What does Japan do if War against USA/UK/DEI postponed to Spring 1942?

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Have GHWB firmly and clearly tell Saddam not to invade Kuwait in 1991 and much of where we are now today (GW1, GW2, 9/11, WOT, Afghan/Iraq occupation, Arab Spring, Syrian collapse, refugee crisis, etc.) would be different.

I seriously doubt Hussein would have listened to such a warning. He was under pressure domestically from the still-huge expenses of the eight-year war with Iraq, and had already spent domestic political capital decrying the Kuwaiti possession of the oil-fields he eventually used as his casus belli. To back down at that point could and probably would have been seen as a sign of weakness, encouraging a coup or even assassination.

Now, it's true that had he not invaded, the picture in the Mid-East would most certainly look different. But I think he was decided upon his adventure well before the fateful conversation with April Glaspie.
 
Interesting aside if Japan lost the Russo Japanese war. How would it go.

Well problem one is still need iron and coal and oil so that need has not gone away. Also Russians have now taken over Manchuria and maybe Korea.
Yikes.

So the whole myriad of problems have not gone away but now worse.

If the civilian politicians got involved then the stab in the back myth might show up. They would have won but the pesky politicians ruined it.

Or the Navy do well and the army botch it. So the Navy takes a large chunk of that army power

But if it goes all horrific wrong and both the army and navy absolutely tank it then maybe this is the most pleasant outcome. Imperial ambition goes down the toilet and the civilian government can now use the defeat as a club to beat down the power of the military to subservience to the state.

Get rid of the hard line and make diplomacy work.

Had the Russians being victorious than the attack on Pearl ain't happening.
 
Why would US forces go to Europe? If Japan doesn't attack in Dec 41 then it's pretty certain that Germany wouldn't unilaterally declare war against the US…so the sleeping giant would continue to slumber. The only change would be if Roosevelt can convince the American people, and Congress, to declare war on Germany. Not sure that would
Why would US forces go to Europe? If Japan doesn't attack in Dec 41 then it's pretty certain that Germany wouldn't unilaterally declare war against the US…so the sleeping giant would continue to slumber. The only change would be if Roosevelt can convince the American people, and Congress, to declare war on Germany. Not sure that would happen.
Why would US forces go to Europe? If Japan doesn't attack in Dec 41 then it's pretty certain that Germany wouldn't unilaterally declare war against the US…so the sleeping giant would continue to slumber. The only change would be if Roosevelt can convince the American people, and Congress, to declare war on Germany. Not sure that would happen.
Considering that Roosevelt and Churchill were both looking for ways to get the US involved in the war, I wouldn't bet against it.
 
You have to very different scenarios in the Pacific.

The historic, or close to it, scenario or the Japanese are defeated in 1905 the Japanese Military build up is much smaller/weaker and the Japanese expansion into China does not take place.

This means the US doesn't need anywhere the size naval expansion of 1940. The US expansion was not planned in a vacuum.

However in 1937-38 the US would have been planning to replace the old WW I ships at some point. Perhaps there wouldn't have been as many to replace if the Japanese navy had stayed small.
But a few 28kt nine 16in Battleships would have been built (or something close to them) plus carriers and cruisers in proportion.

The Germans use of unrestricted submarine warfare was going to bring them into conflict with US much like it did in WW I.
 
If Russia wins the war then maybe the revolution doesn't happen. Maybe ww1 doesn't happen.
Or maybe ww1 goes on longer. But Russia will be in charge of Korea and Manchuria leaving Japan with the 2 options of go hard or go home.

A weak Japan will obviously not be the threat in ww2 and so the need for naval expansion in the Pacific will not be required. Maybe Russia will be the threat in the Pacific. Maybe the Cold War will be between Russian Empire and the West.

This weak Japan is obviously no threat and certainly will not attack other Western counties like Britain or USA. So that aspect of the war won't exist. Even such a weak Japan would have to ally up with the British to stop further Russian expansion.

