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The term "too late" is more of a timing reference in relation to their completion and acceptance into service during the span of the war. Some of the U.S. types I mentioned actually had a relatively short gestation period with the exception of the F8F, which was conceived in 1942.Valid point GrauGeist but the term too late only applies if the war ends when it actually did. When for example the P 51H was first proposed what was the expected end of the war in the worst case scenario.
The term "too late" is more of a timing reference in relation to their completion and acceptance into service during the span of the war. Some of the U.S. types I mentioned actually had a relatively short gestation period with the exception of the F8F, which was conceived in 1942.
Another example of a late-comer to the war would be the B-36, which has it's roots in 1941 and then after a delay, began development in earnest in 1943. Had the timeline of the war extended past it's historical period (let's say that the atom bombs weren't used and the Pacific war continued conventionally), then we most likely would have seen several types, including the B-36 enter into the conflict. However, with the deteriorating situation in Japan (and German, for that matter) in the later years, how much longer would they (Axis) be able to produce and field their newer types?
The planes need pilots and fuel.
If you read personal accounts by Galland and other 262 pilots in the final months of the war, you'll see that they had a reasonable amount of jets in forward areas, but no fuel to mount any sizable offensive, let alone put up any form of solid resistance. It simply wasn't there.That depends on their strategic situations. If Germany (and Japan) are desperately holding on for an extra few months (for example, due to a much less disastrous Bagration), you may see the Horten 229 V3, Me P.1101, and Ta 183 prototypes all fly, and maybe the HeS 011 of you're lucky. Now give the Axis (namely Germany) some strategical breathing room after say a victory in the east for example, and things would be very interesting indeed, or Göring and the RLM will managed to screw it all up
If you read personal accounts by Galland and other 262 pilots in the final months of the war, you'll see that they had a reasonable amount of jets in forward areas, but no fuel to mount any sizable offensive, let alone put up any form of solid resistance. It simply wasn't there.
In late April, unless you were in a Me262, Ar234 or an He162, your life expectancy was almost nil and even then, you had a 50/50 chance of being nailed on take-off/landing.
If the war lasted another 6 months, what little bit of Germany that remained would be ashes. There was simply nothing left the Germans could do to stop the thousands of Allied fighters and bombers that roamed freely across the countryside. The Ho.IX, the P.1101 and the Ta187 were amazing steps in Germany's aircraft design and *if* they had been built and fielded even two years earlier, they would have certainly changed the airwar game to a degree...but they would have simply put off the inevitable.
Germany simply could not match the manufacturing power of the United States and they simply had no sizable army left on the ground to stop the Red Army in the east and the growing Allied army in the west.
By May of 1945, Germany was out of fuel, rubber and sources of raw materials needed for manufacturing munitions, aircraft and armored vericles. They had no more food. They were conscripting children and senior citizens to fill the ranks of their army.
They were done.
The N1K was never a carrier capable fighter, so either that would need to be added to the requirement, or an additional aircraft would need to be developed. (and either way an earlier engine would need to be used initially, namely the Kasei -as the N1K already used in floatplane form)The navy could cansel the J2M, considering that it was build in few numbers and encountered many troubles. But the IJN couldn't even know that the N1K1-J would emerge as a decent alternative. It's perfect hindsight, but Kawanishi obviously had the ability and design capacity to design an outstanding fighter. By canselling the N1K1 they could consentrate on a land fighter, redesigns as moving the wing to the bottom of the fuselage wouldn't be nessessary.
Indeed, developing native engines would be much more effective in that context, but prior to the Homare becoming available, the 14 cylinder Kasei would be the best high-powered engine to consider.The BMW 802 was a very impressive engine with numerous advanced features such as two stage supercharging with an intercooler and, according to the BMW site, the first use of variable valve timing. However, the design was only started after the 801 entered production, so it was not likely to be ready for operational use from 1/1/1944. At least the fuel injectors for BMW engines were not made by Bosch, so there is some chance that anyone taking a licence to produce a BMW engine would not be sabotaged as Japan was over the DB 601.
