Which aircraft would you cancel?

Thank you again for the historical perspective.

It is real easy in hindsight to pick winners and losers, both in hardware and in tactics/techniques/doctrines.

It is a lot harder to criticize on the basis on what should have been known at the time.

A lot of what was known dated from WW I or colonial wars. WW I having fixed battle lines and while close air support was tried it was usually part of a set piece battle and missions/targets were selected before take-off or indicated using large marker panels set on the ground. Strategic bombing was tried but the numbers of aircraft and their lifting ability (or lack of) restricted the actual results and glossed over real lessons, like trying to navigate at night.

The British made plenty of "mistakes" during the 30s but then so did most everybody else.
Multi purpose planes were very popular because budgets were tight. As long as you weren't in actual combat the fact that the multi purpose planes weren't really good at any one thing didn't really show up. A lot of war games/exercises in the 20s and 30s having rather unrealistic conditions/rules.
Many nations simply built "modern" versions of what were basically WW I concepts even if design details changed.
Using the WW I two seater as a "model" many nations were using two/3 seat single engine biplane, sesquiplane, and high wing or parasol monoplane observation, reconnaissance, light bomber/Army co-operation aircraft even though engines were 3-4 times more powerful and structures (or at least frame work) had changed from wood to metal.
What was unknown or ignored was that these aircraft needed almost total control of the air by their own fighters in order to survive. Unknown was doubtful as even in WW I many missions flown by the two seaters were escorted by single seat aircraft. Or it was assumed that escorting fighters would always be available and not off performing other missions.
There was a temporary split in performance between bombers and fighters as monoplane bombers were introduced with much higher speeds than contemporary fighters, bombers not needing the maneuverability desired in fighters (acrobatics) a higher wing loading could be used. Once fighter monoplanes were adopted the bombers margin of speed evaporated. Unfortunately this coincided with combat reports from China and Spain suggesting that high speed bombers could evade fighters. What was ignored was that the fast bombers were a generation ahead of the defending fighters (it was only a few years between generations in the 30s and export fighters were rarely the latest generation). and that both China and Spain had relatively poor early warning systems even compared to 1918, few if any sound detectors and a poor telephone systems.
Mid to late 30s also saw major advances in engine power, propellers, flaps (which could affect wing size) and structure so once again a 1936 design could be head and shoulders above a 1934 design.
Some air forces/air ministries were better at keeping up with these advances than others but deciding when to buy or mass produce an aircraft vs waiting for the next new item/device was a very careful balancing act.
Germans built plenty of rather dubious aircraft, the Hs 126 for one. Nothing wrong with the way it flew and IF the enemies air force had been destroyed/severely crippled it could perform a number of useful missions but it was nothing more than a modernized Albatross C III in concept and would have suffered losses equal to the Lysanders and Battles (and equivalent french aircraft) if used under the SAME conditions in the Battle of France.

I'm glad that you apostrophied 'mistakes'. I'm not trying to apologise for some of the decisions that were later proven wrong but nobody really had any idea how large 'fleets' of bombers could be intercepted.

In 1932 Ludlow-Hewitt (later of Bomber Command) wrote a paper which much influenced British thinking. In it he postulated that bomber formations might be destroyed in two ways.
1. By sporadic close in attack
2. Sustained 'lie off' attack.

This then led two what he perceived as four lines of fighter development.
1. Two seater with improved stern armament
2. A single seater with extra heavy fore armament for lay off astern
3. A two seater with swivelling guns forward, possibly with turret, developed for the no allowance position astern and below
4. A high performance single seater fighter for fire shock action.

In the early/mid 1930s it was by no means certain that a high performance fighter with a fixed forward firing armament was going to be the way forward, however obvious that is to us today.
There were very serious concerns about the ability of a pilot to keep formation, still considered vital in air fighting tactics, and aim his guns. The number of fixed armament single seat fighters able to attack simultaneously was thought insufficient to break up the formation and there were doubts about their ability to make more than one brief attack.
There was a strong body of opinion that felt that a separate gunner would always be needed. In one scheme there would be a crew of two, both of whom could serve as a pilot and gunner, which one flew the aircraft at a given time depending on which armament was being used! Things could have been much worse

There were also well documented concerns about the number and type of guns fighters should employ, whether fixed or not. The quest for fire power had already led to suggestions for 6, 8 and 10 gun fighters long before a certain Ralph Sorley became directly involved, but that's another story.

The issue of cannon armament is also misunderstood. In the first five years of the 1930s the British did not seriously consider smaller calibres of cannon armament because of the terms of the St Petersburg Convention to which the UK was a signatory. This banned the use of explosives in projectiles that weighed less than 400 grams. The Air Ministry was aware of developments of 20mm cannon firing explosive projectiles much lighter than the limit in other countries, but it wasn't until June 1935 that the then Chief of the Air Staff (Ellington) wrote.

"We should however be clear as to our attitude to smaller calibre guns than the C.O.W. If other powers are ignoring the St. Petersburg Convention in respect of explosive projectiles, are we to do the same?"

