Wasn't the P-51 the best escort fighter of the war?

[ColFord]

RAF Mustang Mk.Is did not escort Wellingtons on a raid to the Dortmund-Ems Canal in October 1942. The facts are that the four Mustang Mk.I aircraft of No.268 Squadron conducted their sortie some 12 hours before the Wellingtons conducted their sortie that night over the same area. The confusion and connection of the two sorties arises from multiple editing of the original RAF Official Communique for that day which lists the two sorties separately, the communique then being edited for transmission from the UK to the USA (reducing the word count) and then a further editing by the releasing press agency that released the details to the various news services in the USA that merged the two distinct operations into one. That was then printed in multiple US newspapers at the time. Those press releases were what was then found as a source of information by researchers/authors of a number of early books on the history of the Mustang and have been repeated as fact ever since.

The Squadrons of Army Co-operation Command did in fact, conduct a number of long range bomber escort operations in late 1942 into early 1943. The first of these was escorting the Bostons of No.88 Sqdn RAF on a low level attack against Den Helder in the Netherlands on 16 September 1942. The sortie was conducted at low level throughout, so the Mustangs were well suited to the low level transit and attack at low level with the Bostons. No Bostons or Mustangs lost in the attack. (Photos of this operation held in collection of IWM London.) Further longer range low level bomber escort sorties were conducted by various ACC Mustang Mk.I squadrons into early 1943, primarily for the Boston and Ventura units of 2 Group. Regularly, it is reported in the post action combat report, that the allocated Spitfire escorts either turned up late to the departure rendezvous point, did not turn up at all (did not make the rendezvous) or left early from the escort due to fuel shortage issues. The Mustangs got a good reputation with the 2 Group bomber units for turning up on time and at the rendezvous point and staying with the bombers. However, the ACC Mustang units were then removed from the close escort role - RAF wartime file notes suggest a bit of politics at play - and were then instead used to conduct diversionary operations in support of low level bomber raids by units of 2 Group. So they would be tasked to conduct Rhubarbs or Rangers slightly ahead of the bomber raid to attempt to draw enemy fighters away from where the bombers would be.

Squadrons in ACC were well aware of the long range potential of the Mustang Mk.I and had been conducting long range navigation exercises for some time working out the best engine settings to get best usable combat range out of the aircraft. As an example in mid 1942, a flight from RAF Snailwell near Haymarket in East Cambridgeshire at low altitude to the vicinity of Edinburgh, battle climb to 10,000 to 15,000ft, fifteen minutes simulated air combat at high engine power and high fuel consumption, then return to Snailwell with ample reserves. And course chosen was not a straight line between the two but included flight out over the North Sea and Irish Sea down and back to properly simulate a long approach over water to the target area and the usual 'feints' to throw off radar.

By mid-1943, the reconnaissance requirements for the invasion were developing and so the change in focus occurred, then the Mustang Squadrons, by that time ACC had been disbanded and the Squadrons were attached to Fighter Command pending the formal formation of 2TAF, tasking shifted to coverage of required reconnaissance targets with Rhubarbs on an opportunity basis. Added to the D-Day commitments, they then were tasked with low level coverage of suspected V weapon sites, that escalated in early 1944 to include pre-and post bombing low level photographic coverage of V weapon sites. That was primarily with the Mustang Mk.I and Mk.IA given the timeframe.

RAF Mustang Mk.IIs, since they only got 50 of them as replacements for the P-51/Mustang Mk.IAs they had not earlier received, were not going to be in significant enough numbers for use other than attrition replacements for the earlier Mustang Mk.I and Mk.IAs. They arrived, crated in the UK from USA, recorded arrivals from early June to end of July 1943. First recorded issue to an operational Squadron, being No.II(AC) Squadron, late April 1944, with aircraft being issued through May 1944 into beginning of June 1944. As such by time of D-Day the Squadron did not have sufficient operational Mk.IIs to meet its operational commitments for the invasion and had to borrow Mustang Mk.IAs from No.268 Sqdn until about the end of June 1944.

