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Yes. I'm not kidding, by 1942 the Luftwaffe was already having problems with shortened pilot training. The slow burn of losses had started gradually killing the Luftwaffe because it had never been structured for a long war. There were already shortages of fuel for training, and the aircraft for advanced fighter training were pre-War versions of the ME109 at best, meaning new fighter pilots often reached their frontline units with zero hours on the latest models. On the Channel Front, where such inexperience was considered suicidal, units like JG26 introduced a training staffel to try and bring the new recruits up to speed. They started doing so in 1941. At no time was a similar approach used by JG27 or any other unit in the Med, as there simply wasn't the time, aircraft, fuel or experienced pilots to spare for instruction in that theatre, and certainly not the drive to do so from the Kommodores. Much-lauded aces like Marseille didn't bother teaching their newbies, they simply flew with the same wingmen and let the newbies follow behind.
By July 1942 even Goering couldn't duck the training issue. He did fudge a response by trying to absorb the C schulen into the advanced Ergaenzungseinheiten, but that just shifted the chokepoint. Even in 1942, far too much of the trainee's flying hours had to be done in gliders simply because the training schools were over-stretched and fuel-starved. The real impact was hidden for a while by the poor quality of opposition faced in the Desert and in Russia. When that opposition got better fighters and better operational training, the Luftwaffe's decline was rapid and irreversible.
Well, here is the thing.
JG 27 started pulling back in Sept of 1942 with two squadrons rotated out in October, and the last in December. JG 77 came into North Africa from June to Dec 1942 (with different squadrons coming in) and was still pretty fresh at that time. This corresponds to the phase in of the US merlin-engined P-40 units, starting with the 57th FG in June 1942. These were originally small elements attached to some of the British squadrons like 112, 250 and 260 RAF and 3 RAAF, but by October (2nd El Alemain) was a substantial contingent and were flying as independent units. 57th FG was fully operational by Aug 1942, 33rd FG by November, and 79th by December of 42. US P-38 units first arrived in November 1942.
The tipping point began around mid 1942 which was both when the Spitfires arrived (in small numbers at first) and when the Americans arrived with their P-40Fs and later, P-38s.
The arrival of the Yanks also coincided with three* important Tactical and Operational changes to DAF missions - first and foremost, to the use of wingmen and "finger four" formations (with assorted variations). According to at least one German pilot the Americans were the first ones he encountered doing this although it seems like the RAF started adopting the formations as well which may be unrelated. Second, was the RAF (or specifically, Australian) derived tactic of swinging into an attack as an entire squadron, guns blazing. This turned out to be a very effective way to break up a German 'bounce' from above, (quite important since most engagements with the Germans started with being bounced from above). Third, apparently due to an American impetus, was the switch in tactics to attacking Axis airfields with medium and heavy bombers, escorted mostly by P-40s which would then engage the German fighters that came up to defend. This was effective and had a lot to do with the destruction of both JG 27 and JG 77 in North Africa. A lot of Axis aircraft were destroyed by bombers on the ground and a lot of them were shot down as they climbed up from below to engage fighter escorts. This was made more possible by the new bombers brought into the Theater by the Americans - mainly B-25s and B-24s.
JG 27 was worn down by the RAF / DAF which was indeed mostly due to the British and Commonwealth pilots, JG 77 got there as the Yanks did and were in large part beaten by the Americans, specifically by escort fighters in those raids over their airfields. They were both broken** between third quarter 1942 and second quarter 1943, but they got only that way because of fierce fighting (and many casualties) by Allied forces. Neither unit was quite as hopeless in 1942 or 1943 as you suggest. Other German units like JG 2 (Fw 190, from Nov 1942) and JG 53 (Bf 109, from May 1942) were also involved in the campaign. Both were elite units.
