What if? - Battle of Midway in July 1942 rather than June

Would it have gone better for the Japanese if they had attacked Midway in July 1942?

  • Yes - couldn't have gotten much worse.

    Votes: 3 16.7%

  • No - reinforcement goes both ways.

    Votes: 15 83.3%
  • Total voters
    18
  • Poll closed .

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There would be not be the hard, 6 months, fighting for Guadalcanal
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I was refering to the several naval battles around Guadalcanal.
Without their heavy CV, the Japanese would have to be very cautious with their remaining ships.
The historic carrier battles that took place at Midway and in the Solomon's seem to show this.
 

They were pretty cautious about their surface ships anyway and generally adhered to a strict time table for their forays into Iron Bottom Sound just to get beyond air range of US carriers or Henderson Field. These were mainly at night where the IJN felt very very confident (with good reason). With the airfield in their possession, they would have air cover during the day and so would be safer and more free to act boldly. The Fleet carriers rarely played much of a role in these ventures. The US carriers had to be careful where they positioned themselves due to the extraordinary maritime search capability out of Rabaul which also possessed a significant anti-shipping strike capability. An occupied and defended Guadalcanal airfield should be a more difficult nut to crack for the USN than Midway was for the IJN. Pearl Harbor is over a thousand miles from Midway and therefore out of range of TACAIR assets, while as history showed, the seas around Guadalcanal were in escorted-strike range of Rabaul.
 
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Second Sub-scenario: Japanese bring 6 carriers. US brings 4. The luck of carrier battles goes the way of the IJN. They strike first at the Americans and cripple all four carriers. Second strike puts all four on the bottom. (The odds were against this, but it is "WHAT IF".) After this debacle, the closest thing the US has to a big carrier is the Wasp. Not only is there no force to attack Guadalcanal, the shipping lanes to Australia are in serious jeopardy. What happens from here? Do you still dedicate the new Sangamon-class escort carriers to Operation Torch? How far does Japan push this advantage? How does the US come back?

(By the way, the more I think about this, even the abstract possibility of this outcome happening is probably a good reason NOT to commit the Wasp to Midway even if the ship could have been rushed to the battle.)
 
i would go with a third sub-scenario the japanese had the 4 historical carriers, the operation is in june, the US had only the Enterprise and the Hornet, the Yorktown get too damage in Coral Sea battle for back in action so fast. Could be US carriers go not to defend the Midway?
 
Actually they have the Saratoga and Wasp. Also the big Santee class Escort Carriers arrived from October, plus in a pinjch the USN could utlise the Ranger. However, this scenario means that the Japanese "2nd Operational Phase" which involved an advance to Fiji and the isolation of Australia, is a likly scenario. However japanese logistics simply run out of puff and by September 1943 the situation is more or less back to historical in the PTO, except that for Australai ther has been such a scare that they will not release their ground forces from Home defence. this has significant effects because the US will need to divert the troops the Autralians provided (2/3 until the end of 1943) to mount their own offensives. More or less cans TORCH and probably HUSKY as well. Significant reinforcement by the RN would be required, which puts PEDESTAL and the Murmansk convoys all in doubt and also means that Alamein might not be the total Axis defeat that it was historically. Depending on what the European Axis do with that breather, there could be significant changes to the final outcome of the war.

I dont understand why so many members believe it a more or less foregone conclusion that the US was going to win the battle. All of the major staff studies of this much observed battle and many writers other than those few that are favoured so much in this place rate the US victory as "against the odds". The Japanese had many advantages, and except for a few critical weaknesses and some plain dumb bad luck should have won the battle, or at least done better than they did.
 
Interesting turn of events. Taking and occupying Midway, the Solomon's, Fiji. This would stretch Japan very thin. Perhaps delay the war in Europe.

I dont understand why so many members believe it a more or less foregone conclusion that the US was going to win the battle
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I very much agree. I think Midway was pure luck on the US part, based upon Coral Sea, Eastern Solomons, and Santa Cruz battles.
 

It's the split objective that made it a losing proposition. The much discussed 'luck' worked both ways and in some instances wasn't really luck at all (e.g. The minimal contribution of VF-6 and Hornet) It could and should have been much worse for the IJN, and less destructive to the USN) The loss of 4 IJN carriers was quite likely considering the situation and the loss of Yorktown was not nearly as likely.

Bates' War College study has been largely discredited and Morrison's historical account is almost worthless except for a reasonably accurate accounting of events. That alone prompted a number of very inaccurate but very popular histories. Implications and primary causes aren't discussed. Morrison was a historian not a miltiary analyst nor was he technical enough to understand the important role of technology, and unfortunately many post war analysts were heavily biased with an axe to grind and a story to tell: "Spruance walked on water and Fletcher wasn't there." Understand, I am a Spruance admirer not a critic

Believe it or not, there probably remains more history to be written on that battle.