The 11/2 Lb ( 700 gram) projectile of the C.O.W gun did not contravene the Convention. This led to efforts to fit such a cannon to proposed 'No Allowance' fighters which could make long range attacks on bomber formations. No allowance shooting is NOT just zero deflection shooting as I often see it called. It is based on the principle that a projectile fired at an angle to the line of flight of the aircraft carrying the gun will travel at an angle of incidence to the air stream, thus generating lift and flying in a more or less straight line to the target. The British didn't have a high opinion of their pilot's/gunner's skills and were very keen on this method of air to air gunnery.
If a fighter flew below and behind a bomber at the same course and speed and with its guns set at the correct angle, then the gunner would need to make no adjustments for gravity, aerodynamics or relative speed.

The result of all this was proposals (touched on in my post above) for all sorts of weird and wonderful turret equipped fighters and fighters with swivelling guns in the nose and/or wings.

By early 1935 the Air Staff knew that they wanted a two seat fighter, but there was still confusion about how it should be used. Finally, in April 1935 the Air Staff Requirement called for a fighter which

"can bring fire to bear from a moveable battery of at least four machine guns over the upper hemisphere... thus conferring on it the ability to attack from below and behind, below and in front, or on the flank of an enemy formation, at the same time enabling the batteries of all fighters to be trained on to the target simultaneously while in formation."

Forward firing armament, which had so exercised minds on the Air Staff for the previous several years was simply dropped on the grounds that it was " Undesirable to split the armament."
Back in 1932 two of the short listed entries to the Novel Fighter competition had been discarded precisely because their turrets could not reinforce their forward firing guns. In 1933 Peirse (another future bomber man) had argued for a two seat fighter with a four gun turret and two guns for the pilot. In a dogfight the four turret guns would be fixed forward to give a six gun fighter. Now the Air Staff had come up with a horrible compromise, an aircraft with no forward firing armament at all. In 1938 this became the Defiant.

Cheers

Steve

Some perspective is needed regarding the albacore.

it was an aircraft obsolete before it even entered service, but this was a product of just how far the RN had fallen behind with its aircraft development during the lean years in the wilderness under RAF control. In pre-war Britain there was virtually no chance of getting any support from the RAF with regard to technology or production. there were many in the RAF that worked actively to destroy the FAA, mostly by starving it of technology and personnel as much as much as was politically safe to do so.

With the limited resources the FAA could must at the time, it (the albacore) actually represented a triumph of progress, ingenuity and economy. Compared to the predecessor that it replaced, the legendary Swordfish no less, it represented a 26% increase in top speed, a 46% increase in practical cruise speed, a 60% increase in range, and about a 15% increase in airborne endurance. it was a kinder aircraft to the crews (with enclosed cockpits), and no vices that I know of. It enjoyed significant success in the field of battle. I know of no other aircraft that could boast such massive improvements in performance compared to their immediate predecessor. The fact that numerically those improvements simply moved the RNs TSR aircraft from hopelessly obsolete to just laughably so is more an indictment of the way the RAF failed to meet its maritime responsibilities in the build up to war than any actual failing of the albacore

The Albacore is also a reflection of the size of the FAA and the size/speed of some of the RN carriers.

The 7 RN carriers in service before Sept 1939 held about the same number of planes as 3 American carriers (within a dozen anyway) and the US had 5 carriers in service in 1939 not including the Langley (down graded to sea plane tender in 1937 but rated at 36 planes before then.
The US Navy had independent funding ( and was responsible for Marine Corp Aviation) and had over 480 carrier berths for aircraft (built or building) in 1936. The RN had 240-250 carrier berths for aircraft (built or building) in 1936. 1937 seeing the 4 Illustrious class carriers laid down.
Not trying to do flag waving here but the US had a bigger "investment" in carriers and a bigger need for carrier planes, they also had a different philosophy in that they didn't expect to operate outside of land based air.
But in 1935-36 when the Albacore specification was being worked on (the Swordfish being a 1933 specification and first flight in 1934) 3 of the 6 RN carriers could not exceed 25 knots and most of them had flight decks 100-200ft shorter than US carrier decks.
Going to monoplanes was a step into the unknown for carrier planes. The Douglas Devastator First flying in 1935 but not going into production until 1937. First monoplane in service on US Navy carriers so even with full disclosure and sharing of test results the information would be a bit late for the Swordfish replacement. First Japanese "Kate" didn't fly until 1937 and the Japanese weren't exactly publishing week by week updates on it.
The British could in no way afford two different torpedo planes, one for small/slow carriers and one for the faster/larger carriers.
I would also note that the Germans went with a biplane torpedo bomber (the Fi 167) for the Graf Zeppelin so the British were hardly alone at this time.

Shortround6 said:

Many nations simply built "modern" versions of what were basically WW I concepts even if design details changed.

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Yep, and that's why in the mid to late 30s you had aircraft like the Heinkel He 51, Gloster Gauntlet, Avro Anson and so on occupying front line squadrons. Things didn't change much militarily because there was very much a push for peace as most countries statesmen were horrified with the previous war, they were so keen to prevent it from happening again. Military technology and expenditure around the world in the 20s and 30s didn't match civil aviation and in particular the airline industry, which is unique in that it usually the other way round, but modern airliners led the way in terms of advanced technology and drove the pace of advance.

stona said:

Now the Air Staff had come up with a horrible compromise, an aircraft with no forward firing armament at all. In 1938 this became the Defiant.

