What does Japan do if War against USA/UK/DEI postponed to Spring 1942?

[buffnut453]

Why would US forces go to Europe? If Japan doesn't attack in Dec 41 then it's pretty certain that Germany wouldn't unilaterally declare war against the US…so the sleeping giant would continue to slumber. The only change would be if Roosevelt can convince the American people, and Congress, to declare war on Germany. Not sure that would happen.

 

[EwenS]

US policy as 1941 wore on was becoming more aggressive in the Atlantic. Following agreement with Britain more USN ships were being allocated to that theatre to release RN ships for use in other theatres. The USN was preparing to protect the western Atlantic against German raiders like Tirpitz. The USN escorted convoys to/from Mid Ocean Meeting Points south of Iceland and US ships, both merchant and USN were being torpedoed and sunk. As the year went on the clashes increased in number. That culminated in the sinking of the destroyer USS Reuben James on 31 Oct 1941 with the loss of 115 US lives.

Pre-U.S. Entry Into WWII

Pre-U.S. Entry Into WWII The first action between the U.S. and German navies occured on April 10, 1941, when USS Niblack (DD-424) neared the Icelandic coast to pick-up three boatloads of survivors from the Dutch freighter Saleier, which was sunk the previous day. When a submarine was detected...

www.history.navy.mil

Chronological List of U.S. Ships Sunk or Damaged 1939 to 1941

Chronological List of U.S. Ships Sunk or Damaged 1939 to 1941 due to war causes

www.usmm.org

So the question is just how long would the US public continue to suffer losses before FDR got their support for a declaration of war on Germany? The clashes were bound to continue so it was only a matter of time.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

Hand the Japanese a strong defeat in 1904-5 and they may be a little more cautious when planning their expansions 35 years later

I doubt that. The Samurai mentality would take that as a lesson learned as well as a blemish on their honor, thus justifying an even more rapid and thorough militarization of "the national essence" than historically occurred.
The idea of "planning their expansions" calls for a grain of salt. The 1931 and 1937 incursions in Manchuria and China proper were not planned and directed by IJA headquarters or the imperial chain of command, but unilaterally instigated by activist officers in the field as spurs to get their aggressive dreams in motion. In an atmosphere of nationalistic fervor, government couldn't be seen as backing down from a campaign already in progress, especially with the media enthusiastically on board and assassins prowling about in search of the "less patriotic" elements of the leadership.

Invading China was always about imperial ambitiousness.

Invading China was always about resources, labor and lebensraum.

But that's the turns of history for you. Have GHWB firmly and clearly tell Saddam not to invade Kuwait in 1991 and much of where we are now today (GW1, GW2, 9/11, WOT, Afghan/Iraq occupation, Arab Spring, Syrian collapse, refugee crisis, etc.) would be different.

By 1 Jan 1991, Saddam was already in Kuwait, and I had been flying 10th Mountain troops out of Ft Drum all the previous autumn, on their way to the sandbox. Sadam acted fast and GHWB was essentially dealing with a fait accompli.

 

[ThomasP]

Hey XBe02drvr,

I think Admiral Beez is referring to the remarks made by the US Ambassador to Iraq's in a July 1990 meeting with Saddam Hussein.

"We have no opinion on your Arab-Arab conflicts, such as your dispute with Kuwait. Secretary Baker has directed me to emphasize the instruction, first given to Iraq in the 1960s, that the Kuwait issue is not associated with America."

NOTE that the above quote is from a US government sanctioned release of the meetings report/transcript in September 1991.

Then came:

". . . she had served in Kuwait 20 years before; then, as now, we took no position on these Arab affairs." Although the details of context are a little bit cloudy, this is a very accurate account of one of the statements made by Ambassador Glaspie to Saddam in response to his question: "Where does the US stand in regard to his border dispute with Kuwait?".

NOTE that the substance of the second quote was revealed by a Wikileaks release in January 2011 of a confidential cable that was a report/transcript from the Ambassador to the US Secretary of State Baker.