The weight of the split objective and its consequences weighed heavily on USN planners for the Guadalcanal operation.

In some respects diagnosis of Midway is similar to the question:

"Did the Spitfire win the battle of Britain as popular culture insists or was it the Hurricane?"

One answer provides a great narative the other is awash in minutia. But which is correct?
 
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Luck plays a part even when the odds are 100:1 or 1:100, but if I have the opportunity I'd want to set up the game with the odds in my favor. The Japanese imprudently let the US set up the game at Midway. The Japanese were negligent in their handling of codes, and they broke from their own doctrine in setting up a grand battle away from their support structure, effectively giving the US home field advantage. They assumed the US carriers would be out of the immediate area long enough to focus their air strikes on Midway without having any intelligence to back up the assumption. The Japanese appeared to assume that at most the Americans could oppose them with two carriers, and therefore bringing four carriers would be enough. Through extraordinary effort, the Americans were able to get the Yorktown into the battle, and with the planes available on Midway, the US had an aircraft advantage.
 
Shattered Sword convinced me that the odds were actually in the Americans' favor. The US was able to knock out all four IJN carriers with almost no contribution from the Hornet air group. (It is arguable how much the sacrifice of VT-8 made in the disposition of Japanese fighters and ship defenses.) The odds should have been against the US. The Japanese could have used their small carriers on this operation, but they chose to use them in the Aleutions. With Shokaku out, they could have at least brought Zuikaku with an air group supplemented by the remnants of Shokaku's, and possibly they could have used the planes earmarked for their Midway base. The Japanese could have allocated only a portion of its forces for the airstrikes on Midway, reserving the rest for locating and striking the American fleet if and when found.
 
Breaking the codes made a great deal of difference.
Plus the US groups got there before the Japanese submarines assigned as pickets around Midway, another big factor seldom mentioned.
 

I believe Lundstrom (and even Morrison) shows the Zuikaku Shokaku airgroups as worse than decimented. the Shokaku had shot her bolt and the survivors had taken refuge on the Zuikaku. I don't believe there were many operational aircraft left on the Sho. Even with Sho aurvivors the Zuikaku airgroup had to be rebuilt before it could sail and operate. One organizational factor here that is oerhaps unrecognized is that unlike the USN, the IJN aircraft, pilots and support crews were all essentially ship's company. As I understand it, there the squadron organizationaal concept in each navy was quite different. The USN embarked an airwing comprised of independent squadrons that could be assigned readily to any carrier. So for example even if elements of the Tainan air group VF were available, they couldn't just be reassigned. In contrast, the same problem faced the Yorktown on its arrival back at Pearl Harbor. To solve it the USN quickly folded VF-3 into VF-42 and made similar adjustments to the other squadrons. Bottom line within 3 days a depleted Yorktown airgroup was restored to full strength. Rich Leonard can discuss this with far greater authority than I. But as I recall, that aspect of the battle is brought out in Lundstrom's First Team. The air groups of the two IJN carriers suffered significant losses (to combat and fuel starvation) during the twilight battle on the 7th as well as the main battle on May 8th. USN Squadrons were essentially independent entities ith their own support personnel. For the IJN support was provided by the Ship's company. It's my understanding that the Midway complement of 21 A6Ms were used a CAP throughout the battle. I believe Hiryu used its allotment of 3.
 
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This seems a very artificial construct to me with so much based on historical events happening for better or worse after the fact.
I think a more interesting what if scenario is: What if the IJN recognized the essential value of their existing ribbon defense and put all is efforts into isolating Austratlia. In other words, they did not choose to attempt the Midway operation. What happens after Coral Sea?
 

If there had been no Midway battle, I think the two navies would have slugged it out in the Solomons. I don't think the US would have landed at Guadalcanal in August, it would have been later. They landed in August because they wanted to take advantage of their interim carrier strength, and they wanted to take the airfield before it became operational. With all of the IJN carriers potentially "out there somewhere", the the USN could not get tied down to static defense of a landing force. The USN would have undertaken more and stronger carrier raids in the short term. Oil shortages would have made the Japanese selective in their fleet deployments.
 
