Geoffrey Sinclair
Staff Sergeant
- 849
- Sep 30, 2021
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How true or simplified is the story the A-36 was ordered and built as a way to keep the Inglewood production line open when there were no USAAF orders for the fighter version?
This one may be in class by itself as sort of myth contained within a myth.Among some of his better known fabrications (or "Caidinisms") are the "fork-tail devil" name origin
True but most forget that 78th FG in December 1942 was trained and scheduled to receive the P-38 as the 4th P-38 FG scheduled for 8th AF Operations when Torch diverted their P-38s and sent them to MTO.The USAAF had a total of 3 P-38 groups available for Europe from late 1942 until mid October 1943, the question being where they were going to be the most effective. Similarly the USAAF had 3 P-47 groups available in April 1943, with a fourth in mid August 1943. The ETO logs first P-47 arrivals in December 1942, the MTO in October 1943 with the 12th Air Force having a P-47 group on strength in December, by which stage there were 9 operational and 1 not operational P-47 groups in Britain.
Simply because neither the P-38 nor the P-47 were conceived as CAS when brought into service. As to survivavbiilty over France (or Italy), the AAF-HQ CAS planners deviated from the slow dive bomber strategy in early 1942 to that of the fast battlefield air superiorty attack/fighter/light bomber. The Board that evaluated the A-24/31/35 and XB32 deemed them non-survivable due to lack of airspeed and ability to defend against fighter attacks. The Mustang I morphed from superior Pursuit, when compared to P-40 to Low Level Attack/Dive bomber A-36 to Pursuit/glide bomber/rocket attack in P-51A to same for P-51B, when saner heads recognized the potential for LR Escort.Why would anyone put a turbo supercharger on a ground attack aircraft? The USAAF in 1942 was acquiring dive bombers from USN production plus had the A-31/35, and as it turned out they could have probably deployed dive bombers in France in 1944 with few problems from enemy aircraft. More A-36, using P-40 as the fighter bombers like the RAF was doing with Hurricanes were also options. The pressing allied need was enough fighters with comparable or better performance to the axis ones and during the first half of 1943 the axis fighters were coming to the allies, or at least disputing the front line. That changed in the second half of 1943.
By August 1942, the production plan also called for 500 A-36 and 1200 P-51A for 1943 delivery. The 'plan' changed in October/November when the P-51B/C-1 contracts were let for 400 and 350 respectively plus changed to deliver 310 P-51A with rest of AC-30749 converted to 800 P-51B-5s - all scheduled for 1943 delivery. All of the 310 P-51A, most of the 500 A-36 (some delivered in 1942), 400 B-1, 177C-1, 800 B-5 were delivered in 1943 for total of ~ 2000 P-51 (incl A-36). IIRC there never was a shutdown of P-51 production from 1941 forward.The thinnest part of theline at Inglewood was the crossover of the P-51-NA/Mustang IA endingin early November while the A-36 proceeded from October to April 1943. The first complete P-51B-1 airframe was complete in March 1943 but engines didn't start arriving unil late April, 1943. In February/March the A-36, P-51A and P-51B-1 existed together at Inglewood.As of August 1942 the production plan was to leave the P-39 in full production to October 1943, going through the D, F, K, L, M, N and Q versions, then switching to the P-63, P-40 production would end in May 1943 with the P-40L, Curtiss switching to the P-47G, which would start production in November 1942. Republic built P-47 would go to the D version in February 1943, as of September 1943 the planned peak monthly output for each factory would be reached, Curtiss 273, Farmingdale 183, Evansville 133, while over at Inglewood it was 105 P-51, or over 5 P-47 per P-51 per month, all up during 1943 Curtiss would build 1,979 P-47, Farmingdale 2,160 and Evansville 977. Inglewood would resume P-51 production in May 1943, with 825 built by the end of 1943. As it turned out total 1943 production was Curtiss 271 P-47, Farmingdale 3,024 P-47, Evansville 1,131 P-47, Inglewood 1,533 P-51, and the not mentioned in the schedule Dallas 177 P-51. If you like the USAAF scheduled 5,115 P-47 for 1943 and received 4,426.
