What if the eastern front closed down in spring 43?

[stona]

It's a question of which chemical and biological weapons. There is a big difference between a mustard gas of the sort the British planned to use against an invasion in 1940, and the so called nerve agents (organophosphate toxins) at least one of which, 'Tabun,' the Germans had significant stockpiles. The British had one such toxin, 'Diisopropylfluorophosphate (DFP)', but it was much les toxic than the German products. The British planned to mix it with mustard gas, but it is unclear whether they actually did so.

The US shipped phosgene to the British and of course had stockpiles of mustard gas to. Google SS JOHN HARVEY to see the unfortunate results when things go wrong.

It may be pertinent that very many of the standard texts I read when studying organic chemistry in the 1970s were German in origin

Cheers

Steve

 

[GrauGeist]

Yes, the raid on Bari was a remarkably successful raid by the Luftwaffe, sinking a considerable amount of tonnage for the loss of one aircraft.

Interestingly enough, the raid was conducted almost entirely by Ju88A-4 aircraft...

 

[kool kitty89]

The fact that the US hadn't produced enough U235 for a test shot should give a clue as to what the Japanese programme was capable of. It's just not that easy to do. Several have tried and either struggled or failed, even with substantial information from successful projects.

The US already had its sights set on Plutonium based devices, incredible when you consider that as the Manhattan project was set up there wouldn't have been enough Plutonium 'created' in the world to cover a pin head

The US almost certainly had much larger quantities of lower enriched uranium being cycled through various stages for weapons grade production (and some limited amounts pulled off for experimental reactor use), but the 80% U235 used in Little Boy was very limited, yes.

From what I understand of the Japanese project, they were fairly practical about it and rather than massively dispersing various projects and techniques in a 'shotgun research project' as the US had (and Germans to some extent -much less effectively), and in spite of the split Army/Navy projects, the more successful (and not canceled) of the two focused purely on Uranium enrichment without diverting any efforts towards plutonium breeding AND only using a single form of enrichment (thermal diffusion) whereas the US put a huge amount of effort into membrane diffusion and significant efforts into gas centrifuges and thermal diffusion as well. (thermal is inefficient in terms of energy consumption, but the fastest, simplest, and most foolproof method for the given technology at the time)

Given any/all concrete records of the project's relocated site in Korea were overtaken by the Soviets, these details are all still lost to history and up to speculation. However, I suspect they either were targeting a smaller critical mass of similarly enriched uranium to Little Boy (the final design managing roughly 2.5x masses with the neutron reflectors accounted for), or making due with significantly less enriched material. In either case, quite possibly resorting to an implosion type device due to the limited material available and smaller critical mass needed for given percentage of U235. (that and much more experimental than a gun-type device, so again meriting a test)

I'm not saying it's extremely likely they DID have a deployable/functional nuclear weapon at the end of the war, just that they were far, far closer than the Germans. (that and the radiological effects of even a 'fizzle' deployed at a USN invasion fleet could have had serious longer-term consequences)



Breeding plutonium is, once you figure out how to do it, far far faster and less energy intensive than uranium enrichment with given materials of the time, particularly as any quantities of plutonium can be separated chemically once they've formed. The germans may or may not have had a good idea of how to breed plutonium from simple natural uranium. There's an article on supposed spherical plutonium bomb cores made from layered, moderated mini-reactors to be buried and allowed to breed and then used as-is as bombs with the impact forcing the layers into a critical mass (which would fizzle and create a radiological mess -a potent dirty bomb of sorts), and this has been discussed a few times before:

A bunch of relevant links to other discussions were included in one of my old posts here:
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/bombers-bomb-nyc-16062.html#post431713

Plus this one http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/ww2-general/evidence-german-nuclear-weapon-project-835.html (older discussion from when the new evidence for those nuclear devices was first publicized)

