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Planners identified a dependence by Nazi Germany on fossil fuels imported from the Soviet Union as a vulnerability that could be exploited. Despite initial opposition by some politicians, the French Government ordered General Maurice Gamelin to commence a "plan of possible intervention with the view of destroying Russian oil exploitation", while U.S. Ambassador Bullit informed U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt that the French considered that air attacks by the French Air Forces in Syria against Baku would be "the most efficient way to weaken the Soviet Union."[4] According to the report by General Gamelin submitted to the French Prime Minister on 22 February 1940, an oil shortage would cripple the Red Army and Soviet Air Force, as well as Soviet collective farm machinery, causing possible widespread famine and even the collapse of the Soviet Union: "Dependence on oil supplies from the Caucasus is the fundamental weakness of Russian economy. The Armed Forces were totally dependent on this source also for their motorized agriculture. More than 90% of oil extraction and 80% of refinement was located in the Caucasus (primarily Baku). Therefore, interruption of oil supplies on any large scale would have far-reaching consequences and could even result in the collapse of all the military, industrial and agricultural systems of Russia."[4] An important source of raw materials would also be denied to Nazi Germany with the destruction of the oil fields.
And report supplements my point...Saying that the Red Army "pushed the Wehrmacht back to Berlin using brute force in manpower...not by thier airforce" does a massive disservice to both the strength and effectiveness of the Russian airforces.
The AFHRA study on the effectiveness of Russian airpower concludes that Soviet airpower was an "essential ingredient of the Soviet victory" and "contributed a decisive share in breaking German resistance". Over 1943-1945, Soviet bombers achieved "a commendable measure of success in operations supporting the army on the ground". Fighter, ground attack and bomber cooperation "produced good results".
To quote the study (USAF historical study 175) at length:
What the study makes clear is that
1) The Soviets never had full air supremacy, only superiority, even with their massive numerical advantage
2) Soviet pilots had an inferiority complex compared to the Germans, right up to the end of the war, and the Germans were always more effective in aerial combat
3) Soviet air power only ever achieved 'semi-strategic' projections of power, and only on a moderate scale
4) Soviet night bombing was unimpresssive
5) Soviet pilot training, aggressiveness, technical equipment and morale continued to close the qualitative gap to their German opponents throughout the 1944-45 period, and fighter forces improved their effectiveness across all fields.
I get the feeling that some here think that an attack by the Western Allies against the Soviets would be like a Barbarossa re-run. I'm of a much different opinion. I feel it would be more like Kursk - more expensive for the Soviets numerically, but ultimately more costly for the attacker in the long run.
Otherwise you'd have two massive ground armies mired down in a slugfest that could drag on indefinately, which leaves me with the impression that it would devolve into a Stalingrad or WWI style stalemate...nobody really gaining much ground because both ground armies are well seasoned and well equipped.
and i think if stalin had even an inkling he could brush aside the western allies he would have kept going. the russian were already planning for their western expansions into what later became the com-bloc nations.
The Red Army was not the joke it was in '41...
.no i do not think the russian people were mindless automatons but they were more will into sacrifice in certain respect than the western allies. the amount of deaths reflect that struggle. if Ike would have given every 5th soulder 5 rounds of ammo and told him to pick up a rifle off of a dead GI when they landed on the beach...i seriously doubt D-day would have happend. but that is what happened in stalingrad and the russian troops did it. in light of that i am more inclinded to say stalin could sell it to his people easier than churchill and fdr could theirs.
evidence pertaining to which part or both. the part was "i think"... as stalin was not sbashful about taking what he wanted. they invaded poland at the same time germany did.
russia declares war on japan when it wasnt needed and fought for on for several weeks AFTER japan surrendered. why did they need this buffer zone? it was a lang grab pure and simple.
the way the russians "negotiated" with the west is a matter of record and if you read it very much lopsided towards their needs and not much given back in reciprocity.
At the Tehran Conference (November 1943), Stalin agreed that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan once Nazi Germany was defeated. At the Yalta Conference (February 1945), Stalin agreed to Allied pleas to enter World War II's Pacific Theater within three months of the end of the war in Europe. The invasion began on August 9, 1945, precisely three months after the German surrender on May 8 (May 9, 0:43 Moscow time).
Soviet
Also, how many U.S. bombers and Fighters (plus thier crews) were interred when they had to set down on Russian proper both in the east and in the west during the war?
It just this kind of cold war distortion of history that makes any discussion of the war in the east and the USSR so hard to have and why I try to avoid these discussions, since it inevitably involves explaining Soviet and Western diplomatic relations, and this is often seen as a defence of Stalin.
The USSR didn't invade Poland at the same time as Germany. They waited for 17 days after the German invasion; basically until the Polish military and government had both collapsed:
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/62/Poland2.jpg
and then occupied eastern Poland, basically up to the Curzon line (the ethnic dividing line between Poland and Russia/Ukraine).