The RAF Mustang Mk.III squadrons were initially used in a fighter bomber role in the lead up to and immediately after D-Day. That role came as a bit of a surprise to the RAF aircrew involved at the time, but a clue to that thinking at the time, was the number of ex-ACC Squadron Mustang pilots being posted to the Fighter Command Mustang Mk.III Squadrons at the time. Part of the thinking regarding this at the time was the load and range consideration, the Mustang being able to haul a heavier bombload over a longer distance compared to the Spitfire and Typhoon. So they got the targets furtherest from the UK airfields. Once the Allies were well established on the Continent and aircraft range with a bombing payload became less of an issue, and Spitfire units could be based on the Continent, the Mustang Mk.III Squadrons were transferred from 2TAF to Fighter Command, being replaced by Spitfire units transferred from Fighter Command to 2TAF. The RAF Mustang MK.III units then worked up to provide bomber escort for USAAF and RAF bombers. That then became the primary function of the RAF Mustang Mk.III units until VE-Day.

There is a book out due in June 2020 that looks at the history of the N.A. P-51/B/C Mustang in the context of the development of the USAAF long range bomber escort requirement and the development of the Mustang, published by Osprey, authored by William James Marshall and Lowell Ford (no relation), with input from the like of Gruenhagen and a broad community of Mustang specialist researchers/authors/current restorers and operators, and draws heavily on lots of original source documentation.

 

[Navalwarrior]

RAF Mustang Mk.Is did not escort Wellingtons on a raid to the Dortmund-Ems Canal in October 1942. The facts are that the four Mustang Mk.I aircraft of No.268 Squadron conducted their sortie some 12 hours before the Wellingtons conducted their sortie that night over the same area. The confusion and connection of the two sorties arises from multiple editing of the original RAF Official Communique for that day which lists the two sorties separately, the communique then being edited for transmission from the UK to the USA (reducing the word count) and then a further editing by the releasing press agency that released the details to the various news services in the USA that merged the two distinct operations into one. That was then printed in multiple US newspapers at the time. Those press releases were what was then found as a source of information by researchers/authors of a number of early books on the history of the Mustang and have been repeated as fact ever since.

The Squadrons of Army Co-operation Command did in fact, conduct a number of long range bomber escort operations in late 1942 into early 1943. The first of these was escorting the Bostons of No.88 Sqdn RAF on a low level attack against Den Helder in the Netherlands on 16 September 1942. The sortie was conducted at low level throughout, so the Mustangs were well suited to the low level transit and attack at low level with the Bostons. No Bostons or Mustangs lost in the attack. (Photos of this operation held in collection of IWM London.) Further longer range low level bomber escort sorties were conducted by various ACC Mustang Mk.I squadrons into early 1943, primarily for the Boston and Ventura units of 2 Group. Regularly, it is reported in the post action combat report, that the allocated Spitfire escorts either turned up late to the departure rendezvous point, did not turn up at all (did not make the rendezvous) or left early from the escort due to fuel shortage issues. The Mustangs got a good reputation with the 2 Group bomber units for turning up on time and at the rendezvous point and staying with the bombers. However, the ACC Mustang units were then removed from the close escort role - RAF wartime file notes suggest a bit of politics at play - and were then instead used to conduct diversionary operations in support of low level bomber raids by units of 2 Group. So they would be tasked to conduct Rhubarbs or Rangers slightly ahead of the bomber raid to attempt to draw enemy fighters away from where the bombers would be.

Squadrons in ACC were well aware of the long range potential of the Mustang Mk.I and had been conducting long range navigation exercises for some time working out the best engine settings to get best usable combat range out of the aircraft. As an example in mid 1942, a flight from RAF Snailwell near Haymarket in East Cambridgeshire at low altitude to the vicinity of Edinburgh, battle climb to 10,000 to 15,000ft, fifteen minutes simulated air combat at high engine power and high fuel consumption, then return to Snailwell with ample reserves. And course chosen was not a straight line between the two but included flight out over the North Sea and Irish Sea down and back to properly simulate a long approach over water to the target area and the usual 'feints' to throw off radar.