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In the poor Defiant's defence though - as much as I agree with you, Steve, Defiant units were supposed to work in conjunction with single seaters, not by themselves, against bomber formations, so forward firing armament was not necessary. Also, when the Defiant spec was drawn up, no one in the world had bombers equipped with power operated turrets, so bombers that the Defiant was likely to encounter would have poor defensive armament; a handful of hand held light calibre machine guns. The Germans didn't fit a power operated turret to any of their bombers in service until the Do 217. So, bearing that in mind, was the lack of forward firing armament a hindrance with the aircraft's original role taken into consideration? That also did not hinder it as a night fighter, which in practise proved the turret fighter without forward firing armament could work in the environment that it was designed for; against unescorted enemy bombers.

The turret fighter was a good idea, given the need to destroy large bomber formations, it was just surpassed by tactical developments and the strategic situation confronting the RAF in 1939/40. I've tried to explain, without writing a book, some of the reasons behind its development. The entire concept is commonly rubbished (not here to be fair) as if it was some kind of idiotic aberration resulting from some kind of collective breakdown in the reasoning of the Air Staff, which simply displays an ignorance of the origins of the concept and a lack of appreciation of the struggle that Air Staff's around the world faced, coming to terms with the bomber threat. The way people thought about bombers, and the threat they posed, in 1930-1936 was quite different to how they thought about them in 1940-1945.

As for the deletion of forward firing armament on the Defiant, this was a mistake and should have been recognised at the time. All earlier concepts either had a larger crew and incorporated a forward firing turret or had at least pair of weapons firing forward, usually fixed, often at an angle for no allowance shooting, and usually described as 'for the pilot', which makes it clear who would operate them.
F.9/35 (Defiant) traces its ancestry back directly to the 1st type proposed in Ludlow Hewitt's 1932 review of fighter requirements. It was the then Deputy Director of Operations and Intelligence at the Air Ministry who proposed that a two seat, single engine fighter should be included in the 1935 Experimental Air Programme, believing that the twin engine Novel and Ellington designs would not go into production due to their low performance. That man was none other than Arthur Harris.

In June 1935 the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff (then Courtney) asked that the twin engine 'Ellington' fighter be cancelled, suggesting that the new turret fighter planned (Defiant) would do the same job. The 'Ellington' concept had a front turret, upper turret or a combination of both.

There were few voices against a forward firing armament. Back in 1932 one comment on Maund's 'Bright Idea Fighter' did suggest a less than reasoned attitude in some quarters. It was suggested that deleting forward firing armament operated by the pilot
"removed temptation from the pilot who might otherwise have tried to start his own private war."

The minutes of the Operational Requirements Committee from the meeting at which F.9/35 was discussed show no mention of forward firing armament at all, though Wing Commander Keith, who attended in his capacity as Head of the Armaments branch wrote later that
"some hard things were said by several successful single-seater pilots of the first war."
Subsequently there was a scrabble to produce a turret fighter which would have been a modified Defiant with some forward firing armament, but this came to nothing.

Whilst not wishing to labour the point about early 1930s concepts, they did have a profound effect on the way RAF fighters developed. Just how wrong the Air Staff initially got it is shown by the fact that the two types rejected from the short list of Novel Fighters were the those with eight fixed forward firing guns and those with a midships turret, the very types with which the RAF eventually went to war in 1939!
This also shows that in a very brief period between 1935 and 1939, some also got it almost correct. The RAF started the war with two competitive eight gun fighters and one turret fighter, a hangover from a different era.

The belief that bomber formations could defend themselves against attack by fixed wing fighters, how ever well armed, was not a uniquely British failing. It led to widespread support for multi seat fighters in the belief that only they offered any hope of breaking up bomber formations. The German 'zerstorer' concept is related to this.
We will never know if the Defiant would have been effective against unescorted bomber formations, particularly operating in conjunction with single seat fighters. We do however have an account from Guy Gibson of an attack on his squadron of Hampdens by Bf 110s and Bf 109s. He wrote:

"[Me 110s] had one gun which can fire sideways. Their mode of attack was to fly in formation with the Hampdens perhaps fifty yards out and slightly to the front, and pick off the outside man with their one gun, aiming with a no deflection shot at the pilot.The bomber boys could do nothing about it; they had to just sit there and wait to be shot down. If they broke away they were immediately pounced on by three Messerschmitt 109s waiting in the background."

Eight of the twelve Hampdens were lost....makes you think.

Cheers

Steve

My compliments to all the participants. This is a very educational thread.

I would like to add in defense of British procurement (and some other nations) that sometimes the ruthless armchair hindsight schemes of cutting planes A, B, C, D, from production add building more of planes E, F, G and H can be counter productive in the long run.

