What if America built De Havilland Mosquitoes instead of the B-17 Flying Fortress?

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The Mosquito's "tree top" missions with "pinpoint accuracy" were done in small groups.
Their max. load of 4,000 pounds were done on certain occasions - and that load both shortened their range as well as compromised their speed.

You are not going to destroy a manufacturing site (ball bearing plant or aircraft factory) with a hand full of 4,000 pound specialized bombs.

Additionally: oil refineries, ball bearing plants, aircraft manufacturing sites, marshalling yards, etc. were all staffed by civilians - how does one go about bombing these targets without collateral damage?
I disagree about Schweinfurt, in particular. The B-17 raids took massive losses while inflicting quickly repaired damage. Pinpoint bombing could have done as much with far fewer losses. Flak defenses were no good against Mosquitoes.

Additionally, one has to question the wisdom over bombing population centers, more or less randomly. Many missions to Berlin were merely "drop anywhere in the vicinity and run"
 
A google of "alternatives to balsa" does come up with a few suggestions and alternatives. The Germans developed some alternatives, which had their problems, but they shouldn't be judged harshly because the effect of bombing on German industry forced them to substitute. They did come up with a material called 'formholz' (formed wood) which was glue, sawdust and graphite that was used as the filler/spacer between two sheets of multiply but it can't have been as light as balsa. There was also TyBu or Ty-Bu which was a laminate of wood and Bakelite used as the spar on the He 162.

Then there is the possibility of an all metal Mosquito.

I don't see this as a problem at all for US industry. The three dimensional compound curves of the US metal mosquito would be stretch formed over wooden dies in the same way Martin made the B-26 Marauder and in the way the Spitfire wing was eventually made.

There was also a gentlemen by the name of Howard Hughes who developed Hughes H-4 Hercules (cruelly called the Spruce Goose though it was made of Birch) which I suspect didn't need balsa.

They used many thin layers of birch (not spruce) to create a new material, in fact a composite material called Duramold. Wikipedia explains about this material:

Duramold
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
View attachment 621797
The Hughes H-4 Hercules, made of birch ply Duramold

Duramold is a composite material process developed by Virginius E. Clark. Birch plies are impregnated with phenolic resin, such as Haskelite and laminated together in a mold under heat (280 °F, 138 °C) and pressure for use as a lightweight structural material.[1] Similar to plywood, Duramold and other lightweight composite materials were considered critical during periods of material shortage in World War II, replacing scarce materials like aluminum alloys and steel.[2][3]

The material has some advantages over metal in strength, construction technique, and weight. A cylinder made of duramold is 80% stronger than a cylinder made of aluminum.[4] There are over 17 varieties of Duramold, using various quantities of birch or poplar wood, with as many as seven plies.[5] The Duramold process has also been used to make radomes for aircraft as well as missile bodies.[6]

The Fairchild Aircraft Corporation patented the process, designing and constructing the AT-21, (NX/NC19131) as the first aircraft made using the Duramold process.[7] Several aircraft used Duramold in parts of their structure but the largest aircraft manufactured with the process is the Hughes H-4 Hercules designed by Howard Hughes and Glenn Odekirk, which was almost completely built with Duramold in very large sections.[8] Hughes Aircraft had purchased rights to the process for this use.

The Duramold and Haskelite process was first developed in 1937, followed by Gene Vidal's Weldwood and later the Aeromold process produced by the Timm Aircraft Company. In the United Kingdom, the De Havilland Aircraft Company (founded by Geoffrey de Havilland, a cousin of Olivia de Havilland, the actress who dated Howard Hughes in 1938) used similar composite construction for aircraft including the DH.88 Comet, DH.91 Albatross, the Mosquito, and Vampire. The aeromold process differs in that it is baked at a low 100 °F at cutting and forming, and 180 °F for fusing together sections after the resins are added.[9]

In reality the US probably had a better material than balsa plywood sandwitch.
Here in Detroit, Chriscraft was already building high quality wood boats. It would seem to have been easy to redirect those craftsmen toward the Mosquito.

I strongly suspect that turning down the Mosquito in 1941 had more to do with a profit-motive decision than anything else.
 
