WHICH RIFLE?

From an official test report.

" I have seen it stated that celerity of loading and firing might be found objectionable, as the solider would too soon expend his ammunition........I am fully convinced that there is no force to such an objection. The soldier in battle, possessed of angun that can be instantly reloaded, keeping his eye on the foe, confident of his power and strength (that he is always ready), naturally is inspired with courage and self-possession which are valuable to a solider........I can see no reason to justify the idea that a soldier qualified with an arm possessing great celerity of fire is likely to waste his ammunition at the first sight of a distant enemy.............

I.......recommend that it's adoption to the Marine Corps, believing, as i do, that such an action on the part of the Government will increase the efficiency of that force more than double its present power."

From the report of J. Green, First Lieutenant, U.S. Marine Corps, to Colonel John Harris, Commandant, Marine Corps, 6 February 1860

Report was on the Sharps Breech-loading rifle (which at the time used a separate percussion cap from cartridge) compared to the currant muzzle loader.

The argument that soldiers would waste their ammo and quickly run out is an old one.

I am working my way through the first posted link/report and so far it seems to be a snipe hunt.

Posting a picture of the most complicated and expensive rear sight used on a general issue rifle in WW II seems at least as relevant
as 300 page treatise on artillery and airpower as used to hold down infantry casualties in insurgent warfare. I will keep reading and see if the author actually mentions small arms more than once every few dozen or few score pages

Passage from page 79
"Firepower too easily becomes an acceptable and quick solution for commanders who have neither the experience nor the time to come to grips with the militarily elusive and politically sophisticated challenges of counterinsurgency operations. It is through overemphasis and over-reliance on artillery and aerial bombardment that commanders change effective military tactics into counterproductive operations."

firepower seems to be synonymous with artillery and air strikes so far in this Treatise.

parsifal said:

There is nothing inherently wrong with the Garand, or M1 (ie the carbine, which is always referred to as the M1 in Oz). I have no doubt that Americans would have no difficulty entering into a fit of self adulation about it, but as an outsider who knows veterans who had no special attachment to it, and were unfortunate enough to work with people that used it, it has quite serious problems .


Its problems are less technological as operational. You take a garand pull the trigger, chances are it will fire, and fire well, unless it has run out of ammunition. And therein lies its chief problem. If you are on patrol in the jungle, or surrounded in north western Europe, or cut off in the desert, or stuck in the snow, or the mountains of Algeria (ie nearly every situation your average American GI is likely to fight, in) you are going to be limited in your ammunition supply. In the jungle you would often be restricted to just 3-5 reloads for your personal weapon. The average squaddie would carry about 50% of the ammunition he carried as ammunition for the heavy weapons in the squad. On contact, squad MG goes to ground, and the first thing everyone does is throw or pass their ammo pouches for the squad MG to that gun position. If the squad is supported by a mortar, everyone will also be carrying mortar rounds for that weapon as well. First job for the grunts on point is locate the enemy position causing the problem. No-one would be firing at this stage, except if you are a trigger happy American with a Garand. Chances are you have been taught to go to ground and start firing like an idiot. The weapon you are equipped with is perfect for that way of thinking, so off you go expending ammunition and giving away your position like you have nothing to worry about.


Logistics for the front line is always a problem, and a force that is equipped to just blaze away the minute contact is made, and is equipped with a weapon made for that purpose, and trained to react in that way, will run out of ammo fast, and will take casualties that they needn't.. Instead of using your grunts as you should….to be targets basically (but hard targets because your enemy isn't sure where you are) and out there to protect the main squad assets as quietly and efficiently as you can, they are all out there trying ti win the fight on their own resources. This is about the worst way to manage your small unit tactics. And the garand is built for that purpose.