The A5M doesn't seem like it has an obvious alternative for the time, but the A6M itself might have avoided some of its failings had the Japanese begun applying armor and self-sealing fuel systems around the same time the Americans did (based on reports returning from combat over Europe).Nobody seems to have suggested cancelling any Japanese aircraft but there does seem to be some slight scope for rationalizing their production priorities. Should they have produced the A5M and the Ki-27, the A6M and the Ki-43, the D3A and the Ki-51 or the J1N and Ki-45? OK, I know that the IJA and the IJN were not very good at cooperation. However, should the IJA have produced the Ki-43, Ki-44 and Ki-61? Could any of those have replaced the J2M? Should the IJN have produced the N1K or could the A6M2-N have sufficed if even that was necessary?
Other comments and suggestions?
The N1K was intended to be a land-based fighter for the IJN and by that point in the war, at least the IJN was being realistic, because their carrier force was nearly all submerged...The N1K was never a carrier capable fighter, so either that would need to be added to the requirement, or an additional aircraft would need to be developed. (and either way an earlier engine would need to be used initially, namely the Kasei -as the N1K already used in floatplane form)
The N1K was never a carrier capable fighter, so either that would need to be added to the requirement, or an additional aircraft would need to be developed. (and either way an earlier engine would need to be used initially, namely the Kasei -as the N1K already used in floatplane form)
Neither was the J2M I suggest canselling. And the engine was ready for the N1K1-J which was build in some numbers before the redesign into N1K2-J
That depends on their strategic situations. If Germany (and Japan) are desperately holding on for an extra few months (for example, due to a much less disastrous Bagration), you may see the Horten 229 V3, Me P.1101, and Ta 183 prototypes all fly, and maybe the HeS 011 of you're lucky. Now give the Axis (namely Germany) some strategical breathing room after say a victory in the east for example, and things would be very interesting indeed, or Göring and the RLM will managed to screw it all up
Indeed, developing native engines would be much more effective in that context, but prior to the Homare becoming available, the 14 cylinder Kasei would be the best high-powered engine to consider.
The A5M doesn't seem like it has an obvious alternative for the time, but the A6M itself might have avoided some of its failings had the Japanese begun applying armor and self-sealing fuel systems around the same time the Americans did (based on reports returning from combat over Europe).
Putting emphasis on a successor to the A6M using a more powerful engine (probably the Kasei) would also make sense.
The IJN on the other hand, missed an opportunity with the V-12 powered Ki-28 with its significant performance lead over the Ki 27 and further potential to develop Kawasaki's high speed, liquid cooled monoplane designs. Had that design been favored, perhaps Kawasaki would have continued or accelerated their inline engine development well before any potential DB-601 license. Copying or improving on the likes of the Hispano 12Y (like the Russians did) would make a good deal of sense, though so might developing a larger, heavier, large displacement design following their older BMW VI derived Ha-9. (similar to what Mikulin did in Russia, moving on with an engine of similar cylinder dimensions but using a cast block and eventually developing much more power -from the AM34 to AM35 to AM37 and AM38, etc)
Admittedly, a fighter of the Ki-28 or Ki-61's size would much better match a smaller, lighter V12 more akin to the Hispano 12Y. Plus, the 12Y had already been designed for a hub mounted cannon and did so with greater design flexibility than the German engines. (Possibly making the Army's Ho-3 20 mm cannon useful on single engine fighters before the Ho-5 even enters production, while also being very interesting for later 30 and 37 mm developments)
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One factory that built over 2600 didn't start delivering until May of 1943.
