Was RAF Bomber Command Too Afraid To Fly Daylight Missions?

[Macandy]

Precision is a statistical term that can be quantified, either absolutely from data, or relatively as in "this method was more precise than that method".

When you have a force of 500 bombers, precision is difficult to achieve for many reasons: variation in the skill set of individual crews and/or leaders, target obscured by smoke as the raid progresses, etc.

I am aware of only one heavy bomber unit that was actually achieved both accuracy and precision and that was 617 Squadron. It was a specialist unit, specifically trained in precision bombing and it achieved success repeatedly over its 2 year existence. It was remarkable, really of what it achieved With dumb, unguided ordnance. Perhaps there was a similar unit with the USAAF, but I am ignorant of the existence of such units.

Jim

And No. IX Squadron, every bit as good, some would say better, than 617 at that precision coming lark.

USAAF didn't have an equivalent unit, but they were going to stand up specialist B-29 units for the invasion of Japan carrying either one Grand Slam or two Tallboy bombs.

 

[EwenS]

And No. IX Squadron, every bit as good, some would say better, than 617 at that precision coming lark.

USAAF didn't have an equivalent unit, but they were going to stand up specialist B-29 units for the invasion of Japan carrying either one Grand Slam or two Tallboy bombs.

I've posted before in relation to your comments about the B-29 and Tallboy. Given that the first USAAF trials of a B-29 converted to carry a single Tallboy only took place between Feb & June 1945 from which came a recommendation to form a specialist Group and convert sufficient aircraft to equip them, there is no way that it would have been trained, equipped and in place on Okinawa for Operation Olympic, the invasion of Kyushu, scheduled for 1 Nov 1945. It is unlikely that they could even have achieved it for Operation Coronet, the invasion oh Honshū, on 1 March 1946.


What was scheduled to happen was that the Special Missions Wing of the RAF Tiger Force would have been in place on Okinawa in time for the opening moves in Olympic. That Wing comprised 9 & 617 squadrons with Tallboy equipped Lancasters. Two convoys of personnel & equipment of the RAF Airfield Construction Branch were en route at the beginning of Aug 1945, with the first ships being held at Eniwetok when the war ended. The squadrons themselves would have flown out from late Aug.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

The RAF translated a number of German reports on Air Raid Damage. Dates are in 1943.

REGENSBURG, E. 1679 - Chief, Orpo., 8a 1151 – Min. of Pub. Inf. & Prop., E. 2606 - Min of Armaments & War Production. 17 AUGUST. From about 1125 hours about 120 American aircraft attacked the town and the Messerschmitt Aircraft Works. Damage was mainly inflicted on the Messerschmitt Works and that on the town was "scarcely worth mentioning".

Bombs dropped: 1200 H.E. (21 duds or D.A.), 100 incendiary bombs, 500 phosphorous bombs and/or drums, 4 oil bombs.
Houses: 4 plus 4 hutments destroyed, 4 plus 6 hutments severely damaged, 7 medium damage, 19 slightly damaged
Casualties: 247 dead and 461 injured.

Several flak sites (works defences) were destroyed. A direct hit was scored on the chief water main and telephone lines were destroyed. In the factory area of Messerschmitt factory 1080 H.E. bombs were dropped destroying 80% of the factory and causing 100% loss of production for some time. Several assembly halls and the administrative building were destroyed, equalling a floor space of 91532 sq, metres out of a total of 138920 sq. metres.

SCHWEINFURTH, E. 1679 - Chief, Orpo, 8a 1151 - Min. of Pub. Inf. & Prop., E. 2576 - LGK XII summaries, E. 2606 - Min. of Arm. & War Prod., 17 AUGUST, (USAAF). Approximately 270 aircraft took part in this raid from 1600 until 1700 hours. The main weight of the attack fell on the Central Station, Old Town and the industrial and barracks area.

Bombs dropped: 1 mine, 1317 H.E. (59 duds), 27 phosphorous bombs 1800 oil bombs.
Houses: 160 destroyed and 1010 damaged.
Fires: 19 major and 150 medium to small fires.
Casualties: 249 dead, 639 injured.

The firms of Kugelfischer, Georg Schaefer & Co., Fichtl & Sachs Ballbearing Works and the Rothhenburger Metal Works were severely damaged. No. 2 Works of the Vereinigte Kugellager Works was partially damaged.

