaffe of vitally needed aviation fuel certainly helped.

Most of that happened after the Luftwaffe was mostly destroyed.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Most of that happened after the Luftwaffe was mostly destroyed.

... by drawing them up and setting the Allied fighters free of close-escort. The bombers were the bait.

 

[33k in the air]

Most of that happened after the Luftwaffe was mostly destroyed.

And which helped keep it that way.

 

[mig2830]

Well, fighters destroyed the Luftwaffe. Not the bombers, regardless of their effectiveness.

No not quit. The Luftwaffe was made ineffective by the lack of fuel. The fuel shortage was so severe, that the training of new pilots was impossible, the aircrafts were not taxing to the runway but toed, the acceptance flights of new aircrafts were grinding to a hold. The aircraft production went on to the very end!


The fuel shortage was due to bombing of refineries' and transport systems.

 

[MIflyer]

The fuel shortage was important, but as even Bomber Harris eventually realized not as important as it might have been if the RAF and USAAF had gone all out on that target. Bomber Harris' favorite missions, "dehousing" of the German people, were never effective, no matter how successful in terms of buildings destroyed. Right until the end the Germans were more afraid of their own government than they were the Allies. There were no German uprisings against the Nazis demanding an end to the war to save their homes.

And as for a fuel shortage, they never were short of fuel for diesel engines and jets. They were able to manufacture such low grade fuels from coal and they used alcohol in the V-2 rockets because they could manufacture that as well. They were stills ending out U-boats to the very end of the war. Their jets were not out of fuel, but they had too little nickel to build jet engines that lasted more than 25 hours or so. When the USAAF and RAF captured the German jets at the end of the war, they found that the records on how many hours were on each engine had been destroyed, making cranking the airplanes up and flying them a bit dicey.

Another impact of the daylight bombing raids and the associated fighter escort was that from 1 Jan 1944 to 1 Jan 1945 the Luftwaffe lost over 20,000 airplanes, not in combat, but while they were being delivered to the operational units. You have hundreds of aggressive and kill-hungry fighter pilots roaming around the country and they'll shoot anything with wings, on the ground or in the air.

 

[mig2830]

Their jets were not out of fuel, but they had too little nickel to build jet engines that lasted more than 25 hours or so. When the USAAF and RAF captured the German jets at the end of the war, they found that the records on how many hours were on each engine had been destroyed, making cranking the airplanes up and flying them a bit dicey.

I think you are a bit off here. The fuel for the jets (J2) was in fact in short supply if you read official government documents. In fact so that the jets were towed to the runway not to use fuel for taxing. Also the test flights of the new and rebuild jets were hampered by fuel shortages.

When there was fuel for it the numbers and effectiveness of the jets were such that the USAAF with the daylight raids were getting scared by the numbers that they decided to take out the jet airfields on a raid on April 10, 1945. This also put an end to the operation of the jets.

 

[MIflyer]

Multiple researchers have said that they were not short of fuel for the jets (e.g., "The Jet Race and The Second World War"), as their ability to send out U-Boats demonstrates. Admiral Donitz figured out in 1943 that sendeng out U-boats was a waste of men because at their very best they never got more than 10% of the supply ships going to Europe. But Donitz said that with the German army troops dying at the front and the Luftwaffe being shot out of the skies, the Kreigsmarine could not sit idly by.

10 April 45 is one month before the war ended.

I think that most people would be surprised, as I was , at how many German jets the USAAF shot down: 175. Those are all verified kills and in most cases we know not only the USAAF pilot;s name but also the name of the German pilot.

 

[GrauGeist]

The Jets were often moved from the ramp to the staging area with Schleppers in order to prevent overheating and to minimize time accrued on the engine(s).

Keep in mind that the various vehicles used to tow the jets back and forth used fuel, too.

 

[pbehn]

When discussing Germany's fuel and fighter situation, no mention is ever made of Operation Bagration and previous operations that over ran Oil production facilities and fighter airfields. (Map from Wiki).

 

[JDCAVE]

I'm reading Middlebrook's book about the Schweinfurt/Regensburg fiasco, and it has one pic that is stunning -- the bombs hitting the test field at the Regensburg factory are packed so tight that for a few hundred yards there is no ground visible at all, only explosions. A truly amazing concentration of ordnance.