By mid-1943, the reconnaissance requirements for the invasion were developing and so the change in focus occurred, then the Mustang Squadrons, by that time ACC had been disbanded and the Squadrons were attached to Fighter Command pending the formal formation of 2TAF, tasking shifted to coverage of required reconnaissance targets with Rhubarbs on an opportunity basis. Added to the D-Day commitments, they then were tasked with low level coverage of suspected V weapon sites, that escalated in early 1944 to include pre-and post bombing low level photographic coverage of V weapon sites. That was primarily with the Mustang Mk.I and Mk.IA given the timeframe.

RAF Mustang Mk.IIs, since they only got 50 of them as replacements for the P-51/Mustang Mk.IAs they had not earlier received, were not going to be in significant enough numbers for use other than attrition replacements for the earlier Mustang Mk.I and Mk.IAs. They arrived, crated in the UK from USA, recorded arrivals from early June to end of July 1943. First recorded issue to an operational Squadron, being No.II(AC) Squadron, late April 1944, with aircraft being issued through May 1944 into beginning of June 1944. As such by time of D-Day the Squadron did not have sufficient operational Mk.IIs to meet its operational commitments for the invasion and had to borrow Mustang Mk.IAs from No.268 Sqdn until about the end of June 1944.

The RAF Mustang Mk.III squadrons were initially used in a fighter bomber role in the lead up to and immediately after D-Day. That role came as a bit of a surprise to the RAF aircrew involved at the time, but a clue to that thinking at the time, was the number of ex-ACC Squadron Mustang pilots being posted to the Fighter Command Mustang Mk.III Squadrons at the time. Part of the thinking regarding this at the time was the load and range consideration, the Mustang being able to haul a heavier bombload over a longer distance compared to the Spitfire and Typhoon. So they got the targets furtherest from the UK airfields. Once the Allies were well established on the Continent and aircraft range with a bombing payload became less of an issue, and Spitfire units could be based on the Continent, the Mustang Mk.III Squadrons were transferred from 2TAF to Fighter Command, being replaced by Spitfire units transferred from Fighter Command to 2TAF. The RAF Mustang MK.III units then worked up to provide bomber escort for USAAF and RAF bombers. That then became the primary function of the RAF Mustang Mk.III units until VE-Day.

There is a book out due in June 2020 that looks at the history of the N.A. P-51/B/C Mustang in the context of the development of the USAAF long range bomber escort requirement and the development of the Mustang, published by Osprey, authored by William James Marshall and Lowell Ford (no relation), with input from the like of Gruenhagen and a broad community of Mustang specialist researchers/authors/current restorers and operators, and draws heavily on lots of original source documentation.

Resp:
What you outlined makes much more sense, in that the RAF ultilized the Allison engine Mustangs to their fullest extent. Some time ago, I came across a 'pre-mission report' (for lack of a better term) that was issued to each pilot, that gave mission, speeds, altitude, coordinates to fly zigzag courses for ingress/egress for each day's Rhubarbs/Rangers. The level of Intel for AA guns, EA activity for each day's mission was extensive and up to date. Amazing! Thanks for the detailed info.

 

[pbehn]

RAF Mustang Mk.Is did not escort Wellingtons on a raid to the Dortmund-Ems Canal in October 1942. The facts are that the four Mustang Mk.I aircraft of No.268 Squadron conducted their sortie some 12 hours before the Wellingtons conducted their sortie that night over the same area. The confusion and connection of the two sorties arises from multiple editing of the original RAF Official Communique for that day which lists the two sorties separately, the communique then being edited for transmission from the UK to the USA (reducing the word count) and then a further editing by the releasing press agency that released the details to the various news services in the USA that merged the two distinct operations into one. That was then printed in multiple US newspapers at the time. Those press releases were what was then found as a source of information by researchers/authors of a number of early books on the history of the Mustang and have been repeated as fact ever since.