The drop tank question/debate is important, but nothing in the development pipline for the -47D matterered until a.) wing and pylon and fuel feed were incorporated to maximize capability of fixed 305g internal fuel capacity, and b.) the internal fuel capacity was increased from 305g to 370g - delivered in Jan/Feb 1944 and May/June 1944 respectively.Part of the question is how much of the self defending bomber idea the 8th Air Force held for so much longer than others was because they had to, given their targets, and then how that played out in the early decision for fighters and bombers to fight their separate battles. Eaker was asking the British for local drop tank production, in February 1943 the 8th had been warned the stretched British industry could not handle rush orders, in June the 8th was interested in large numbers of drop tanks but it took until early October for local production to receive final design approval.
LuftFlotte 3 was deemed (tentativey) adequate in 1942 through spring 1943, but elements of JG11 and 3 were being moved. Hamburg during Blitz Week raised the 3-Alarm fire warning - and could be cited as the transition from JG26/2 being front line of defense to the layered defense to include t/e day and night fighters - as well as Lwbh Mitte to LF Reich as planning for central defense. Additionally Milch implemented nearly double fighter production over previous levels. JG 27 was gradually pulled from MTO as well units of JG 54 from Ost Front as the migration of units from Ost and Sud fronts began.The USAAF had 3 P-38 and 2 Spitfire groups available in early 1943, joined by 3 P-47 groups in April, for the ETO and MTO, the only fighters available that had the altitude ability and performance to at least match the Bf109G and Fw190A. The Luftwaffe spent the first half of 1943 minimising its fighter commitment in the ETO while trying hard to dispute MTO airspace. The losses the Luftwaffe took in the MTO, the tactical and strategic benefits the allies gained there through 1943 all say the USAAF made the correct call on where it put its better fighters in early 1943. Remembering the people in early 1943 were operating off a more optimistic schedule for USAAF growth, so the P-38 groups sent to the MTO were expected to be replaced sooner than what happened.
Spaatz was still USSAF, commanding 8th AF and 9th, when he moved to command USAAF in MTO for Torch. Eaker then reported to Arnold with careful co-operation with Spaatz. Eaker fell out of favor gradually in the eyes of Arnold for a variety of reasons - mostly invalid and attributable by Arnold's impatience with 8th Ops slowness in aattacking strategic German targets. That said, NOTHING was clear regarding command structure for Overlord. I suspect that you could cite the olitics and in-fighting between US Army (Marshall, Eisenhower), USAAF (Arnold, Eaker, Spaatz), RAF and probably each of the CombinedChiefs in very fluid kabuka dances from Thanksgiving 1943, through Mid December.One thing that was not apparent at the time but clear now, the Mediterranean command team was going to command Overlord, as they were the most experienced allied commanders.
Why would you think that Doolittle-Spaatz gained some advantage in air operations and esort requirements when 8th AF was attacking the French/Netherlands and Germany, 100% protected by LW - the same LW that wrested control of the air from RAF and US? While MTO sorties were not near Germany, were freqently escorted by P-38s to the targets in Africa, Sicily and Italy aainst far less robust air defenses in MTO?Doolittle and Spaatz learnt a lot about heavy bomber raids and their escort requirements in 1943, which needed P-38s. In the period June 1942 to April 1943 inclusive 461 USAAF heavy bomber sorties attacked targets in Germany, according to the statistical digest the USAAF in the ETO launched 3,722 heavy bomber sorties while losing a total of 122 to enemy aircraft in the 10 months, the MTO 5,802 sorties losing 42 to enemy aircraft.
Mixed. There were in fact FY42 funds for Dive Bomber, as well as the political will and muscle in AAF-Hq Planning&Reqirements and CAS to ignore AAF-MC - to compel a selection of a high performance High-speed dive bombing version of the Mustang. There is significant evidence that Arnold was the King behind the tie breaker when Echols protested the selection, citing the XP-32 as the answer to a mother's prayers. It is a fact that Kindelberger hosted Spaatz and Arnold in Jan 1942 and were shown the A-36 Proposal. It is a fact that Eaker flew the XP-51#2 at Inglewood as e transitioned from CO of 20th PG to CO of 8th AF in December 1941 - and praised it highly, with a follow up letter to Arnold.How true or simplified is the story the A-36 was ordered and built as a way to keep the Inglewood production line open when there were no USAAF orders for the fighter version?