Many nations not only wanted the best planes they could get at the moment, they also wanted a healthy competitive aircraft industry for future projects/production. Sometimes this was accomplished by a losing company in a design competition being given a production contract for a rivals design in order to help them stay in business. Sometimes design contracts were sort of 'rationed' with no one company working on more than 2-3 new designs at the same time. The Air Ministry (of what ever nation) trying to decide if the capacity of the design dept and prototype shop area of certain company/s could handle more work without slowing down both work in progress and having the newest design take 6 months longer to fly/get into production than if they went with company "B"s proposal. Sometimes they chose the 2nd best proposal on paper in the interest of trying to get the desired type of aircraft into service a number of months quicker. In the late 30s everybody knew war was coming, they didn't know when so 2nd best in production when the shooting starts looked pretty good compared to 1st best not flying as a prototype yet. It was also the reason for some duplicate programs.

Producing the absolute minimum number of aircraft types is efficient from a production stand point but it means fewer design teams in existence for future projects and once you are down to only 2-3 air-frame makers competitive bidding tends to start going away making each airplane more expensive. Finding the right balance between the number of companies/design teams and the number of projects was a hard one. And if you cut the number of teams your choices for future projects goes way down. The US navy design competition that lead to the Grumman Avenger had 17 different proposals from 9 different companies, Grumman had 3 different proposals in the competition. Navy sorted through them, short listed some and sent those back to the submitting companies for more detailed proposals/plans, and then funded 3 different prototypes.
Cutting your national design capabilities to 2-3 teams cuts down on the innovation in future designs. British aviation industry may very well have had too many separate companies during and after WW II but the forced mergers during the 50s and flip-flopping on orders/projects effectively reduced the the British to one Airframe maker and one engine maker. Better hope you like their design/s if you want an all British aircraft because there is no where else to go to.
Mergers were forced in the sense that certain projects required submitting companies to merge with another company in order to bid or be considered. In some cases after the mergers were completed the project was canceled outright with no production.

parsifal said:

Some perspective is needed regarding the albacore.

it was an aircraft obsolete before it even entered service, but this was a product of just how far the RN had fallen behind with its aircraft development during the lean years in the wilderness under RAF control. In pre-war Britain there was virtually no chance of getting any support from the RAF with regard to technology or production. there were many in the RAF that worked actively to destroy the FAA, mostly by starving it of technology and personnel as much as much as was politically safe to do so.

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It is odd that David Beatty, as First Sea Lord, and with the goal of reclaiming control of the RNAS would meet with Trenchard at the Admiralty in December 1919 and agree a twelve month truce between himself, Trenchard and Wilson (Army) which lost him the best chance of preventing the RAF and Air Ministry retaining control of naval aviation.
He had swung the Admiralty behind the Smuts plan in 1917, but for rather different reasons.
By 1923 Beatty was threatening Bonar Law (Prime Minister) with his resignation if the RNAS was not returned to Admiralty control.
Later that year Bonar Law's successor, Stanley Baldwin, was faced with Admiralty resignations en masse over the issue. It was only the board of enquiry, established by Bonar Law under Lord Salisbury, ruling in favour of continued RAF control that prevented this.
It didn't end there. There was almost open warfare between the Senior Service and RAF for a further two years. The Lord Chancellor, Richard Haldane had to intervene, demanding that the two Services establish a working relationship within three months in order to get the Committee of Imperial Defence working again. This did lead to a compromise (Beatty's deputy, Admiral Roger Keyes stepped in) giving a sort of dual control of the Naval Air Service which lasted until 1937.
Arguments raged on about the existence of the RAF as an independent Service, but following a review of defence spending in 1925 it was confirmed by the Colwyn report of 1926. Trenchard had won his battle and had the support of the previous Secretary of State for Air, now Secretary of State for War who told parliament:
"The existence of an independent Air Ministry and an independent Air Force to carry out the Air needs of the country is an established part of the programme of every party...the longer the idea remains in existence that the question is an open one the worse it is for relations between the three Services."
In the next eleven years, up until 1937, inestimable damage was done to naval aviation while it languished under RAF control.
Cheers
Steve

Between 1923 and 1930 Air Ministry orders averaged just 646 aircraft per year. It was the policy of 'rationing' work between different contractors that kept the industry, now in what has been described as a 'peacetime equilibrium', going.
Most of the airframe manufacturers received at least £1.8 million in this period, a considerable sum, and some (like Supermarine) operated very profitably on such receipts.

Receiving more than £1.8 million were, Short, Armstrong Whitworth, Blackburn, Bristol, Hawker, A.V.Roe, Supermarine and Westland.

Receiving less were only Boulton Paul, Gloster, Handley Page and Saunders.

There was a drive to consolidation. Vickers purchased Supermarine in 1928. The Armstrong Siddeley Development Company (which included Armstrong Whitworth and Armstrong Siddeley Motors) acquired both A.V.Roe and High Duty Alloys in the same year. It was absorbed into the Hawker Siddeley Group with Hawker and Gloster in 1935.
Many of these companies were not as independent as a list of names would suggest.
78% of aircraf built for the Air Ministry in 1933-1935 were either produced by Vickers, A.V.Roe, or Hawker or designed by Hawker and sub contracted to other firms.

By the early 1930s two firms, Bristol and Rolls Royce dominated the aero engine industry.

De Havilland had captured the private flying market.

Cheers

Steve

stona said:

As for the deletion of forward firing armament on the Defiant, this was a mistake and should have been recognised at the time.

