Which aircraft would you cancel?

Glider said:

The list of Britsh aircraft that should have been cancelled is significant. Sterling, Botha, Albacore, Lerwick, Hampden, Lysander, Albemarle, Roc, Defiant, Bisley.

Click to expand...

List is a bit harsh. Stirling gets a bit of a bad rap for being the first 4 engine British bomber and the fact that both production lines were bombed just as production was starting delayed it's service debut by months. It should have gone into action 3-5 months before the Halifax, not one month before. After you have two factories tooled up and producing it gets a lot harder to cancel.

Botha should have been a no-brainer even on the drawing board.

Albacore gets a bit trickier. Canceled when and in favor of what? It should have been and was an improvement in many respects over the Swordfish, enclosed heated cockpit for one thing. It just wasn't enough of an improvement to compete with monoplanes. Taurus engine troubles were a bit hard to foresee. Waiting for the Barracuda might not have been a good option.

Lerwick was canceled fairly soon. Several other countries/companies totally screwed up flying boat bottoms and had to start form almost scratch on new fuselage/hull bottoms. Consolidated Coronado for one.

Original hull form and "single" rudder.

as modified.

Not sure what the problem with the Hampden was? But you weren't going to get much else for the investment. A four engine bomber using Pegasus engines is a non-starter.

Lysander should have been replaced by Austins in 1940. That was a real carry over from the 1930s requirements even if the airframe/wing had innovations.

Albemarle might have been better if introduced sooner but is also an example of conflicting requirement/s and too little design staff. It also ties into the last on the list.

The Bisley. Only real reason for building the Bisley was the failure of the air ministry and British air industry to come up with a NEW light/medium bomber using modern engines and concepts (see Albemarle) like a 3-5 seat medium bomber/attack plane using Hercules engines. They couldn't build Mosquitos fast enough to equip the numbers of needed squadrons and all to many squadrons had to fight using ole/obsolete aircraft.

Wholesale cancellations of air-frames and engines already in large scale production could mean the loss of hundreds of airframes or engines during the change over period.

Instead of going for Abacore, the torpedo bomber based on the Battle should be a safe bet? If succesful, further development avoids the Barracuda.
Swordfish with a more powerful version of the Pegasus might be a no-risk item, until new TB is available? Some Swordfishes have had the enclosed cockpit.
Hampden was surely no Wellington, but it was still an useful bomber IMO.

Shortround6 said:

Not sure what the problem with the Hampden was? But you weren't going to get much else for the investment. A four engine bomber using Pegasus engines is a non-starter.

Click to expand...

Could you please elaborate a bit on the bolded part?

The Bisley. Only real reason for building the Bisley was the failure of the air ministry and British air industry to come up with a NEW light/medium bomber using modern engines and concepts (see Albemarle) like a 3-5 seat medium bomber/attack plane using Hercules engines. They couldn't build Mosquitos fast enough to equip the numbers of needed squadrons and all to many squadrons had to fight using ole/obsolete aircraft.

Click to expand...

Wonder how good/bad would've been the Beaufighter with cannons deleted, with bomb bay instead?

tomo pauk said:

Could you please elaborate a bit on the bolded part?

Click to expand...

I think we have been over this before. You could build a 4 engine bomber using Pegasus engines but what would you have?
The Halifax MK I with Merlin X engines was certainly no ball of fire performance wise. With the Pegasus you have less power and more drag. 885hp at 15,500ft for a two speed supercharged engine using 87 octane vs 1010hp at 17,750ft. Cruise in one source is 640hp at 10,000ft for the Pegasus vs 865hp at 13,000ft for the Merlin X.
Trying to build an airframe that could be switched to Hercules engines (Or Merlin XX) at a later date is using the retrospectroscope a little too much. The airframe would be over weight for the Pegasus engines.
In order to work at all you would have to get around a good number of the mid to late 30s British requirements. Like the ground pressure limit requiring huge tires. Like the residual requirement for large bombers to be emergency troop transports. There was no reason at all for the Stirling fuselage to be 17ft longer than a Halifax fuselage except for internal volume that had little or nothing to do with the size of the bomb-bay.
Even with a small fuselage you might be able to better the Y1B-17 by a certain amount (first 13 planes without turbos and 930hp at take-off Cyclones) but they only carried five .30cal guns with 1000 rpg bomb load was good, 4000lbs for 2400 miles but waaay less than later 4 engine bombers. cruise of around 217mph at altitudes in the teens doesn't offer much safety either.

Wonder how good/bad would've been the Beaufighter with cannons deleted, with bomb bay instead?

Click to expand...