In letters to my Grandmother, my Uncle Jimmy (her brother) was calling the P-38 a "fork-tail devil" in 1942, while he was training on it.This one may be in class by itself as sort of myth contained within a myth.
Pilot's Manual for the P-38 in WW II has the "fork tail devil" quote in the introduction.
Doesn't say where it is from.
Wiki biography of Caidin says he was born in 1927. He was getting articles published in aviation magazines during WW II but for the Army to quote a 15-17 year old kid in a flight manual?
I have no doubt that Caidin used the phrase in his books but then any author who bothered to read the intro in the pilots manual would have seen it.
AAF manual 51-127-1 on page 6.
Well I'll be.This one may be in class by itself as sort of myth contained within a myth.
Pilot's Manual for the P-38 in WW II has the "fork tail devil" quote in the introduction.
Doesn't say where it is from.
Wiki biography of Caidin says he was born in 1927. He was getting articles published in aviation magazines during WW II but for the Army to quote a 15-17 year old kid in a flight manual?
I have no doubt that Caidin used the phrase in his books but then any author who bothered to read the intro in the pilots manual would have seen it.
AAF manual 51-127-1 on page 6.
The 78th Fighter Group transition from P-38 to P-47 is directly related to P-38 losses, how likely is the P-38 force staying in England taking fewer casualties during the time period? Given your description of the air defences in the Mediterranean as less robust. One thing I do not have is the date when it was decided the RAF Eagle Squadrons would become the 4th Fighter group, the move happened in September 1942, and the subsequent decision to equip them with P-47 given the impact on USAAF requirements, for a start more P-47. The 78th began the transition to P-47 in February and the 4th in March 1943.most forget that 78th FG in December 1942 was trained and scheduled to receive the P-38 as the 4th P-38 FG scheduled for 8th AF Operations when Torch diverted their P-38s and sent them to MTO.
28 July for P-47 over Germany, with further blitz week strikes on 29 and 30 July.The question of most efffective in MTO vs ETO will always be debated as the P47C and D never actually penetrated German airspace until July 1943 at the end of Blitz week, when the 8th was establishing an operational rythm in deeper strikes to mid Germany. Within three weeks following Blitz week was the disastrous Tidal Wave attack at Ploesti, followed by Regensburg-Schweinfurt missions on August 17th.
The 20th FG arrived on 26 August, the 55th FG arrived on 16 September 1943. Neither could be available for July or August operations.The 55th and 20th arrivals in ops October and December brings 6 LR Escort capable of full coverage during Blitz week and Regensburg- Schweinfurt.
Ignoring the A-24 and A-24A transfers from USN orders which started with 68 in 1941. The A-24B contract date is 1 December 1942, acceptances March to December 1943, 42-54285 to 54899, A-25A contract date is 27 May 1943 but acceptances were December 1942 to March 1944, 41-18774 to 18873, 42-79663 to 80462. The A-36 were 42-83663 to 84162, contract dated 7 August 1942 acceptances October 1942 to March 1943. The problems of the A-24 in New Guinea were later in 1942. As far as I am aware although the USAAF ended up with plenty of A-31/35 the orders were all originally meant for others.Simply because neither the P-38 nor the P-47 were conceived as CAS when brought into service. As to survivavbiilty over France (or Italy), the AAF-HQ CAS planners deviated from the slow dive bomber strategy in early 1942 to that of the fast battlefield air superiorty attack/fighter/light bomber. The Board that evaluated the A-24/31/35 and XB32 deemed them non-survivable due to lack of airspeed and ability to defend against fighter attacks. The Mustang I morphed from superior Pursuit, when compared to P-40 to Low Level Attack/Dive bomber A-36 to Pursuit/glide bomber/rocket attack in P-51A to same for P-51B, when saner heads recognized the potential for LR Escort.