Form the American point of view then gearing up for war is good business. Selling weapons in war is good for a dollar. How USA would get into the war is an issue. A few ships sunk are not as great as bombing Pearl. The shock value is far less. Getting USA into the war is not going to be an easy job especially if you need a big spectacular event to push them over the edge.

Although if Russia is dominant then would they allow Germany to invade in the first place? This really is the looking glass where anything is possible.
 
I seriously doubt Hussein would have listened to such a warning. He was under pressure domestically from the still-huge expenses of the eight-year war with Iraq, and had already spent domestic political capital decrying the Kuwaiti possession of the oil-fields he eventually used as his casus belli. To back down at that point could and probably would have been seen as a sign of weakness, encouraging a coup or even assassination.

Now, it's true that had he not invaded, the picture in the Mid-East would most certainly look different. But I think he was decided upon his adventure well before the fateful conversation with April Glaspie.
When I was in 8th grade, we played this role-playing international relations game, and the intent of the game was to show that a world war can't be won, so you have to avoid it. I played the leader of North Korea, and according to my card, I was supposed to be pathologically power driven and self-centric. I started the world war by invading South Korea. The teacher was pissed at me, but I was just playing the role. It's not like all of us haven't seen absolutely irrational world leaders in our lifetimes.
 
As I remember, Gallup polls through 1940-41 showed a slow but steady change from a largely-isolationist civilian mood to one of "we're going to be involved in it eventually". The Naval Acts of the 1930s probably indicated a foreshadowing of this as well, inasmuch as the politicians understood that we were so far from prepared as to be backwards.

I was going to post about that. I've mentioned it in another thread, but you can find the results of the Gallup polling in 1941 here.

Here are a couple of interesting ones regarding Japan.

Polling conducted Oct. 24-29, 1941. The question asked was, "Should the United States take steps now to prevent Japan from becoming more powerful, even if this means risking a war with Japan?" 64% replied yes, 25% replied no (11% no opinion).

Polling conducted Nov. 27 to Dec. 1, 1941. The question asked was, "Do you think the United States will go to war against Japan sometime in the near future?" 52% replied yes, 27% replied no (21% no opinion).

Regarding Germany:

Polling conducted Sept. 19-24, 1941. The question asked was, "In general, do you approve or disapprove of having the United States navy shoot at German submarines or warships on sight?" 62% replied approve, 28% replied disapprove (10% no opinion).

Polling conducted Oct. 9-14, 1941. The question asked was, "Which of these two things do you think is the more important — that this country keep out of war, or that Germany be defeated?" 68% replied defeating Germany, 32% replied keeping out of the war.

While the U.S. public seemed reluctant to directly wade into the war, it's clear it understood that entering the war was likely inevitable, and it would have to fight at some point.
 
Well, I didn't say that Hussein's invasion of Kuwait was "rational". I simply pointed out the reasons he probably wanted to do it.
In the same vein as your observation regarding Hussein, Japan's motivation to attack Pearl harbor and expand south was driven by the US embargo on oil and steel exports. The US embargo was in response to Japanese aggression in China and hurt the Japanese quite severely. Rather than give in, the Japanese saw the embargo as a provocation and justification to secure critical resources so that they would not be vulnerable to outside influence.
 
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In the same vein as your observation regarding Hussein, Japan's motivation to attack Pearl harbor and expand south was driven by the US emerge on oil and steel exports. The US embargo was in response to Japanese aggression in China and hurt the Japanese quite severely. Rather than give in, the Japanese saw the embargo as a provocation and justification to secure critical resources so that they would not be vulnerable to outside influence.

Right, at a certain point it crosses over from the status of one potential course of action to one which can't be walked back without serious repercussions to both economy and prestige. The American oil/scrap-iron embargo as well could and perhaps should be viewed in that light as well.

This is always the problem with brinksmanship in diplomacy, no?
 
One thing to keep in mind, when looking at Japan's decision to attack Pearl Harbor, is that the Philippines were a driving force behind that decision.