Many of the Mosquito's famous targets were not defended because they were not considered targets, like Gestapo offices and prisons. Flying at tree top height doesnt negate flak defences, you can be hit by any machine gun or rifle and means it is very easy to get lost.
The Mosquitoes followed road and railroads when low, and a very high reminder was put on navigators. Flak would be ineffective if th
And none of that addresses the enormous task of retraining the 8th AF's bomber crews for an entirely different suite of tactics and doctrine called-for by the switch to ultra-low-level bombing
we're talking an exceptional pilot and navigator, that's all. The Mossie had by far the best survivability rate of the war, therefore you're not losing crews.


>>From November 1943 to March 1944 Berlin was repeatedly bombed, the loss rate of the heavy bombers (predominantly Lancaster's) was 5.1%, for the Mosquito it was 0.5%.<<
 
The Germans weren't stupid - how many low level raids by Mossies would it take before the Germans changed their AA tactics?
In Italy, the Germans, tired of the repeated A-36 attacks, started hanging cables across the valleys that the A-36s patrolled.

If Mosquito raids in any quantity became the norm, they would adjust their detection and AA to meet that threat. With the heavy bombers, the Germans determined routes and set up "killing zones" with their heavy flak batteries, which inflicted considerable damage.

Let's also keep in mind that the further the Mossie flew (combat radius), the lighter the bomb load. So how many Mossies would it take to equal the hundreds of B-17s that struck Berlin on a typical raid?
 
we're talking an exceptional pilot and navigator, that's all. The Mossie had by far the best survivability rate of the war, therefore you're not losing crews.

Even with only two guys aboard, the retraining is going to take time and work, don't you think? It's an entirely different operational doctrine, in a different flight regime, with a different airplane. That's a lot of retraining. How much time might that take?
 
Enlighten me. Treetop flying negated flak defenses. Route changes at that speed provided less reaction time. They were flying over Berlin even late in the war with impunity.

These were fighter bomber variants engaged in low altitude precision raids against pinpoint targets with a tactical aim, not area bombing of a specific target with a strategic aim. Two totally different roles carried out by different variants of the type.

(The Brits built several bombers that were absolute junk).

Interesting, which ones...

USA making Mosquitoes is a good thing in general. We might 1st know the goal post: is it being made instead of B-17, or instead of B-24, or instead B-25 or/and B-26? Or a combination? Perhaps something not listed should be axed instead?

Before all of that - timing is the crucial issue here, and before it is well defined we're unlikely to arrive at plausible scenarios.

Correct. Timing is everything. As Wuzak has stated, when does this happen? The B-17 began production in its initial form before the war (the 1939 war, and the 1941 war for the US forum members) The prototype Mosquito first flew in November 1940. De Havilland had a hard enough time getting support from the British, let alone having to anticipate the problems getting the Americans to buy into it.

As has been said elsewhere, getting the US to build Mosquitoes is a good idea since on their introduction into service, every British command wanted them. But this then raises the question of who these Mossies are for? The Brits aren't going to ask the Americans to build the type for anything except to fulfill their own needs and the Americans are not likely to build the Mosquito except to fulfill their own needs, so, it appears we are at an impasse.

As for the practicalities of replacing the US supply of big bombers with smaller twins, not the best idea. In other threads there are discussions about why the Germans didn't build big bombers, but those don't really apply to the USA, so the disadvantages of a smaller type to do the job of a bigger type apply. Also, the USA industry was skilled in metalwork, and, although there's nothing stating that they couldn't work in wood, why would they need to, apart from the obvious in that they might want Mosquitoes? It takes quite a bit of effort for a workforce to change from one means of construction to another. Just wheeling in some jigs and plywood into a factory set up for manufacturing metal aircraft doesn't happen quickly, especially not at the rate at which US production escalated to. Over time things would pick up, but there is a significant lag in production as a result.

The other thing is that the strategic bombing effort required lots of bombers, not just a few and if the Americans built Mosquitoes, production, like it was in Britain would be shared between commands - the US wanted night fighter and reconnaissance Mossies. Add bombers to the mix and there are fewer aircraft to go round.
 
