Was RAF Bomber Command Too Afraid To Fly Daylight Missions?

[Thumpalumpacus]

Precision is a statistical term that can be quantified, either absolutely from data, or relatively as in "this method was more precise than that method".


Jim

Right, and that's exactly why I restated it in relative and probabilistic (i.e statistical) terms.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

So how did you like Middlebrook on this subject? I believe his books are the Gold Standard to which all historians should ascribe to attain.

Jim

So far it's a great book. He walks a very fine balance between hard data and oral recollections. The former is needed for accurate knowledge, and the latter are required for understanding the human toll of an event. Additionally, he takes pains to present the German perspective, which is something that as an American reader I haven't seen so much of, so I'm learning more on that score as well.

I'm not done with it yet, but I'm damned sure looking forward to the rest of it. Based on what I've read so far (about 50% done), I'd already recommend it for any curious about these missions. Were it not such a good read so far, I'd offer to send it along to someone else wanting to read it -- but it's a keeper, in my eyes.

 

[wuzak]

I can understand that. I'd thought PFF operated on a visual basis, but definitely open to correction given my paucity of knowledge on their ops.

The PFF used electronic aids (Gee, Oboe, Gee-H, H2S) to mark targets, which the main force would bomb visually.

Gee, Oboe and Gee-H were limited by the altitude at which the aircraft could fly. The Mosquito because it could fly ~10,000ft higher then the Lancaster was prized for this role.

Often, however, the electronic aids would fail, and the pathfinder would have to use dead reckoning.

The master bomber would instruct the main force to bomb on certain target indicators, ignore others if they were too far off, call out corrections, and call for the PFF to drop new markers when necessary.

 

[33k in the air]

I can understand that. I'd thought PFF operated on a visual basis, but definitely open to correction given my paucity of knowledge on their ops.

The book The Science of Bombing — Operational Research in RAF Bomber Command by Randall T. Wakelam (University of Toronto Press, 2009) might be worth a look. It explores the role which scientific examination played in shaping the tactics and techniques of bombing during the war. If you search for the title on Google Books, you should find a preview which shows a reasonable amount of the book, allowing any prospective buyer to get a good sense of what it contains.

Bomber Command used a variety of attack methods, some which required the target be sited visually, some not. The glossary of the book mentioned above offers definitions of the terms used for such methods (p.239–248). The examples reproduced below might be helpful

Shaker — Target identification technique using flares dropped by Gee-equipped aircraft and followed by a small force bombing by visual sighting which would drop incendiaries in order to mark the target with fires for the following main force.

Musical Paramatta — Target-marking technique. Method of groundmarking using coloured target indicators dropped blindly using Oboe.

H2S Paramatta — Target-marking technique. Similar to Musical Paramatta, but using H2S rather than Oboe. As such more primary markers could be dropped and these were used by backers up who aimed at the M[ean] P[oint of] I[mpact]. The Main Force then bombed the backers up marking and not the primary T[arget] I[ndicator]s.

Newhaven — Target-marking technique. Method of groundmarking using flares dropped blindly using H2S followed, when possible, by visual identification using coloured target indicators.

Musical Newhaven — Same as Newhaven but with initial proximity marking done by Oboe.

Wanganui — Target-marking technique; also called H2S skymarking. Similar to Oboe Skymarking (Musical Wanganui).

Musical Wanganui — Target-marking technique. Method of skymarking using coloured markers dropped blindly using Oboe.

G-H Formation — Daylight attack procedure where aircraft attacked in formation. Leading aircraft bombed using G-H and followers released bombs when the leaders' bombs were seen falling. Aircraft usually flew in elements of three with each leader using G-H. There was no requirement to see ground.

Oboe Formation — Daylight attack procedure where aircraft attacked in formation. Leading aircraft bombed using Oboe control and followers (usually not more than a dozen) released bombs when the leader's bombs were seen falling. No requirement to see ground.

