Weather limitations in carrier aviation in the interwar and WWII eras

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The problem I have remembering the names of RN ships is it that they all seem to have these stupendous adjectives for names.
I do admire the British (I am an UK-born, indigenous English after all, no matter what the Guardian says) tendency to avoid naming their important ships after politicians. Yes, there's HMS Churchill, but most are named after battles, admirals (though HMS Iron Duke was an army general, and pm), places, or my favourite, as you say stupendous adjectives: Implacable, Indefatigable, Formidable, Indomitable, Audacious, Illustrious, Resolution, Defiance, Invincible, and of course Dreadnought to name a few. Then there's the constellations like Canopus and Orion, and the mythological heros like Achilles and Argonaut, and all the Didos.
 
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County-class ships of the Royal Navy
ShipPennantSubclassBuilderLaid downLaunchedCompletedFate
Berwick65KentFairfield Shipbuilding &
Engineering Company
, Govan
15 Sep 192430 Mar 192615 Feb 1928Broken up at Blyth, 1948
Cumberland57Vickers-Armstrongs, Barrow in Furness18 Oct 192416 Mar 192621 Jan 1928Broken up at Newport, 1959
Suffolk55HM Dockyard Portsmouth30 Sep 192416 Feb 192631 May 1928Broken up at Newport, 1948
Kent54HM Dockyard Chatham15 Nov 192416 Mar 192622 Jun 1928Broken up at Troon, 1948
Cornwall56HM Dockyard Devonport9 Oct 192411 Mar 192610 May 1928Sunk by Japanese aircraft in "Easter Sunday Raid" south of Ceylon, 5 Apr 1942
London69LondonHM Dockyard, Portsmouth23 Feb 192614 Sep 192731 Jan 1929Broken up at Barrow-in-Furness, 1950
Devonshire39HM Dockyard, Devonport16 Mar 192622 Oct 192718 Mar 1929Broken up at Newport, 1954
Sussex96Hawthorn Leslie & Company, Hebburn1 Feb 192722 Feb 192819 Mar 1929Broken up at Dalmuir, 1950
Shropshire73William Beardmore & Company, Dalmuir24 Feb 19275 Jul 192812 Sep 1929To RAN 1943
Broken up at Troon, 1954
Norfolk78NorfolkFairfield Shipbuilding & Engineering Company, Govan8 Jul 192712 Dec 19281 May 1930Broken up at Newport, 1950
Dorsetshire40HM Dockya
 
I was fortunate to know Eric and Lynn Brown; we exchanged visits Over There and Over Here. He said that in Nor Lant ops, 60-foot "excursions" were known in flight deck pitch, and the batsmen (LSOs) had to judge the parameters within VERY thin margins. IIRC sometimes there was no option but to plant the airplane on the deck regardless of consequences, because in those conditions the pilot/crew would be lost in a ditching.
 
When the Hermes was ordered in April 1917 no one had LANDED an aircraft on a ship. There were NO flush deck aircraft carriers in existence. The Argus was redesigned with a flush deck in April 1918 and commissioned in September 1918. After the war ended the completion of the Eagle and Hermes was logically delayed to incorporate the experience of actually operating aircraft from a actual aircraft carrier.
While its fun to criticize some of their design features I cannot image anyone coming up with a better design than these two ships. They established the template for all aircraft carriers to follow.
The Hermes and Eagle were magnificent ship that don't get the attention they deserve as the true pioneers of todays aircraft carriers
 
I don't think the other Navies fully grasped the importance of the island at first. While the Lexington and Saratoga did have islands the Ranger only had an island added during construction. The Hosho was built with a tiny island which was quickly removed. The Agaki and Kaga were built without islands and didn't have them until reconstructed until the late 30s. The Soryu was completed with an island in 1937. The history of Japanese aircraft carrier islands is well documented in this video.

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xtFE0NessRs
 
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In the RN the argument about whether or not an island or islands (one on each side) were required bounced back & forth from 1916 to at least the mid-1920s. Also what length it should be. Plenty of wind-tunnel testing was done.

Argus, after being designed with two islands (one of which was actually fitted for a short period in early 1918 when she was fitting out with the other lying on the dockside), was commissioned with a flush deck. She was then trialled with a wood and canvas temporary island. Those trials delayed the completion of Eagle in 1920 while decisions were made about an island for her, amongst other things.

It was eventually decided to complete Furious with a flush deck after some to-ing & fro-ing and C & G were to follow as flush deckers. Strip down of the latter pair had begun before plans changed in 1924 and a short island designed in. And the RAF, responsible for operating the aircraft, were not in favour!

One concern about fitting an island was that it might constrain the size of aircraft that could be carried in the future. That was something that was repeated in the late 1940s / early 1950s when CVA-58 United States (never built) and the subsequent CVA-59 Forrestal class were being designed. So flush decks were again under consideration.

But islands were not the only features of a modern carrier that proved controversial in the RN during the 1920s. Arrester gear, crash barriers, and catapults all resulted in arguments both within the RN and / or between the RN and RAF.

Worthwhile remembering that by 1926 the RN had 4 carriers in service and another 2 under conversion and thoughts of how the next generation of carriers should look. It was the world leader, and as such the first to discover the problems of operating wheeled aircraft from carriers. The USN only had Langley (completed 1922, where aircraft had to be craned on and off the lifts!) plus the 2 Lexingtons under conversion (completed Nov/Dec 1927) and initial thoughts about a new ship that eventually became Ranger. The IJN had Hosho (completed Dec 1922) plus Akagi & Kaga under conversion (completed March 1927 & 1928 respectively). Help for the IJN came from Britain.
 