Aside from the validity evidence being presented and disputes regarding it, the issue that seems to come up less often (but the most blaring one to me) is: if they COULD get those sphere reactors working, why the hell would they waste them as radiological weapons as-is, rather than cracking them open and processing out and purifying the plutonium? (and making provisions to the spheres to make such operations less dangerous and faster/simpler/more efficient)
In theory they SHOULD have worked as breeder reactors not too unlike the graphite based breeders the US used, except with the weaker moderator material a sustained reaction needed to be initiated by a spark-plug of sorts (a neutron generator near the center of the sphere, jump starting the reaction to generate just enough plutonium to create a sustained reaction on a much smaller scale than the US reactors were using ... and without using lots of tungsten carbide reflectors)

The German Nuclear program is a bit odd though, and honestly, odd politics aside, I seriously wonder how many of the scientists may have sabotaged efforts internally, or at least slowed progress. (there's far too many simple things that they seemed to miss out on, including ones that had been publicly published before the start of the war) All that effort towards paraffin reactor experiments and (especially) heavy water production when little actually contributed to useful experimental results ... and the lack of emphasis on solid (graphite and carbide) neutron reflector/moderator materials is also quite odd. (albeit the heavy water production seemed to be more a pre-emptive development in anticipation of heavy water reactor power stations -indeed, THAT is one of the more believable aspects of the German nuclear program: that little effort was put towards a bomb and far far more interest was focused on nuclear power generation -a far more complicated and resource intensive engineering undertaking to be sure ... bombs are easy compared to reliable, usable, civil -let alone mobile/military- nuclear power plants ... bit of putting the cart before the horse there though, visions of a nuclear powered Germany and electrical power infrastructure before experimental reactors were working ... or any efforts towards enrichment or plutonium breeding -both of which they must have considered, and the former of which they most certainly understood how to accomplish, the latter would be more experimental and speculative at the time)

 

[kool kitty89]

In a discussion about the decision to use the Atomic bomb against japan, I read that the USA had the worlds largest store of Chemical weapons (can't remeber which book). Using them were one of the alternatives considered to bypass the need for an invasion of the Japanese home isles.

Plus conventional incendiary bombs were devastating against the heavily-wooden/shack based Japanese cities, much more so on a plane for plane, mission for mission, ton of bombs basis over Europe. And in terms of the impact a SINGLE bomber could have with late-war weapons, that 'bat bomb' may seem silly on the surface, but it worked, was ready to use, and would have been extremely effective for those same reasons. Only the use of nuclear bombs and the end of the war precluded its use. (unlike the also effective pigeon-guided anti-ship missiles that were refused on ... mostly aesthetic/psychological grounds)

Project Pigeon - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

General Groves had an eye on history. Here is a transcript made (by me) of a filmed post war interview in which he justified the use of the first bombs against Japanese cities.

"It would have come out, sooner or later, in a Congressional hearing if nowhere else, just when we could have dropped the bomb if we didn't use it. And then, knowing American politics you know, as well as I do, there'd be elections fought on the basis that every mother whose son was killed after such and such a date, the blood is on the hands of the President."

Not particularly eloquent, but he made a point difficult to refute.

It worked too, and in hind sight, that's the big point. It's one of the very few times the shock/terror of weapons has actually ended conflict (unlike the terror/morale bombings over Europe, firebombings over Japan -or various acts of terrorism, etc, etc- where it usually backfires and embitters and steels the resolve of the enemy rather than crushing their spirits, forcing a war of attrition, which is likely what would have happened if we invaded Japan as well ... a bloody mess with much more loss of life on both sides)

There were considerable stores of chemical weapons possessed by many countries at the time and the U.S. had a stockpile of them on hand in Europe in case the Germans used theirs. Hitler did not use what they had because he knew that would bring retaliation.

The Japanese had chemical and biological weapons on hand - this fact was known by the Allies in the Pacific.