The Squadrons of Army Co-operation Command did in fact, conduct a number of long range bomber escort operations in late 1942 into early 1943. The first of these was escorting the Bostons of No.88 Sqdn RAF on a low level attack against Den Helder in the Netherlands on 16 September 1942. The sortie was conducted at low level throughout, so the Mustangs were well suited to the low level transit and attack at low level with the Bostons. No Bostons or Mustangs lost in the attack. (Photos of this operation held in collection of IWM London.) Further longer range low level bomber escort sorties were conducted by various ACC Mustang Mk.I squadrons into early 1943, primarily for the Boston and Ventura units of 2 Group. Regularly, it is reported in the post action combat report, that the allocated Spitfire escorts either turned up late to the departure rendezvous point, did not turn up at all (did not make the rendezvous) or left early from the escort due to fuel shortage issues. The Mustangs got a good reputation with the 2 Group bomber units for turning up on time and at the rendezvous point and staying with the bombers. However, the ACC Mustang units were then removed from the close escort role - RAF wartime file notes suggest a bit of politics at play - and were then instead used to conduct diversionary operations in support of low level bomber raids by units of 2 Group. So they would be tasked to conduct Rhubarbs or Rangers slightly ahead of the bomber raid to attempt to draw enemy fighters away from where the bombers would be.

Squadrons in ACC were well aware of the long range potential of the Mustang Mk.I and had been conducting long range navigation exercises for some time working out the best engine settings to get best usable combat range out of the aircraft. As an example in mid 1942, a flight from RAF Snailwell near Haymarket in East Cambridgeshire at low altitude to the vicinity of Edinburgh, battle climb to 10,000 to 15,000ft, fifteen minutes simulated air combat at high engine power and high fuel consumption, then return to Snailwell with ample reserves. And course chosen was not a straight line between the two but included flight out over the North Sea and Irish Sea down and back to properly simulate a long approach over water to the target area and the usual 'feints' to throw off radar.

By mid-1943, the reconnaissance requirements for the invasion were developing and so the change in focus occurred, then the Mustang Squadrons, by that time ACC had been disbanded and the Squadrons were attached to Fighter Command pending the formal formation of 2TAF, tasking shifted to coverage of required reconnaissance targets with Rhubarbs on an opportunity basis. Added to the D-Day commitments, they then were tasked with low level coverage of suspected V weapon sites, that escalated in early 1944 to include pre-and post bombing low level photographic coverage of V weapon sites. That was primarily with the Mustang Mk.I and Mk.IA given the timeframe.

RAF Mustang Mk.IIs, since they only got 50 of them as replacements for the P-51/Mustang Mk.IAs they had not earlier received, were not going to be in significant enough numbers for use other than attrition replacements for the earlier Mustang Mk.I and Mk.IAs. They arrived, crated in the UK from USA, recorded arrivals from early June to end of July 1943. First recorded issue to an operational Squadron, being No.II(AC) Squadron, late April 1944, with aircraft being issued through May 1944 into beginning of June 1944. As such by time of D-Day the Squadron did not have sufficient operational Mk.IIs to meet its operational commitments for the invasion and had to borrow Mustang Mk.IAs from No.268 Sqdn until about the end of June 1944.

The RAF Mustang Mk.III squadrons were initially used in a fighter bomber role in the lead up to and immediately after D-Day. That role came as a bit of a surprise to the RAF aircrew involved at the time, but a clue to that thinking at the time, was the number of ex-ACC Squadron Mustang pilots being posted to the Fighter Command Mustang Mk.III Squadrons at the time. Part of the thinking regarding this at the time was the load and range consideration, the Mustang being able to haul a heavier bombload over a longer distance compared to the Spitfire and Typhoon. So they got the targets furtherest from the UK airfields. Once the Allies were well established on the Continent and aircraft range with a bombing payload became less of an issue, and Spitfire units could be based on the Continent, the Mustang Mk.III Squadrons were transferred from 2TAF to Fighter Command, being replaced by Spitfire units transferred from Fighter Command to 2TAF. The RAF Mustang MK.III units then worked up to provide bomber escort for USAAF and RAF bombers. That then became the primary function of the RAF Mustang Mk.III units until VE-Day.

There is a book out due in June 2020 that looks at the history of the N.A. P-51/B/C Mustang in the context of the development of the USAAF long range bomber escort requirement and the development of the Mustang, published by Osprey, authored by William James Marshall and Lowell Ford (no relation), with input from the like of Gruenhagen and a broad community of Mustang specialist researchers/authors/current restorers and operators, and draws heavily on lots of original source documentation.