The Central Station was destroyed and a few trains burnt out. The Goods Yards were also hit, damaging buildings, tracks and rolling stocks. Damage was also caused to 2 barracks. The Municipal Gas Works were destroyed and Post Office buildings badly damaged. On the firm of Kugelfischer, Georg Schaefer & Co. 33500 kg of H.E. and 3900 kg of incendiary bombs were dropped, destroying 19000 sq. metres = 8% of the total area of the factory.

SCHWEINFURTH, E. 2576 - LGK XII summaries, E. 2606 - Min. of Arm. & War Prod., 14 OCTOBER (USAAF). There are no German documents available which give details of where the bombs fell but it is evident from the following the ball-bearing works were mainly affected. About 250 - 300 aircraft took part.

Bombs Dropped: A number of mines, 1200 H.E., 1500 oil bombs.
Houses: 107 destroyed and 280 damaged.
Casualties: 283 dead and 359 injured.

Of the bombs dropped, 3600 kg of mines, 35500 kg of H.E. and 2400 kg of incendiary bombs fell on the factory area of the Kugellagerwerk Kugelfischer, Georg Schaefer & Co. They destroyed 19400 sq. metres of the factory area, equal to 8.5% of the total area. In addition 45 1000 lb (2 duds) H.E. and 43 261b (2 duds) incendiary bombs fell on the factory area of the Vereinigten Kugellager-fabrik, Works I and II.

Dresden, in 1945
DRESDEN, 28X - 10 - LW. Ops. Staff, 13/14 FEBRUARY. Two heavy attacks were made on the entire city area between 2209 and 2235 hours and 0122 and 0154 hours. Bombing was concentrated on the residential and commercial districts in the city centre.

Bombs dropped: 6000 H.E., 400000 incendiary bombs, 2000 oil bombs, 4500 jet incendiary bombs and a large number of leaflets and ration cards.

Houses: Exact figures cannot be given but houses in the city area were extensively damaged. The Old Town and adjoining districts and the southern suburban area were almost completely destroyed. Very heavy damage resulted in the districts of Johannstadt, Friedrichstadt, Strissen, Blasewitz, Strehlen, Gruna, Plausen and in the New Town.

Fires: There were a large number of fires and fire storms developed in the central district.

Casualties: Casualties were believed to be very heavy, the majority of them arising in the second attack when large numbers of people were leaving the city. A very large number were trapped by rubble. About 500000 were rendered homeless.

A large number of public buildings were hit and nearly all of them destroyed. Railway buildings and installations were seriously affected, including the regional offices. The Central Station was gutted and severe damage done to tracks, resulting in services being temporarily suspended. At the Neustadt passenger station the reception building was destroyed, heavy damage caused to tracks and services suspended. At the Neustadt goods station sheds were badly damaged by fire. At the Altstadt station passenger coaches and goods trucks were also badly damaged by fire. The Infantry Barracks and several reserve hospitals were badly damaged and gas, water and electricity services were put out of action.

The following industrial concerns were destroyed: Clemens Mueller (special instruments); Glaesser Coachbuilders; Laube Machine Works; Zeiss-Ikon; Ika (optical and special signals equipment); Ernemann (fuses and optical instruments); "Universell" Dresden (weapon parts and torpedoes) and a number of others.

DRESDEN, 28X - 10 - LW. Ops. Staff, 14 FEBRUARY, (USAAF). About 1100 bombers penetrated to attack various towns. Some of these carried out a raid on Dresden from 1215 to 1225 hours and Loebau, Friedrichstadt, Cotta and Leipziger-Vorstadt were the districts mostly affected.

Bombs dropped: 1000 H.E., 30000 incendiary bombs, 300 oil bombs.

Details of damage to houses and the number of casualties are not available. The Friedrichstadt Goods Station and the Wettiner Station were hit.

DRESDEN, 28X - 11 - LW. Ops. Staff, 2 MARCH, (USAAF). Part of the force of 1100 bombers with fighter protection which paid a visit to Dresden, Magdeburg and Chemnitz attacked Dresden at about 1025 hours.

