What if the U.S. and the USAAF had paid attention?

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There was somewhat more private speculation going on in the 1930s.
Aviation was the leading technology, at least in the public eye. Money could be raised and prototypes built much easier than post war. The Planes were simpler

Also a number of planes were derivatives. Seversky designed one plane (somewhat joking) see. Seversky Aircraft

and then kept modifying it.

Curtiss may well have lost money on the CW-21 but it was an attempt to make money on previous work. The CW 19

Some of those prototypes were speculative.

To be fair the USAAC was not interested in a single engine interceptor aircraft at that time.
The USAAC was very interested in single engine "interceptors", however they had to meet USAAC requirements/needs.
Aircraft in the 1930s were like cell phones today. A few years can make a huge difference. Put that together with congress not willing to spend money and the USAAC had to be very careful what they spent money on. Interest did not always turn into hard orders.
The Original Hawk 75 airframe went through at least 4 engine types in it's life. two 14 cylinder radials, one 9 cylinder radial and an Allison V-12 (original Hawk 75 was also the XP-37)
The YP-36s used a 5th engine.

From Joe Baughers website.
" With the R-1830 engine, the Y1P-36 did so well that it won a 1937 Army competition, and on July 7, 1937, the Army ordered 210 P-36As, the largest single US military aircraft order since the First World War. Curtiss's private venture had finally paid off."
It took over two years to get that order. And 4 different engines tried in the airframe that gained about 50% in power from the first engine.
However note that the USAAC would put out a requirement and ask companies to "bid".
Company showing up with design in hand and telling the USAAC that their requirement and tactical thinking were out of date and design X would solve problems they didn't know they had might not go very well.
 
You ask a simple answer to address a complex political and industrial environment. Strictly speaking the US was shocked when WWII began - and nearly 100% universally determined to not get involved again. Nearly 100% of the total US Industrial capacity was devoted to commercial markets. Army hated Navy, Air Force was struggling for free rein from Army HQ and fighting USN that did not want Air Force programs competing with Naval Air for very scarce dollars.

Congress was sufficiently concerned that purse strings were loosened to provide for the 'common defense'. Airpower (combined strategic bombing and attack aircraft for battlefield control) was in infancy and struggling for clarity of mission - and most importantly, clarity of Priorities for the scarce $$. Pursuit aviation was stuck in terms of Interceptor for National defense but the AAC Materiel Command did not have great processes to envision the technologies necessary to fight any war the US might be committed to. General Hap Arnold was the Chief Technology Officer and a pretty good one in retrospect.

From AAC-MC proposals were solicited, sparse funding supplied for response, but the manufacturers were on the hook to build the prototype. The competition was separated along 'view of competency' by AAC-MC leadership. For example in 1939 Curtiss, Grumman and Seversky/Republic were viewed as 'go to' with Lockheed emerging based on YP-38. NAA was viewed as competent for Trainers and Light/Medium bombardment - but kept from competing in Pursuit contracts.

When Britain and France came to US in summer 1939 to solicit arms, what US had was 'potential' in the form of A-20, B-17B/C, Curtiss XP-40, Seversky P-35 and P-43, Bell XP-39B, Brewster XF2A, Grumman XF4F. The B-25 was about to win its competition, and XB-24 was nearing completion.

Zero were combat ready to RAF standards, most were in early development stage and built primarily by hand - Not one could be considered as ready for mass production, nor were any deemed 'nearly ready' with respect to the size and tooling and supply chain/logistics of their plants. Actually NAA probably was closest due to relationship with General Motors and existing contracts for Harvard and BC-1.

So, what magic can you imagine to put a superior fighter to A6M in the airspace over Pearl Harbor, in a span of 15 months - other than the P-38E which deployed in squadron strength only a month before? The P-40C and F4F were 'competitive' with superior tactics - but not equal.

Final note - The AAC-MC started to wake up as the war in Europe and Asia and then Russia in June 1941. They started issuing contracts before full flight testing. B-25 and XP-47B were examples but look to how long before the P-47C was deployed and near combat capable - December 1942
 
My curiosity gets the better of me oh wise one. In your learned opinion, what were the odds of P-38's showing up for the scrap at Midway in June '42? My slim grasp of reality says probably not going to happen but without some magic wand waving or pixie dust, was it possible?

Thanks.
 
Joe - even the F-117 had some 'encouragement', probably from black funding dollars to pursue a proposal from Skunk Works to adopt the obscure Soviet paper on signal damping to an airframe. Note: I am not sure.
 