Bill is a contributor to this forum

 

[tomo pauk]

...

There is a book out due in June 2020 that looks at the history of the N.A. P-51/B/C Mustang in the context of the development of the USAAF long range bomber escort requirement and the development of the Mustang, published by Osprey, authored by William James Marshall and Lowell Ford (no relation), with input from the like of Gruenhagen and a broad community of Mustang specialist researchers/authors/current restorers and operators, and draws heavily on lots of original source documentation.

(my bold)
We need to find out who that fellow is...

Thank you for that post, BTW.

 

[ColFord]

I only noted Bill's post over in the books part of the forum about the new book a couple of hours after I had made my post. That's life.

 

[drgondog]

I only noted Bill's post over in the books part of the forum about the new book a couple of hours after I had made my post. That's life.

Colin Ford was a Major contributor..

 

[TheMadPenguin]

OP asked "best escort fighter".
Everybody pounded facts.
Something only glanced at: the cost of the planes. Pilots might not care, Bomber drivers might, so here's the gist:

P-51: $50,985 in 1945
P-47: $85,000 in 1945
P-38: $97,147 in 1944

So: Do you want 100 P-38's, 110 P-47's, or 200 P-51's?

 

[FLYBOYJ]

OP asked "best escort fighter".
Everybody pounded facts.
Something only glanced at: the cost of the planes. Pilots might not care, Bomber drivers might, so here's the gist:

P-51: $50,985 in 1945
P-47: $85,000 in 1945
P-38: $97,147 in 1944

So: Do you want 100 P-38's, 110 P-47's, or 200 P-51's?

Depends what I'm going to use them for and in what theater of operation. And what model of each aircraft? P-51B? P-38L? P-47M? There will be scenarios where 100 P-38s are more cost effective in terms of capability and pilot survivability then 200 P-51s.

 

[pbehn]

Costs are always difficult to compare, the buyer wasn't always paying for the same thing and frequently it was based on volume. In any case the plane (or anything) has to be up to the job, you cant make a P-26 cheap enough for the USA to buy in 1944 because pilots are always worth more than planes.

 

[TheMadPenguin]

Depends what I'm going to use them for and in what theater of operation.

Please lend us newbies some understanding: WHERE would you prefer 110 P-47 to 200 P=51?

And what model of each aircraft? P-51B? P-38L? P-47M?

Whatever they were making in 1944 (P-38) and 1945 (others).

There will be scenarios were 100 P-38s are more cost effective in terms of capability and pilot survivability then 200 P-51s.

I'd like to know which scenarios you have in mind please.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Please lend us newbies some understanding: WHERE would you prefer 110 P-47 to 200 P=51?

When I have a 20mm shell blow off 3 cylinder heads. I'd rather be flying a twin over an ocean any day of the week, let the taxpayer fund my survivability.

Whatever they were making in 1944 (P-38) and 1945 (others).

Still depends on mission and theater.

I'd like to know which scenarios you have in mind please.

See above!

 

[pbehn]

P-47 had more fire power, ammunition and survivability than a P-51, P-38 had more bomb dropping and night fighting ability. Many USA aircraft were given away under lend lease, or you could argue other nations supplied the men and blood in a fight against a common enemy. The total cost of all USA fighter airframes is chicken feed in terms of the total cost of the war. The cost of an airfield in UK with all the trained people needed to keep 12 or 16 aircraft in service dwarfs the cost of the airframes, without consideration of the whole cost of weather recon, target recon and the cost of the whole bomber force. A fighters cost was frequently a nominal business sum that makes sense in war but not in peace time, when the government pays for the factory and tools and finances the training for a product only they are allowed to buy and becomes worthless overnight how do you make a price?

 

[michael rauls]

I certainly wouldn't argue that the p51 wasn't the best escort fighter of the war for most situations but there are situations where one of the other options might be a better choice. In adition to the example Flyboy gave if I knew the mission would likely result in fighting at or abouve 35,000 feet I might opt for a Thunderbolt.
If the mission called for ground attack on a target heavily defended by AA on the way back, again might opt for a p47.