Japan considered the Philippines as part of the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosparity Sphere" and intended to have it "join" (regardless of what the Philipinos wanted) and it being the point of U.S. military influence in the region was something the Japanese were not comfortable with, regardless.

Damaging the U.S. fleet at Pearl and over-running the Philippines should have, in many of the Japanese planner's minds, caused the U.S. to come to a negotiated agreement.
If the Americans refused, then plan B was to catch their Navy in one grand battle and destroy it, ensuring that the U.S. would have to negotiate a peace.

I'm sure that all looked good on paper at the time, but aparently the Americans didn't have the same play-book...
 
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Damaging the U.S. fleet at Pearl and over-running the Philippines should have, in many of the Japanese planner's minds, caused the U.S. to come to a negotiated agreement.
If the Americans refused, then plan B was to catch their Navy in one grand battle and destroy it, ensuring that the U.S. would have to negotiate a peace.

I'm sure that all looked good on paper at the time, but aparently the Americans didn't have the same play-book...
Recent history (BoB and mainland China) was already indicative of the futility of daunting a population by aerial bombardment, and those few influential Japanese who, like Yamamoto, had seen the US up close and understood the risks of that approach were able to do little more than compromise their own credibility in the face of war fever.
If only the carriers had been in Pearl...
 
If only the carriers had been in Pearl...
At most that would be three carriers (USS Enterprise, Lexington and Saratoga) sunk or more likely damaged at Pearl Harbour. Weren't the IJNAS' orders to go for the battleships first? If so, we might have seen the three carriers with repairable holes in their decks. But even if all three carriers are torpedoed and sunk, we'd quickly see USS Yorktown, Ranger and Wasp dispatched to PH, followed asap by Hornet. Any carriers sunk or damaged at Pearl will be priority for recovery and repair. I just don't see the Japanese gaining a huge strategic advantage if the three USN carriers are at PH.

If all three USN carriers are permanently or long term temporarily out of action I would expect the US to demand a British carrier or two be sent to the region asap under RN or USN flags, likely HMS Illustrious and/or Formidable currently completing repairs in VA. Churchill will do whatever FDR asks. The lifts won't handle the non-folding Wildcat or Dauntless, so the CAG would need to be whatever folding Wildcats can be found in Dec 41, Jan 42 plus Swordfish or Albacores.
 
On 7 Dec Saratoga was at San Diego having just completed a routine docking at Bremerton. So she would have survived to arrive, as historical, at PH on the 15th.

Yorktown left Norfolk for the Pacific on 16 Dec, arriving San Diego on the 30th.

Hornet, having only completed at the end of Oct, was undertaking a shakedown cruises Dec-Feb. She sailed for the Pacific 4 March 1942 reaching San Diego on the 20th. In Feb she carried out tests launching B-25 bombers to prove the feasibility of that ahead of the Doolittle Raid. 4-5 months was a typical work up and transit to the Pacific time for a US fleet carrier in WW2. So I doubt she can be got there much quicker. Maybe 2-3 weeks at most.

Wasp and Ranger could have been sent, but the USN was never keen on using Ranger in the Pacific. But needs must. Historically Wasp wasn't earmarked for the Pacific until after the loss of Lexington at Coral Sea.

The first USN reports of units having folding wing F4F-4 was the 17 Feb 1942, with Wasp's VF-71 having just received them in the previous week. That was followed by Long Island and Charger (6 each) and Hornet's VF-8 by the time she sailed for the Pacific. Even fixed wing F4F-3/3A were in short supply with the fighter squadron on either Lexington or Saratoga in this period still flying Buffalos.

You will recall from previous discussions that RN Martlet II with folding wings were only delivered from Oct 1941. Illustrious left with the first batch for squadrons in the U.K. in Dec.