Not good.
A, without relocating the wing (up) there isn't enough room inside the fuselage for a decent bomb-bay.
B, even with a a decent bomb-bay the Beaufighter is still slower than an A-20.
C. While most A-20s didn't have very good defensive guns the Beaufighter either had none or one .303.
D. Beaufighter needs new nose or position for a bombardier.
E, Yanking the 20mm guns and ammo is only worth about 1300-1500lbs? A pretty light load for a plane with two Hercules engines.

Shortround6 said:

I think we have been over this before. You could build a 4 engine bomber using Pegasus engines but what would you have?
The Halifax MK I with Merlin X engines was certainly no ball of fire performance wise. With the Pegasus you have less power and more drag. 885hp at 15,500ft for a two speed supercharged engine using 87 octane vs 1010hp at 17,750ft. Cruise in one source is 640hp at 10,000ft for the Pegasus vs 865hp at 13,000ft for the Merlin X.
Trying to build an airframe that could be switched to Hercules engines (Or Merlin XX) at a later date is using the retrospectroscope a little too much. The airframe would be over weight for the Pegasus engines.
...
Even with a small fuselage you might be able to better the Y1B-17 by a certain amount (first 13 planes without turbos and 930hp at take-off Cyclones) but they only carried five .30cal guns with 1000 rpg bomb load was good, 4000lbs for 2400 miles but waaay less than later 4 engine bombers. cruise of around 217mph at altitudes in the teens doesn't offer much safety either.

Click to expand...

I hear what you say about how good/bad was the 1st Halifax.
However - the RAF did not have any bomber capable to lug those 4000 lbs over 2400 miles until 4-engined jobs came to service two years after ww2 started. Even the reasonably capable Wellington I was good just for 1000 lbs over 2500 miles - four times less than pre-series B-17s. The Wellington with Hercules engines - 1500 lbs over 2040 miles.
The Whitley with Merlins was carrying 4500 lbs over 1645 miles, or 3500 over 300 miles more, still falling after those B-17s. The Whitley with Tigers is worse.
Hampden - 2000 lbs over 1820 miles.
BTW, neither Hampden nor Blenheim complied much with pre-requisite to carry troops on board.
So if RAF can use the the bombers that can lug 1000-1500 lbs over 2500-2000 lbs, the bomber that doubles or quadruples the bomb load over distance would be welcomed. Not that it would be escaping from good fighters, but than neither of those mentioned can. The 4-engined plane will have far better engine-out capability than 2-engined. The next-gen 4-engined bomber can/will use Merlin/Hercules.

Not good.
A, without relocating the wing (up) there isn't enough room inside the fuselage for a decent bomb-bay.
B, even with a a decent bomb-bay the Beaufighter is still slower than an A-20.
C. While most A-20s didn't have very good defensive guns the Beaufighter either had none or one .303.
D. Beaufighter needs new nose or position for a bombardier.
E, Yanking the 20mm guns and ammo is only worth about 1300-1500lbs? A pretty light load for a plane with two Hercules engines.

Click to expand...

A - yep, maybe bulged one can help. Flush one could do maybe 4 x 500 ( vs. Blenheim/Bisley 2 x 500)?
B - yes
C - install two-gun turret, as the Blenheim/Bisley received?
D - yes
E - payload of mid-war Beaufighters was also one torpedo (2000+ lbs with shackles/racks) AND 682 imp gals (819 US gals) of fuel - more than the best A-20, so there is plenty of elbow room for payload. Late war Beaufighters carried another 130 imp gals of fuel, plus 2000 lbs worth of torpedo & it's shackles.