 

[tomo pauk]

I don't think that Merlin Mustang was in any kind of disadvantage when fighting was at 35000 ft, especially against the German or Japanese opposition.

As for the 100 P-38s vs. 200 P-51s: a bomber force that is escorted by 200 fighters will have far less losses than the bomber force that is escorted by 100 fighters, it is likely that escort force will suffer less casualties vs. defender. Big & distinctive 2-engined fighter will be noticed and recognised far easier than a smaller and generic-looking 1-engined fighter, thus alerting the defender earlier, giving him more time to adjust it's formation and altitude.
Having a doubled size of aircraft number in the air, while also offering a set of other advntages, is just too good opportunity to pass.

 

[michael rauls]

I don't think that Merlin Mustang was in any kind of disadvantage when fighting was at 35000 ft, especially against the German or Japanese opposition.

As for the 100 P-38s vs. 200 P-51s: a bomber force that is escorted by 200 fighters will have far less losses than the bomber force that is escorted by 100 fighters, it is likely that escort force will suffer less casualties vs. defender. Big & distinctive 2-engined fighter will be noticed and recognised far easier than a smaller and generic-looking 1-engined fighter, thus alerting the defender earlier, giving him more time to adjust it's formation and altitude.
Having a doubled size of aircraft number in the air, while also offering a set of other advntages, is just too good opportunity to pass.

Was cost ever a determining factor. I mean was this even a real issue. Did it ever actually happen the the US could only put up half as many planes in any theater because of cost. I honestly don't know for sure although I've never read that it was so it would surprise me.
And if cost isn't an issue, well the Mustang is still the better choice MOST of the time , imho but as noted earlier there are situations where other options might perform better. Nobody's saying a P51 can't fight at 35,000 feet, it's just that above this altitude a p47 might be better.
Same with flying over long stretches of shark infested waters, p51 can certainly do it and be effective but having that extra engine a p38 might be desirable. At least it was to awful lot of guys.

 

[drgondog]

Was cost ever a determining factor. I mean was this even a real issue. Did it ever actually happen the the US could only put up half as many planes in any theater because of cost. I honestly don't know for sure although I've never read that it was so it would surprise me.
And if cost isn't an issue, well the Mustang is still the better choice MOST of the time , imho but as noted earlier there are situations where other options might perform better. Nobody's saying a P51 can't fight at 35,000 feet, it's just that above this altitude a p47 might be better.
Same with flying over long stretches of shark infested waters, p51 can certainly do it and be effective but having that extra engine a p38 might be desirable. At least it was to awful lot of guys.

Theatre commanders could voice a request. Mission and availability dictated the distribution.

From the previous discussion, the following observations. Kenney was the number one advocate and requester for P-38s because of range beginning with P-38F already equipped with wing racks and plumbing, even though the external tanks were ferry tanks in 1942 and 1943. He had a supply source in Australia and an innovative head of Air Technical Services who thought out of the box. The P-38s that went from 8th AF to 9th and 15th were 'suplussed' from 8th as P-51s became the fighter of choice - for 8th AF mission and for 15th mission. The P-38J/L that went to 15th were more focused on CAS for Italian campaign as the 4 P-51FGs equipped with P-51B/D were sufficient for most long range escort tasking.

In my research I have yet to uncover discussions between HQ-Plans&Reqmnts and Materiel Command in which cost was the factor for deployment. IIRC no Mustang equipped FG were replaced by P-38s in Pacific or CBI or ETO, where local commander choice MAY have influence, but operational costs and training costs were far less that P-38.

The P-47M had to be considered a Novelty. Introduced in ETO only because of 56th FG and somewhat of a problem because it maintained a more complex logistics issue for VIII Air Services command when the rest of 8th AF was all P-51. The P-38FGs in 9th AF converted to P-47 and P-51. The replaced P-38s filled attrition for the 15th AF P-38 FGs. The P-47D inventory for 9th and 12th AF were pretty stable.