Some people took this to indicate that Ambassador Glaspie was incompetent and gave the green light for an invasion by Iraq into Kuwait. When it was subsequently revealed that the Ambassador was conveying a thoroughly rehearsed and vetted statement from the Bush administration, the same people presented it as proof that President Bush handled the situation incompetently. Surprisingly, the people making the accusations were not from the Democrats or liberals.

 

[Admiral Beez]

By 1 Jan 1991, Saddam was already in Kuwait….

Apologies, I meant 1990. Stop Iraq from invading Kuwait and there's no US "invasion" of Saudi Arabia, and GW1, reduced motivation for Bin Laden and Al Qaeda, perhaps no 9/11, then no WOT, no invasion of Afghanistan, no GW2, less instability and chances of the Arab Spring in Syria, Libya, and Egypt, et al and the migrant crisis across Europe. Nothing is guaranteed of course, but it would be a different world had Iraq been stopped in 1990.

 

[Admiral Beez]

"We have no opinion on your Arab-Arab conflicts, such as your dispute with Kuwait.

It's such an incredible statement. I can't imagine the US telling any country that it has no opinion on its border disputes. Heck I imagine if today Laos and Cambodia had a squabble over some bit of jungle that Washington would weigh in.

 

[Conslaw]

In my hypo Japan declares war only on the Dutch in Dec 1941 or a bit later. The stated purpose is to secure the "co-prosperity sphere" from European colonists. If Japan gets attacked on the flank by British or Americans in the theater Japan can deal with it. This is a gut-check moment for the US - will the US declare war on Japan? If no, Japan gets a few months to focus on the Dutch East Indies. If yes, Japan is really in no worse shape than it would have been in our actual history. I think they should skip Pearl Harbor but invade the PI and South East Asia as they did.

As a side note: if Japan waits beyond December 1941 to attack the Philippines, that gives the Americans the chance to get their act together - the chance to coordinate radar with fighter interception, to assemble all the fighters that have been shipped and give the crews a bit of experience. If the US avoids having its Philippine air force cut in half the first day as in our history, Japan may never get air superiority over the Philippines. They might eventually take the Philippines but might burn out their offensive power in doing so, resulting in a much shorter war. I guess they could use the Kido Butai to get air superiority, and that might be a good justification to not attack Pearl Harbor.

 

[Admiral Beez]

In my hypo Japan declares war only on the Dutch in Dec 1941 or a bit later. The stated purpose is to secure the "co-prosperity sphere" from European colonists. If Japan gets attacked on the flank by British or Americans in the theater Japan can deal with it. This is a gut-check moment for the US - will the US declare war on Japan?

I think FDR is going to have to manufacturer a USS Maine or RMS Lusitania event to provoke Congress into declaring war.

 

[EwenS]

I think FDR is going to have to manufacturer a USS Maine or RMS Lusitania event to provoke Congress into declaring war

Well the Reuben James sinking certainly split US politicians, press and public but probably moved the US nearer the declaration of war that FDR was seeking. It didn't spark the same outcry as the Maine. FDR didn't seek to break off diplomatic relations with Germany and while FDR himself may have been less outspoken about it, he was perhaps leaving the bellicose talk to some of his fellow politicians like Frank Knox US Navy Secretary who called it "worse than piracy". An NYT editorial noted that "it brushes away the last possible doubt that the United States and Germany are now at open war in the Atlantic".

So just what does it take to turn public opinion against Germany? Does it need to be a single large event (a Maine or Lusitania) or the effect of a cumulative series of smaller incidents (multiple destroyers getting sunk while on escort duty) to provide the trigger? You can only poke the bear so often before he reacts. Certainly the more vessels you put in harm's way the more likely that losses will occur.

Or does Germany back down and restrict its U-boat activities to the eastern Atlantic where the convoys are escorted by British & Canadian escorts? And those convoys are now better protected because increasing numbers of escorts have only half the Atlantic to cover.

And historically more USN Battleships and cruisers in the Atlantic helped free up British Battleships and cruisers for other theatres. So probably a much stronger RN presence in the IO and at Singapore in early 1942. So regardless of whether the US enters war with Germany in Dec 1941 or months later it seems to me that Britain wins.