Americans are taught to get as many rounds out as quickly as they can, trying to win the battle single handedly. After all, they are equipped with the most up to date side arm, fully semi automatic and well able to empty the magazine in seconds. Result of this John Wayne attitude is a squad that is loud, inaccurate and a logistic liability. The Garand and M1 are built for that purpose, and from an operational point of view should not be viewed as optimal weaponary especially in the WWII era when re-supply was even more difficult than it is now. Only by the use of overwhelming numbers were the American forces able to keep their loss rates to low levels. That is not a mark of success. It is the mark of desperation.

Click to expand...

Pretty much a load of crap.

Tell me, were British squaddies limited to just 3-5 reloads for the Enfields? 30-50 rounds of personnel ammo?

The US soldiers in June of 1941 were supposed to carry 40 round on their person on the march with 192 rounds held in the unit ammunition train. 96 rounds were to issued prior to combat in 48 round bandoleers (total 12 reloads in addition to the first 5) with 96 held as reserve. a further 96 rounds (also in 8 round clips and bandoleers) was held on the ammunition train of a higher unit.
US troops with either M1 Garands or 1903s did NOT carry ammo for the BAR/s unless they were a designated assistant gunner or ammunition carrier. In pre war literature twenty five 20 round magazines are accounted for between the gunner, the assistant gunner and one ammo carrier when kitted out for combat ( the assistant gunner and ammo carrier are also carrying bandoleers of ammo in rifle clips to reload the magazines with, not a full amount for all 25 magazines).

Now in actual combat and with supply problems this could and did change and in later use the ammo carrier may have been done away with in the squad.

I am still trying to figure out
"most up to date side arm, fully semi automatic and well able to empty the magazine in seconds"

Fully semi automatic as opposed to semi semi automatic?
The Garand was semi auto ONLY (just like the SLR) and the M1 Carbine only got the full auto option at the end of 1944/early 1945. Before that it too was semi-auto only and was not a common weapon in the first year or two of the war. A squad was much more likely to have a Thompson gun in it than an M1 Carbine. The carbine not being approved for production (standardized) until Oct 22 of 1941 let alone actually going into production. It's influence on 1930s US army thinking or tactics would be non-existent. The Project started in 1938 with announced purpose of replacing the .45 automatic pistol for 2nd line (support) troops like drivers, artillerymen, signalers and the like. Again, influence on combat troops or infantry tactics would have been non-existent in this time frame.


ut please note that it is quite possible to empty an Enfield in mere seconds also.

Now can you actually show anything in print that supports your position?

and spare me any more wild goose chases like
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a233505.pdf

A very interesting read about the use of artillery and airpower in support of troops but has nothing to do with the either the selection or use of rifles, submachine guns or squad automatics in the first indo-chinese war, Korea, the 2nd indo-chinese war, Afghanistan (Russian involvement) or the Falkland Islands.
It has about as much to do with the US selection of the M1 Garand and it's initial use/doctrine (1930s)as a cook book on 100 recipes for apple pie.

As a treatise on the use of artillery and airpower in limited wars it is very good.

One of the few mentions of small arms in the Treatise on firepower Pages 243/244

"It is essential that infantry in training be imbued with a bold, aggressive attitude. Many units do not acquire this attitude until long after their entry into combat, and some never acquire it. On the other hand units containing specially selected personnel such as Airborne and Rangers exhibited an aggressive spirit from the start. The average infantry soldier places too much reliance upon the supporting artillery to drive the enemy from positions opposing his advance. He has not been impressed sufficiently with his own potency and the effect of well-aimed, properly distributed rifle and machine gun fire.'

This from a study done by the US army post Normandy. bolding by me.
This hardly sounds like the attitude/position of an army training it's men to flop on their bellies and and fire all available ammunition as fast as possible as soon as contact is made.

Pretty much a load of crap.

Tell me, were British squaddies limited to just 3-5 reloads for the Enfields? 30-50 rounds of personnel ammo?