Numerous H.E. and incendiary bombs were dropped which caused severe damage to the Neustadt, Altstadt and Niedersebnitz districts. Also hit in the Leipzig suburb, the industrial area in the north and the districts of Striesen, Radebeul, Coswig, Dobritz and Gruna. Severe damage was also caused to the Waldschloesschen district. Damage to transport installations included severe damage to the permanent way at the Neustadt passenger station and to railway installations on the banks of the Elbe in the Alstadt near the Marien bridge.

At the date of the report (2nd March) information concerning industrial damage and casualties was not available. Medium damage resulted at the Neustadt Goods Station and the stations at Wettinerstrasse and Koenig-Albert-Hafen. Four lines were temporarily closed.

DRESDEN, 28X - 11 - LW. Ops. Staff, 17 APRIL, (USAAF). Some 1200 bombers and 350 fighters
penetrated as far as Nuremberg where one division remained, the rest flying on to Pilsen and Dresden which latter town was attacked from 1350 to 1500 hours by one division.

Bombs dropped: 3000 H.E., 10000 incendiary bombs.

In the Old Town and New Town, in Strehlen and further suburbs damage was caused to houses, public buildings and public supply installations. Numerous fires were started. Compared with the scale of attack the damage was slight. Most of the bombs fell on former bombed-out sites. Railway installations at 6 stations, damage to tracks and buildings was extensive and an ammunition train was blown up. Rail traffic was stopped for several days.

 

[Peter Gunn]

There were 16 synthetic oil plants as well as refineries for crude oil in Germany. Bombing had been an on and off affair until
May 1944 when a more systematic approach was taken. The results were catastrophic for Germany.

Petrol, Oil, and Lubricant production went from 316,000 tons in April down to 107,000 tons in June dropping to as low as 17,000 tons
by September. Synthetic production of aviation fuel went from 175,000 tons in April to 30,000 tons in July and down to 5,000 tons by
the end of September.

Coal for synthetic fuel was also becoming a problem as stockpiles grew at mines because of the ongoing attacks on the rail system.

The mining of the canal / river systems was another big hit to the German POL system. Side effects also included losses in synthetic
rubber and Nitrogen production (fertiliser and munitions).

Just to touch on the campaign against oil production, and not wanting to hijack the thread, but I've always wondered if the war could have been shortened (and by how much) by going after fuel production earlier. I realize that before the Mustang is available in force, the 8th AF got rather careful about where it was sending its bombers, but, and not to second guess the planners of the time, I would have thought fuel would have made a better target than ball bearings in the fall of '43.

But again, that's 20/20 hindsight on my part and not fair to the men responsible for target selection at the time.

 

[JDCAVE]

And No. IX Squadron, every bit as good, some would say better, than 617 at that precision coming lark.

USAAF didn't have an equivalent unit, but they were going to stand up specialist B-29 units for the invasion of Japan carrying either one Grand Slam or two Tallboy bombs.

Now I'd have to find the document but I had read somewhere that the accuracy of 9 Squadron's bombing want up to the same standard as 617. It's a lame answer I realize but I stumbled onto something somewhere recently on that very question. That said, 9 Squadron also dropped the tall boy bombs.

Jim.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

The allies lacked the bomb lift, accuracy and importantly loss rates to start the oil campaign much before they did. Although H2X accuracy was poor in the winter of 1943/44 the 8th had little bad weather bombing capacity versus a year later. One reason Arthur Harris was against the oil campaign was the then known drop off in bomber activity and accuracy in winter. Throughout the war the allies expanded the definition of flyable weather much more than that of accurate bombing weather. They also dramatically increased the average bomb lift available as 1944 went on. In terms of bomber losses the German day air defences became much less effective around April/May 1944, as a percentage of effective sorties the 8th lost 4.2% in April, the night defences weakend in August/September, they were inflicting over 5% losses on heavy bombers attacking Germany most of the time January to June 1944. The more predictable the attacks the generally high the loss rates.

The primary European Theatre operation in 1944 was Overlord, it historically had an impact on the oil campaign start and early effort

There are various Oil Campaign bomb tonnage figures 77,150 short tons dropped by the 8th Air Force is the Richard Davis figure, over around 12 months, that tonnage is all of the 8th Air Force bombs March 1943 to February 1944, it becomes half of all bombs dropped if you change the year to June 1943 to May 1944, however bombs on Germany for that year were 95,860, so 4 out of 5 bombs dropped on Germany would be needed to give 77,150 short tons on oil. Assuming sustainable is every second raid to Germany bombs oil that is the year September 1943 to August 1944 and given winter accuracy you probably need to slip the schedule a couple more months. If sustainable is every fourth raid to Germany the year becomes 1944.