You have to put the design of all the bombers with which the RAF started the war into a historical perspective. All but one (the Blenheim being the exception) were designed at a time when operational requirements were drawn up with a view to a war with France. In the 1920s there were two classes of day bomber, high and medium performance. The Hawker Hart and its derivatives was the prime high performance bomber and equipped 25 squadrons at the end of 1936. Until the end of 1935 the sole representative of the medium performance bomber was a squadron of Sidestrands formed in 1929.
This is our woeful starting point!
New factors were introduced with Japanese aggression in the Far East and the 1935 Abyssinian crisis, primarily a ferry range sufficient to reinforce the Middle and Far East.
It was only the recognition of Germany as a potential enemy in the mid 1930s that led to demands for increased operational range, speed and armament.
The sort of bomber that the Air Ministry was looking to develop in October 1930 was a 'High Speed 1000lb Bomber....twin H or F engines, for home defence work. To carry twice bomb load of present types at great speed or defence.' This is along way from the Stirling.
To cut a long story short (Maund at the Air Ministry pointed out that using two engines to lift 1,000lbs of bombs was like equipping a Battle Cruiser with 4" guns as primary armament, others objected to the difficulties of shipping a twin engine type (to the Far East)) this was never built.
Fast forward to the 'Multi-Engined Day Bomber Operational Requirements' issued in July 1931 to see just how low the bar was set. Salient points are a range of 600 miles, a bomb load of 1lb per horse power and a top speed of 190 mph at 15,000ft. Nonetheless in September 1931 the AMSR advised that this requirement asked 'for rather more than we can expect to get'. It was not lost on the Air Staff that such a bomber would have the same performance as a fighter to Specification F.7/30 but with a range of 600 miles carrying 1,000lbs of bombs.
It was at this time that the size limitations which would effect much later bombers were introduced by Salmond who feared that if designers were given a free hand then 'these machines may become so large that we cannot get them into any of our sheds.' This was incorporated into B.9/32. A much more serious and invariably overlooked limitation on the specification arose from the Geneva Disarmament Conference and a proposal to limit the tare weight of bombers to three metric tonnes. The weight limit finally settled on for B.9/32 was 6,500 lbs.
Fast forward again to March 1934 and another requirement for a night bomber (to replace the Heyford) is under discussion. This bomber would have a range of 1,250 miles (a 500 mile radius of action suitable 'for a European war or a war in Afganistan'). The wing span limitation of 100' was included as, for the first time, was a troop carrying capacity. By July 1934 Specification B.3/34 called for a top speed of 225 mph and clarified the troop carrying ability. The aircraft should be designed ' to be entirely suitable for operation as a bomber and, in emergency, as a bomber transport.' The troop carrying role was very much secondary. We are now only five years from the outbreak of the war.
The B.3/34 specification evolved over the following months and years (given new numbers, simply Specification 1,2,3.) The 'Americanised Specification 3' evolved into B.1/35 in March 1935. Still a 'normal' load of 2,000lbs for 1,500 miles was required but for the first time internal stowage was a requirement for the maximum load of 4,000lb/900 miles.

It is impossible to divorce Air Ministry specifications from bombing policy.
The large jump occurred in specifications for bombers to attack Germany in 1936, three years before the war. The straight forward technical requirements to get the range and speed to attack targets in Germany, by day, inevitably led to much heavier bombers than had been required to bomb Paris. This fueled the discussions about new medium and heavy bombers in 1936, and the search for an 'ideal' or standard bomber in 1937 There was however no big bomber policy. Concerns about the size of a new heavy bomber, what would become the Short Stirling, were first voiced by the Operational Requirements Committee'. The Air Staff stated in reply that 'in drafting the requirements they had visualised using the medium bomber as the backbone of the Striking Force supplemented by a certain number of these heavy bombers.'
The normal bomb load of this generation of medium bombers was reduced below that of the bombers they would replace in the quest for speed. The 1938 Ideal Bomber Study demonstrated the major influence of speed on weight. High speed and powerful defensive armament were considered necessary to implement a bombing policy which had not changed since the 1920s.
The minutes of the 14th meeting of the Bombing Committee, held in April 1937 confirm this.
"The Chairman opened the meeting by saying that the subject of night bombing was now, for the first time, before this Committee.'
At this time plans to fit ventral turrets to Pegasus engined Wellingtons were advanced, allowing them a better chance to defend themselves in daylight. The idea was supported by the Operations Branch because
'The Pegasus Wellington must form a considerable proportion of our day bombing attack until the Merlin Wellington, Stirling, Halifax and Manchester come into service in quantity.'
The last three are of course bombers derived from the various 1936 specifications and were to be sent on daylight operations in the hope that the deficiencies of the earlier generation of bombers had been overcome. They had not, and these aircraft would instead form the mainstay of the RAF's night bombing offensive. It was Specification B.12/36 'Heavy Bomber' which produced the Stirling. Amazingly Short Bros. was not even on the list of companies originally asked to tender! Most of the tenders offered Kestrel or even Goshawk powered aircraft, only Supermarine and late comers Short Bros. planned to fit Merlin and Hercules engines.
The Halifax and Manchester/Lancaster both ultimately came as a result of P.13/36, a strange and convoluted specification with roots in a sort of multi role medium bomber, not a heavy bomber at all! From such inauspicious beginnings one of the best aircraft of the war came. The important point is that the specifications for these aircraft were not even issued until 1936.
Once again, hindsight is a wonderful thing
Cheers
Steve

Very Informative Steve!