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Yet as a night fighter it proved that it didn't need fixed forward firing armament to work efficiently. You haven't actually said why it was a mistake, Steve and to be honest it wouldn't have made much of a difference to the Defiant's fortunes as a day fighter and as a night fighter it would have had a harder time catching up with the bombers it was intercepting.

As we know, adding fixed forward firing armament would have made it heavier, larger and therefore slower (you needed to put the fuel you'd removed from the wings to fit the guns somewhere else, after all) and it was slow enough - that was its biggest fault. The ability of the pilot to fire the turret's guns forward was installed, but without a gun sight and with the angle at which the guns fired when the turret was pointed forward made the idea a bit of a (pardon the expression) hit and miss affair. The turret switch that enabled the gunner to switch firing control to the pilot was not used, if I can remember correctly, being wired off.

stona said:

Subsequently there was a scrabble to produce a turret fighter which would have been a modified Defiant with some forward firing armament, but this came to nothing.

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By whom? BP? Not at the time of F.9/35 - it was specified without fixed forward firing armament as you state and none of the competing designs had fixed guns either - got any further info on that? It wasn't until F.18/40 that such a thing was proposed and that was originally written without a turret as a fixed gun fighter requirement and the turret was introduced in December 1940. BP's idea was a scaled up Defiant with either a Centaurus of Sabre, two or four forward firing cannon in the wings and a turret. A nice model survives with the BP Association.

stona said:

We will never know if the Defiant would have been effective against unescorted bomber formations, particularly operating in conjunction with single seat fighters.

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Actually we do know how effective/ineffective it was against unescorted bomber formations. 27 May 1940, Blue Section (three Daffys) 264 Sqn encountered "a dozen" unescorted He 111s in formation and claimed three destroyed and two damaged. The formation was disrupted and the bombers scattered and sped home.

Two days later 264 claimed a total of 19 Ju 87s, whose escorts were previously engaged with single seaters. This was 264's Day of Glory, which has been proven to have been something of an overestimation, as the squadron claimed 37 e/a without loss on that day, but nevertheless, the airmen at the time felt they'd done what they'd claimed. This wasn't all either; the first losses of Defiants to Bf 109s was a case on 12 May where 264 Sqn was attacking Ju 87s over Holland, while Spitfires were holding off the escorts, and although the Daffys claimed four Stukas, five were shot down by the Bf 109s.

You also have to count its successes as a night fighter in terms of unescorted bombers; this also includes night intruder sorties by Defiant squadrons over Northern France. In one night on one such operation, 11 May 1941, 264 Sqn Defiants shot down three e/a; two He 111s and a Do 17 over France.

There are various degrees of independence in large corporations or conglomerates.

In the US, United Aircraft for instance was the result of the break up (due in-part to anti-trust laws) of the late 20s/early 30s "United Aircraft and Transport Corporation" The transport division becoming United Airlines, Manufacturing east of the Mississippi river becoming United Aircraft and comprising Chance Vought, Sikorsky, P & W and Hamilton Standard. manufacturing west of the Mississippi becoming Boeing Aircraft.
What is important in the context we are discussing is wither or not these branches or subsidiaries maintained independent design teams and at the time in question (late 30s and 40s ) I believe they did, Now in a certain corporation or group one company or another may specialize in one type of aircraft over another or in a certain customer (Navy vs Air Force or Army) but that doesn't mean they might not at least submit proposals (if nothing else to keep the design teams hand in with latest developments.

The scrabble for forward firing armament came in 1936 when the Operational Requirements Committee decided that forward firing armament was needed. It was needed originally, back in 1932/3 to engage enemy aircraft other than the bombers, and the bombers themselves in certain scenarios. Remember these would be French, the presence of German escorts years later was another question, which seems finally to have entered the minds of a few on the Air Staff in 1936. They might have been expecting some kind of long range escort/zerstorer by this time, certainly not single engine fighters.

Two options were initially suggested. The first was a reincarnation of the Ellington type, a three seat twin with a forward firing turret and a midships turret and this was the preferred option. The second option was an extension of the Defiant concept with just one cannon armed midships turret, but it would be a twin, allowing the turret to fire straight ahead. The second option was eventually adopted, it was cheaper, and at Dowding's request a single fixed forward firing machine gun was added. Oddly the reason given by Dowding for needing the single forward firing machine gun was the requirement to engage a single low flying aircraft. Nobody seems to have asked why the turret couldn't do this. The designation of this new turret fighter was F.11/37 and an Air Staff Requirement with that number was issued in May 1937.

All the earlier proposed turret fighters (F.22/33 and F.5/33) had a front turret or moveable forward firing armament. Armstrong Whitworth claimed that they could meet F.9/35 with a front turret and asked if this would be acceptable. Now in a volte-face, making a mockery of the previous three years promotion of turret fighters, the DCAS (Courtney) said that the downward firing capability of a front turret was no longer required. Ellington had earlier argued that a turret fighter, diving on a bomber formation, would need forward and downward firing armament.
Boulton Paul had bought the rights to the French SAMM turret in November 1935 which gave a ready made midships turret without the time and cost of development and this was certainly attractive to the Air Staff. Ellington finally conceded and the Defiant was ordered as the RAF's turret fighter.