P-51 inventory continued to surge in 1944-1945 as it increasingly became the fighter of choice for those units not totally dedicated to Tactical Air in Pacific and CBI. Only a few P-47Ns (respectively) ever made it into combat Ops and did not replace P-51s - only P-38 FGs. IIRC the 318th, the 413th and 507th were the only P-47N FGs.

One thing seems to jump out. The P-51D/K was the dominant escort to Japan, P-47Ns arrived in time to do some but the P-38L seemed to be shut out of what was the most active long range escort over water.

 

[michael rauls]

Theatre commanders could voice a request. Mission and availability dictated the distribution.

From the previous discussion, the following observations. Kenney was the number one advocate and requester for P-38s because of range beginning with P-38F already equipped with wing racks and plumbing, even though the external tanks were ferry tanks in 1942 and 1943. He had a supply source in Australia and an innovative head of Air Technical Services who thought out of the box. The P-38s that went from 8th AF to 9th and 15th were 'suplussed' from 8th as P-51s became the fighter of choice - for 8th AF mission and for 15th mission. The P-38J/L that went to 15th were more focused on CAS for Italian campaign as the 4 P-51FGs equipped with P-51B/D were sufficient for most long range escort tasking.

In my research I have yet to uncover discussions between HQ-Plans&Reqmnts and Materiel Command in which cost was the factor for deployment. IIRC no Mustang equipped FG were replaced by P-38s in Pacific or CBI or ETO, where local commander choice MAY have influence, but operational costs and training costs were far less that P-38.

The P-47M had to be considered a Novelty. Introduced in ETO only because of 56th FG and somewhat of a problem because it maintained a more complex logistics issue for VIII Air Services command when the rest of 8th AF was all P-51. The P-38FGs in 9th AF converted to P-47 and P-51. The replaced P-38s filled attrition for the 15th AF P-38 FGs. The P-47D inventory for 9th and 12th AF were pretty stable.

P-51 inventory continued to surge in 1944-1945 as it increasingly became the fighter of choice for those units not totally dedicated to Tactical Air in Pacific and CBI. Only a few P-47Ns (respectively) ever made it into combat Ops and did not replace P-51s - only P-38 FGs. IIRC the 318th, the 413th and 507th were the only P-47N FGs.

One thing seems to jump out. The P-51D/K was the dominant escort to Japan, P-47Ns arrived in time to do some but the P-38L seemed to be shut out of what was the most active long range escort over water.

Ya, I've always found that odd( that p38s weren't used more to escort B29s that is).
Already had alot of them in the Pacific with experienced aircrews and as important as the safety of the extra engine seemed to be to the pilots. Seems the p38 pilots as a whole thought it was verry important anyway.
Might be altitude. Alot of the B29 missions were at higher altitudes as I understand it especially early on. If your going to operate bombers at high altitude probably a plane that is best below 25,000 feet is not a the best choice. They did do escort work where such high altitude was not used.
I'm thinking it's just a matter of picking the best plane for the specific mission.

 

[Navalwarrior]

Theatre commanders could voice a request. Mission and availability dictated the distribution.

From the previous discussion, the following observations. Kenney was the number one advocate and requester for P-38s because of range beginning with P-38F already equipped with wing racks and plumbing, even though the external tanks were ferry tanks in 1942 and 1943. He had a supply source in Australia and an innovative head of Air Technical Services who thought out of the box. The P-38s that went from 8th AF to 9th and 15th were 'suplussed' from 8th as P-51s became the fighter of choice - for 8th AF mission and for 15th mission. The P-38J/L that went to 15th were more focused on CAS for Italian campaign as the 4 P-51FGs equipped with P-51B/D were sufficient for most long range escort tasking.

In my research I have yet to uncover discussions between HQ-Plans&Reqmnts and Materiel Command in which cost was the factor for deployment. IIRC no Mustang equipped FG were replaced by P-38s in Pacific or CBI or ETO, where local commander choice MAY have influence, but operational costs and training costs were far less that P-38.

The P-47M had to be considered a Novelty. Introduced in ETO only because of 56th FG and somewhat of a problem because it maintained a more complex logistics issue for VIII Air Services command when the rest of 8th AF was all P-51. The P-38FGs in 9th AF converted to P-47 and P-51. The replaced P-38s filled attrition for the 15th AF P-38 FGs. The P-47D inventory for 9th and 12th AF were pretty stable.