8 Group Visual — Target-marking technique. Similar to controlled Oboe. Master bomber usually assessed Oboe marking and remarked the A[iming] P[oint] visually.

5 Group Visual — Target-marking technique. Flares and proximity marking followed by visual dive marking. These markers were offset by several hundred yards so that they were not obscured by smoke and dust; Main Force crews were given settings for their sights to allow for this.

Master Bomber — A technique first developed in 5 Group in which a designated officer would orbit the target area and issue, via radio telephone, adjustments to the raid order or specific corrections to arriving crews so that the bombing was as accurate as possible. Deputy master bombers were also assigned so that this control could be generally assured in case of the loss of the primary master bomber.

Controlled Oboe — Oboe-placed target markers were assessed by a master bomber who then directed the main force by radio and sometimes backed up the best-placed TIs with additional TIs of a different colour.

So addressing the points made above, it wasn't entirely accurate, but it was damaging.

That statement can be applied to a lot of the strategic bombing operations during the war.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

The book The Science of Bombing — Operational Research in RAF Bomber Command by Randall T. Wakelam (University of Toronto Press, 2009) might be worth a look. It explores the role which scientific examination played in shaping the tactics and techniques of bombing during the war. If you search for the title on Google Books, you should find a preview which shows a reasonable amount of the book, allowing any prospective buyer to get a good sense of what it contains.

Bomber Command used a variety of attack methods, some which required the target be sited visually, some not. The glossary of the book mentioned above offers definitions of the terms used for such methods (p.239–248). The examples reproduced below might be helpful

Shaker — Target identification technique using flares dropped by Gee-equipped aircraft and followed by a small force bombing by visual sighting which would drop incendiaries in order to mark the target with fires for the following main force.

Musical Paramatta — Target-marking technique. Method of groundmarking using coloured target indicators dropped blindly using Oboe.

H2S Paramatta — Target-marking technique. Similar to Musical Paramatta, but using H2S rather than Oboe. As such more primary markers could be dropped and these were used by backers up who aimed at the M[ean] P[oint of] I[mpact]. The Main Force then bombed the backers up marking and not the primary T[arget] I[ndicator]s.

Newhaven — Target-marking technique. Method of groundmarking using flares dropped blindly using H2S followed, when possible, by visual identification using coloured target indicators.

Musical Newhaven — Same as Newhaven but with initial proximity marking done by Oboe.

Wanganui — Target-marking technique; also called H2S skymarking. Similar to Oboe Skymarking (Musical Wanganui).

Musical Wanganui — Target-marking technique. Method of skymarking using coloured markers dropped blindly using Oboe.

G-H Formation — Daylight attack procedure where aircraft attacked in formation. Leading aircraft bombed using G-H and followers released bombs when the leaders' bombs were seen falling. Aircraft usually flew in elements of three with each leader using G-H. There was no requirement to see ground.

Oboe Formation — Daylight attack procedure where aircraft attacked in formation. Leading aircraft bombed using Oboe control and followers (usually not more than a dozen) released bombs when the leader's bombs were seen falling. No requirement to see ground.

8 Group Visual — Target-marking technique. Similar to controlled Oboe. Master bomber usually assessed Oboe marking and remarked the A[iming] P[oint] visually.

5 Group Visual — Target-marking technique. Flares and proximity marking followed by visual dive marking. These markers were offset by several hundred yards so that they were not obscured by smoke and dust; Main Force crews were given settings for their sights to allow for this.

Master Bomber — A technique first developed in 5 Group in which a designated officer would orbit the target area and issue, via radio telephone, adjustments to the raid order or specific corrections to arriving crews so that the bombing was as accurate as possible. Deputy master bombers were also assigned so that this control could be generally assured in case of the loss of the primary master bomber.

Controlled Oboe — Oboe-placed target markers were assessed by a master bomber who then directed the main force by radio and sometimes backed up the best-placed TIs with additional TIs of a different colour.




That statement can be applied to a lot of the strategic bombing operations during the war.