Operating as a night fighter is an entirely different scenario to acting as a day fighter and bomber destroyer. The specification to which the Defiant was built did not include a night fighting capability. That the Defiant did prove capable (in terms of the time period) in this role was fortuitous and not by design.

If the Defiant had been as capable as some of its earlier successes seem to have suggested it would not have been quickly withdrawn from front line daylight operations.

Cheers

Steve

Shortround6 said:

.
What is important in the context we are discussing is wither or not these branches or subsidiaries maintained independent design teams and at the time in question (late 30s and 40s ) I believe they did,

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Most did, and I agree 100% that this was very important.

I have some figures for 'Drawing Office Employment' from 1935. A drawing office certainly implies that at least some design work was being carried out. All 19 of the major aircraft companies had a drawing office. They employ numbers from 55 (Armstrong Siddeley) to 328 (Bristol, aircraft and engines).

Numbers must be put into context and there was a severe shortage of design staff as rearmament got underway. In December 1936 Vicker's technical staff numbered 221 and was one of the largest in the industry. The drawing office employed 123 though Sir Robert McLean stated that he would gladly have employed twice that number had they been available.
To put the numbers in further perspective, when Sir Ernest Hives visited Heinkel in 1935 he found that the company employed 600 technical staff.
Pure research in the UK was not done by individual companies but by organisations like the Royal Aircraft Establishment and the National Physics Laboratory, so we must be wary of direct, cross national, comparisons too.

In 1938, when discussing the slow progress of design and development with the Supply Committee, both Frederick Handley Page and Richard Fairey blamed their problems on the shortage of draughtsmen and drawing office section leaders.

Writing in 1946 the Vice-Chairman of Westalnd, Eric Mensforth, agreed.

"Staffs have undoubtedly been too small; an increase in their size would have allowed of a substantial reduction in the development period."

The shortage of technical staff and skilled labour would dog the British aircraft industry for years. In the absence of a State policy the onus fell on individual firms to solve the problem. It's another topic on which a book could have been written and far beyond the scope of even a lengthy forum reply

Cheers

Steve

Steve, interesting synopsis of the development of the turret fighter, that which I am aware, but at no time was there ever a thought of fitting forward firing armament to the Defiant or F.9/35 aircraft. F.11/37 was a very different spec and did not involve directly the Defiant as BP developed a new twin engine aircraft. The previous turret fighter ideas, which you mention, (F.22/33 and F.5/33) were superseded by F.9/35 and the promising Boulton Paul Bittern, which pre dated even these specs never saw any form of production or service, which introduced the concept of a barbette armed twin engined bomber interceptor.

stona said:

Operating as a night fighter is an entirely different scenario to acting as a day fighter and bomber destroyer. The specification to which the Defiant was built did not include a night fighting capability. That the Defiant did prove capable (in terms of the time period) in this role was fortuitous and not by design.

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Actually, it did. The original requirement for F.9/35 called for a two-seat day and night fighter. The Defiant was intended from the outset to carry out both roles, although we could argue that at the time the British were not, nor any one else for that matter, fully aware of how specialised (the key to the Defiant's success in the role - the fact that it was specialised, perhaps) a night fighter would eventually become - another discussion for another time.

It was not just fortuitous that Defiants became night fighters at all; 264 Squadron also carried out night sorties during its stint as a day fighter unit as was its remit. Their proliferation in the role could perhaps be argued as being fortuitous as it was because the Beaufighter was taking longer than expected to mature - poor performing radar sets, awkward handling in the Mk.II etc, which meant that Defiants were quickly implemented as night fighters in late 1940 and 1941 to bridge a gap, but that doesn't mean that it's performance in the role was fortuitous; it was specialised and intended from the outset as a night fighter and it carried out its duties well.

stona said:

If the Defiant had been as capable as some of its earlier successes seem to have suggested it would not have been quickly withdrawn from front line daylight operations.

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that is true, but simplistically so. It could be argued that those who made the decision not to put them in harms way any longer were aware of their inadequacies before the shooting started and that they should not have placed them in harms way to begin with. A more sensible option would have been to locate the Defiant squadrons - only two by the time the decision was made, of which only one was active, north, where single-seaters would not be an issue and bombers would be operating either with Bf 110s, which Defiants had successfully combatted against, or without escort at all.

The problem with the Defiant spec F.9/35 has been discussed and despite my objections to what you are stating here, Steve, I actually agree that it was at fault to begin with and should not have been able to progress, but it was progressed with and its too easy in hindsight to criticise the decision, but regarding the Defiant, the facts speak for themselves. I can and do provide evidence that much of what is understood about the Defiant is based on pre-conceived notions borne about by ignorance, most of which was generated after the war. Even in this post I have contradicted claims made by you that are incorrect.

It should be remembered that of a two year and six month (time of use by 264 Sqn from December 1939 until May 1942 when the first Mosquitoes arrived to replace the Defiants, although examples remained on squadron strength until the end of 1942) long front line combat career as a fighter, it was a day fighter for only 8 months of that. The rest of that time, 22 months, it served with success, fortuitous or not.