In the period May 1944 to April 1945 the historical oil tonnage was 17.5% of bombs dropped on Germany and 13.7% of all bombs dropped.

Bomber Command reports dropping 157,457 long tons of bombs in 1943, of which 136,433 tons were on Germany, while in the roughly 11 months 1944/45 campaign dropped 97,914 tons on oil targets. Again assuming sustainable is every second raid on Germany bombs oil that is reached in the year November 1943 to October 1944, as Bomber Command did a lot more invasion support than the 8th Air Force. In the period June 1944 to April 1945 the historical oil tonnage was 25.6% of bombs dropped on Germany and 11.9% of all bombs dropped.

Arthur Harris Despatch on War Operations has an accuracy graph, raids at night, German cities excluding Berlin, bombs within 3 miles of target, to April 1943 under 30%, jumps to 50 to 60% in June, stays there for a year, climbs to near 90% June to October 1944, on that basis Bomber Command needs to drop up to 50% more bombs in 1943 to score the same number of hits as later in 1944.

It was mid November 1944 before the 8th reached its halfway point for total bombs dropped on Germany for the war versus end September 1944 for Bomber Command.

The 15th Air Force has the problem of suppressing Ploesti until it is captured by the Red Army, so the earlier the campaign starts the more bombs needed.

Finished Oil Products, hundred thousand tons. Avgas figures are in the total, they are NOT extra. Synthetic other includes the following processes, Fischer/Tropsch (Motor/Diesel), Coal Tar (motor/diesel/fuel), Alcohol (motor), Benzol (Avgas/motor/misc).

Type	Synthetic	Synthetic	Domestic	Occupied	Import	Total	Avgas	Avgas
Month	Hydrogenation	other	Refine	Territory	Import	Total	Hydrogenation	Benzol
Jan-44​	336​	162​	175​	48​	179​	900​	159.5​	0​
Feb-44​	306​	172​	160​	48​	200​	886​	163.2​	0.5​
Mar-44​	341​	201​	191​	49​	186​	768​	180.1​	0.3​
Apr-44​	348​	153​	157​	48​	104​	810​	175.1​	0.3​
May-44​	285​	151​	170​	47​	81​	734​	155.9​	0.2​
Jun-44​	145​	153​	129​	44​	40​	511​	53.3​	0.5​
Jul-44​	86​	143​	115​	38​	56​	438​	30.2​	4.5​
Aug-44​	47​	137​	134​	16​	11​	345​	12.5​	4.6​
Sep-44​	26​	126​	113​	5​	11​	281​	5.3​	4.7​
Oct-44​	38​	117​	124​	3​	34​	316​	16.4​	4.6​
Nov-44​	78​	107​	105​	10​	37​	337​	35.4​	3.6​
Dec-44​	56​	108​	108​	9​	22​	303​	23.4​	1.1​

 

[Macandy]

I've posted before in relation to your comments about the B-29 and Tallboy. Given that the first USAAF trials of a B-29 converted to carry a single Tallboy only took place between Feb & June 1945 from which came a recommendation to form a specialist Group and convert sufficient aircraft to equip them, there is no way that it would have been trained, equipped and in place on Okinawa for Operation Olympic, the invasion of Kyushu, scheduled for 1 Nov 1945. It is unlikely that they could even have achieved it for Operation Coronet, the invasion oh Honshū, on 1 March 1946.


What was scheduled to happen was that the Special Missions Wing of the RAF Tiger Force would have been in place on Okinawa in time for the opening moves in Olympic. That Wing comprised 9 & 617 squadrons with Tallboy equipped Lancasters. Two convoys of personnel & equipment of the RAF Airfield Construction Branch were en route at the beginning of Aug 1945, with the first ships being held at Eniwetok when the war ended. The squadrons themselves would have flown out from late Aug.