In was pretty much a game of chicken, though more so with Germany than Japan (or at least I believe Germany's chemical/bio weapons were more dangerous and more deployable than Japan's, certainly far more dangerous targets within reach -mainland Europe + Britain)

It's a question of which chemical and biological weapons. There is a big difference between a mustard gas of the sort the British planned to use against an invasion in 1940, and the so called nerve agents (organophosphate toxins) at least one of which, 'Tabun,' the Germans had significant stockpiles. The British had one such toxin, 'Diisopropylfluorophosphate (DFP)', but it was much les toxic than the German products. The British planned to mix it with mustard gas, but it is unclear whether they actually did so.

The German stockpiles of refined botulinum toxin is the one weapon Delcyros always brought up as the most horrific and potent chemical/biological weapon they had. (the link in the previous post includes several discussions where this comes up -pretty much every time WWII WMDs of any sort came up, if Delcyros was around, that botulinum toxin was mentioned ... sometimes anthrax too, but usually in reference to it being a much lesser concern than botulinum)

 

[Just Schmidt]

In my opinion it is questionable whether the Atomic bomb (or bombs, why should it take excactly two?) was THE decisive factor in Japans surrender. As mentioned in the post abowe, incendiary bombing was going on as well, and arguably the fire bombing raid on Tokyo was the one most devastating aral raid of the Whole war. japan was starinf starvation in the eye, and it was just a question of making continuing the war even more hopeless. Anyway the long term effects of Nuclear weapons were not realized in their full extent.

The Soviet attack on Manchuria and Korea played a part too. Not so much in making the hopeless military situation even more hopeless (impressive though the Soviet advance was), the shock was probably that japan had hoped that Stalin would stay out of the asiatic war. They had kept their pact With USSR to the letter, amongst other Things allowing american foodstuffs to be supplied to the harbours in easternmost USSR. If memory serves, they had also asked the Soviets to mediate in negotiations with the western allies. But what probably scared them the most was the fear that the Soviet invasion could help spark communist revolts in the liberated territories and Japan itself.

Though the Soviet invasion was planned long time Ahead (it was an old agreement that USSR should join the war against Japan 3 months after ending of the war in europe), that was probably moved forward by the use of the Atomic bombs. Old agreements apart, Truman was more aware of the worldmap after ending of hostilities than FDR ever was, and wasn't really keen on the Soviets keeping their part of the deal, thank you very much. The less territory the Soviets held in the end, the better, and that in itself is likely to be a contributing reason for using the bomb at that time. As well as a warning to Stalin.

Ironically what really made it possible (in psykological terms) for the Japanese to surrender, possibly was the allies going back on their demand for an unconditional surrender, as they agreed to the emperor keeping his throne.

 

[Just Schmidt]

There were considerable stores of chemical weapons possessed by many countries at the time and the U.S. had a stockpile of them on hand in Europe in case the Germans used theirs. Hitler did not use what they had because he knew that would bring retaliation.

QUOTE]

Then again, Hitler did towards the end decide that the german People hadn't shown itself worthy of existence, and ordered all infrastructure and Production facilities in Germany destroyed. This was not supposed just to be an extreme case of scorched Earth, but actual wernichtung of the germans as Wolk. Very few in the nazi hierarchy followed through on that one, but from that perspective Allied retaliation shouldn't seem that awfull to Hitler.

On a side note, of course the germans did use gas to a considerable extent, just not on the Battle Field.

On capabilities we should be ablre to agree that in the V" rockets the germans did have the means to deliver Chemical weapons in spite of Allied air superiority. Even though I've seen it argued (and I think convincingly) that as it played out, the V1 made a lot more sense than the V2. It was cheap and simple to produce, and as a defence against it was possible, it tied Down Allied Resources for defence. The V2, though unstoppable, was so expensive that it could never have been made in enough numbers to be anything else than pinpricks. Barring powerfull enough warheads. Probably the Resources going into the V2 could have been better spent trying to develope effective surface to air missiles.