There would be no US "demand" for RN carriers. There might be a "request" for help. But I'm not sure how quickly it could be fulfilled. Illustrious had only begun her work up in Nov and only had one Swordfish squadron aboard. Formidable only completed her repairs at the beginning of Dec after 6 months in dock and had no aircraft. The rest of their squadrons were in the U.K. So both need work up time.

And, if the Lexington and Enterprise Air Groups had survived at PH by being ashore, none of their aircraft are compatible with the British carriers anyway. So they need to return to the U.K. I doubt the RN would be willing to give up Victorious as the sole Home Fleet Carrier at the time. Which only leaves Indomitable. But RN pllans in autumn 1941 were calling for reinforcement of the IO and had a carrier, not necessarily Indomitable, pencilled in. But by the end of the year she is the only one available.

So I'm not sure the RN is in a position to help. The USN might just have to suck it up, rely on their own resources and hope that Lexington and Enterprise can be repaired quickly. It may mean cancellation of some of the strikes against Japanese outposts in the early months of 1942.
 
No USN carriers early means no harrassment raids in Central Pacific. No Lea Salamaua raid. This means Japanese move earlier to sieze Port Moresby. Can be bolder about expanding island perimeter in South Pacific. Historically, the USN had just enough planes to equip just enough flight decks as CVs were lost.
 
and Japan may well join the Wallies.

Now, wouldn't that be something. We might even get to see Japanese carriers pass through the Panama Canal and operate in the North Atlantic, then we'd see how our Zeroes would do over Europe after all...

It's interesting to note that during the Great War IJN warships escorted the ANZAC Convoy from New Zealand and Australia into the Indian Ocean before it entered the Suez Canal and the armoured cruiser Ibuki even requested that they intercept the German raider Emden, which was eventually caught by the RAN cruiser Sydney.

The British Empire in the east may last another few decades compared to its collapse in 1947 to 1960.

Ah, a wee correction, the British Empire didn't collapse, it evolved and it's going very well thank you very much, just without Britain at the head and renamed the Commonwealth and with each member nation with a distinct sense of independence and capable of defending itself as military alliances are more regionally focussed these days, that is, except New Zealand, which has never really been able to defend itself, to be fair. In fact, Britain has returned to trading with some of its former Empire buddies at the expense of regional trade following Brexit...
 
At most that would be three carriers (USS Enterprise, Lexington and Saratoga) sunk or more likely damaged at Pearl Harbour. Weren't the IJNAS' orders to go for the battleships first?

Not insofar as I've read. If the carriers had been in PH, from my readings, they would have been prioritized.

If so, we might have seen the three carriers with repairable holes in their decks. But even if all three carriers are torpedoed and sunk, we'd quickly see USS Yorktown, Ranger and Wasp dispatched to PH, followed asap by Hornet. Any carriers sunk or damaged at Pearl will be priority for recovery and repair. I just don't see the Japanese gaining a huge strategic advantage if the three USN carriers are at PH.

As noted above, both Ranger and Wasp were considered unusable (in the former's case) and deficent (in the latter's case, which might be supported by its rapid loss immediately after redeployment).

Had Enterprise and Sara been in harbor the morning of the 7th, I don't doubt that both would have been rendered useless if not sunk.

If all three USN carriers are permanently or long term temporarily out of action I would expect the US to demand a British carrier or two be sent to the region asap under RN or USN flags, likely HMS Illustrious and/or Formidable currently completing repairs in VA. Churchill will do whatever FDR asks. The lifts won't handle the non-folding Wildcat or Dauntless, so the CAG would need to be whatever folding Wildcats can be found in Dec 41, Jan 42 plus Swordfish or Albacores.

I'm not sure about this. He certainly was unwilling to denude Britain of fighters during BoB, and I don't know that he would've have acceded to any "demand" knowing that the Med fleet would thereby be stripped of air cover while Malta was being crucified. Indeed, he actually requested a second ferry mission from Wasp to succour the island. Churchill was by no means afraid to talk back to FDR, especially when it was UK units on the line -- and rightfully so, imo.
 

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