What if the U.S. and the USAAF had paid attention?

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I suspect that racial prejudice and the mythology of oriental technical ineptitude was so pervasive in the ranks that any attempt from "top down" to encourage serious consideration of "Buck Rogers stuff" from a known insubordinate maverick would have a tough time trickling down. "What can the General be thinking of?? Brainwashed, maybe? We know anything that hot from the Japs 'sgotta be BS!!"

I think you're right.

I read an editorial in a vintage U.S. aviation magazine published in Autumn of 1941 (Flight? Aviation Week?) where the writer sneered at Japanese aircraft manufacturing capabilities and the quality of the planes and pilots. Four years later, the same magazine - to their credit - published an editorial where they admitted that they were wrong and that the Japanese actually fielded some pretty good airplanes and pilots. Pity that I can't find them on the web.

Practically, even if the U.S. high command had perfect knowledge of Japanese aircraft performance in 1941, I'm not sure that there would have been much they could have done about it. "The IJN pilots are really good - mostly battle-hardened with hundreds to thousands of hours of combat flight time. They've got an insanely maneuverable fighter with remarkably long range, but it's fragile as hell and its control surfaces stiffen up at high speeds. Keep your speed up, don't try to turn fight it, fight as a team, and aim for the pilot and the fuel tanks. You guys will have to figure out tactics to beat it."

At best, U.S. doctrine in the Pacific would have changed so that fewer U.S. aircraft got destroyed on the ground and U.S. pilots learned the lessons that the Flying Tigers did 6-12 months earlier than they did historically. Japanese air losses would have been much heavier during and after Pearl Harbor and the invasion of the Philippines, but given relative force levels and available equipment, the Allies would have still been beaten soundly. Even so, higher levels of pilot and aircraft losses during the first 6 months of the Pacific war might have had an overall weakening effect on IJN operations, possibly making them more cautious in the use of their carriers and quicker to consider armoring their aircraft.
 
I read somewhere that at some point after Midway (I don't know if it was a week, month, 6 months, a year or what) but at some point after Midway a group of P40's made the flight from the Hawaiian islands to Midway with I think a B17 acting as navigator. But I don't know where I read that or what model P40 it was.
Would have to been a P-40E or later from early '41 onward, the P-40C was not plumbed for drop-tanks.
 
Tomahawk IIB (P-40C), Kiwi restored. I do not know if this is any kind of evidence that the P-40C was fitted with DT in WWII, but the website says the P-40C was fitted, as well as the Tomahawk IIB. For what it is worth Wiki also says that the P-40C model was the first equipped with a DT.
P-40C Tomahawk IIB Kiwi restored.jpg
 
Tomahawk IIB (P-40C), Kiwi restored. I do not know if this is any kind of evidence that the P-40C was fitted with DT in WWII, but the website says the P-40C was fitted, as well as the Tomahawk IIB. For what it is worth Wiki also says that the P-40C model was the first equipped with a DT.
View attachment 630642
Oops, you're right!
Been a long day - I had meant P-40B was not plumbed, the P-40C was equipped for 52 gallon drop-tank, but the P-40E was the one first capable of long distances.
 
From the aircraft specs the A6M had a radial engine with a two speed supercharger that allowed it to operate well in both the low and mid-range altitudes, say from sea level up to a little over 20,000 feet. From what I've been able to gather, none of the then current (pre Dec. 7th) U.S. fighters had two speed superchargers; they had either single speed or no supercharger. Apparently the only engine in the U.S. inventory having a Two Speed supercharger at that time was the Curtiss Wright R-2600 radial. Around Nov. 1938 the Curtiss engineers played around with trying to fit that engine into a P-36/P-40 airframe which I think was a bad idea. They should have designed a new plane around that powerplant in order to get something decent. Again it's the factors of time and the abilities of the design department that weighed heavily against having something that could match or exceed the A6M in altitude and speed performance within reasonable time.
 
The A6M2 used a single speed supercharger. The A6M3 and later got the 2 speed.
The Wright R-1820 came in two speed supercharger versions. But the US was not using it as a fighter engine at the time. US practice was to use a low gear on the two speed engines to improve take off power.
 
From what I've been able to gather, none of the then current (pre Dec. 7th) U.S. fighters had two speed superchargers; they had either single speed or no supercharger.
Huh? No supercharger? What 1941 US fighter engine had no supercharger? I thought they were pretty much universal in tactical aircraft by then. Even the 220 HP Continental radials we took apart and put together in mech school had a blower built into the nose case. Those were Stearman PT17 engines modified to drive tanks, then sold surplus and modified back again for aircraft use.
 