 

[stona]

In my opinion it is questionable whether the Atomic bomb (or bombs, why should it take excactly two?) was THE decisive factor in Japans surrender. As mentioned in the post abowe, incendiary bombing was going on as well, and arguably the fire bombing raid on Tokyo was the one most devastating aral raid of the Whole war. japan was starinf starvation in the eye, and it was just a question of making continuing the war even more hopeless. Anyway the long term effects of Nuclear weapons were not realized in their full extent.

The two bombs were the straws that broke the camels back.

Why did it take two? We can never be sure, but dropping two showed the Japanese that the US had more than one, for all the Japanese knew they might have had ten.

The long term effects of radiation exposure might not have been known and the effects and even dosages that humans would receive in an attack were not properly understood. There was no hard data. Most data used in later studies was gathered at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. However, the effects of exposure to various radiations and the effects of ingestion of or contamination by radioactive materials were well enough known.
It is no accident that those observing the Trinity test had two escape routes, one essentially North, the other South. I think it was Edward Teller who described the cloud formed after the explosion boiling and 'glowing' with radioactivity and thought that he and the other observers might have to make a sharp exit in an unplanned direction.

Cheers

Steve

 

[GrauGeist]

Then again, Hitler did towards the end decide that the german People hadn't shown itself worthy of existence, and ordered all infrastructure and Production facilities in Germany destroyed. This was not supposed just to be an extreme case of scorched Earth, but actual wernichtung of the germans as Wolk. Very few in the nazi hierarchy followed through on that one, but from that perspective Allied retaliation shouldn't seem that awfull to Hitler.

There were quite a few ranting by Hitler, but the fact remains that suicidal edicts were not something Hitler was in favor of. The Fi103R could be an example of that reluctance to commit to a sacrificial/suicidal policy.

On a side note, of course the germans did use gas to a considerable extent, just not on the Battle Field.

The Germans also had quite a few stockpiles in strategic locations in the event that they were needed. It was said that the Germans didn't deploy the nerve agents at Normandy for fear of harming their much needed draft-horses. However, the larger reason why the Germans didn't use nerve agents is because they incorrectly assumed the Allies had access to nerve agents and feared retaliation if used.

On the otherhand, the Japanese did use chemical weapons extensively thoughout Asia against Communist and Nationalist Chinese troops. The weapons used were blistering agents, mustard gas, red gas, etc.

On capabilities we should be ablre to agree that in the V" rockets the germans did have the means to deliver Chemical weapons in spite of Allied air superiority. Even though I've seen it argued (and I think convincingly) that as it played out, the V1 made a lot more sense than the V2. It was cheap and simple to produce, and as a defence against it was possible, it tied Down Allied Resources for defence. The V2, though unstoppable, was so expensive that it could never have been made in enough numbers to be anything else than pinpricks. Barring powerfull enough warheads. Probably the Resources going into the V2 could have been better spent trying to develope effective surface to air missiles.

The problem with a chemical weapon laden V1 is that it can be intercepted. The V2 (A4), while it may have been more expensive, was impossible to intercept and did carry a slightly larger bombload.

If the V2 were used to deploy a chemical weapon, that would mean the unstoppable delivery of 2,200 pounds (1,000kg) of a deadly component. If you look at the devastation that a single WWI chlorine gas or phosgene laden artillery shell was capable of, just imagine what a ton of it could do from a single V2 impact.

The two bombs were the straws that broke the camels back.

Why did it take two? We can never be sure, but dropping two showed the Japanese that the US had more than one, for all the Japanese knew they might have had ten.

Even after the bombing of Hiroshima, the Japanese war council was arguing over continuing the war or surrender and even then, they argued over the 4 conditions of surrender.

By August 9th, when the Soviets violated the neutrality pact with Japan and the news of Nagasaki's bombing is when the Japanese leaders started realizing that the war was over for them. Although there were still a few factions that wanted to continue resistance...but their numbers were quickly dwindling.