You've never done any time in rough terrain of any description have you.

to answer the question, the 1937 Infantry training handbook states that the issue of ammunition to front line units would depend on the particular war establishments, in other words it depends. In northern Europe on those days when there were not ammunition shortages the standard issue was 5-8 reloads....about 50-80 rounds. The Infantry handbook stressed the importance of re-supply, so the logidiyic support units in theory were pushed as far forward as possible.

That's the theory. in practice it seldom panned out that way. At gona, the standard issue unless you were part of a designated assault, the standard issue was 3 rounds per man. There was no support echelon to speak of . Re-supply, such as it was was by mule , carrier or aircraft, and typically men went into battle with 3 or 4 reloads maximum

Still think its a load of crap?

At Tobruk the ammunition issue was halved most of the time. there were plenty of ammunition stockpiles in the defensive trenches, but Tobruk was mostly a war of patrols and surprises. the Italians tried hunkering down in the trenches and ended uo surrendering the fortress. To keep the enemy off guard and off balance, there was a constant battle of night patrols and battles often fought with no ammunition.

At Gallipoli the standard issue was again three rounds and the trench raids were often carried out with no ammunition.

Moreover the combat experience of all armies was that resupply echelons could seldom get ammunition to the men under fire in near sufficient quantities . Operating with inadequate supply of ammunition was the norm rather than the exception

Still want to claim its pretty much a load of crap. I will tell what is a load of crap. Quoting out of standard texts with NO CLUE as to what happens in the real world


The US soldiers in June of 1941 were supposed to carry 40 round on their person on the march with 192 rounds held in the unit ammunition train. 96 rounds were to issued prior to combat in 48 round bandoleers (total 12 reloads in addition to the first 5) with 96 held as reserve. a further 96 rounds (also in 8 round clips and bandoleers) was held on the ammunition train of a higher unit.
US troops with either M1 Garands or 1903s did NOT carry ammo for the BAR/s unless they were a designated assistant gunner or ammunition carrier. In pre war literature twenty five 20 round magazines are accounted for between the gunner, the assistant gunner and one ammo carrier when kitted out for combat ( the assistant gunner and ammo carrier are also carrying bandoleers of ammo in rifle clips to reload the magazines with, not a full amount for all 25 magazines

That's pretty much the same as was assumed for the british, Australian and indian soldiers in Malaya. they went into the jungles overburdened and unable to manoeuvre. And over reliant on wheeled transport. they were easily outflanked and defeated by a far more agile enemy carrying no rice, just ammunition and limited amounts of that so that they were not bogged down by the weight.
Because there is no support echelon you also have to carry one or two rounds of mortar ammunition. You will probably also need to carry a couple of grenades . Because there is no support echelons you will have to carry rounds for your support gun. If you leave it up to your gunner and his number 2 to carry over 100 rounds was it, they are not going to be anywhere in sight. Now you are carrying your 100 rounds of spare ammunition. you are up to your knees in mud, haven't eaten for a week and are fighting on an incline of about 35 degrees, with a couple of thousand steps to climb. still think you are going into battle with 100 rounds? I can tell you you aren't. If you try you will end on the side of the track crying into your mess tin for your mommy to come and get you. Pretty much what did happen to the US army in the jungle at the start.


Ive shown you stuff in print, had to ask you twice to read it. You claim you've read it, but think that its just about artillery apparently. not what I read I have to say. not much point in giving you anything further to read, when your experience and comprehension is just so limited.


Saying that US GIs don't carry ammunition for their main firepower....the BAR just confirms that they reied heavily on the firepower of their rifle squads as a subsititute for the MG. And such reliance lessened the effectiveness of the squad overall

parsifal said:

Ive shown you stuff in print, had to ask you twice to read it. You claim you've read it, but think that its just about artillery apparently. not what I read I have to say. not much point in giving you anything further to read, when your experience and comprehension is just so limited.

Click to expand...

I read it.
It says nothing about rifles or ammunition loads for rifles or even for any squad weapon.