Another problem was over optimistic claims for the performance of some of these designs. There was a trend in RAF bomber requirements for ever increasing speed (touched on above). It was seen as essential to limit exposure to fighter attack on daylight raids.
The 'Ideal Bomber' was supposed to cruise at 280 mph.
There was a lot of pressure for P.13/36 (Halifax/Manchester) to specify a 300mph cruising speed and the 275 mph finally specified was a compromise. Speeds far higher than this were attributed to both P.13/36 and B.12/36 designs during development, up to 330 mph being claimed for aircraft in both categories!
When these aircraft finally came into service around 1941 their top speeds were lower than the cruising speeds stipulated in the specifications.
Trials of the Halifax, without a mid upper turret showed a top speed of 275 mph and a cruising speed of just 210 mph, a full 65 mph slower than the specification.
The Manchester had a top speed of 262 mph and a cruising speed of 225 mph, still 50 mph slower than specified.
I don't have the figures for the Stirling to hand, but they were equally disappointing.
Cheers
Steve

tomo pauk said:

I hear what you say about how good/bad was the 1st Halifax.
However - the RAF did not have any bomber capable to lug those 4000 lbs over 2400 miles until 4-engined jobs came to service two years after ww2 started. Even the reasonably capable Wellington I was good just for 1000 lbs over 2500 miles - four times less than pre-series B-17s. The Wellington with Hercules engines - 1500 lbs over 2040 miles.
The Whitley with Merlins was carrying 4500 lbs over 1645 miles, or 3500 over 300 miles more, still falling after those B-17s. The Whitley with Tigers is worse.
Hampden - 2000 lbs over 1820 miles.
BTW, neither Hampden nor Blenheim complied much with pre-requisite to carry troops on board.
So if RAF can use the the bombers that can lug 1000-1500 lbs over 2500-2000 lbs, the bomber that doubles or quadruples the bomb load over distance would be welcomed. Not that it would be escaping from good fighters, but than neither of those mentioned can. The 4-engined plane will have far better engine-out capability than 2-engined. The next-gen 4-engined bomber can/will use Merlin/Hercules.

Click to expand...

Timing is everything. What you are proposing is a very expensive stopgap aircraft of somewhat limited capability. The bigger 4 engine bombers were being worked on from 1936 on (in one form or other). Which company shelves which project to build the 4 engine lite.
The Whitley was often referred to as a night bomber even in some pre war articles. It's long range cruising speed was such that on the 'famous' Genoa/Turin raid the Whitleys (after refueling on the Channel Islands) they had to fly a number of hours in daylight in order to have the most time in darkness in the target area. Fortunately France had not yet surrendered so that these daylight hours were spent over French controlled territory.
The Fall of France changed a lot of things. Practical range for night bombers in 1940-41 is rather dependent on how many hours of darkness there are on the night in question times the long range cruising speed. This should have been known back in 1934-36 when the initial specifications for the 4 motor lite would have had to been drawn up/issued.

While the Hampden and Blenheim didn't carry troops. the troop requirement (or desirability) was long standing. Biplane large/heavy bombers had been used to transfer troops in the late 20s or early 30s. Light bombers (two seaters) had obviously not been used as troop transports and the Blenheim and Battle were more replacements for the Hawker Harts than replacements for the Overstrand or older heavy bombers.
British were also struggling to increase the total number of squadrons during the 30s. See Stona's excellent post. In addition to the 25 squadrons of Harts in service in 1936 and the one squadron of "medium" bombers there were 10 heavy or night bomber squadrons, unfortunately their equipment was little better or perhaps even worse, one squadron of Fairey Hendon monoplanes and 9 squadrons of HP Heyford Biplanes. Some of these were replacing Vickers Virginia bombers of which there were 5 squadrons in Jan 1935,all gone by the end of 1936.
1/2 the number of "heavy" bombers, even if of greater capability means fewer squadrons total. Politicians and armchair generals were often counting squadrons at this time because aircraft capability didn't really vary that much or hadn't for around 15 years. A Hart didn't carry a much different bomb load than a DH 4 or DH 9. The Overstrand went into service in Jan 1935 with a top speed of 148mph and a max bomb load of 1500lbs, range was 548 miles. Engines were 580hp Pegasus. This compares to a 1918 DH 10 with a pair of 375 RR Eagles that could carry up to 920lbs and had a speed of 124-131mph depending on altitude.
British did order both the HP Harrow and the Bristol Bombay although deliveries of both took a while. The Whitley was a skinny fuselage (relatively) AS 23

A - yep, maybe bulged one can help. Flush one could do maybe 4 x 500 ( vs. Blenheim/Bisley 2 x 500)?
B - yes
C - install two-gun turret, as the Blenheim/Bisley received?
D - yes
E - payload of mid-war Beaufighters was also one torpedo (2000+ lbs with shackles/racks) AND 682 imp gals (819 US gals) of fuel - more than the best A-20, so there is plenty of elbow room for payload. Late war Beaufighters carried another 130 imp gals of fuel, plus 2000 lbs worth of torpedo & it's shackles.

Click to expand...