 

[stona]

Even after the bombing of Hiroshima, the Japanese war council was arguing over continuing the war or surrender and even then, they argued over the 4 conditions of surrender.

By August 9th, when the Soviets violated the neutrality pact with Japan and the news of Nagasaki's bombing is when the Japanese leaders started realizing that the war was over for them. Although there were still a few factions that wanted to continue resistance...but their numbers were quickly dwindling.

That's my point. The nuclear weapons were decisive in bringing about the surrender and it needed two, with the implicit threat of more if needs be.

This was made explicit in the Emperor's 'surrender' speech:

"But now the war has lasted for nearly four years. Despite the best that has been done by everyone – the gallant fighting of the military and naval forces, the diligence and assiduity of Our servants of the State, and the devoted service of Our one hundred million people – the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan's advantage, while the general trends of the world have all turned against her interest.
Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is, indeed, incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives. Should We continue to fight, not only would it result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization.
Such being the case, how are We to save the millions of Our subjects, or to atone Ourselves before the hallowed spirits of Our Imperial Ancestors? This is the reason why We have ordered the acceptance of the provisions of the Joint Declaration of the Powers."

I find the idea that the nuclear attacks on Japan were not a tipping point leading to her surrender dangerous revisionism. There were at the time, and are even more now, people who do not believe the use of such weapons was justified. There is a tendency to portray Japan as a victim as a result of the attacks which flies in the face of the evidence for everything that had happened in Asia since 1931.
Of course there were many other factors which forced Japan's hand, but it is by no means clear that a surrender would have been forthcoming in 1945 without the nuclear attacks. It was even less clear to the men authorising the attacks at the time. The looming shadow of Soviet involvement may also have been a factor for the Americans.

Cheers

Steve

 

[GrauGeist]

I find the idea that the nuclear attacks on Japan were not a tipping point leading to her surrender dangerous revisionism. There were at the time, and are even more now, people who do not believe the use of such weapons was justified. There is a tendency to portray Japan as a victim as a result of the attacks which flies in the face of the evidence for everything that had happened in Asia since 1931.

That has been a disturbing trend lately along with the recent rash of "war crimes against the citizens of Dresden" rhetoric.

There was a recent discussion in depth about this trend in the media here: www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/ww2-general/smithsonian-article-plagued-revisionism-comments-41382.html

I suppose the old adage: "never let facts get in the way of a good story" seems to apply.

 

[parsifal]

There was a pattern that occuurred in 1918 that gives some indicators of what would happen. In 1917 the Rusians dropped out of that war, and shifted resources to the west for a final push to victory before the US strength could be brought to bear. The first US divisions went into action in April 1918, and were promptly taken out of the line for a time for further training. US boots on the ground did not have much effect until the following July, From there there was a rapid ramping up of effort by the US, as they shouldered more and more from ther exhausted allies. France had needed to be careful with its army since 1917, afteer the mutinies that almost caused her army to collapse. britain was running out of men. But it was the germans who collapsed the most and first. A ground war with a fully committed US was unwinnable for the germans, provided britain and the commonwealth remained in the fight, and there was no way for the germans to win, with or without atomic weapons, and with or without the use of gas. For every kiloton of bombs the germans could make and deliver, there would have been 50 kilotons of Allied atomic bombs falling on Germany. Germany just couldnt win the war after the entry of the US, unless the Japanese could win in the pacific.

Which brings me to the second point that needs to be made. this discussion thus far is far too parochial, far too Euro-centric to be described as healthy. The war by 1943 was a global war, in which the allies were were fully committed to a joint effort to defeating all of the axis unconditionally. With the USSR out of the war, something that was never going to happen, incidentally, even if Staklin was an abominable person, he would not abandon the grand alliance against germany under any real circumstance (rerlaistic ones at least). But if he had, the greatest likely impact would have been a rethink of the "Europe first" Strategy. I think the lobby in the US to concentrate on Japan would have gained weight. Japan would have been the subject of some hammer blows by both the US and gret Britain. Its plausible that Japan would be out of the war by the end of 1943.