We'll just ignore that the 509th was dropping Pumpkins , much the same weight as Tallboys, on point targets in July/August 1945 - 49 bombs against 14 targets.
The results were deemed to be effective.
If the USAAF had decided they were going to drop Tallboys from B-29's in November 1945, they'd have made it happen. Its not as if the B-29 Silverplates weren't already fitted with the right bomb shackles and they had extensive experience of dropping very large bombs on point targets.

 

[33k in the air]

Just to touch on the campaign against oil production, and not wanting to hijack the thread, but I've always wondered if the war could have been shortened (and by how much) by going after fuel production earlier. I realize that before the Mustang is available in force, the 8th AF got rather careful about where it was sending its bombers, but, and not to second guess the planners of the time, I would have thought fuel would have made a better target than ball bearings in the fall of '43.

But again, that's 20/20 hindsight on my part and not fair to the men responsible for target selection at the time.

Alternatives include starting the dedicated campaign against the German transportation network sooner, or focus on the German electrical supply, something which was vulnerable but difficult in some cases to target.

 

[GrauGeist]

...or focus on the German electrical supply, something which was vulnerable but difficult in some cases to targe.

Operation Chastise had fairly good results in crippling the area power supply.

 

[EwenS]

Operation Chastise had fairly good results in crippling the area power supply.

But only for a limited period. Weeks not months.

 

[Peter Gunn]

Alternatives include starting the dedicated campaign against the German transportation network sooner, or focus on the German electrical supply, something which was vulnerable but difficult in some cases to target.

I remember reading that Albert Speer, in a post war interview said how one of his biggest fears was Allied bombing of the electrical grid, he felt that was the Third Reich's Achilles Heel.

Then again, it's Speer we're talking about and he was adept as a box of foxes at maneuvering his was through tough situations so he may have just been blowing smoke to make the interrogators feel good.

 

[WARSPITER]

I remember reading that Albert Speer, in a post war interview said how one of his biggest fears was Allied bombing of the electrical grid, he felt that was the Third Reich's Achilles Heel.

Then again, it's Speer we're talking about and he was adept as a box of foxes at maneuvering his was through tough situations so he may have just been blowing smoke to make the interrogators feel good.

Speer was good at what you say although in this case he looks to actually be genuine. In a seperate interview the German Chief electrical engineer
(don't know the name) said although Germany was thought to have a sophisticated electrical system where various sub systems could compensate
for losses. It didn't. There was a fear that bombing may concentrate on electrical generation which was vulnerable and hard to repair. He stated that
the war would have ended up to two years earlier if electricity generation had been targeted as a priority.

Speer also noted the effects of what he said Germans considered to be a second front. Most of Germany was on the front line with 1 million troops involved
in anti aircraft duty - many with nothing to do for months at a time. The other number to consider is around another million involved in repairs and rebuilding.

 

[ThomasP]

Again, somewhere on the internet . . .

There is a post-war study by US intelligence (I think by the same group that produced the USSBS) that concluded the bombing campaign would have had more effect earlier if they had concentrated more assets on destroying electricity production and disrupting the distribution grid. There were, however, caveats that mentioned possible unpredictable and unfavorable effects in other areas.

Again, the study went away with my last computer.

 

[33k in the air]

I remember reading that Albert Speer, in a post war interview said how one of his biggest fears was Allied bombing of the electrical grid, he felt that was the Third Reich's Achilles Heel.

I recall he also was concerned over key chemical factories, since knocking those out would have greatly impacted Germany's ability to produce explosives.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Speer's interviews and writings about the effects of the allied bombing campaign appear largely correct, reporting what the damage and beliefs of the time were, like post Hamburg firestorm, the first major strikes on oil targets and so on. Then again he knew the allies had lots of his and other's reports plus it made his book in particular a good source of quotes about the campaign for those passionate about what happened and who deserves the credit.

