Correct. Yes, the Germans had this technology, but it was rushed into service before it was ready and fully understood because the Germans needed something other than the way they had been fighting the war to that point. The tide turned in 1943; from then on, in hindsight, of course, the war was to end in defeat for the Nazis, despite the fight they had in them, despite their wonder weapons etc. The fielding of jets and rockets did nothing to change the outcome nor could they have done so if the war kept going, unlike wot people say might have happened on the internet. Because of its approach to the war and belief of how it could be won, underestimating its enemies etc, the Nazis were always gonna lose once the USA and USSR got into their stride. Their jets and rockets were aiming at the wrong cities and targets; German wonder weapons could never reach the USA's or the USSR's industrial heartlands.
What if the U.S. and the USAAF had paid attention?
- Thread starter Akuma
- Start date
Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
Correct. Yes, the Germans had this technology, but it was rushed into service before it was ready and fully understood because the Germans needed something other than the way they had been fighting the war to that point. The tide turned in 1943; from then on, in hindsight, of course, the war was to end in defeat for the Nazis, despite the fight they had in them, despite their wonder weapons etc. The fielding of jets and rockets did nothing to change the outcome nor could they have done so if the war kept going, unlike wot people say might have happened on the internet. Because of its approach to the war and belief of how it could be won, underestimating its enemies etc, the Nazis were always gonna lose once the USA and USSR got into their stride. Their jets and rockets were aiming at the wrong cities and targets; German wonder weapons could never reach the USA's or the USSR's industrial heartlands.
You don't think a 7500 mile V13 ICBM was in the cards? Where's your faith, Kamerad?
It wasn't really. The Japanese believed, much like the Germans in the swift stroke, which is not sustainable in a long-term war of attrition. Going to war should be a last resort, not the favoured outcome. Japan set itself on a path of militarism after the Great War that was strategically unsustainable. Japan had few natural resources and had to rely on foreign trade in order to survive. What it achieved during its invasion of the Pacific was admirable and shocked the world, but it couldn't sustain an empire the size of the one it had created; it simply did not have the resources to maintain what it had taken and gone to war against a belligerent and technically equivalent and soon to be the superior enemy.
Of course! Could they do it in the time period remaining with the scant resources and crumbling infrastructure the Nazis had, with the angry hoards of Soviet soldiers frothing at the mouth and vowing for revenge bearing down on them? Naaah...
Also they didnt have to replace them, as in building new ships, the USA had a huge fleet, they just needed to move other US or allied ships there. The overall statistics may say that the Kamikaze attacks were more effective but they were unsustainable and defences became increasingly effective. Producing hundreds of pilots and planes per day/week or month to sink ships on one way missions, just isnt a solution
The same flawed view is used comparing bombing raids on London with the V1 and V2 weapons. It was an outside possibility that bombing London in 1940 would force a negotiation, there was no chance of forcing anything once D-Day was successful even if you were dropping more explosives per day at the start, London would be emptied before that was considered.
Way outside, but yup, definitely agree compared to V 1 and V 2 attacks, as materially devastating as they were. Again, however, the question was not whether or not London could sustain the attacks, but whether or not the Germans could, with everything going on in the Reich at the time.
I have read that all the V1 and V2 weapons sent to London were targeted on Tower Bridge, what would Adolf had done if Tower Bridge surrendered, because no one else would have, it was pure folly. The USA didnt take their lead from London and the Canadians and British forces wouldnt have laid down their arms because of some bombs landing in London, it was just as much of a desperate fantasy as the Kamikaze attacks.
The V 1's guidance system was very primitive and relied on the basic distance, speed, time equation and being pointed in the general direction of London, before the fuel lines were cut and the deflectors jammed in the downward position and the thing commenced its dive. The wee spinny thing on the front was a simple counter, there was nothing sophisticated about it at all. They might have said they were aiming for London, but they ended up flying all over the place.
The V 2 was more sophisticated, but the theory was the same, with distance, speed, time to the target from the launch point, which was carefully calculated, and calculations of engine shut-off and thrust vane guidance being done by an onboard analog computer, with radio signals switching stuff off after prescribed times. The fins were numbered on the V 2s and this was to aid in aiming the thing in horizontal distance - the Fin I was pointed to the target on launch.