I don't disagree that the Defiant was not to have forward firing armament. Both the proposals resulting in F.11/37 (a revision of F.18/36) recognised the necessity for forward firing armament. This had been at the heart of all the twin turret fighter designs since 1932 which it is why it is so surprising that F.9/35 did not include it.

Ellington (9/31):
"We must modify the type of aircraft with which we equip our fighter squadrons and endeavour to design one which will enable the front gun to be worked by a gunner who is not the pilot."

21st November 1932 saw the issue of the Memorandum 'Suggestions for an Improved Form of Fighter Aircraft' which asked that these suggestions "meet as far as they can"

(i) Fighters should be able, when in squadron formation or tactically deployed, to open simultaneous fire on hostile formations and to sustain the attack until a decision is reached.

(ii) The armament layout should enable fighters to employ tactics which will deflect the enemy formations from their course and away from their objectives during the action phase.

(iii) The design of aircraft and armament layout should permit action to be joined from as many different directions as possible with minimum of preliminary manoeuvre and loss of time.

(iv)Fighters should be able to successfully engage fighters as well as bombers

(v) An adequate margin of performance is over contemporary bombers is needed both as regards speed and manoeuvrability together with the highest possible rate of climb.

(vi) Ability to operate by night as well as by day and to carry the required equipment of a zone fighter.

(viii) Special attention to be given to the freedom of arcs of fire from obstructions such as tail planes, e.t.c. if movable guns are employed.

(viii) Machine Guns in movable mountings should be capable of being operated under all conditions.

It was articles (iii) and (iv) which gave rise to turret designs, ALL of which had forward firing armament which was a requirement until suddenly abandoned for F.9/35.
When the final short list of four aircraft was reached it comprise two types (an eight gun fighter designed by a Major Thomson of the Armaments Branch nearly made it too). These were.

(a) Those with a turret mounted to cover the upper hemisphere, or most of it.

(b) An aircraft with a special turret in the nose to enable it to fire not only in the front hemisphere but through a considerable portion of the remaining area.

The committee considered the most important zone of attack to be the front hemisphere. It eliminated both entries in class (a) because in one case the upper turret could not reinforce the forward firing guns and in the other doing so compromised the pilot's view aft.
This eliminated any midships turret fighters and left only designs with principally forward firing armament.

We are splitting hairs over day/night fighters. It was almost standard in Air Staff requirement that a night fighting clause was included, even the Spitfire was supposed to be a day/night fighter, but nobody seriously expected anything resembling the night fighting that began in 1940/41 and it was fortuitous that the Defiant was able to perform this role. It was NOT designed for it. All the development of the turret fighter concept envisaged engaging enemy bomber formations by day, flying in formation, something obviously impossible at night. The concept was based on the quest for more firepower and the perceived need to bring the fire of formations of aircraft to bear simultaneously on the enemy formation. It's why the fixed eight gun fighter, proposed by Thomson in 1932, was discarded, they couldn't bring enough guns to bear simultaneously, attacking in small numbers, though future developments would show him to have been remarkably prescient.

With just one midships turret F.9/35 did not really satisfy this obsession with formation attacks. It's why the idea of a twin was revived (as in my post above) and it's why, in an attempt to revive the fixed eight gun fighter, during preliminary discussions preceding F.10/35, the question of traversing guns arose.
This dated back to a suggestion by Group Captain Pattisson at the time of the Novel Fighter competition that

"the pilot of a single seater should be enabled to adjust the angle of his guns whilst in flight."

Later, in 1934 Air Vice Marshal Playfair suggested

"remote controlled movable guns in single seaters"

This possibility was later included in 'Notes on Design and Tactics of ADGB Fighters' in April 1934 by Brooke Popham. The Air Fighting Committee proposed trials to investigate such "offset" guns and to establish whether flank fighters, in formation, could attack without risk of collision. The committee decided that a formation attacking in this way should be limited to three aircraft which defeated the object of the exercise. It was alreay reckoned that fixed gun fighters could attack in pairs or possibly threes.
In January 1935 Verney (Director of Technical Development) minuted Dowding (Air Member for Supply and Research).

"Wing Commander Keith has brought forward a new scheme for formation fighting which necessitates traversing the wing mounted guns through an arc of about 50 degrees. I have shown the scheme tentatively to the DCAS [Deputy Chief of the Air Staff] who is very interested, as it is evident that it offers a means of greatly increased rate of fire and concentration without the necessity for mounting as many as 8 guns, which may present difficulties"

The idea was that an entire formation of fighters could aim its guns at a target continuously during an approach on the 'curve of pursuit'. It also offered the possibility of fitting less guns to individual fighters whilst maintaining sufficient weight of fire from the formation.

Experiments were carried out using an experimental aircraft, the Hendy Heck.

This never ending quest to achieve a greater concentration of fire meant that for both F.10/35 (Spitfire/Hurricane) and F.37/35 (cannon fighter) it was

"contemplated that some or all of [their] guns should be mounted to permit of a degree of elevation or traverse with some form of control from the pilot's seat."

