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The Me-262 and Arado 234 were advanced, Germany lost the war before they understood what they had and how to deploy it!
You don't think a 7500 mile V13 ICBM was in the cards? Where's your faith, Kamerad?Their jets and rockets were aiming at the wrong cities and targets; German wonder weapons could never reach the USA's or the USSR's industrial heartlands.
The assessment tactically for Japan was wrong but the strategic planning was spot on.
You don't think a 7500 mile V13 ICBM was in the cards? Where's your faith, Kamerad?
Also they didnt have to replace them, as in building new ships, the USA had a huge fleet, they just needed to move other US or allied ships there. The overall statistics may say that the Kamikaze attacks were more effective but they were unsustainable and defences became increasingly effective. Producing hundreds of pilots and planes per day/week or month to sink ships on one way missions, just isnt a solutionThe downside to this logic was the US was capable of replacing those ships lost at a higher rate than their losses. Kamikaze was an act of desperation; an unwinnable strategy.
It was an outside possibility
I have read that all the V1 and V2 weapons sent to London were targeted on Tower Bridge, what would Adolf had done if Tower Bridge surrendered, because no one else would have, it was pure folly. The USA didnt take their lead from London and the Canadians and British forces wouldnt have laid down their arms because of some bombs landing in London, it was just as much of a desperate fantasy as the Kamikaze attacks.Way outside, but yup, definitely agree compared to V 1 and V 2 attacks, as materially devastating as they were. Again, however, the question was not whether or not London could sustain the attacks, but whether or not the Germans could, with everything going on in the Reich at the time.
I have read that all the V1 and V2 weapons sent to London were targeted on Tower Bridge,
I agree with you. I wonder, though, just how close it might have come to a "winning strategy" of a negotiated peace. If you consider losing everything except the home islands a win. I don't remember what the losses to Kamikaze attacks were but it was quite substantial. Were alternatives to unconditional surrender being considered because of mounting casualties? I don't know and I'm not interested in some YouTube conspiracy theory. Just a thought.The downside to this logic was the US was capable of replacing those ships lost at a higher rate than their losses. Kamikaze was an act of desperation; an unwinnable strategy.
Were alternatives to unconditional surrender being considered because of mounting casualties?
That was a great post. I thoroughly enjoyed reading it! I was actually aware of the machinations at the Imperial Court. I was wondering if any Allied leaders were thinking, after the mounting horrific losses to the Special Attack forces, "Aw screw it."Yup, apparently so. This from wiki is actually quite detailed and mentiones the attempted overthrow of the emperor prior to Japan's surrender:
In early 1945, in the wake of the losses in the Battle of Leyte, Emperor Hirohito began a series of individual meetings with senior government officials to consider the progress of the war. All but ex-Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe advised continuing the war. Konoe feared a communist revolution even more than defeat in war and urged a negotiated surrender. In February 1945, during the first private audience with the Emperor he had been allowed in three years,[41] Konoe advised Hirohito to begin negotiations to end the war. According to Grand Chamberlain Hisanori Fujita, the Emperor, still looking for a tennozan (a great victory) in order to provide a stronger bargaining position, firmly rejected Konoe's recommendation.[42]
With each passing week victory became less likely. In April, the Soviet Union issued notice that it would not renew its neutrality agreement. Japan's ally Germany surrendered in early May 1945. In June, the cabinet reassessed the war strategy, only to decide more firmly than ever on a fight to the last man. This strategy was officially affirmed at a brief Imperial Council meeting, at which, as was normal, the Emperor did not speak.
The following day, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Kōichi Kido prepared a draft document which summarized the hopeless military situation and proposed a negotiated settlement. Extremists in Japan were also calling for a death-before-dishonor mass suicide, modeled on the "47 Ronin" incident. By mid-June 1945, the cabinet had agreed to approach the Soviet Union to act as a mediator for a negotiated surrender but not before Japan's bargaining position had been improved by repulse of the anticipated Allied invasion of mainland Japan.
On 22 June, the Emperor met with his ministers saying, "I desire that concrete plans to end the war, unhampered by existing policy, be speedily studied and that efforts be made to implement them." The attempt to negotiate a peace via the Soviet Union came to nothing. There was always the threat that extremists would carry out a coup or foment other violence. On 26 July 1945, the Allies issued the Potsdam Declaration demanding unconditional surrender. The Japanese government council, the Big Six, considered that option and recommended to the Emperor that it be accepted only if one to four conditions were agreed upon, including a guarantee of the Emperor's continued position in Japanese society. The Emperor decided not to surrender.
That changed after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the Soviet declaration of war. On 9 August, Emperor Hirohito told Kōichi Kido: "The Soviet Union has declared war and today began hostilities against us."[43] On 10 August, the cabinet drafted an "Imperial Rescript ending the War" following the Emperor's indications that the declaration did not compromise any demand which prejudiced his prerogatives as a sovereign ruler.
On 12 August 1945, the Emperor informed the imperial family of his decision to surrender. One of his uncles, Prince Yasuhiko Asaka, asked whether the war would be continued if the kokutai (national polity) could not be preserved. The Emperor simply replied "Of course."[44] On 14 August the Suzuki government notified the Allies that it had accepted the Potsdam Declaration.
On 15 August, a recording of the Emperor's surrender speech ("Gyokuon-hōsō", literally "Jewel Voice Broadcast") was broadcast over the radio (the first time the Emperor was heard on the radio by the Japanese people) announcing Japan's acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration. During the historic broadcast the Emperor stated: "Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is, indeed, incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives. Should we continue to fight, not only would it result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization." The speech also noted that "the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan's advantage" and ordered the Japanese to "endure the unendurable." The speech, using formal, archaic Japanese, was not readily understood by many commoners. According to historian Richard Storry in A History of Modern Japan, the Emperor typically used "a form of language familiar only to the well-educated" and to the more traditional samurai families.[45]
A faction of the army opposed to the surrender attempted a coup d'état on the evening of 14 August, prior to the broadcast. They seized the Imperial Palace (the Kyūjō incident), but the physical recording of the emperor's speech was hidden and preserved overnight. The coup was crushed by the next morning, and the speech was broadcast.
From here: Hirohito - Wikipedia
That was a great post. I thoroughly enjoyed reading it! I was actually aware of the machinations at the Imperial Court. I was wondering if any Allied leaders were thinking, after the mounting horrific losses to the Special Attack forces, "Aw screw it."
As I understand it the defence of Okinawa and Kamikaze attacks incurring massive losses were part of a strategy to bring about a negotiated settlement as opposed to unconditional surrender, obviously Hiroshima and Nagasaki changed things.That was a great post. I thoroughly enjoyed reading it! I was actually aware of the machinations at the Imperial Court. I was wondering if any Allied leaders were thinking, after the mounting horrific losses to the Special Attack forces, "Aw screw it."
Which earned him a lot of flak on the home front.The emperor was kept in place by MacArthur to keep Japan sweet.
Hmmm. Controversial.Which earned him a lot of flak on the home front.
If you ask the average American; "Absolutely! The firing squad for him!"Hmmm. Controversial.
Should the Emperor be convicted of war crime?
I would say the Soviets were a big shadow in 1945 and the Emperor hid in the shadow. There was fear the Soviets may ask for Japanese territory or that Japan may turn red.
So should the Emperor have been convicted of war crimes? Yesssssno.