Are you building a "medium" bomber or an attack plane?
The A-20 was conceived as an attack plane and never had the range of a real medium bomber. On the other hand it was available and being delivered with 1600hp engines in the winter of 1940, not too much latter than when Beaufighters were being delivered. Why jump through hoops with the Beaubomber to get a not much different result unless the goal is simply to get an ALL BRITISH aircraft?
British were getting A-20s (DB-7s) that had been ordered by both the French and British back in 1939 early 1940.

Perhaps the British could have simply slung a pair of 500lbs under the fuselage of the Beaufighter and another under each wing and accepted the loss of performance due to drag.
late war A-20s went to 27,000lb gross and could carry 2000lbs inside, four 500lb outside under the wings. had 6 .50s in the nose. a low drag turret (compared to the Bisley turret) with two .50s and a .50 out the ventral tunnel.
It is usually a mistake to use late war capabilities when saying what planes should have been built or canceled 3-5 years earlier.
A 27,000lb A-20 might never have made it off a British 1940 Grass airfield.

What the British were lacking was a plane somewhere between the A-20 and B-25. Something that could carry 3000lb or so around 1500 miles (more over shorter distances?) at higher speeds than the Wellington or Hampden. They needed this plane in 1941-42 in quantity to replace the Blenheim and Beaufort. Such a replacement was actually in the "works" in that the British had placed an initial order for 25 uprated Hudsons in Feb of 1940 and by May of 1940 this had been modified to 300 Venturas using 1850hp P&W R-2800s. Another 375 were ordered in late 1940. This was also meet by the orders for Martin Baltimores. Unfortunately they were both a little late in coming into service.
With the General shortage of Hercules engines a twin engine Hercules bomber in addition to the planes already built was probably a non-starter.

stona said:

Another problem was over optimistic claims for the performance of some of these designs. There was a trend in RAF bomber requirements for ever increasing speed (touched on above). It was seen as essential to limit exposure to fighter attack on daylight raids.
The 'Ideal Bomber' was supposed to cruise at 280 mph......

Click to expand...

Goes with the 370mph Beaufighter.

Shortround6 said:

Goes with the 370mph Beaufighter.

Click to expand...

Yep. People often say something was built to such and such a specification without considering how often and by how far the resulting production aircraft fell short of said specification.

I agree with the comments on the Sterling but the RAF didn't need three four engine bombers and the Sterling had the worst performance of the three.
Albacore it offered no significant improvement over the swordfish and on that basis alone it shouldn't have been started.
Lerwick again no improvement over the Sunderland, had they used the effort to develop an aircraft that could fill the Atlantic Gap, now that would have been worth the effort.
Albermarle and Bisley again they were never going to offer an increased performance and should never have been started.

The Stirling was the only production version of a four engine bomber built to B.12/36 and it predated the bombers built to P.13/36, neither of which were originally intended as four engine bombers. The Halifax quickly became a four engine design and the Manchester-Lancaster conversion came much later. Cancelling the Stirling, given the destruction of the Supermarine prototype would, at the time, potentially have left the RAF with no four engine bomber at all..
There was no option to cancel the Stirling prior to series production (which due to the intervention of the Luftwaffe caused a later than intended introduction in numbers). It should certainly been cancelled when better aircraft became available, but the Air Ministry were always cagey about accepting an over all reduction in total bomber numbers (or a reduction in numbers of any class of aircraft) and this is why mediocre aircraft were produced for too long.

BTW the troop carrying requirement is often misunderstood. It was included in B.3/34 with the conditions I mentioned earlier. It was however dropped from the requirement after discussions with the aircraft industry and when the DTD admitted that a typical loss of 10 mph in speed would be likely.
The 1936 bomber specifications (B12/36 and P.13/36) stated:

"Consideration is to be given in design for fitting a light removable form of seating for the maximum number of personnel that can be accommodated within the fuselage when the aircraft is being used for reinforcing Overseas Commands."

The mandatory requirement was for consideration to be given, which is certainly open to interpretation.

The British were not as profligate as the Germans. I mentioned earlier the 30 different aircraft types being built by the relatively small German aircraft industry for the RLM in the mid 1930s. The British were wary of such a course, but still fell into the same trap. It was the pace of technical advance at this time which drove the numbers up. In 1938 the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff noted.

"As a result of the introduction of the fast monoplane with relatively high wing loading in 1935, we have been obliged, during the last two years, in order to keep the Air Force up to date, to put out new requirements for every type of aircraft in service... This, of course, has resulted in an abnormal number of new specifications, and we have at present no fewer than seventeen types of aeroplane building that have not yet been tested, and in all but a few instances, not been flown."

Add that seventeen to those already in production and the number spread across the rather ramshackle inter-war British aviation industry was far too many.