ETA: here's the pic, though not from the book as the caption is not Middlebrook's:

View attachment 703195

I read Middlebrook's Regensburg book 20 years ago and it's not in my library. Did they hit the factory or just the field?

This is an example of high precision, but it is not the same as accuracy. As the formation is tight and they all released their bombs with the bombing leader dropped his, precision is guaranteed. But if they weren't on target...

Let's remind ourselves about the differences between precision and accuracy...

Jim

 

[JDCAVE]

In "The Destruction of Dresden" by Avid Irving (1963), the author reviews the British night bombing strategy and implimentation that led up to that raid. He passes on some information that is not brought up by others. For example, we are so used to the way American bomber raids were organized and carried out that we skip over the RAF ways. For example - night bombers were given the target and suggested flight paths, then each bomber took off on its own to find that target, hopefully designated by colored flares dropped by pathfinders who flew in while there was still some daylight, or twilight. They did not fly in formation and rarely saw another bomber in their group unless the moon was out. Often they would just see the flames as another bomber went down. This made it difficult to report back on who's plane they saw go down.
RAF crews had a derogotory name for planes that went out in the dark, dumped their bombs (not on the target) and came back. They were called Rabbits. The first serious bombing survey done by the RAF showed remarkably small amount of bombs were dropped even within 5 miles of the target.
Also, German hospitals were marked with blue lights on the roof.

Wow! Irving's book is full of misleading and false information. The Soviets reiterated the Goebbels propaganda on the subject and so did Irving. There are two books I would suggest are required reading for this raid: Firestorm. The Bombing of Dresden, Paul Addison and Jeremy Crang (Ed.) with essays contributed by Sebastian Cox, Tammy Biddle, and Richard Overy. Sebastian Cox's contribution is a minute by minute appreciation of the two raids. Second, Fredrick Taylor's book Dresden Tuesday Feb 13 1945. Also excellent.

You said

...night bombers were given the target and suggested flight paths, then each bomber took off on its own to find that target, hopefully designated by colored flares dropped by pathfinders who flew in while there was still some daylight, or twilight...

This statement is mostly not true. The turning points for the route to Dresden were communicated to the aircrew, the navigators were provided with a flight plan and route was plotted prior to leaving the stations and they flew that route. Crews were constantly harangued about the need to maintain concentration in time and space along the route. Here is the flight plan for the second attack on Dresden, the author is my father's navigator, 419 Squadron:

Note the ETA for the target, 0133. Dad bombed at 0132.1. That was an acceptable deviation from the ETA, but two minutes was less so, and 3 minutes different and the navigator caught a rocket from the squadron's navigation leader.

What I found from the extant primary historical material as I prepared my research for my essay on dad's operation, was an operation what was unexceptional—not altogether different than any other raid, except perhaps that it was a boring operation. In his audio memoirs, Dad remembers: "It was pretty "sissy" actually, we went along and nothing seemed to bother us... And to my knowledge there was very little flak and we didn't see…a fighter the whole time we were on that trip." There were certainly other operations that were far more frightening and dangerous to crews. As there was so little opposition, crews were able to do their jobs without interference. This, together with the weather conditions and poor preparation of the city by the political and civil services sealed the fate of Dresden.

Jim

---

 

[Engineman]

I'm reading Middlebrook's book about the Schweinfurt/Regensburg fiasco, and it has one pic that is stunning -- the bombs hitting the test field at the Regensburg factory are packed so tight that for a few hundred yards there is no ground visible at all, only explosions. A truly amazing concentration of ordnance.

ETA: here's the pic, though not from the book as the caption is not Middlebrook's:

View attachment 703195

This photo shows the raid on the Messerschmitt aircraft plant at Regensburg Prüfening, at noon on 17th August 1943. Prüfening is just over a mile due west of the Regensburg Innenstadt, or Centre. Around 400 people were killed on the ground. Aircraft production was stopped for a short period, although I don't know how long production stopped or the lost production figures.
The bombing pattern looks tight but, I do not know the specific aiming point. Of note, the factory works extend quite a bit outside the shown impacts. Again, full analysis of the bombing would need to be checked with records. However, it did do a lot of damage.
On another level, I guess this would satisfy General Dreedle.

Eng