Neither were anywhere precise enough to actually succeed in hitting the tower with anything other than pure luck, but good on them for having goals...
Last edited:
SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
I agree with you. I wonder, though, just how close it might have come to a "winning strategy" of a negotiated peace. If you consider losing everything except the home islands a win. I don't remember what the losses to Kamikaze attacks were but it was quite substantial. Were alternatives to unconditional surrender being considered because of mounting casualties? I don't know and I'm not interested in some YouTube conspiracy theory. Just a thought.
Again, not a winning strategy.
Yup, apparently so. This from wiki is actually quite detailed and mentiones the attempted overthrow of the emperor prior to Japan's surrender:
In early 1945, in the wake of the losses in the Battle of Leyte, Emperor Hirohito began a series of individual meetings with senior government officials to consider the progress of the war. All but ex-Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe advised continuing the war. Konoe feared a communist revolution even more than defeat in war and urged a negotiated surrender. In February 1945, during the first private audience with the Emperor he had been allowed in three years,[41] Konoe advised Hirohito to begin negotiations to end the war. According to Grand Chamberlain Hisanori Fujita, the Emperor, still looking for a tennozan (a great victory) in order to provide a stronger bargaining position, firmly rejected Konoe's recommendation.[42]
With each passing week victory became less likely. In April, the Soviet Union issued notice that it would not renew its neutrality agreement. Japan's ally Germany surrendered in early May 1945. In June, the cabinet reassessed the war strategy, only to decide more firmly than ever on a fight to the last man. This strategy was officially affirmed at a brief Imperial Council meeting, at which, as was normal, the Emperor did not speak.
The following day, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Kōichi Kido prepared a draft document which summarized the hopeless military situation and proposed a negotiated settlement. Extremists in Japan were also calling for a death-before-dishonor mass suicide, modeled on the "47 Ronin" incident. By mid-June 1945, the cabinet had agreed to approach the Soviet Union to act as a mediator for a negotiated surrender but not before Japan's bargaining position had been improved by repulse of the anticipated Allied invasion of mainland Japan.
On 22 June, the Emperor met with his ministers saying, "I desire that concrete plans to end the war, unhampered by existing policy, be speedily studied and that efforts be made to implement them." The attempt to negotiate a peace via the Soviet Union came to nothing. There was always the threat that extremists would carry out a coup or foment other violence. On 26 July 1945, the Allies issued the Potsdam Declaration demanding unconditional surrender. The Japanese government council, the Big Six, considered that option and recommended to the Emperor that it be accepted only if one to four conditions were agreed upon, including a guarantee of the Emperor's continued position in Japanese society. The Emperor decided not to surrender.
That changed after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the Soviet declaration of war. On 9 August, Emperor Hirohito told Kōichi Kido: "The Soviet Union has declared war and today began hostilities against us."[43] On 10 August, the cabinet drafted an "Imperial Rescript ending the War" following the Emperor's indications that the declaration did not compromise any demand which prejudiced his prerogatives as a sovereign ruler.
On 12 August 1945, the Emperor informed the imperial family of his decision to surrender. One of his uncles, Prince Yasuhiko Asaka, asked whether the war would be continued if the kokutai (national polity) could not be preserved. The Emperor simply replied "Of course."[44] On 14 August the Suzuki government notified the Allies that it had accepted the Potsdam Declaration.
On 15 August, a recording of the Emperor's surrender speech ("Gyokuon-hōsō", literally "Jewel Voice Broadcast") was broadcast over the radio (the first time the Emperor was heard on the radio by the Japanese people) announcing Japan's acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration. During the historic broadcast the Emperor stated: "Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is, indeed, incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives. Should we continue to fight, not only would it result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization." The speech also noted that "the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan's advantage" and ordered the Japanese to "endure the unendurable." The speech, using formal, archaic Japanese, was not readily understood by many commoners. According to historian Richard Storry in A History of Modern Japan, the Emperor typically used "a form of language familiar only to the well-educated" and to the more traditional samurai families.[45]
A faction of the army opposed to the surrender attempted a coup d'état on the evening of 14 August, prior to the broadcast. They seized the Imperial Palace (the Kyūjō incident), but the physical recording of the emperor's speech was hidden and preserved overnight. The coup was crushed by the next morning, and the speech was broadcast.
