What does Japan do if War against USA/UK/DEI postponed to Spring 1942? (1 Viewer)

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The incoming B-17s also caused Lt Tyler to shrug off the Opana Point radar detection of the Japanese first wave. He told Elliot and the other guy whose name I forget that they were the expected incoming Forts.
That always puzzled me.

The attack waves would have been coming from a different direction and with a more significant "blip".

I know early radar didn't have the definition or detail of modern radar systems, but something should have tossed up a few red flags with that contact.

At least the Enterprise's inbound VB-6 and VS-6 elements knew something was afoot, they just didn't expect the Japanese to be at Pearl when they arrived.
 

I think Lt Tyler, on an early Sunday morning before any bombs had dropped, was still in peacetime mode, especially considering the radar site was still in training.

So far as I know, Enterprise's a/c had notice after the attack had started to expect a rough welcome, but I'm not informed about anything they might have known before 0755. I'd welcome any info you might have on what they were briefed on.
 
Halsey put his taskforce on wartime footing as he left Midway on his own volition.
VB-6 and VS-6 were armed and conducting a tactical sweep ahead of the Enterprise's taskforce as they approached Hawaii.

The SBDs were not aware of the attack until they flew into the middle of it.

Had they been aware of the attack in progress, they would have been prepared to defend themselves.
 
I'm not an apologist for the Lieutenant but given navigation of the time, perhaps the B-17s coming in from a different direction might be plausible?
They were coming to the islands from the West Coast, the course of approach to Oahu would have been from the east - the B-17s were unarmed (no Mgs or ammunition) in order to help extend their range, so they were flying as straight of a course as possible in order to get the most out of their fuel...which they were very short on, as they approached Pearl.
 
The B-17s flew to Hawaii from Hamilton Field, California, being the shortest distance from the West Coast to Hawaii. Distance was approx 2,350 miles. That is just north of San Francisco. So the direction of approach to Hawaii is from the North East.

The Japanese strike forces approached Hawaii from the North.

They were carrying their guns (but not mounted) but not ammunition for them. The plan being to degrease them and mount them in Hawaii for the onward journey. The USN laid on a number of ships along their course as guides with final homing to Hawaii on a civilian radio transmitter.

This book may be of interest. B-17 details from p72 (p87 of the .pdf file)
 
The air attack commenced 0748.
USS Ward engaged a midget submarine at 0637.
The Attack force was picked up on radar at 0702.

If you ever been on a military base on a lazy Sunday morning then the events are well known. Nobody is about and nothing is going on.

There was no procedure for action that day so it would be a classic case of trying to find somebody who could do anything.

So yeah the IJN picked a very good moment.
 
Navigation back in the day was point in general direction and best effort.

So the idea the B-17s would be anywhere near the prescribed route is not perfect. Finding the Island itself is Gold Star award material.

So if the B-17 were not exactly what and where they should be would have been of no importance
 
I know early radar didn't have the definition or detail of modern radar systems, but something should have tossed up a few red flags with that contact.
It is amazing. The US was readying for war with Japan, they had radar and fighters on Hawaii so clearly planned to counter a Japanese attack from the air, and at this distance from Japan, that has to be an IJN carrier strike. The US had everything in hand, radar, fighters, etc…, they just needed the responsible people to do their jobs.
 
A case of disbelief? You can train for something for years but it's still training. When the real deal happens, there might be a disconnect between reality and complacency.
I suppose so. Sort like being a security screener at Logan Airport in Sept 2001, you're trained to look for trouble, but when trouble comes you don't look. The appearance of preparedness combined with overall complacency was the name of the game.
 
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I know A Admiral Beez probably won't read this because I'm contrarian but the simple fact is that Britain provided the most financial aid to China until the end of 1941, after which the US became the primary aid-giver. Britain was also an advocate of an "International Air Force" and had plans well advanced to deploy a squadron each of Buffalos and Blenheims as part of a "British Volunteer Group" under Chennault in November 1941.
 
Problem is the military is not like the TV.

All shiny and effective.

Sunday morning is the true military. Utter FUBAR followed by a SNAFU.

So any one who has ever served day one in the military know full well exactly what happened.

It was a dumpster fire. And no one who is ex military will be surprised.
 
That's something I never knew.
 
I have a friend (really) who is retired U.S.Army. He told me the US military closes for Christmas.
 
That's something I never knew.

I suspect if Japan didn't attack until the spring of 1942, we'd see a proxy war in China with Britain (and its Commonwealth) and the US providing aircraft and aircrew to support the Chinese Nationalists.

It's interesting to ponder how long Japan would hold off without going to war. Their economic situation was pretty perilous, particularly once the US oil embargo starts to bite. Meanwhile, the US and the UK (and, to a lesser extent, the NEI) are continuing to build their in-theatre forces. I suspect a delay, even until April, would have resulted in very different results for Japan. For example, in Malaya, the planned set up of a radar warning network would have been completed, and the Buffalos would be replaced/augmented by P-40s. Those factors all would have contributed to the IJAAF having a much harder time establishing air superiority over Malaya...and without that, establishing and maintaining a bridgehead on the Kra Isthmus would be much more challenging.
 
They were planning on an attack: a sabotage attack by the Japanese-Americans resident in Hawai'i. Apparently, no thought was given to a carrier-launched attack even though the USN had, I've read, wargamed exactly this scenario.
 

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