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The HeS 011 was probably a dead end (it might have worked, but not at the power/efficiency targeted and would be very costly/work intensive tomanufacture due to the precision machined mixed-flow compressor stage). The Jumo 004D and E (including afterburning variants) and BMW 003D (using reaction rather than impulse compressor blading) would be the more realistic engines approaching the 'class II' thrust range.That depends on their strategic situations. If Germany (and Japan) are desperately holding on for an extra few months (for example, due to a much less disastrous Bagration), you may see the Horten 229 V3, Me P.1101, and Ta 183 prototypes all fly, and maybe the HeS 011 of you're lucky.
The N1K was intended to be a land-based fighter for the IJN and by that point in the war, at least the IJN was being realistic, because their carrier force was nearly all submerged...
Neither was the J2M I suggest canselling. And the engine was ready for the N1K1-J which was build in some numbers before the redesign into N1K2-J
Abandoning the extension shaft arrangement and going for a more conventional short cowling (possibly still using a cooling fan or perhaps resorting to a cuffed propeller to help facilitate a tighter cowling and larger/streamlined spinner) should have saved a great deal of time and difficulty in production and service regardless of sticking with the interceptor requirement. (Curtis and Focke Wulf both attempted extension shaft and odd cooling arrangements for radial engines and abandoned those in favor of more conventional arrangements, with or without fans)In the context of that thinking, wrong and misplaced as it was, the J2M made perfect sense. It was everything the Zeke was not......powerful, well armed, protected, fast, big engine. That it suffered massive delays and technical glitches was not really the fault of the aircraft, more a function of Japanese over confidence as to their capabilities.
The Kinsei combined with structural reinforcement (including thicker skin) would be a significant adaptation. (along with armor and self-sealing tanks) You'd lose some range, of course, and CoG shift might be an issue, but it's not all that different an engine change than the F2A saw going from the F2A-1/B.239 to the F2A-2 or Buffalo Mk.I, or what the A6M already dealt with switching to the heavier Sakae models. (making engine and armor changes at the same time would also allow some degree of controlling CoG by using armor plate weight and location as ballast)The Japanese had a partial solution to the A6M problem staring them in the face. Stick the Kinsei engine in the Zero airframe in 1942. It had about 15-16% greater displacement ans should offer a similar or slightly less increase in power for only a slight increase in diameter and weight. It was done at the end of the war with the A6M8.
But would it be more troublesome than getting the licensed DB-601 into production? This could include avoiding the more extensive changes the Soviets made and remaining closer to the performance range the French managed with development of the 12Y (not 12Z) but possibly making further supercharger improvements or at least implementing 2-speed drive.The Japanese had enough trouble developing the engines they had without trying to fool around with total redesigns of antiques like the Ha-9. The Russians didn't just tweak the Hispano to get the M-105, it took them years and several intermediate steps (engine models) just to get to the 1100hp M-105P version, they also added almost 200lbs of "improvements". Having the Japanese devote 10s of thousands of man hours to developing these engines could only be a benefit to the Allies.
The Ha41 followed by Ha109 seems reasonable for an aircraft of that class, assuming they didn't go for the Jumo engines. (or in addition to those in either case -any 12Y derivatives would probably top out too low to work well on something of the Ki-61's size, but again better for something closer to the earlier Ki 28 )The Ki 61 was bigger, with huge internal fuel load (199 US gals), and, as war progressed, improving armament. The 'Ki 61 lite' should be interesting - swap the wing between historical Ki 44 and Ki 61? Or, install the Ha-109 on the Ki 61 to produce the 'Ki 100'
I think you've got Kasei and Kinsei switched there. (Kasei would be a slightly larger/more powerful engine than the Sakae, the Kasai is in another class entirely and more akin to the BMW 801 or R-2600)the Zero needs the Kasei dearly.
The Raiden with 'plain vanilla' Kinsei (= no ext. shaft) should also be KISS business. The wing is already tad bigger than of Fw 190.
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I think you've got Kasei and Kinsei switched there. (Kasei would be a slightly larger/more powerful engine than the Sakae, the Kasai is in another class entirely and more akin to the BMW 801 or R-2600)