 

[NevadaK]

US policy as 1941 wore on was becoming more aggressive in the Atlantic. Following agreement with Britain more USN ships were being allocated to that theatre to release RN ships for use in other theatres. The USN was preparing to protect the western Atlantic against German raiders like Tirpitz. The USN escorted convoys to/from Mid Ocean Meeting Points south of Iceland and US ships, both merchant and USN were being torpedoed and sunk. As the year went on the clashes increased in number. That culminated in the sinking of the destroyer USS Reuben James on 31 Oct 1941 with the loss of 115 US lives.

Pre-U.S. Entry Into WWII

Pre-U.S. Entry Into WWII The first action between the U.S. and German navies occured on April 10, 1941, when USS Niblack (DD-424) neared the Icelandic coast to pick-up three boatloads of survivors from the Dutch freighter Saleier, which was sunk the previous day. When a submarine was detected...

www.history.navy.mil

Chronological List of U.S. Ships Sunk or Damaged 1939 to 1941

Chronological List of U.S. Ships Sunk or Damaged 1939 to 1941 due to war causes

www.usmm.org

So the question is just how long would the US public continue to suffer losses before FDR got their support for a declaration of war on Germany? The clashes were bound to continue so it was only a matter of time.

It is often overlooked that the United States began preparing for war as early as 1939. The National Defense Advisory Commission, in particular, oversaw the rapid build up of the nations armaments industrial base and before December 1941 had invested over $9 billion on the construction of new factories across the country. The mobilization plan had also begun and the infrastructure for the rapid expansion of military forces was in place. Japan's greatest failure was in not recognizing this mobilization and assuming it would be years before the US would be able to wage war. At the very least, the US was prepared to arm its allies.

 

[GrauGeist]

The Lusitania incident didn't actually lead the U.S. into war with Germany, though it was a prominent point used to sway public opinion.
It was Germany's switch back to unrestricted submarine warfare two years after the Lusitania's sinking that led to a declaration of war.

 

[Admiral Beez]

It is often overlooked that the United States began preparing for war as early as 1939.

I wonder how the US military would have looked by December 1941 had intensive rearmament started in 1936 as part of Depression Era stimulus and a reaction to Germany, with a boost again in 1937 with Japan's invasion of China. While the two North Carolina class were laid down in 1937/38 and the first of the SoDak class in 1939, the first eleven Essex class carriers were not ordered until 1940. Move those dates so that the eleven Essex class are ordered in 1938 and enter service in 1940 and Japan won't have any illusions. This may require the US to pull out of any naval treaties.

 

[SaparotRob]

The Lusitania incident didn't actually lead the U.S. into war with Germany, though it was a prominent point used to sway public opinion.
It was Germany's switch back to unrestricted submarine warfare two years after the Lusitania's sinking that led to a declaration of war.

The Zimmermann Note might have also pushed the U.S. a bit.

 

[EwenS]

I wonder how the US military would have looked by December 1941 had intensive rearmament started in 1936 as part of Depression Era stimulus and a reaction to Germany, with a boost again in 1937 with Japan's invasion of China. While the two North Carolina class were laid down in 1937/38 and the first of the SoDak class in 1939, the first eleven Essex class carriers were not ordered until 1940. Move those dates so that the eleven Essex class are ordered in 1938 and enter service in 1940 and Japan won't have any illusions. This may require the US to pull out of any naval treaties.

Historically the order for Essex was placed in Feb 1940 and she was laid down in April 1941. The contractual completion date was April 1944 ie a peacetime build time of 3 years. Even at Nov/Dec 1941 that estimated completion date had only been advanced by 3 months. The other 13 month saving came after the outbreak of WW2, presumably once the yards can go to working round the clock. It was a similar story for the rest of the class ordered in 1941.

So to get them in 1940 and without US involvement in a shooting war the construction needs started before the end of 1937. And then you have the problem that under the 1936 London Treaty, to which the US was a signatory, a Carrier can't exceed 23,000 tons, so a 27,000 ton Essex isn't possible at that point.