Cheers

Steve

Please everybody could we talk about the Short StIrling which was named after the Scottish Town of StIrling. StErling with an E makes me grind my teeth and I havent got a lot of teeth left

fastmongrel said:

Please everybody could we talk about the Short StIrling which was named after the Scottish Town of StIrling. StErling with an E makes me grind my teeth and I havent got a lot of teeth left

Click to expand...

I've got both in my post (two i and one e), or did. I've corrected it now.
Cheers
Steve

I've been looking at the various specifications to which some of these subjects for cancellation were built and can relate that to my current investigations into the British aircraft industry at large in the pre-war period.
One think is abundantly clear. The Air Ministry had drawn up plans between 1918 and 1934 which envisaged a rapid transformation from peacetime to wartime conditions. By the onset of rearmament, in order to avoid a projected shortage of aircraft in the first year of any war plans existed for groups comprising aircraft and engineering firms. One group would be established to manufacture each of the most important aircraft and aero engines, and only one aircraft from each of the main operational classes would be selected for group production. An Air Ministry organisation would be created to coordinate the output of the different sectors of the aircraft industry. This highly rational plan was predicated on that rapid transformation from peacetime to wartime production. Nobody was equipped with clairvoyance and what none of the planners foresaw was a prolonged intermediate phase, lasting several years, between peacetime and wartime, nor did they expect that a technological revolution in aircraft design would occur at exactly this time.
During this period there were practical and political objections to the implementation of wartime production plans. A State production policy was not developed in any meaningful way. Crucially, and most obviously to anyone looking at the numbers today, targets were defined in terms of front line air force strength, rather than industrial capacity. It wasn't until March 1938 and the 'Anschluss' that peacetime planning was combined with longer term preparations for war.
Scheme L was accepted following the Anschluss. This involved the production of 12,000 aircraft in the next two years, an increase of 170% in the output of military aircraft over that achieved in 1937. This was raised further after the Munich crisis and planning commenced for a War Potential programme for the production of 17,000 aircraft in the first 12 months of a war (projected fairly accurately to commence in October 1939) and then for a capacity of 2,000 aircraft a month by the end of 1941.
I don't have time here to go through the earlier Schemes, but despite some large increases on the existing meagre production, mostly of older types,they pale into insignificance compared with those from 1938 onward.
At the risk of sounding like a broken record, we enjoy a hindsight not afforded to the decision makers in this critical period between 1935 and 1939. Following the Munich crisis of September 1938 you didn't need a crystal ball to see that a war with Germany was imminent, the start of that war was predicted to within one month, but this was simply not so a few years earlier. There were of course concerns about Germany from the mid 1930s, but convincing the government to disburse millions of pounds to develop the aircraft industry and the shadow industries on the back of such concerns was never going to be possible in a free democracy.
Cheers
Steve

The Stirling did have the worst performance, but it was the earliest in timing. It went into action over a year before the Lancaster and almost simultaneous with the Manchester. Had both factories not been bombed in August of 1940 The Stirling might well have been in operational use (combat) in the late fall of 1940 before the first Lancaster prototype even flew (and that was with Merlin X engines).

Of the 7 factories that built Lancasters , most took around 6 months to work up to decent or full production (which in some cases was only 15-20 planes per month) after the first went went out the door.
Canceling the Stirling in the summer or fall of 1940 means a major short fall in bombers in in 1941 ( or even more Manchesters?)
Canceling late 1941 still means a major shortfall.

The Albacore may have under-performed compared to predictions but the RN got very lucky with the Swordfish, depending on a 1934 biplane with a 690-750 hp engine as the primary attack plane for the carriers with NO replacement possible until 1941-42 would have been totally negligent. The Swordfish was built to a 1933 specification, the Albacore to a 1936 specification ( and it did perform better, handling and control response was a problem). Unfortunately the rest of the world was moving to monoplanes. Fairey had submitted a monoplane proposal at the same time as the Albacore but it was thought the landing speed would be too high. Sometimes you have build planes for the carriers you have, not the ones you wish you had. Part of the Swordfishes longevity was it's ability to operate from converted cargo ships, a requirement/situation that did not exist in the 1930s.