Here in Detroit, Chriscraft was already building high quality wood boats. It would seem to have been easy to redirect those craftsmen toward the Mosquito.
While anything is possible it would have been impossible to produce the amount of Mosquitoes needed to launch a campaign that would have equaled the amount of bombers eventually produced to mount the air war over Europe.
I strongly suspect that turning down the Mosquito in 1941 had more to do with a profit-motive decision than anything else.
To put it mildly, this statement is "out in left field." Profit driven? How is that when "the customer" (USAAF or a foreign government) sets the speciation for procurement to include materials and equipment.
 
Most of the US war time contracts were of a "cost Plus" type.

That is to say that the US government and the manufacturer figured out how much it actually cost to make plane (or tank) "X" and then the manufacturer was allowed to tack on a extra amount, call it profit, or management fee or what ever. It was often around 3% of the value of the contract. Please note that there was continual auditing going on and as manufacturers figured out faster/better ways of the making the product (Plane/tank/mess kit) the price for later batches would be adjusted.
In some cases you had three different factories (a few times more) making the same airplane and there might be a different price per plane from each factory.
You also had the government paying for new factories and new tooling and leasing these factories back to the manufactures' Perhaps there was a sweet heart deal or two (those tended to come after the war was over when the government sold the factories/tooling).


You don't build planes the way you build boats, or desks or bunk beds.

Some of the wood working knowledge may carry over but not as much as some people think.
Many of the US manufacturers of wooden aircraft were working flat out on trainers, the US glider program and subcontracting parts for the metal planes.
If you are using cloth covered control surfaces on your aircraft then it is not the big a stretch for a "wooden" plane maker (cloth covered) to sub contract ailerons or elevators, build them in metal instead of wood and use their knowledge/skill in fabric covering/painting/doping to cover the framework

and then there was the US combat glider program.
Fighting Gliders of World War II

perhaps we should have built Mosquitoes ;)
 
While anything is possible it would have been impossible to produce the amount of Mosquitoes needed to launch a campaign that would have equaled the amount of bombers eventually produced to mount the air war over Europe.

To put it mildly, this statement is "out in left field." Profit driven? How is that when "the customer" (USAAF or a foreign government) sets the speciation for procurement to include materials and equipment.
Building these things involves finding and training high specified woodworkers. Far more profit to be had in building metal planes on assembly lines. Why else would it have been rejected summarily?

>>In April 1940, U.S. Army Air Forces General Hap Arnold brought to the U.S. a complete set of Mosquito blueprints, which were sent to five American aircraft manufacturers for comment. All were contemptuous of the British design, none more so than Beechcraft, which reported back, "This airplane has sacrificed serviceability, structural strength, ease of construction and flying characteristics in an attempt to use construction material that is not suitable for the manufacture of efficient airplanes." Beech couldn't have gotten it more wrong if they had tried.<<

The Miraculous Mosquito
 
Let's also keep in mind that the further the Mossie flew (combat radius), the lighter the bomb load. So how many Mossies would it take to equal the hundreds of B-17s that struck Berlin on a typical raid?

From what I've read, the Mosquito and the B-17 had comparable bomb loads for missions to Berlin.
 
Interesting, which ones...

At least two were garbage:

>>Blackburn Botha is one of the rare aircraft in the history of aviation that has been replaced with an older version. It happened after a very brief war career that began in 1939 and lasted for only 18 months.

Roc was another poor design from the Blackburn aircraft manufacturer. It appeared at the same time as the Botha and had a similar career. The Blackburn Roc entered the service of the Fleet Air Arm as a two-seater fleet defense fighter.<<

The Manchester was another unsatisfactory abortion.
 
Building these things involves finding and training high specified woodworkers. Far more profit to be had in building metal planes on assembly lines. Why else would it have been rejected summarily?

>>In April 1940, U.S. Army Air Forces General Hap Arnold brought to the U.S. a complete set of Mosquito blueprints, which were sent to five American aircraft manufacturers for comment. All were contemptuous of the British design, none more so than Beechcraft, which reported back, "This airplane has sacrificed serviceability, structural strength, ease of construction and flying characteristics in an attempt to use construction material that is not suitable for the manufacture of efficient airplanes." Beech couldn't have gotten it more wrong if they had tried.<<

The Miraculous Mosquito

I doubt it was April 1940 when Arnold took Mosquito plans to the US, as it was unlikely that a complete set of plans existed at that time and the prototype was still under construction.