I think you will find Spitfires flew none to very few fighter bomber sorties in North Africa, they were needed for air superiority, it was Malta with its all Spitfire force that began (a few) fighter bomber operations. The allied air situation in North Africa/Tunisia was consider serious enough the RAF formed an elite fighter unit, the Polish fighter flight, gave it the latest equipment and only one mission, air superiority.One may argue eloquently that the Allies did very well indeed with the P-40 and Spit and Hurricane - with a slight nod to P-39 - leading the way for multi purpose Fighter role in Africa.
See above for the heavy bomber activities. We know from the 8th and 15th Air Force reports the P-38 were not good at shooting down large number of axis interceptors. They were very good at enabling the bombers to hit targets with low losses to enemy aircraft. No one is claiming the P-38 were crucial to Torch, they were important for the heavy bomber forces to hit longer ranged targets with acceptable losses and those targets were important axis supply routes.IIRC there were only 3, then five BG(H) in 12th AF through re-assignment to 15th AF in November 1943. The P-38, while suitable for MTO medium range attacks, while based in N.Africa and then Sicily - weren't attritting LW any more than the P-40 and Spits combined. May one argue that P38 was critical to early success for Torch? Hardly. The P-38 FG got their heads handed to them unti they learned to capitalize on thier strengths and quit 'dogfighting'.
My opinion is the Luftwaffe was set up to fail in 1944 by a whole lot of factors, one of which was the allied tactical air forces had gained control of the front line and to a depth of around tactical fighter, light and medium bomber range by no later than end 1943 as well as inflicting continual losses on the Luftwaffe. The Luftwaffe fighter force had withdrawn out of that range to defend Germany against the heavy bomber raids, that fight remained, along with a bombing plan that was able to really hurt the German war economy.POINTBLANK on the other hand was the highest priority tasking for the Allied Air Forces - and the 12th AF, save the attack on Ploesti hardly contributed to the Combined Allied Air Forces attacks on German industry or the destruction of the LW as well demanded of 8th AF/RAF BC. That said I respect your opinion to the contrary.
With the unpressurised 200 gallon tank belly tank and the 1943 108 gallon types the P-47 was able to make western Germany from mid 1943, the 150 gallon belly tank was next in March 1944. If nothing mattered means attacking targets in most to all of Germany then the statement is correct, if it means enabling the P-47 to encounter large numbers of Luftwaffe fighters the statement is incorrect, given the combat claims.The drop tank question/debate is important, but nothing in the development pipline for the -47D matterered until a.) wing and pylon and fuel feed were incorporated to maximize capability of fixed 305g internal fuel capacity, and b.) the internal fuel capacity was increased from 305g to 370g - delivered in Jan/Feb 1944 and May/June 1944 respectively.
The early period where the fighters would sweep one area and the bombers would bomb another area.There was no decision for 'fighters and bombers to fight their separate battles'.
See above for some of the details and while the Hamburg firestorm certainly made it clear for the first time bombers looked like being a major threat it also happened after the failures in the east and south.LuftFlotte 3 was deemed (tentativey) adequate in 1942 through spring 1943, but elements of JG11 and 3 were being moved. Hamburg during Blitz Week raised the 3-Alarm fire warning - and could be cited as the transition from JG26/2 being front line of defense to the layered defense to include t/e day and night fighters - as well as Lwbh Mitte to LF Reich as planning for central defense. Additionally Milch implemented nearly double fighter production over previous levels. JG 27 was gradually pulled from MTO as well units of JG 54 from Ost Front as the migration of units from Ost and Sud fronts began.
If Republic are being sent (lots of) reports of buggy aircraft which becomes more important, fixing the bugs or increasing internal and external fuel?The MTO had 3 P-38 and 2 Spitfire groups available in early 1943. The 8th AF had ONE Spitfire FG operational (4th FG) with two P-47FGs 'in-training' (The 56th and 78th - and the 78th had P-38 trained pilots trying to learn the buggy P-47C).
