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Have GHWB firmly and clearly tell Saddam not to invade Kuwait in 1991 and much of where we are now today (GW1, GW2, 9/11, WOT, Afghan/Iraq occupation, Arab Spring, Syrian collapse, refugee crisis, etc.) would be different.
Why would US forces go to Europe? If Japan doesn't attack in Dec 41 then it's pretty certain that Germany wouldn't unilaterally declare war against the US…so the sleeping giant would continue to slumber. The only change would be if Roosevelt can convince the American people, and Congress, to declare war on Germany. Not sure that would
Why would US forces go to Europe? If Japan doesn't attack in Dec 41 then it's pretty certain that Germany wouldn't unilaterally declare war against the US…so the sleeping giant would continue to slumber. The only change would be if Roosevelt can convince the American people, and Congress, to declare war on Germany. Not sure that would happen.
Considering that Roosevelt and Churchill were both looking for ways to get the US involved in the war, I wouldn't bet against it.Why would US forces go to Europe? If Japan doesn't attack in Dec 41 then it's pretty certain that Germany wouldn't unilaterally declare war against the US…so the sleeping giant would continue to slumber. The only change would be if Roosevelt can convince the American people, and Congress, to declare war on Germany. Not sure that would happen.
When I was in 8th grade, we played this role-playing international relations game, and the intent of the game was to show that a world war can't be won, so you have to avoid it. I played the leader of North Korea, and according to my card, I was supposed to be pathologically power driven and self-centric. I started the world war by invading South Korea. The teacher was pissed at me, but I was just playing the role. It's not like all of us haven't seen absolutely irrational world leaders in our lifetimes.I seriously doubt Hussein would have listened to such a warning. He was under pressure domestically from the still-huge expenses of the eight-year war with Iraq, and had already spent domestic political capital decrying the Kuwaiti possession of the oil-fields he eventually used as his casus belli. To back down at that point could and probably would have been seen as a sign of weakness, encouraging a coup or even assassination.
Now, it's true that had he not invaded, the picture in the Mid-East would most certainly look different. But I think he was decided upon his adventure well before the fateful conversation with April Glaspie.
It's not like all of us haven't seen absolutely irrational world leaders in our lifetimes.
As I remember, Gallup polls through 1940-41 showed a slow but steady change from a largely-isolationist civilian mood to one of "we're going to be involved in it eventually". The Naval Acts of the 1930s probably indicated a foreshadowing of this as well, inasmuch as the politicians understood that we were so far from prepared as to be backwards.
In the same vein as your observation regarding Hussein, Japan's motivation to attack Pearl harbor and expand south was driven by the US embargo on oil and steel exports. The US embargo was in response to Japanese aggression in China and hurt the Japanese quite severely. Rather than give in, the Japanese saw the embargo as a provocation and justification to secure critical resources so that they would not be vulnerable to outside influence.Well, I didn't say that Hussein's invasion of Kuwait was "rational". I simply pointed out the reasons he probably wanted to do it.
In the same vein as your observation regarding Hussein, Japan's motivation to attack Pearl harbor and expand south was driven by the US emerge on oil and steel exports. The US embargo was in response to Japanese aggression in China and hurt the Japanese quite severely. Rather than give in, the Japanese saw the embargo as a provocation and justification to secure critical resources so that they would not be vulnerable to outside influence.
Recent history (BoB and mainland China) was already indicative of the futility of daunting a population by aerial bombardment, and those few influential Japanese who, like Yamamoto, had seen the US up close and understood the risks of that approach were able to do little more than compromise their own credibility in the face of war fever.Damaging the U.S. fleet at Pearl and over-running the Philippines should have, in many of the Japanese planner's minds, caused the U.S. to come to a negotiated agreement.
If the Americans refused, then plan B was to catch their Navy in one grand battle and destroy it, ensuring that the U.S. would have to negotiate a peace.
I'm sure that all looked good on paper at the time, but aparently the Americans didn't have the same play-book...
At most that would be three carriers (USS Enterprise, Lexington and Saratoga) sunk or more likely damaged at Pearl Harbour. Weren't the IJNAS' orders to go for the battleships first? If so, we might have seen the three carriers with repairable holes in their decks. But even if all three carriers are torpedoed and sunk, we'd quickly see USS Yorktown, Ranger and Wasp dispatched to PH, followed asap by Hornet. Any carriers sunk or damaged at Pearl will be priority for recovery and repair. I just don't see the Japanese gaining a huge strategic advantage if the three USN carriers are at PH.If only the carriers had been in Pearl...
and Japan may well join the Wallies.
The British Empire in the east may last another few decades compared to its collapse in 1947 to 1960.
That's hardly the same. If it were, in 1982 the RN Task Force sailing south would have been joined by the RCN, RAN, RIN, etc.Ah, a wee correction, the British Empire didn't collapse, it evolved and it's going very well thank you very much, just without Britain at the head and renamed the Commonwealth
That's hardly the same. If it were, in 1982 the RN Task Force sailing south would have been joined by the RCN, RAN, RIN, etc.
At most that would be three carriers (USS Enterprise, Lexington and Saratoga) sunk or more likely damaged at Pearl Harbour. Weren't the IJNAS' orders to go for the battleships first?
If so, we might have seen the three carriers with repairable holes in their decks. But even if all three carriers are torpedoed and sunk, we'd quickly see USS Yorktown, Ranger and Wasp dispatched to PH, followed asap by Hornet. Any carriers sunk or damaged at Pearl will be priority for recovery and repair. I just don't see the Japanese gaining a huge strategic advantage if the three USN carriers are at PH.
If all three USN carriers are permanently or long term temporarily out of action I would expect the US to demand a British carrier or two be sent to the region asap under RN or USN flags, likely HMS Illustrious and/or Formidable currently completing repairs in VA. Churchill will do whatever FDR asks. The lifts won't handle the non-folding Wildcat or Dauntless, so the CAG would need to be whatever folding Wildcats can be found in Dec 41, Jan 42 plus Swordfish or Albacores.