From here: Hirohito - Wikipedia
SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
That was a great post. I thoroughly enjoyed reading it! I was actually aware of the machinations at the Imperial Court. I was wondering if any Allied leaders were thinking, after the mounting horrific losses to the Special Attack forces, "Aw screw it."
Dunno, but after the brutality of the war in the field, it's not likely. Maybe someone somewhere other than on the receiving end of it.
As I understand it the defence of Okinawa and Kamikaze attacks incurring massive losses were part of a strategy to bring about a negotiated settlement as opposed to unconditional surrender, obviously Hiroshima and Nagasaki changed things.
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
It was also the ferocity of the battles of Iwo Jima and Okinawa that led Allied leaders to the conclusion that the invasion of the home islands would be the mother of all battles, which in turn led to the decision to use Atom Bombs.
So the Emperor's insistence on creating a strong bargaining position backfired on an epic level.
So the Emperor's insistence on creating a strong bargaining position backfired on an epic level.
The Basket
Senior Master Sergeant
- 3,712
- Jun 27, 2007
The Japanese were talking to the Soviets before about a conditional end of the war. Not surrender.
Japan would keep the Emperor and Korea and Manchukuo and the Americans were like no.
We are blockading you and turning your cities into ash. Your bargaining posture is highly dubious.
Olympic would have happened in November so the main focus in August was the new Soviet intervention.
The Soviet invasion put paid to Korea and Manchukuo.
In my view, the atomic bomb was done to end the war quickly, give Japan an out and to stop Soviet expansion into Japan itself.
The American plan in China, however turned out to be a total fiasco and Americans biggest failure in WW2.
Japan would keep the Emperor and Korea and Manchukuo and the Americans were like no.
We are blockading you and turning your cities into ash. Your bargaining posture is highly dubious.
Olympic would have happened in November so the main focus in August was the new Soviet intervention.
The Soviet invasion put paid to Korea and Manchukuo.
In my view, the atomic bomb was done to end the war quickly, give Japan an out and to stop Soviet expansion into Japan itself.
The American plan in China, however turned out to be a total fiasco and Americans biggest failure in WW2.
The Basket
Senior Master Sergeant
- 3,712
- Jun 27, 2007
Whether Kamikaze was a winning strategy or not, it was achieving military aims.
America had no wish to invade the home islands. The only card Japan could play was mass suicide and play it, it did.
Kamikaze didn't work against the Soviets however.
Mass casualties was an American thing. Stalin was not bothered about such..
America had no wish to invade the home islands. The only card Japan could play was mass suicide and play it, it did.
Kamikaze didn't work against the Soviets however.
Mass casualties was an American thing. Stalin was not bothered about such..
The Basket
Senior Master Sergeant
- 3,712
- Jun 27, 2007
I have found no details that the Americans did promise the Emperor could continue as ruler.
Japan did unconditionally surrender.
The emperor was kept in place by MacArthur to keep Japan sweet.
Which is actually a case of realpolitik over reality.
But it worked.
Japan did unconditionally surrender.
The emperor was kept in place by MacArthur to keep Japan sweet.
Which is actually a case of realpolitik over reality.
But it worked.
Which earned him a lot of flak on the home front.
The Basket
Senior Master Sergeant
- 3,712
- Jun 27, 2007
Hmmm. Controversial.
Should the Emperor be convicted of war crime?
I would say the Soviets were a big shadow in 1945 and the Emperor hid in the shadow. There was fear the Soviets may ask for Japanese territory or that Japan may turn red.
So should the Emperor have been convicted of war crimes? Yesssssno.
If you ask the average American; "Absolutely! The firing squad for him!"
Old Asia hands like MacArthur, with a little more understanding of the realities of Japanese and other Eastern cultures, realized that the Emperor was essentially a cloistered figurehead, revered by all but not an active participant in everyday politics. His function was to approve or not approve the policy proposals put forth by the power structure and based on the briefings he was given, which were almost never complete and unbiased. Hirohito's initiative in seeking peace toward the end of the war was unprecedented in the modern imperial age, and unsettling to the traditionalists who surrounded him.
MacArthur was well aware that a peaceful occupation of Japan would be impossible if the Emperor was treated like a common war criminal.