The adoption of the angled deck aided flight ops. and allowed the Forrestals to keep an island. Too bad the angled deck wasn't conceived earlier, imagine the Essex's with angled decks like the later FRAM conversions.
 
Up until 1942 or so, and I'd argue until 1944, you could not be certain of sinking enemy surface combatant with a carrier unless carrier force significantly outnumbered surface warships.

And HMS Hermes in fact spent brief time with the Atlantic Fleet and some significant time with the Mediterranean Fleet IIRC. In both of these theatres, surface action involving carriers was basically a certainty - hence why Illustrious class had not just an armored flight deck but a full armored box. Surface-based gunfire was a major concern for the Royal Navy carriers.
The adoption of the angled deck aided flight ops. and allowed the Forrestals to keep an island. Too bad the angled deck wasn't conceived earlier, imagine the Essex's with angled decks like the later FRAM conversions.
It wasn't really necessary before. IIRC the angled flight deck only appeared because jet fighters were too large and fast to operate with a crash barrier. And angled deck adds its own set of issues to ship construction and design, so until the jet age it will have been an unnecessary complication.
 
Surface-based gunfire was a major concern for the Royal Navy carriers.
Not just for the RN. Also for the USN.

As for the Lexingtons. From Stern "The Lexington Class Carriers":-

"From the ships' inception there was constant argument over the retention of these guns. Despite the arguments, the original guns were upgraded in November 1940 in Lexington with a new model (Mk 9, Mod 2). The commitment to the retention of the 8in battery went so far as to include the installation of FC (Mk 3) surface fire control radar on Saratoga during her late 1941 refit. Any plans for the main battery were superseded by the outbreak of war and Saratoga's subsequent torpedoing."

It was the need to free up displacement to bring more of the side armour belt back above the waterline and to allow an increase in AA that drove the removal of the guns & gunhouses from Lexington in March 1942. However the yard at PH were ordered NOT to remove the ammunition hoists "this time"

The fate of Glorious in June 1940 once again raised the question of big guns on USN carriers. In Nov 1940 BuAer (the aviators) were the ones resisting attemps to remove the 8" battery from the Lexingtons. The reasoning was that in bad weather or at night a carrier would not be able to operate her aircraft and that an attacking force might destroy, seriously damage or evade her cruiser escort leaving her to defend herself. During the design phase of the MIdway class BuAer, in July 1940, had been suggesting that any carrier ordered after CV-12 should have an 8" armament. Subsequent hearings discussed 8", 6in single and DP and a mixed 6"/5" main battery. That led to 8 outline designs with these big guns being drawn up for consideration. It seems to have been early 1942 before the idea of big guns on the new carrier was finally put to bed.
 
Was there any thinking about carrier belt armor protection against aircraft delivered bombs coming in through the sides, or was it purely a surface gunfire thing?
 
One can understand the fear of being caught by surface warships, however

  1. Before the 1930 LNT there was no limit on cruiser tonnage, so there was nothing preventing building 10kton 8" cruisers as carrier escorts, thus saving tonnage on the treaty limited carriers.
  2. Glorious isn't really a good example of a situation where heavier guns on a carrier would have helped. A few 8" guns would have done piddly squat against the ugly sisters.
 
Was there any thinking about carrier belt armor protection against aircraft delivered bombs coming in through the sides, or was it purely a surface gunfire thing?
That was a consideration for the RN when the Illustrious class was designed in 1936. But the hangar sides were the first thing to be thinned out when the Implacables were designed and Indomitable redesigned. Slimmed from 4.5" to 1.5". Necessary to remain within the 23,000 ton Treaty limit.
 
1. Everyone was building 10k / 8" cruisers from the early 1920s led by Britain & Japan. In the 1930 London Treaty the US managed to get agreement to allow it to build more than anyone else.

The size of the US carriers was not driven by the gun armament. The US had been examining c 35,000 ton carriers with 6" guns before they went to Washington in 1921. Size was driven by the need for speed and range for Pacific operations. From Washington, it got what it wanted, the ability to build 2x33,000 ton ships (in reality 36,000 ton. The Japanese weren't the only ones stretching the rules). 8" guns follow as the need to counter the expected enemy cruisers.

2. Expected enemy was the Japanese 8" cruisers, not their BB or ships like the twins.
 

Part of the island story is also the issue of how to route the exhaust. All kinds of weird and wonderful schemes were tried in an effort to minimize the effect of the hot exhaust on aircraft coming in to land. It took a while, but everyone eventually converged on the solution of having the funnels part of the island structure.
 
Interesting although an 8" cruiser should have a significant advantage over an 8" gunned aircraft carrier. Far more agile, much smaller target, much more training in surface to surface and most importantly not full of avgas. I also don't see how 8" guns could have saved Glorious. The lesson there is not to be caught naping.
 
But not until postwar.

See Japanese Unryu class (completed after the Hiyos and Taiho), WW2 Independence & Saipan class CVL, WW2 escort carriers. Even the 1948/49 flush deck CVA-58 United States (not built) and early iterations of the Forrestal design.

Going nuclear got rid of the problem.
 

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