I really appreciate you taking the time to lay this out for me, and that book will be on my radar.

 

[JDCAVE]

G-H was only used by 3-Group, not Pathfinders. Pathfinders also used "visual marking" that did not rely on electronic aids, but it could only be used if the target was visible, i.e. no clouds.

Jim

 

[Peter Gunn]

The whole Allied bombing campaign is a long and bloody tale.

True, but what aspect of any war isn't? What is war if not bloody and full of death and destruction?

BTW, I'm not trying to be a dick to you, just making an observation.

Cheers.

 

[Engineman]

True, but what aspect of any war isn't? What is war if not bloody and full of death and destruction?

BTW, I'm not trying to be a dick to you, just making an observation.

Cheers.

Hi,

I think I was trying to convey the vast expenditure of blood and treasure that the Allied bombing campaign really was. Perhaps, as a counter to a somewhat pathetic title "

Was RAF Bomber Command Too Afraid To Fly Daylight Missions?

Cheers

Eng

 

[SaparotRob]

As one of our Forum members mentioned, it's a click bait title. I personally think it's a stupid one.

 

[GrauGeist]

Perhaps, as a counter to a somewhat pathetic title

If you watched the video in the first post, you would discover that the "somewhat pathetic title" to the post, is a quote from the video.

 

[Engineman]

If you watched the video in the first post, you would discover that the "somewhat pathetic title" to the post, is a quote from the video.

Who said I didn't watch it?
It is a pathetic title. Just my opinion, of course.

Eng

 

[GrauGeist]

Who said I didn't watch it?
It is a pathetic title. Just my opinion, of course.

Eng

To each their own - I found the context of the video's author legitimate and the title of the OP appropiate, since that was the core question of the video.

 

[pbehn]

As one of our Forum members mentioned, it's a click bait title. I personally think it's a stupid one.

It originally had the word "coward" pointing to the RAF crew member, changed quickly to a question mark. This is what masquerades as an "historian" now.

 

[WARSPITER]

My understanding is that Germany's aviation fuel in 1944 came mostly from its synthetic fuel refineries.

There were 16 synthetic oil plants as well as refineries for crude oil in Germany. Bombing had been an on and off affair until
May 1944 when a more systematic approach was taken. The results were catastrophic for Germany.

Petrol, Oil, and Lubricant production went from 316,000 tons in April down to 107,000 tons in June dropping to as low as 17,000 tons
by September. Synthetic production of aviation fuel went from 175,000 tons in April to 30,000 tons in July and down to 5,000 tons by
the end of September.

Coal for synthetic fuel was also becoming a problem as stockpiles grew at mines because of the ongoing attacks on the rail system.

The mining of the canal / river systems was another big hit to the German POL system. Side effects also included losses in synthetic
rubber and Nitrogen production (fertiliser and munitions).

 

[Snautzer01]

Yes, but if you look at fuel consumption of a Kettenkrad and a ME262 you will see that fuel used to move the plane from bomb shelter to the runway was neglectable!

Uhmm i would like to see that in paper.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

As one of our Forum members mentioned, it's a click bait title. I personally think it's a stupid one.

Not just stupid, but disparaging. Bomber Command proved their balls in the war. Has the writer of that headline done so?

 

[GrauGeist]

Jesus wept, the thread title is quoted from the video - watching from 0:00 to 3:22 leads up to that question with a contextual introduction, FFS.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Jesus wept, the thread title is quoted from the video - watching from 0:00 to 3:22 leads up to that question with a contextual introduction, FFS.

Right, I'm not criticizing the thread's author or the video's producer, but rather the verbiage quoted in the video itself. Anyone who would argue that, well, color me skeptical.

 

[wuzak]

Right, I'm not criticizing the thread's author or the video's producer, but rather the verbiage quoted in the video itself.

As in the YouTube comments to which the video was a response?

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

As in the YouTube comments to which the video was a response?

No, the quote to which the video's producer was replying.