If I am wrong give me page numbers.

My comprehension doesn't seem to be much worse than yours when you seem to confuse two different rifles the M1 Garand and the M1 Carbine.
and you seem to confuse full automatic rifles and semi automatic rifles.

Claiming a bolt action rifle is superior to a semi auto because it doesn't use ammo as fast is a crap argument.

Bringing supply issues of three rounds a man is also crap. I could fire 3 rounds from a bolt action rifle in 6-7 seconds and keep the 3 rounds in a 1 foot circle at 200 yds. Whoops, my ammo allotment is gone in seconds. The bolt rifle didn't save me. If if don't aim I can probably fire 3 rounds in 4-5 seconds. If I don't get 3 more rounds until the next day it doesn't matter what kind of rifle I use. I could use a Martini-Henry and use up my allotment in under 10 seconds.



You want to convince me that the US Army used mass un-aimed rapid rifle fire as a doctrine/training standard before or even during WW II come up with a training film or training manual that says so or lays out such a training course.

You want to argue that the US Army slipped into that doctrine/training mode in the late 50s or in the 60s during the Vietnam war I won't argue. I don't know one way or the other and the results ( and newsreel footage) show an appalling lack of aimed fire. but that is 15-20 years after you claim it started.

Again. give me the page numbers in the first link. Show me where my comprehension is so bad. Pages/paragraphs that talk about small arms and NOT JUST firepower (which can be anything).

I will give you start pages 143/144

"In his debriefing report, written after relinquishing command of the I Field Force in 1971, General "Ace" Collins reported a disturbing and pervasive tendency among his junior leaders to call for artillery, gunships, and air support in response to any contact, even some involving as few as two or three enemy. The result, he contended, was an immediate loss of the tactical tempo, as troops waited around for the firepower to arrive and be coordinated. When the advance resumed, the enemy was gone. Collins suggested to his superiors that the infantry begin again to stress the importance of small unit tactics and the habitual use of rifles and grenade launchers. "When we have a large enemy unit, or when he is well dug in," he wrote, we properly should use all the firepower available to get him out. But we routinely follow the overwhelming firepower route, regardless of enemy strength or size."
Italics mine.

Page 151

"Critical professional skills were lost by the ARVN during the days of firebases, airmobile operations, and massive fire support. After ten years of neglect, ARVN leaders forgot the art of maneuver warfare. They rarely employed any form of maneuver other than frontal assault-a deadly business if not fully supported by firepower. They gave little thought to envelopment or flanking maneuvers. The principles of fire and movement using organic infantry weapons were also in eclipse. Seldom did young leaders establish a base of fire with rifles and machineguns while a maneuver element moved against the enemy. Battalions appeared to be completely dependent on outside fire support-a dependence that became tragic once massive outside support disappeared."

Italics mine. Now maybe you think that such passages show the US (and their trainees) adopted a John Wayne shoot all available ammo as fast as possible from rifles upon contact mindset.

I don't.

I won't argue that the US troops sent to New Guinea were not poor performers. They were for a variety of reason. But substituting M1903s for M1 rifles wouldn't have changed much of anything.

BOTH of you knock it off with the personal attacks.

I apologise for the outburst.

The US was involved in active operations for 44 months in the ETO, and 48 in the PTO.


It was engaged in active operations in the PTO from the first day to the last nearly all of the campaigns were fought in poor terrain, or in conditions where getting supply to the front line was difficult. You could put the whole of the campaigns on the SWPac, and the soPac in those categories, so too the battles to retake the PI. You would probably place the battles on tarawa betio etc in the category of 'poorly supplied" as well. There certainly shortages experienced on saipan, By the time the 1945 campaigns rolled around the afloat supply train was completely sorted out and the front line soldier was not short of anything even on a temporary basis.