See above and many of the benefits were done before July and effectively all by end October. To sustain the raids the 8th needs losses around 5%, or a quarter of the historical losses. Also with the large amount of stocks, supply from other countries and other parts of Germany plus rebuilding the 8th would need repeated attacks. And as the postulated change in force mix does not increase the number of fighters available, but does decrease the amount of axis fighters they can be expected to shoot down there is a long way to go before the long range raids are sustainable.Could you highlight strategic benefits in MTO (for P-38) which outweighed having LR escorts to Schweinfurt, perhaps cutting losses by 50% and enabling immediate return to Schweinfurt until bearings capacity was seriously curtailed before Speer could de-centralize?
Yes, hence my comment about apparent now, Marshall was a candidate for command, Eisenhower could write how the US were now the Mediterranean supporters, not the British (Anvil/Dragoon). Careful selection of material can make it look like the US was dragged kicking and screaming into Overlord by the British for example.NOTHING was clear regarding command structure for Overlord. I suspect that you could cite the olitics and in-fighting between US Army (Marshall, Eisenhower), USAAF (Arnold, Eaker, Spaatz), RAF and probably each of the CombinedChiefs in very fluid kabuka dances from Thanksgiving 1943, through Mid December.
Mainly as they had to factor in being part of a combined plan that included the army and navy, they had to first gain control of their own airspace, they needed much more immediate results on targets out of tactical air range and were more directly exposed to some of the most experienced air commanders on the allied side. Which dates are you talking about when the Luftwaffe had control and where? The Fw190 was making life very hard for the RAF over coastal France in 1942 for a start.Why would you think that Doolittle-Spaatz gained some advantage in air operations and esort requirements when 8th AF was attacking the French/Netherlands and Germany, 100% protected by LW - the same LW that wrested control of the air from RAF and US?
The allied navies had a priority task in 1942/43, win the Battle of the Atlantic, Torch drew large numbers of ships away from that battle and added extra convoy duties, making the victory take longer and be harder. Being part of a combined plan which inevitably has to make trade offs. The 8th Air Force was ultimately going nowhere if it lacked clear supply lines.You might note the many joint operations and co-ordination with RAF in Africa as well as the fact that AAF-MTO had ALL to FGs originally tasked for 8th AF and 8th AF not only had to rebuild VIII FC but also had to replace the experienced 97th, 301st BG (H), 81st FG, 1st, 14th and 82nd FG, 31st aand 52nd FG, but also the B-26BG (17th, 310th, 319th, 320th) and the 47th BG (A-20)
Bingo! That was a product of the Burbank PR office the way "Whistling Death" was a product of the Stratford (Vought) PR office."Der Gabelschwanz Teufel" and other nicknames.
Muskeg is spot-on. Caidin and a few others (Hoyt comes to mind) passed for historians in the 50s and 60s. IMO that was because the market had not evolved to the point of knowledgeable readers who began seeking more detail and credibility.Which popular WW2 aircraft and air combat "histories" are simply not true?
Almost anything written by by Martin Caidin.
I grew up reading all the WW2 aviation "history" authored or edited by Caidin that I could find. He's undoubtedly a "colorful" storyteller who spun tales that rivaled the best of the 1960s and early '70s war comics. Little did I know then... At least Caidin's work is to a large part responsible for my lifelong interest in military aviation.
Nope, SM-79s - read the history of "PQ-17 - Convoy from Hell" - my uncle was there.Italian torpedo bomber on Murmansk convoy?? imho this is false
There were no Regia Aeronautica aircraft attached to Luftflotte 5 in Norway.Nope, SM-79s - read the history of "PQ-17 - Convoy from Hell" - my uncle was there.
Nope, SM-79s - read the history of "PQ-17 - Convoy from Hell" - my uncle was there.
imho the book and your uncle are wrong,Nope, SM-79s - read the history of "PQ-17 - Convoy from Hell" - my uncle was there.
There were no Regia Aeronautica aircraft attached to Luftflotte 5 in Norway.
The Regia Aeronautica participated in the Battle of Britain and on the Eastern Front but no further north.