I have to disagree. The IJN still enjoyed superiority of numbers, equipment, aircrew experience, and range. What they needed to do was find the US carriers earlier. if that had happened, they could have held the US at range, preventing the Americans from effectively hitting them, whilst they attacked and in all probability sank all the US carriers. The IJN achieved this very advantage at both Santa Cruz and later at Phillipine Sea. If it had been achieved at Midway, the result would have been devastating for the Americans
 
from the Midway battle orbat on navweaps
Japanese
planes in the 4 fleet carriers
93 Type 0 fighters
72 Type 99 dive bombers
1 Type 2 recce planes
81 Type 97 torpedo bombers
247 total

US
planes in the 3 fleet carriers
81 F4F fighters
109 SBD dive bombers
44 TBD torpedo bombers
234 total

so the strenght were around the same
 
While, as usual, I agree with much of what Pars says, especially with citing the advantages held by IJN cv forces and Santa Cruz as the nightmare scenario for the USN, However, I think things might have been a little more complex considering the unstated USN advantages (there were a few). There is also the issue of timing. When does the next battle play out and whose in charge. If Halsey is in charge, things go badly for the USN but the troops get a LOT of battle experience (worst case? IMHO). Spruance does a little better (brains offseting his lack of experience and presumably Halsey's disfunctional staff). Fletcher? The IJN needs to be careful, he's an experienced and wiley old fox and appropriately cautious.

King wanted a soulthern pacific advance early in the war evidently underestimating the actual IJN capability and skill. It is doubtful the USN will risk more than 3 of its carriers in an operation. Nimitz and King evidently wanted to keep at least one in reserve and preferred to operate two in tandem. Since Yorktown is afloat it can be teamed with Wasp or Hornet while Sara, Enterprise and one of the latter two take on the IJN. The IJN itself, is unlikely to risk all 6 big decks in one operation. I would expect 2 in reserve or refit for which they were all due.

Before Santa Cruz, the USN had enjoyed two exceptionally devestating radar directed intercepts, it's probably even money that the RADAR gives adequate range and the FDO does his job properly in any given CV vs CV battle. In that event, the VF of 3 USN CVs could inflict some serious harm on an IJN strike. After June 4, TBFs replace the TBDs but with the original flight crews. That's more formidable than the subsequent VT units deployed. Torpedoes still are wanting (I don't know when the improved upgrades begin to arrive). IIRC, AAA Proximity fuses arrive before Santa Cruz and the effects are important. After Eastern Solomons USN VF embarked numbers increase to >30 per big deck. Based on the way each battle played out, I'd say it's roughly even chance who gets the better of who. I'd estimate 55% IJN vs 45% USN chance of coming out on top. Either way who ever wins the other will be serious mauled. JMO
 
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Doesnt tke into account the very capable floatplane division more or less permanently attached to Car Div 1 and carDiv 2, The USN was forced to use a portion of its CAG as searchplanes. The IJN had 12 floatplanes attached to Tone and Chikuma which had been attached to the carriers since the outbreak of the war. They also had the two fast BBs which had a further 8 floatplanes, all of which had worked closley with the carriers for extended periods and could provide very effective support and co-operation whilst underway. the USN had nothing to compare to that. The land based PBYs were inexperienced and there were severe difficulties in getting them to co-operate effectively with the forces afloat, because they simply lacked the experience to do so, and in any event the land based forces were badly placed to provide that support.

Beyond those immediately available support forces, if one want to think a little laterally, the IJN also had three float plane carriers, carrying 44 lr recce aircraft which had the ability to launch and recover in open seas (these forces were held back with the main body), and the training to undertake searches and lr reporting, whilst underway in open waters, something totally absent in USN floatplane capability. Moreover USN floatplanes were not trained for this (they were meant as artillery spotters mostly and lacked the range to be effective at recon work.

The result of all this is that the in the opening attacks, the USN should have roughly 50-60% less aircraft available for strike than the Japanese. Thats a critical imbalance.

Why didnt it pan out that way. The USN knew from its codebreaking where and when the IJN would be, and did not need to expend too many resources finding the Japanese. The Japanese got unlucky and sloppy in their searches, and it cost them the battle. If the IJN had changed their codes, and called on11 carriers in July instead of 4 in June (the 11 carriers being Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, Hiryu, Zuikaku, Shokaku, Zuiho, Hiyo, Junyo, Ryujo and Hosho), the result would not have been in much doubt. What the Japanese had to do, however was get over themselves and the victories they had won to that point.
 
I really like Crow's scenario of no Midway battle. It certainly opens up countless possibilities. I wonder what other objectives would have brought out the entire US fleet. Samoa? Fiji? Espirito Santo? Noumea?
 
there were also the planes on Midway for the US.....
others plane avaialble for Japanese
8 Type 96 torpedo bomber (Hosho)
12 Type 96 fighter and 12 Type 97 torpedo bomber (Zuiho)
35 Seaplanes in the Chitose and Kamikawa Maru
a max 31 seaplanes was possible carried from the BB and an other 39 from the CC i've many doubt that actually they loaded the max number of seaplanes

others planes available for US
31 PBY-5 on Midway
6 TBF on Midway
21 F2A on midway
7 F4F on Midway
40 SBD on Midway
16 B-17 on Midway
4 B-26 on Midway

plus the seaplanes in the fleet (max 20)
 
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