Bombing the electricity grid was not tried on any systematic way, which makes it ideal maybe fodder. Richard Davis says the 8th Air Force dropped 667.6 short tons of bombs on power plants, starting in January 1944, the 15th 28 tons and Bomber Command 39 tons from January 1942 onward. The area raids did some significant damage to the electricity grid. Data on how vulnerable generators, sub stations and the like were to bombs seems to largely exist in theoretical studies, nor is there data on how good standard precautions like sandbagging would limit damage. The big 8th Air Force strike on a power plant was on 6 October 1944, at Stralsund, visual bombing, 146 aircraft, 362 short tons of bombs dropped. It was a target of opportunity the 8th assessed it as "Good results. Strike photos show 11 concentrations of G.P. and RDX and 1 concentration of I.B. in the Stralsund area. On the Thermo Electric Power Station direct hits seen on the border house and on the turbine house. The switch house received a probable direct hit." The German version of this report would be useful.

https://www.nsa.gov/portals/75/docu...a/dated/1944/25oct_info_bombing_straslund.pdf

If you have a boiler or similar for things like hot water you can generate your own electricity, I have no idea how many of the main German factories actually did this or could do it. Then comes importing power from surrounding countries or simply stripping them of the relevant equipment to replace damaged or destroyed items in Germany.

The end the war 2 years earlier is May 1943 and it would take several months to bomb all the key vulnerabilities, which translates into Bomber Command largely on its own, historically 65,553 long tons of bombs, 54,173 tons of that on targets in Germany, January to May 1943, with around 25 to 30% of bombs that could be plotted from target photographs hitting within 3 miles of the target in cities in Germany (excluding Berlin)

 

[JDCAVE]

I remember reading that Albert Speer, in a post war interview said how one of his biggest fears was Allied bombing of the electrical grid, he felt that was the Third Reich's Achilles Heel.

Then again, it's Speer we're talking about and he was adept as a box of foxes at maneuvering his was through tough situations so he may have just been blowing smoke to make the interrogators feel good.

In communications I've had with David Bercuson (professor emeritus, U. Calgary) he reminded me that Speer lied a lot in post war interrogations. He was concerned about saving his skin, and very much aware about the pending Nuremburg war trials. He told the American interrogators what they wanted to hear and told the British interrogators what they wanted to hear.

3-Group's G-H methods were particularly useful against oil targets, Fall-Winter 1944-Spring 1945. What I recently discovered, is, their master bombers were often bomb aimer's rather than pilots, for example to Heinsberg, 16-November-1944. Not sure how common that was. A careful review of the 3-Group operations may be revealing.

Jim

 

[JDCAVE]

Again, somewhere on the internet . . .

There is a post-war study by US intelligence (I think by the same group that produced the USSBS) that concluded the bombing campaign would have had more effect earlier if they had concentrated more assets on destroying electricity production and disrupting the distribution grid. There were, however, caveats that mentioned possible unpredictable and unfavorable effects in other areas.

Again, the study went away with my last computer.

I think many intelligence officers had their "Pet Achilles Heels", depending on their area of expertise. But if every city had multiple electrical generating stations, and these would have been coal based, then how to proceed? Remember Duisburg was struck on numerous occasions (10,000 tons on 14-October-1944 alone and was back up and running quite quickly. The Transport and Communications required massive attacks on multiple locations. The Dortmund-Emms Canal was hammered multiple times at Ladbergen and losses were quite high. In my opinion, the Oil Campaign made the most sense, but the Air Commands were well occupied with the Land Forces in France and also with the V-1 and V-2 targets which were designated high priority. It wasn't until September-October 1944 that the focus on oil was continued.

Lest we forget: Targets of Opportunity for the USAAF were the marshaling yards, easy to find in 10/10's cloud with H2X. Bomber Command could hit many targets, in the Ruhr, in range of Gee, Oboe and G-H. Hagen was by Gee on 2-December-1944 and Soest Marshaling yards were bombed on Oboe Sky Marking. Extensive damage was caused to the Accumulator Factory at Hagen and the marshalling yards at Soest was seriously damaged.

. Dad was on both of these:

 

[WARSPITER]

The bomber offensive had to chop and change from 1942 due to other events which lowered the concentration on German
targets.

Africa, Sicily, and Italy.
Aircraft for the Atlantic / Tirpitz etc.
Lead up to D-day.
The V1 and V2.

Things became more cohesive when the two commands were put under central control for specific targeting meaning a site
would be hit several times over a short period by day and on some nights to maximise damage and reduce ability to repair (1944).

 

[Macandy]

A primary aim from early 44 was to draw the Luftweaffe up to fight and be destroyed in detail to enable Overlord and its exploitation.

 

[BlackSheep]

Night was afraid of the RAF...

So now we're equating the RAF with Chuck Norris?