And it also means that the Second Vinson Act, historically in May 1938, needs to happen sooner and not contain a restriction on the size of the USN. Historically it only added 40,000 tons of carrier tonnage.

And you need to increase the design capacity of the USN after a long period of stagnation. That was one reason why CV-8 Hornet was built as a minimum change repeat Yorktown and not a new design.

So to achieve what you want you need to
1. Withdraw the US from the Treaty system. Under the WNT no BB can be laid down before 1 Jan 1937. So that only saves 10 months on the North Carolina build. That means withdrawing from the Treaty system at the same time as Japan ie giving notice by the end of 1934. And no 1936 London Treaty. So you can get your Essex by 1940 skipping the Hornet.
2. Ensure that US legislation was changed from the WNT limits to allow a much higher / unlimited navy type tonnage.
3. Expand design capacity in the USN or use the civilian sector to a much greater extent.

Now persuade the US public of the need for all this in 1934 not your proposed 1936. That is before Hitler reoccupied the Rhineland (March 1936) and the Abyssinian Crisis (from late 1935). And it is also before tensions with Japan really began to ramp up.

Edit:- one other point. CV-7 Wasp used up the last of the available US carrier tonnage under WNT. So the tonnage is not available to lay down an Essex sized carrier before 1Jan 1937 assuming 1 & 2 above.

 

[special ed]

The Lusitania incident didn't actually lead the U.S. into war with Germany, though it was a prominent point used to sway public opinion.
It was Germany's switch back to unrestricted submarine warfare two years after the Lusitania's sinking that led to a declaration of war.

Germany (Hitler) solved FDR's problem by declaring war on the US December 10th 1941

 

[Greg Boeser]

Yes. In support of Japan. Had Japan not attacked, Hitler would have stood pat.

 

[GrauGeist]

And the day after Germany declared war on the U.S., the U.S. returned the favor.

It's interesting to note that the U.S. declared war on Japan 8 December, not the Axis.

 

[Conslaw]

The seeds for Japan's destruction were already sown before Dec. 7, 1941. The two-ocean Navy Act, the beginning of the B-29 program, and the beginning of the US atomic bomb program. Japan could have run the table even more than it did between 12/1941 and 1943, but With the Essex-class carrier anchored fast carrier force, the US Navy would have swept across the central pacific in 1944 and taken Iwo Jima and Okinawa by mid 1945. Japan's only hope was to come close to provoking the US into entering the war but not have it actually happen. Maybe just invading the Dutch East Indies would do that, maybe it would have been a step too far.

 

[swampyankee]

With a much less internationalist president, Germany's brilliant foreign policy convinced the US to declare war on Germany, so how long do you think it would take for Germany's WW2-era diplomacy to succeed in getting the US to be an active participant and ally of the UK?

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

So the question is just how long would the US public continue to suffer losses before FDR got their support for a declaration of war on Germany? The clashes were bound to continue so it was only a matter of time.

As I remember, Gallup polls through 1940-41 showed a slow but steady change from a largely-isolationist civilian mood to one of "we're going to be involved in it eventually". The Naval Acts of the 1930s probably indicated a foreshadowing of this as well, inasmuch as the politicians understood that we were so far from prepared as to be backwards.

I think the shootups in the Atlantic between DDs and Ubooten would eventually have riled the public enough to drive America to step in (much like the resumption of unrestricted U-boat warfare in 1917 did, with help from Zimmerman).

If my opinion is correct, and there's no saying if it is, then the question becomes when does that intervention happen? I'd guess, and that's all it is, by the summer of 42. Long daylight hours in the North Atlantic provide more opportunities for skirmishes that the FDR administration clearly didn't shy from.

What the Japanese would make of that later entry, and how that might help their industrial intelligence estimates, would seem up in the rarified what-if stratosphere -- but I think they would have perhaps been a little more complacent in their estimates than they were historically.

We should keep in mind that a number of Japanese officers and diplomats spent some time in America as Yamamoto had, and had some insight into our latent industrial potential as well. But that latent potential was no secret, as we see from Allied orders for equipment and materiel.