P-51 inventory continued to surge in 1944-1945 as it increasingly became the fighter of choice for those units not totally dedicated to Tactical Air in Pacific and CBI. Only a few P-47Ns (respectively) ever made it into combat Ops and did not replace P-51s - only P-38 FGs. IIRC the 318th, the 413th and 507th were the only P-47N FGs.

One thing seems to jump out. The P-51D/K was the dominant escort to Japan, P-47Ns arrived in time to do some but the P-38L seemed to be shut out of what was the most active long range escort over water.

Resp:
Hap Arnold told Kennedy in mid-late 1943 that he would not be getting P-38s due to the need for 8th AF long range escorts. This was before the Merlin engine P-51Bs started to arrive. Instead, Kenney was offered P-47D-5/-6s, which were not drop tank capable. Kenney's engineers developed plumbing for a centerline drop tank (either a 200 ot 250 gal flat tank, which worked . . but made it hard to fly straight, causing increased pilot fatigue). These tanks were made by Australia's Ford Motor Co.. I recently learned that the US Govt actually began providing the RAF with Mustang IIIs directly from NAA almost parellel delivery w US units, but a great many of these early Mustangs were transferred to USAAF fighter groups after arriving in England. The two tone upper camouflage and RAF roundels were stripped/painted over with olive green and star insignias, with the original yellow tail registration number.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Resp:
Hap Arnold told Kennedy in mid-late 1943 that he would not be getting P-38s due to the need for 8th AF long range escorts. This was before the Merlin engine P-51Bs started to arrive. Instead, Kenney was offered P-47D-5/-6s, which were not drop tank capable. Kenney's engineers developed plumbing for a centerline drop tank (either a 200 ot 250 gal flat tank, which worked . . but made it hard to fly straight, causing increased pilot fatigue). These tanks were made by Australia's Ford Motor Co.. I recently learned that the US Govt actually began providing the RAF with Mustang IIIs directly from NAA almost parellel delivery w US units, but a great many of these early Mustangs were transferred to USAAF fighter groups after arriving in England. The two tone upper camouflage and RAF roundels were stripped/painted over with olive green and star insignias, with the original yellow tail registration number.

I believe that's not totally accurate. While it was documented from several sources that Arnold had told Kenny the ETO was the priority, P-38s did find their way to the South Pacific. In the book "Peter Three Eight" (Stanaway) the Arnold/Kenny situation was mentioned but Kenny acquired enough P-38s to bring up 3 operational P-38 combat squadrons by the spring of 1943, I believe they were the 80th, the 475th and the 39th FS, all under V fighter command. I believe a 4th was on line during the summer of 43'. Well into 1943, P-38s were finding their way to the V fighter command. Bottom line in mid-late 1943, there were already P-38s in theater and more were on their way.

 

[drgondog]

I believe that's not totally accurate. While it was documented from several sources that Arnold had told Kenny the ETO was the priority, P-38s did find their way to the South Pacific. In the book "Peter Three Eight" (Stanaway) the Arnold/Kenny situation was mentioned but Kenny acquired enough P-38s to bring up 3 operational P-38 combat squadrons by the spring of 1943, I believe they were the 80th, the 475th and the 39th FS, all under V fighter command. I believe a 4th was on line during the summer of 43'. Well into 1943, P-38s were finding their way to the V fighter command. Bottom line in mid-late 1943, there were already P-38s in theater and more were on their way.

Joe - the P-38G/H that made their way to SWP were before the Blitz Week crisis at end of July, 1943. Arnold directed the re-routing of the 20th and 55th FG to ETO (from Med) which arrived in August 1943. IIRC it was October 1943 when he said ALL P-51B and P-38J were to go to ETO. After that the only new P-38FG in any Theatre until May 1944 were the 8th AF 364th/479th ETO and the 367/370474th 9th AF. About this time the flow of replacements were from 8th AF to 9th and then 15th until the Long Range crisis was effectively over around D-Day. Then the production logistics pointed to SWP and some CBI for most remaining New production