With Japan out of the war, vast resources are unleashed against Germany. Italy would be out of the war by the ebd of the year, though neutral, it would need to be occupied by Germany and disarmed. Close to 30 US Divs would be released from the pacific, along with 15 Australian, about 3 NZ, 2 SA, 35 Indian, 15 or so brit. Chinese unknown, but say 5 for foreign service. Canada would release at least 4 divs but had the capacity to field at least 15 more than she did for Europe The US is able to raise its army to well over 200 divs instead of the 90 it did historically, because of the released manpower from the logistics supporting the pacific, as per the historical plans that it made to cover this eventuality. Allies now have an amphib lift capability exceeding 30 divs in the intial assault,, and the potential to commit to the final battle with germany of around 350 divs to take on the germans. Fighting might spread to Spain as it did in Napoleons time, But with a force of that size, Germany is again doomed in a land campaign.

After the entry of the US and the committments made under the Atlantic charter, Germany's fate was sealed.

 

[gjs238]

the greatest likely impact would have been a rethink of the "Europe first" Strategy. I think the lobby in the US to concentrate on Japan would have gained weight. Japan would have been the subject of some hammer blows by both the US and gret Britain. Its plausible that Japan would be out of the war by the end of 1943.

Can you elaborate on the lobby in the US to concentrate on Japan? I haven't heard much about that and would be keen to learn more.

 

[kool kitty89]

In my opinion it is questionable whether the Atomic bomb (or bombs, why should it take excactly two?) was THE decisive factor in Japans surrender. As mentioned in the post abowe, incendiary bombing was going on as well, and arguably the fire bombing raid on Tokyo was the one most devastating aral raid of the Whole war. japan was starinf starvation in the eye, and it was just a question of making continuing the war even more hopeless. Anyway the long term effects of Nuclear weapons were not realized in their full extent.

My points were less that the nuclear bomb uses were necessary, but more that they may have still been the lesser evil, or at least seen as such strategically without the understanding of full long-term contamination consequences. (continuation of fire bombings alone -let alone more potent developments using conventional incendiaries -and the bat bomb) could have led to a greater immediate loss of life and homes/civil infrastructure/etc than the A-bombs did. (even aside from the far more costly prospects of invasion, or consequences of greater Soviet involvement -it's bad enough they managed to get as far as Northern Korea)

Ironically what really made it possible (in psykological terms) for the Japanese to surrender, possibly was the allies going back on their demand for an unconditional surrender, as they agreed to the emperor keeping his throne.

Yes, the conditions of surrender is a very big deal as well, and a compromise that may have shortened the War in Europe by a great deal as well, and potentially led to greater support for a military coup to depose the Nazi leadership. (but would meant the Allies breaking their agreements with Stalin as well as losing the USSR's support in Asia ... granted ... you could very well build THAT sort of scenario as a counterpart to this thread's main topic -Coup+negotiations with Western Allies allowing the Eastern front to be kept open, limiting Soviet Advances, say in a post D-Day coup + conditional/partial surrender)

The problem with a chemical weapon laden V1 is that it can be intercepted. The V2 (A4), while it may have been more expensive, was impossible to intercept and did carry a slightly larger bombload.

If the V2 were used to deploy a chemical weapon, that would mean the unstoppable delivery of 2,200 pounds (1,000kg) of a deadly component. If you look at the devastation that a single WWI chlorine gas or phosgene laden artillery shell was capable of, just imagine what a ton of it could do from a single V2 impact.

Or, again, botulinum toxin.