I also think that too little attention is paid, and too little respect given to the Italian pilots in North Africa and their aircraft. In the early war they had obsolescent planes, though so did the Allies, and which side had the advantage went back and forth. But by 1942 the older cadre of CR 42 biplanes and open cockpit MC 200 and G.50 fighters was giving way to the excellent and quite deadly MC 202 and later in 1943, the MC 205, as well as more exotic types like the Re 2000 series and the rare but superb Fiat G.55. The venerable SM.79 meanwhile may have been the single most effective ship killer in the Med, certainly in the top three types***. Some of the Italian pilots may have been ambivalent about the war, and about Fascism in general which they had been enduring ten years longer than the Germans had by then, but they still gave a very good fight and showed a great deal of courage in many air battles, they were not the push-overs which seem to be assumed in the shorthand of the history.
As an aside, you seem to be a bit eager to engage in some Brit vs. Yank debating, but that is not the goal of this thread and what is more, quite a bit of that has already been discussed and hashed out upthread, which I'd again encourage you to read through or skim if you really want to wade into it. I really don't have a dog in that hunt - I think the Spitfire IX was the best fighter overall in the Theater full stop. The Spitfire mk V was more comparable with both it's competition and some of it's Allied stablemates but was still the best overall Allied fighter for 1942. I'm not claiming the P-40 of any version was the best fighter in the region, I am only suggesting that the historical record as we can currently percieve it shows us that it was a big more useful than had been previously assumed (or declared in the often misleading shorthand) and definitely was far from the worst.
The signals angle while quite interesting is certainly tangential to the discussion about comparing the two fighter types. Each of the major Allied powers, British and Americans, certainly made their mistakes and had their blind spots, as did some of the smaller countries involved, but thankfully they worked together, complimenting each others strengths and started to do so quite effectively by the third quarter of 1942 and from that point onward. In the Air in particular they seemed to have merged together well, and unlike the Luftwaffe the DAF was already quite good at being useful to the ground war. In 2nd El Alemain, on which battle I concede I am not an expert, from my understanding the air battle in general and CAS in particular was indeed quite important. Allied tank losses were very high and were nearing a tipping point, when air strikes for example took out some emplaced 88mm AT guns. I have the details somewhere and can dig them up if needed. Montgomerry notably formed a close relationship with the 79th Fighter Group as the result of some of these strikes, of which they were justifiably proud, and he continuously made use of them as a kind of CAS 'fire brigade' from that point onward.
The larger point we are addressing here is your claim that the air opposition was weak and worn out by the time the Americans got involved in the war. I would say that is far from the truth, the Axis air forces were strong and quite dangerous, and the battle was very hard fought. Commonwealth forces in general and DAF in particular were hard pressed for most of the first half of 1942 and the third quarter of that year in Tunisia etc. was a ferocious all out bloodbath comparable in scale and ferocity to some of the battles going on in Russia at that time. They could certainly have used the Typhoon, and they definitely needed the P-40.
The various arguments put forth as to why the Typhoon wasn't sent to the Med and more broadly why it didn't score more victories in the long period from 1941-1944 are somewhat plausible but not 100% convincing to me. Yes the Sabre would have been a new engine with a new supply chain, though this was partly true for the R-2800 of the P-47 and the B-26 (and the Ventura as well apparently). Yes the Typhoon was perhaps wanted for defense of the Home Island which certainly did take priority, but I think the Spitfire was ideal for that - however it is true that once Fw 190 raids started the Tiffy had an important role in countering them.
Overall however I suspect that if the Typhoon had performed more like the Tempest from an earlier period, and there is no real reason in my mind that it couldn't have (if they had made the wing a bit differently and sorted out a few other design problems) they probably would have sent some to fight in the Med and it would have made a big difference.
* There may have also been increasing use of overboosting engines but that is a bit controversial around here and we don't need to go down that tunnel, as I doubt it was as important as the three things I mentioned above.
** And were of course, quickly re-formed to rejoin the fight
*** Ok realistically I'd say Beaufighter, Ju 88 and then SM 79. But they were quite dangerous.
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