This wasn't deleted from F.37/35 until April 1936 and was not finally abandoned until Dowding, now AOC-in-C Fighter Command decided that the extra weight was not justified in 1937.
Even then Dowding remained interested in guns that were movable in the vertical plane to allow no allowance shooting. The first draft of F.18/37 (Typhoon/Tornado) stated that

"The Air Staff are anxious that the guns should be adjustable in elevation from 0 degrees to 15 degrees, if this is possible"

This suggestion had been removed by January 1938 in the final version of the specification circulated to industry.

Even then F.9/37, issued to Gloster in 1937, specified a twin engine fighter with a four gun midships turret and nose mounted cannon set at a no allowance angle. The turret was deleted but work progressed to a prototype no allowance cannon fighter.

We have got a little of course now, but it is important to understand the even in the period immediately preceding the war debate about both the best type of fighter and what its armament should be, continued. In 1937/38 it was by no means a given that a fixed, wing mounted, machine gun or cannon armament was the best or most efficient. Doubts were still being expressed about the ability of individual fighters to inflict sufficient damage on enemy bombers. These doubts were justified, but other factors enabled the fixed gun fighter to dominate the aerial battles of the coming years.

Cheers

Steve

Thank you again for posting this historical perspective.

I would agree that many specifications called for fighters to be both day and night fighters but basically all that meant was that the pilot/crew had a reasonably good chance of being able to take-off and land at night without crashing.
Exhausts should be placed (or shielded) so as not to cause the pilot to loose night vision, landing speed should be low, landing light and generator/battery should be fitted, landing flares and chutes fitted for emergency landing at air fields that are not equipped with runway lights.
The night fighter 'equipment' had nothing to do with actually locating an enemy plane or with shooting it down (different armament than day fighter).
In the early 30s the fitting of even a basic item like a generator was by no means universal and in many cases it was a wind driven generator.

The original Defiant concept was for the turret guns to be able to be set forwards and above the airscrew disk with a no deflection sight for the pilot to operate. Hence the pilot having a button to fire the turret guns IOTL. That the concept was not followed through does not mean that the Defiant was not designed to have forward firing fixed guns. It had them. Just not the sights, doctrine or training. The same weight of fire as a Gladiator or Skua. In night fighting the turret allowed the aeroplane to formate on the target in the best possible position for visual identification and with the least exposure to defensive fire and then attack from that position. The real downside to the turret was the weight and drag. Roughly equivalent to sending in Spitfires to attack Bf109s in the BoB with 500lb bomb under the fuselage.

yulzari said:

In night fighting the turret allowed the aeroplane to formate on the target in the best possible position for visual identification and with the least exposure to defensive fire and then attack from that position.

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Which turned out to be below and behind, not a million miles away from the Luftwaffe's much later 'Schrage Musik' system

The problem with forward firing armament on the Defiant, and any other single engine turret fighter, was the inability to depress the armament, when facing forward, even to the horizontal, as this would result in shooting into the cockpit or shooting off one's own propeller.
It was a long held belief that the 'forward hemisphere' was the most important to cover in the arcs of fire of whatever armament was fitted and a hemisphere obviously extends below the centre line of the aircraft.
It's why the proposed turret fighters had all previously been twin engine designs and the F.11/37 and then F.9/37 (to Gloster) were both proposed as twins.
Dowding wanted a forward firing machine gun, separate from the turret armament and to be operated by the pilot. This was contrary to the original reason given for not fitting independent forward firing armament to F.9/35, that it was " undesirable to split the armament."
Cheers
Steve

Part of the problem may be what was desired vs what was considered possible at a given point in time.
one possible hangup.
Production MK I Defiants got DH constant speed airscrews ( at least in manual of late 1939?), Not sure what the prototype had in Aug of 1937 let alone what the propeller proposed was in 1936. type of propeller really affects take-off distance and adding weight without the variable pitch prop may have pushed the Defiant over the edge of acceptable take-off? At over 1500lbs heavier than a Hurricane MK I (with constant speed prop) and slightly smaller wing adding more weight may not have been looked on with favor. Hurricane MK I added 40-45 yds to the take off-run/ distance to clear 50ft ob. with the addition of about 435lbs. Granted a single .303 Browing and ammo is a lot less but how close to maxing out some of the existing fields was the Defiant?
A 2nd possible hangup. How far along were the drawings or prototype construction? In other words how much delay would have adding the wing gun/s cause?

The divided armament argument may have included these or not, But goes back to the question of crew co-operation. Is the pilot maneuvering the plane to get the best possible firing solution for the fixed gun or for the turret. How long does it take to switch "mental gears" back and forth in combat as the situation changes? How well can gunner communicate to the pilot his (the gunners) needs/desires as the situation changes and at what point does he relinquish "control" of the fight to the pilot or at what point does he "take over", Tell pilot to quit trying a curve of pursuit attack (or head on attack or....) and position the fighter so the target is within the arc of fire of the turret. current or ex pilots on a committee are going to have certain set of opinions while advocates of the turret fighter are going to have different ones.

Sometimes decisions are made for many reasons. some large and some small.

Better props and relaxed take-off/landing requirements (longer runways) made adding weight a lot easier in 1939/40 than in 1936/7.