The tendency for V2s to bury themselves before detonating might have made them more effective as chemical weapons systems than conventional, or at least have a lesser detriment to effectiveness. Potential for the earth/debris to muffle the explosion and cause the dispersion of gas to be more focused at low level and remain concentrated around populated areas more, that and potentially contaminating groundwater.

One alternative to V1s might have been turbojet powered cruise missiles, something that may have been further benefited by the relatively low cost of materials and man-hours per engine for (and limited service life) of the Jumo 004B, or perhaps an even simpler specialized low-life engine that used even more mild steel in place of stainless alloys. (I do wonder how long a plain mild steel turbine might hold up when used in a similar air-cooled configuration, especially with zero concern for throttle changes further increasing wear)

More costly than a V1 to be sure, but perhaps a great deal less costly than the V2, and faster than the V1, heavier payload, and potentially longer range, plus fewer hurdles with vibration to work though. (with the pulse jet's fuel pressure regulation issues at altitude avoided, pushing heights more around 10,000 ft cruising around 500 MPH would make it both hard for AA to hit and impossible for fighters to intercept)

Even if using standard 004B engines, it should have been more practical, reliable, and less costly to manufacture/operate than the jet powered mistel developments on the drawing board, and probably could have been adapted/executed sooner had it actually been developed as part of the V1 program. (500 mph cruise missiles carrying more than a cookie's worth of high explosives at 500 MPH may have even been more cost effective in terms of damage operational use than the actual V1 -plus, just slow/low enough to still waste resources TRYING to intercept them ... head-on/side long passes at top speed might have had limited success, enough to be a major distraction as well as a strategic weapon)


I should probably bring it up in one of the Jet engine threads too (or start a cruise missile thread), but the un-cooled radial turbine that allowed relatively consistent operation on Heinkel/Ohain's early engines may have been well suited to short-life disposable engines made with most/all hot components of plain steel. (aside from the bearings, Ohain's HeS 3 and 6 were nearly entirely mild and stainless sheet steel and aluminum, including the compressor and diffuser -using rolled or forged aluminum blades fastened to a steel hub for the impeller, less aerodynamically efficient but faster/simpler to construct than the machined impellers used in most superchargers -also easier for Heinkel's airframe manufacturing facilities to construct in the late 1930s prior to any access to engine manufacturing facilities)
Such disposable engines may have been aided somewhat by specific fuels being used. Methanol in particular has a lower flame temperature and may have made for a somewhat lower turbine/exhaust temp and lesser wear and easier to start Heinkel's early, hydrogen-warmup dependent vaporization dependent combustion systems on -soot tending to clog the injectors if gasoline/kerosene was introduced too soon, or especially at start-up. (but also less than half the energy density of kerosene, reducing range or payload ... but also the cheapest synthetic fuel to manufacture AND its corrosive issues -especially with aluminum- being totally moot in a disposable machine -blending with ethanol, acetone, ether, among others could improve things somewhat, some vaporizing easier than others -ethanol the worst of those, diethyl ether better than methanol, dimethyl ether would be useful too but it's a gas unless under modest pressure or dissolved in other fuels)

In fact, methanol is one of the easiest fuels to get pulse jet engines to reliably function on, and may have even accelerated V1 development somewhat and eased starting compared to the acetylene+gasoline/kerosene start-up procedure. (diethyl ether would probably work even better, dimethyl more so and almost as cheap to produce as methanol but would need pressure containment somewhat similar to butane, or disolved/blended with other fuels -methanol included, though given the pressure feed system on the V1, omitting the fuel pump and using pressurized liquified fuel directly might have been useful and no special start-up fuel needed -could work in a turbojet just as well, and even simplify start-up)




Edit:
Cruise missile stuff moved here: http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/turbojet-powered-cruise-missiles-43188.html

 

[Koopernic]

The UK did not use their WMD, such as Anthrax (Churchill was a fan of using it) and Mustard gas because they knew it would bring retaliation.
The Germans did not use their WMD, the much more effective Sarin and Taubin, nerve gases because they thought it might bring retaliation.
The British used Area Bombardment directed at Civilians because they knew the Germans did not have the resources to respond credibly.
The United States used Area Bombardment directed at Civilians because they knew the Japanese did not have the capacity to respond.