From the aircraft specs the A6M had a radial engine with a two speed supercharger that allowed it to operate well in both the low and mid-range altitudes, say from sea level up to a little over 20,000 feet. From what I've been able to gather, none of the then current (pre Dec. 7th) U.S. fighters had two speed superchargers; they had either single speed or no supercharger. Apparently the only engine in the U.S. inventory having a Two Speed supercharger at that time was the Curtiss Wright R-2600 radial. Around Nov. 1938 the Curtiss engineers played around with trying to fit that engine into a P-36/P-40 airframe which I think was a bad idea. They should have designed a new plane around that powerplant in order to get something decent. Again it's the factors of time and the abilities of the design department that weighed heavily against having something that could match or exceed the A6M in altitude and speed performance within reasonable time.
All operational US fighters had at least single speed/single stage superchargers - explicitly including radial and inline engines.
 
Huh? No supercharger? What 1941 US fighter engine had no supercharger? I thought they were pretty much universal in tactical aircraft by then. Even the 220 HP Continental radials we took apart and put together in mech school had a blower built into the nose case. Those were Stearman PT17 engines modified to drive tanks, then sold surplus and modified back again for aircraft use.
I wasn't sure if the P-26 had a supercharger or not during that time period.
 
The A6M2 used a single speed supercharger. The A6M3 and later got the 2 speed.
The Wright R-1820 came in two speed supercharger versions. But the US was not using it as a fighter engine at the time. US practice was to use a low gear on the two speed engines to improve take off power.
Wiki is listing the A6M2 Type 0 Model 21 with the Nakajima NK1C Sakae 12 engine as having a two speed supercharger. Apparently they're wrong again.
Actually I'm trying to say that the CW R-2600 at that time had the potential to be used in a fighter that could have been a more effective stop gap for the U.S. until the newer planes could come online.
 
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The 10th NA-73 was delivered in December 1941 and the first combat sortie (flight level) was April/May 1942. AAF could have taken over te contract but never in time to a) allocate for training of pilots and maintainers in Training Command, b.) Create first squadrons designated for combat in Mustang I, c.) convert all British GFE to US (radios, etc), and d.) Deploy a squadron to Midway before the Brits had their first squadron operational in June 1942. The AAF would also have to completely bypass Eglin Operational Suitability Testing. The first A-36 flew in Oct/Nov 1942 and the first P-51A in Feb 1943 and first P-51B-1 flew in early May 1943. The NAA (and P-51B/C) were not given High Priority for tooling, material, Packard engines until June 1943.
All true ( I did read the book after all ) I was just using pinsog's premise of the utopian scenario where the AAF, after seeing NA-73X goes "Hot Damn" we gotta' have this baby NOW!!! And then moves Heaven and Earth to get it deployed ASAP.

Do I think there was a snowballs chance of that happening? Nein... Nyet... Nada.
 
Wiki is listing the A6M2 Type 0 Model 21 with the Nakajima NK1C Sakae 12 engine as having a two speed supercharger. Apparently they're wrong again.
Actually I'm trying to say that the CW R-2600 at that time had the potential to be used in a fighter that could have been a more effective stop gap for the U.S. until the newer planes could come online.
The problem with a "stop-gap" mod. is that by the time the engine has been upgraded (and the airframe, fairing, Cog proofing, adequate prop applied, etc.), time has passed and other types in the works are in production/distribution.

Changing powerplants in a fighter isn't as easy as swapping out a 250 L-6 for a 327 V-8 in your '68 Chevelle.
 
The problem with a "stop-gap" mod. is that by the time the engine has been upgraded (and the airframe, fairing, Cog proofing, adequate prop applied, etc.), time has passed and other types in the works are in production/distribution.

Changing powerplants in a fighter isn't as easy as swapping out a 250 L-6 for a 327 V-8 in your '68 Chevelle.
Funny you should mention that... my first car was a '69 Chevelle with the 250 six in it. We did a slightly harder swap out, a 250 six for a 454 V8. Yeah, in retrospect might not have been the brightest move because then we had to dick with the suspension and differential etc. not to mention the attention from Johnny Law.
 