Arnold would likely have never gone for the Mosquito concept had he not seen it demonstrated, something which occurred in early 1941 (February?).
 
>Blackburn Botha is one of the rare aircraft in the history of aviation that has been replaced with an older version. It happened after a very brief war career that began in 1939 and lasted for only 18 months.

Roc was another poor design from the Blackburn aircraft manufacturer. It appeared at the same time as the Botha and had a similar career. The Blackburn Roc entered the service of the Fleet Air Arm as a two-seater fleet defense fighter.<<

The Manchester was another unsatisfactory abortion.

The Botha was rubbish, but it was a land-based torpedo dropper, not a strategic bomber, and Bothas were replaced by Bristol Beauforts in frontline service, for which they were designed in competition for the same requirement. The Roc was also not a bomber and yes, it too was rubbish. John North of Boulton Paul was not happy when he was instructed to build the Roc instead of a naval fighter of his own design. In the mid-1930s the two-seat turret fighter had merit on a carrier deck. The only opposition the British expected to encounter far out to sea were long-range bombers and reconnaissance aircraft. In the late 1930s and early 1940s, the concept of escorting bombers and recon aircraft out to sea wasn't a thing, believe it or not, and there was no one else in Europe that had operational carriers except the French. Before the war, there was no way a Bf 109 had the range to fly from Germany to get anywhere near a British carrier.

Blackburn did drop the ball following the 1920s and 30s, in which time its types were prevalent on British carrier decks, but their last naval product made up for all of the disasters, I reckon...

50197592087_5ac202fe54_b.jpg
Bruntingthorpe 19

The Manchester had its bad points, issues with aerodynamics, electrical systems and bad engines, but the problems with the Vulture were solved by the time the Manchester III prototype first flew, which, because of its four Merlins was renamed the Lancaster. The Vulture was discontinued because RR had a greater requirement for Merlins. The airframe, with its massive 33 foot-long unobstructed bomb bay, which was unique in a WW2 bomber, required very little structural change to make the Lancaster, and, as I've said before, it was a worthy basis for Britain's best heavy bomber of the war.
 
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The Manchester had its bad points, issues with aerodynamics, electrical systems and bad engines, but the problems with the Vulture were mostly solved by the time the Manchester III prototype first flew, which, because of its four Merlins was renamed the Lancaster. The Vulture was discontinued because RR had a greater requirement for Merlins. The airframe, with its massive 33 foot-long unobstructed bomb bay, which was unique in a WW2 bomber, required very little structural change to make the Lancaster, and, as I've said before, it was a worthy basis for Britain's best heavy bomber of the war.

Fixed that for you.

The problem for the Manchester was that it was probably too large for a twin engine bomber with a maximum bomb load of over 10,000lb. Even at the expected power of the Vultures (1,800hp).
 
Building these things involves finding and training high specified woodworkers. Far more profit to be had in building metal planes on assembly lines. Why else would it have been rejected summarily?

Because manufacturing specifications, manufacturing and engineering doctrine for bomber and pursuit aircraft was set years earlier. Again, you have a notion that the manufacturer designs and builds the aircraft and the government just accepts it. It's the opposite.

>>In April 1940, U.S. Army Air Forces General Hap Arnold brought to the U.S. a complete set of Mosquito blueprints, which were sent to five American aircraft manufacturers for comment. All were contemptuous of the British design, none more so than Beechcraft, which reported back, "This airplane has sacrificed serviceability, structural strength, ease of construction and flying characteristics in an attempt to use construction material that is not suitable for the manufacture of efficient airplanes." Beech couldn't have gotten it more wrong if they had tried.<<

The Miraculous Mosquito

I see no "profit conspiracy" about this. All Arnold was looking for was "comments." It got a negative response for the same reasons it would get today - it wasn't a US design.

NOW - if the AAF put out a contract bid for a manufacturer to BUILD 500 Mosquitos under license, now a whole different ball game.
 

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