The United States used nuclear weapons, killing 50,000 Catholic Japanese in Hiroshima ground zero (who tended to oppose the war), because they did not think the Japanese had a weapon to respond with and didn't bother check the personal beliefs of the people they were going to kill. Having said that I think that Secretary of State Henry L Stimson had class for saving the magnificent Shinto Temples of Kobe from the a-bombe.

The Soviet Union and USA did not use nuclear weapons because they new it meant MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction). They fought indirectly via proxy states and psychological warfare.

Having said that there were moral and ethical reservations on both sides. Even Hitler There is a youtube interview video of Adolf Galland in which he says that Adolf Hitler had said to him and said he was very ill-at-ease with bombing the English as they were too familiar, too like us and had no direct dispute with them. Prior to WW1 Adolf had lived in Liverpool for a few months with an uncle. He eventually set aside his anglophilia.

The tendancy of the V2 to bury its warhead in the ground and thus deaden its own impact was well known to the Germans. Walter Dornberger, the Artillery General in charge of the V2 program, mentions in his book that Hitler had told him that it would be a problem with the V2. Hitler had an strong fascination and interest in heavy artillery and would spend time with the Sales Rep in charge of Bespoke artillery from Krupp. If the warhead high explosive or nerve agent hit a building it would not be an issue. As it was there was work on a proximity fuse.

 

[tyrodtom]

There's about 500,000 Catholics in all of Japan today, you're saying 1/10 that number was killed by one A bomb over one city.
I don't think so.

 

[GrauGeist]

When you say WMD, I assume you are referring to Chemical and Biological weapons. The definition of WMD works for today's media sharks, but is useless when referring to anything specific in WWII.

And just so that we're on the same page here, Kyoto, Hiroshima, Nagasaki and others all contained extensive military targets. The cities were selected for their size, topographical layout and other "control" features that could offer data for the bomb's performance. It is of little or no difference if the U.S. thought the Japanese had an A-bomb, the war needed to end. I know this simple fact runs contrary to modern day conspiracy/socialist-lapping ideology, but it's true. The U.S. didn't select targets based on the percentage of population being children or Buddist or having red bicycles.

Fact of the matter is: Far more people died or were displaced from the fire raids of Tokyo than Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined.

Name me one city that was attacked during WWII, that did not a suffer single civilian casualty.

And something that is often overlooked today when crying over these terrible "war crimes" of WWII, is that warfare in earlier times was absolute. There was no consideration or salvation for civilians. When an army pushed through the area, women and children were rounded up for slavery - IF the army were so willing, otherwise the women were raped before they were killed along with everyone else. The cities were sacked and burnt, livestock added to the supply (if the army had time - otherwise the livestock was killed) and the fields put to the torch.

In the case of the third Punic war, Rome not only sacked Carthage and killed (445,000) or enslaved (50,000) all they could catch after a terrible seige, but razed the city to the ground, leaving no two stones touching. So shall we assume that Scipio is just a war criminal, specifically targeting women and children simply for the aim of accomplishing a victory? We could then assume, that Carthage was the victim here, because they simply were trying to compete against Rome for a fair market share, but Rome's imperialistic and capitalistic goals were being hurt by Carthage's long time presence and the Roman leadership decided to attack Carthage to support the military/industrial complex.

And I have to chuckle at the "non-issue" of the V2 burying itself on impact. The holes these weapons made were very large. And has been discussed earlier, if a V2 were carrying a nerve agent, like a ton of phosgene and explosives, it would be devestating because that quantity of gas dispersed at ground level in a civilian environment would be a catastrophe.