Lerwick was never intended to be a improvement over the Sunderland. It was intended to be a replacement for the older twin engine bi-plane flying boats. Sunderlands were large and expensive. A smaller, cheaper aircraft was thought to be needed as an accompaniment. The Lerwick was roughly 1/2 the weight of a Sunderland. The Lerwick had handling problems both in the water and in the air and was canceled pretty promptly once this was found out. Another reason for not ordering off the drawing board. But cancelling planes before they were built in order to bridge the "Atlantic Gap" which didn't exist in 1937-39 is really using the retrospectroscope to full advantage.
I would also note that some of the airbases used to narrow and then fill the gap didn't exist in the late 30s and/or were on foreign soil. Iceland being an independent country and Greenland belonging to Denmark. You also needed some technological development in order to make a plane that could bridge the "Atlantic gap". Simple flying over the Atlantic wouldn't do the job. You needed to be able to patrol for several hours in the gap, you needed a high enough transit speed to get to and from the gap without pushing the crews to a dangerous level of fatigue. Liberator missions were later restricted to a set number of hours rather than by the actual range/endurance of the aircraft. Planes large enough to hold spare crew members in quarters where they are not suffering from the same fatigue effects as the working crew (heated and sound proofing needed) makes the plane even larger and more expensive (means fewer planes built) .

Albermarle and Bisley are somewhat tied together in that they are Blenheim replacements. Albermarle got hung up with a demand for a plane using non-strategic materials which rarely worked well for anybody, the Mosquito being a rare exception. The result might not have been predictable at the time but in hindsight it joined the vast majority of non-strategic material design planes in being overweight and under performing. The Bisley morphed from being a ground attack variant of the Blenheim (armored nose with machinegun battery) to just being the Blenheim MK V. Thoroughly outdated but the production lines were set up, the workers trained and the engines were available and the replacement aircraft for the Blenheim squadrons were slow in coming (Venturas and Baltimores) or not coming at all. The Albermarle had been canceled as a bomber (only 40 built, the rest were ordered as glider tugs and transports) ) several months before the Bisley (MK V) prototypes even flew. In retrospect it would have been better for the crews if the MK V had never been built but the idea of disbanding squadrons was a hard one to go through with in 1941-42.

The British did make a lot of mistakes in aircraft procurement before and during WW II. Some were judgement and some were a legacy of the economic times of the 20s and early 30s in the British aircraft industry. Too many companies struggled with small orders and hung in by the skin of their teeth. The Domestic market was small for civilian aircraft and modern monoplane retracting gear aircraft required much more drawing/engineering time than the old biplanes. Too few engineers/draftsmen for the number of projects being worked on stretched out development cycles so that some planes were bordering obsolete when they entered service.

stona said:

I've been looking at the various specifications to which some of these subjects for cancellation were built and can relate that to my current investigations into the British aircraft industry at large in the pre-war period.......

Click to expand...

Thank you.
I would note or reinforce Stona's comments that it was this obsession with numbers that lead to a lot of the over production of obsolete or unsatisfactory types of aircraft.
The concentration on "front line air force strength" also wound up biting them in the butt a little bit. The training sector was rather ignored (but not totally) and fortunately, like may air forces, a lot of old/obsolete front line aircraft could and did serve as trainers, target tugs,etc. However, without this influx of obsolete aircraft into secondary roles the actual effectiveness of the front line "numbers" would have been even less than it was. Many people here over the years have proposed canceling the Fairey Battle outright or severally curtailing it's numbers and building Hurricanes (or something else) instead. The true problem in the Battle of Britain was not a shortage of fighter aircraft but shortage of adequately trained fighter pilots.While nowhere need as bad off as late war German or Japanese pilots too many pilots were posted to operational squadrons with little or no time in the type of fighter they were flying, only the most rudimentary of air to air gunnery training and so on. Even pilots with 2-300 hours of flight time in flight school should not have had to learn the basics of air combat "on the job" in a high level combat setting like the BoB.
They should have known better given the high wastage of pilots in WW I.
Some on the forum/s want to cancel aircraft that did good service in the training role even if found wanting in combat. Less well trained crews than historically would not accomplish much more (if as much) even with better aircraft.

It was this obsession with numbers that lead to so many planes (and tanks and.....) being ordered off the drawing board and having too much money, material (how many forgings and specialty items) and man hours invested in the program to shut it down when the aircraft (tank and ....) turns out to be a turkey. Some of the planes could perform secondary functions fairly well if not ideal, others should have been recycled (scrapped) as soon as possible.

The F6F was good enough to handle any Japanese fighter through 1945 and into 1946. In a perfect world, the A-26 would have progressed fast enough to justify cancelling production of the B-26 and the B-25; but really, due to changing design specifications, Douglas got them into service about as fast as could be expected; and in the meantime the B-26 and B-25 were doing a good job. Replacing the Ventura (really the Harpoon by this point) with the B-25 would not have helped. The larger fuselage of the Harpoon was an important asset in the patrol bomber role. From a Monday morning quarterback position, the B-32 could have been cancelled; but it was hard to know even up to 1944 if the problems with the B-29 were going to be solved within a reasonable period of time.

Conslaw said:

The F6F was good enough to handle any Japanese fighter through 1945 and into 1946...