I'm thinkin' Zero Probability based on Lockdown of Hawaiian islands and and defense tasking- and many P-38E were being converted to F-4 in December to February timeframe. The P-38E was also installing the ferry tank/bomb pylons as kits. It was 'possible', just not probable.
 
Joe - even the F-117 had some 'encouragement', probably from black funding dollars to pursue a proposal from Skunk Works to adopt the obscure Soviet paper on signal damping to an airframe. Note: I am not sure.
Probably more than some. What I think is likely is that Lockheed did some IR&D (which is largely company funded but interesting enough so the government chucks a few pennies at it), then it got funded when the government determined it was militarily useful enough to cough up the funding.
 
To be fair the USAAC was not interested in a single engine interceptor aircraft at that time.
I sense that you don't grasp the mindset of AAC/AAF in the late 1930s. First, save the B-17 there was no high speed/high altitude bomber that approached YB-17 performance. In 1937-1938 there were zero Pursuit fighters truly capable of effective interception. The stipulation by AAC-MC that single stage supercharged engines could be mated with turbos to provide the high altitude interception capability for the inevitable catch up - but Pursuit aviation was focused on parallel development of offshore Pursuit designs. The XP-40 and XP-39 w/o turbo were deemed high performance and with respect to top speed were competitive with Spitfire I and Hurricane and Bf 109C/D - and actually with A6M. With peak performance FTH, the single stage/single seed Allison V-1710 was just fine vs He 111 and Do 17 in the Curtiss M75/P-40 and Bell P-39B.

Recall that the XP-39 WAS a single Interceptor prototype. It was just a lousy product.

As to devoting a team of Preliminary Design engineers and precious working capital of Douglas, Grumman, NAA to build a better mousetrap? You have to sense a Market for your investment. Allison could have devoted the thought leaders to push 2S/2S supercharger engine but its parent GM didn't see the AAC desiring that solution to replace coupled turbos. And they were correct.

The AAC kept pushing twin engine Pursuit/escort platforms because they didn't see the 2S/2S engine practicality and knew T/E was required to carry enough fuel to escort to targets 300-400 miles from base, much less to combat radius of B-17.
 
The BT- 8 morfed into the AT-12 of which some were bought and Curtiss-Wright, St. Louis, sold the SNC-1 to the Navy developed from the CW-21, -23 series.
 
Joe - even the F-117 had some 'encouragement', probably from black funding dollars to pursue a proposal from Skunk Works to adopt the obscure Soviet paper on signal damping to an airframe. Note: I am not sure.
I think there was a solicitation put out to several manufacturers (IIRC) and Lockheed wasn't initially invited to the party. Through some contacts and persistence, folks at the Skunk Works was able to convince some DARPA folks a demonstrator model can be built to show the feasibility of Stealth Technology. They gave a nod (without a committed solicitation) and "Have Blue" was born. I think this is mentioned in Ben Rich's book.
 
Human nature.

Dehumanizing a class, race or nation gives a sense of superiority.

That tactic is about as old as the Human race itself.

Has anyone learned from the countless lessons over the eons?

No. No, they have not...
I don't remember exactly, it may have been Jean-Jacques Bullard, but an African American took part in the Spanish Civil War as a fighter pilot for the Republicans (the anti fascists side) and returned to America and tried to warn the War Dept. about how advanced German aviation was. He was ignored most likely because of the color of his skin. Getting on my anthropologist soap box, look at a human skeleton and tell me what race it is. Racism is a combination of cancer and type II diabetes rolled into one and it is slowly killing us.
 
Jean-Jacques Bullard flew in WW1 and as far as I know did not participate in the Spanish Civil War but was very active in WW2
 
????

Hap Arnold was VERY aware of Spanish Civil War developments, particularly the demonstrated vulnerability of daylight bombers to Pursuit aircraft. Enough so that he overturned the Emmons Board priorities which placed development of Pursuit aircraft with 1500 mi range from 4th to 1st. He was already developing a sense of foreboding that the 'Bomber (B-17 and B-24) May Not Always Get Through'.

As to being his warnings rejected because of the color of his skin, he was in fine company with Claire Chennault - which if memory serves, was Not African American.
 
Other fliers who flew on the Republican side were shunned in the US because of politics, i.e the Republican side enlisted the aid of Communist Russia.
 
Misremembered 'cause I am old. It was Frank Tinker, thanks for the reminder, and I guess it did not come across but you'd think any amount of information from someone who was there would be useful.
 

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