The problem with a "stop-gap" mod. is that by the time the engine has been upgraded (and the airframe, fairing, Cog proofing, adequate prop applied, etc.), time has passed and other types in the works are in production/distribution.

Changing powerplants in a fighter isn't as easy as swapping out a 250 L-6 for a 327 V-8 in your '68 Chevelle.
I think the problem of 'What If' is that to answer 'Yes it could have been done', would require not only the realization by the U.S. military of the need for a seriously improved aircraft, but also a competent aircraft manufacturer in a position to fill that need along with a first class aircraft design team.
 
Well, before the U.S. entered the war, it had first class aircraft that met it's needs (F2A not included - that was just poor judgement).
The Hurricane, Bf109 and P-36 were all developed at the same time and all three at that time were top of their class.

The P-36 fell behind because the U.S. was not testing it's aircraft in a civil war or in a shooting war directly after.
The P-36's progeny, the P-40 was a solid, robust aircraft that ultimately served on every single theater of the war.
Curtiss was a competent aircraft manufacturer but infatuated with upgrading the P-36 into a myriad of upgrades when they should have whipped out a clean sheet of paper and designed something new, even while the P-40 was in production.
North American did that for the British instead of making contract P-40s and look what they came up with.

But here's the problem:
The U.S. was not on a war-time footing, so there was no way the military could convince Congress to loosen the purse strings for accelerated development.
Congress is notorious for closing the barn door after the horse got out...in other words, money would be forthcoming only after the bullets start flying.
 
Curtiss was a competent aircraft manufacturer but infatuated with upgrading the P-36 into a myriad of upgrades when they should have whipped out a clean sheet of paper and designed something new, even while the P-40 was in production.
North American did that for the British instead of making contract P-40s and look what they came up with.
I don't think so. By this time it looks to me like Curtiss's corporate culture was too much "inside the box", maybe having spent too long at the top of the market.
A scrappy, growing young outfit like NAA with a confident, talented core group and not much traditional company mythology to live up to, was far better suited to tackling the innovative and technological risks of conceiving and developing something like the P51.

The U.S. was not on a war-time footing, so there was no way the military could convince Congress to loosen the purse strings for accelerated development.
Congress is notorious for closing the barn door after the horse got out...in other words, money would be forthcoming only after the bullets start flying.
In keeping with American thinking and tradition of "the citizen soldier" going back to the 1600s: minimal peacetime military, with mobilization only when necessary. A long and proud tradition, perhaps a little too dear to our hearts.
OTOH, Middle America wasn't feeling threatened, and was still feeling the depression, so why open the tap? I read history and I know that here in rock-ribbed Republican Vermont, where depression was a permanent fixture (little noticeable difference between the roaring twenties and the depressed thirties and the wartime forties), FDR was known to be a scandalous communist and a warmonger out to destroy America as we knew it. We knew that the "recovery" (such as it was) was happening in spite of FDR, not because of anything he did.
 
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Well, before the U.S. entered the war, it had first class aircraft that met it's needs (F2A not included - that was just poor judgement).
The Hurricane, Bf109 and P-36 were all developed at the same time and all three at that time were top of their class.

The P-36 fell behind because the U.S. was not testing it's aircraft in a civil war or in a shooting war directly after.
The P-36's progeny, the P-40 was a solid, robust aircraft that ultimately served on every single theater of the war.
Curtiss was a competent aircraft manufacturer but infatuated with upgrading the P-36 into a myriad of upgrades when they should have whipped out a clean sheet of paper and designed something new, even while the P-40 was in production.
North American did that for the British instead of making contract P-40s and look what they came up with.

But here's the problem:
The U.S. was not on a war-time footing, so there was no way the military could convince Congress to loosen the purse strings for accelerated development.
Congress is notorious for closing the barn door after the horse got out...in other words, money would be forthcoming only after the bullets start flying.
When I mentioned not having monies in the period we're talking about a number of others proceeded to tell me that with war on the horizon congress had already loosened the purse strings. Of course after Dec. 7th, the sky was no longer the limit when it came to available monies but a number of others here have said that plenty was already available before the attack. So which was it?
At least in my view a competent manufacturer would not be enamored of a single successful product to the point of doing nothing but variations on a theme. A forward thinking company would have a minimum of one new design on the boards and ideally would be looking at two or three possibilities of new designs and exploring how they might be achieved. The worst thing a aircraft company can do is to sit on it's laurels.
 

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