Click to expand...

The Japanese were fielding some very competitive aircraft during the later years of the war and I would be cautious about that statement.

Types like the N1K1, KI-84 and KI-100 were quite capable of besting the F6F and other Allied types.

Two major factors kept the Japanese in check, however. One being the dwindling pilot pool and the other being low production output.

And sometimes it was just the reality of 200-300 mph aerial warfare not matching expectations at all.

It was specifications issued by the summer of 1935 that resulted in Fighter Command entering the war in 1939 with the Spitfire, Hurricane and Defiant as its three first-line fighters (ignoring the Blenheim).
In the years immediately preceding the war, efforts were made to improve the single seat fighters derived from F.10/35 in terms of speed and fire power. These are outside the scope of this thread. The efforts to improve the turret fighter, particularly a cannon armed version are not, given that just about everybody wants to cancel the Defiant.

The most pertinent factor is and always has been that the turret fighter was conceived as a defensive fighter and that it was expected to intercept unescorted bomber formations. At a meeting of the Air Staff's Operational Requirements Committee of November 1937 it was noted that:
"During the last war the single-seater pilot was nearly always exposed to attack by other single-seaters and would therefore be more liable to become excited than the home defence pilot who could attack possibly from a range at which the enemy could not hurt him."
There then follows a pencil manuscript note:
"Will the Germans have fighter escorts?"
The answer was presumably that they would not. In May 1939 Saundby (then Director of Operational Requirements) declared, specifically on the subject of turret fighters:
"Generally speaking they are all intended for Home Defence. i.e. the destruction of bomber aircraft in circumstances in which they are unlikely to meet enemy fighter aircraft."

The Defiant was a strange beast. It was the result of the cancellation of two other turret type 'fighters', the results of the Novel Competition (November 1932) and Ellington's opinions, Specifications F.5/33 and F.22/33. Three seater, twin turret, cannon armed designs had more in common with the German 'zerstorer' principal.
In May 1936 the argument that had been used to cancel these aircraft was turned on its head when a forward firing capability was deemed important for a turret fighter. Various permutations were discussed, a twin engine defiant with one mid turret equipped with four 20mm cannon with a forward firing capability was initially favoured, then a new high wing monoplane with the turret 'merged into the wing' was considered. Eventually a Defiant with one forward firing machine gun was a cheaper option.
F.11/37 (derived from F.18/36) was issued in May 1937, at which time the turret fighter concept was still alive and well.
F.9/37 was issued later that year to Gloster for a twin engine fighter with 2 x 20mm cannon in the nose and a four gun turret amidships. The turret was dropped from the specification before a prototype was built.

In 1938 a review of 'Air Defence Fighter Tactics' by the Air Staff concluded that at the speeds at which bombers were now flying, a single seat fixed gun fighter (meaning Spitfire and Hurricane) could only attack from astern. In consequence the bomber would only need a rear defensive armament, it would be difficult to surprise the bomber and only one or two fighters could attack at a time.The familiar argument about turret fighters was repeated:
"The moveable gun fighter, by flying on a paralell course to the bomber, can attack it from any direction and so overcome all of these disadvantages."
It was also argued that for 'air superiority fighting' where the intention was to destroy enemy fighters and Army cooperation aircraft, a moveable gun fighter could act defensively as well as offensively, and thus penetrate enemy territory and withdraw at will, whereas a siingle seat fighter could not. Enemy fighters seem to have slipped minds at this meeting, the posibility of them decimating these intruding turret fighters does not appear to have been considered.
Such was the confidence in the turret fighter concept in 1938 that, given the lack of progress with F.11/37, yet another cannon armed turret fighter proposal was considered necessary. This specification, drawn up in early 1939 was issued as F.2/38. Now things get really odd. At first a return to the Novel fighter, with four 20mm cannon in a nose turret, conceding a limited arc of fire, was considered. Then someone suggested that the turret from B.1/39 might be applicable. B.1/39 was the specification for the Ideal Bomber and implies a midships turret.
Subsequent studies concluded that the new turret fighter would be no better than that already existing (Defiant). The project was redesignated F.26/39 before being abandoned altogether. Not one of the post 1935 requirements I have mentioned above led to a completed turret fighter.

In conclusion, given the RAF and Air Staff's infatuation with the turret fighter concept we are lucky that the Defiant, for all the failings that would be revealed when the war started, was the only one that was built. There were solid plans for many more, some of which would certainly have been far worse, unwieldy and ineffective than the Defiant. Imagine Fighter Command fighting the Battle of Britain with something that looked like a fighter version of the Wellington bomber. There was never any chance that no turret fighter would have been built, or that the Defiant would have been cancelled, given the prevalent thinking of the time.

Cheers

Steve