At the other end of the spectrum was the US army's experience in PNG. Even though the supply was getting to the supply heads in vast quantities, the difficulty was getting it from those dumps to the front line. The US army, like us suffered chronic shortages in that campaign in the places they needed supply. Sometimes they might be fully supplied as you say, other times, most of the time in fact, they were not. in those situations conservation of ammunition was critical, but it was difficult to get the USAC units engaged in that campaign to follow those principals. They had, as you say, been trained in the 30.s to assume a fully functioning support echelon, but for most of the crucial battles they were engaged in this just wasn't the case. More times than not they were short of ammunition. The worst was I think the slogging match in buna, but the whole PNG campaign was pretty desperate. You could throw guadacanal, New Georgia even boungainville into this group. US operations in Burma were the same. This takes you through to at least the end of 1943, where the US army operated in sub par supply conditions.

In the ETO most of 1942 the army was not engaged. They became engaged from November and rapidly their campaign broke down due to the terrain, the poor logistics and of course the stiffening opposition. Each of these factors fed off each other I think.

In Sicily and Italy, the supply trains worked better, but were still hampered by the terrain and the poor road network. in winter in particular the US forces were not adequately supplied at the front .

The following year the main invasions occurred at Normandy and smaller invasions into the south of france. There were supply difficulties from the start at Normandy, less so for Dragoon. Eventually, after a lot of fighting enough port capacity was restored to enable unfettered operations to commence from about November

What dos this thumbnail do in understanding this issue? For most of the war, certainly during the crucial tide turning ones in the middle of the war, the US front line forces were not adequately supplied. I don't know about all of those campaigns in enough detail to comment about the minutae of each campaign, but for the campaigns in PNG I can. It is not an exaggeration to say the US doctrines of war and how to conduct their forces were nothing short of a disaster. they simply did not understand the supply issues that dogged every movement, every engagement. They did not understand that every bullet dragged painstakingly to the front was worth it
s weight in gold. every shot fired had to count.

Now, there is nothing wrong with the Garand as a weapon, but in a war where supply was most of the time a major issue, its ability to fire ammunition off at profligate rates , and further, for the US military to come to the mistaken belief that they would firstly always be well supplied, and secondly that uncontrolled semi automatic rifle fire would not lessen the effectiveness of their squad firstly in the belief that rapid fire from their garands was an adequate substitute for their heavier weapons is just nuts.

Although I embarrassingly lost my temper SR did clarify that in the US army the GIs did not carry extra ammunition for the BAR. Package that however you like, but at the end of the day that's going to mean a coule of things......the BAR is not going to serve as the main focus of the squad, if it is operating in rough terrain it will always come short of ammunition.

The enfield is certainly capable of wasting ammo just as easily as the garand. that was never my main point. but from 1937, the British army began to realise that their rifles were there to support their heavy weapons, not the other way around. Squaddies were there mostly as ammunition carriers and as glorified targets , with the emphasis on aimed fire over volume of fire. Didn't always work that way. In 1940, in flanders there were shortages in automatic weapons that were made up for with massed rapid fire volleys by the rifle components of the squad. far from perfect, made worse by the fact that the average squaddie was never much more than a poor to average shot. . But the theory was there. I don't think that theory ever percolated completely in the US army, certainly not in the camapins I knw the best.
. .

I brought up the supply of ammo in July of 1941 to US forces as an indication of doctrine at that time (before combat was joined by US forces) and I am more than willing to concede that pre-war planning went out the window when faced with the reality of combat and the reality of supply in combat conditions/situations.

We may also be talking about two different forms or levels of "firepower". The US Army was certainly moving to a reliance on support weapon firepower in excess of many (but not all?) other armies. Like mortars, tripod mounted machineguns and divisional artillery. Other armies having these but perhaps not in the quantity the US was planning on. Again US plans vrs what was issued in 1941/42/43 was rather different.
1939/40 British infantry battalions being rather lacking in support firepower. which called for different tactics. The British added support firepower to the battalion as time went on (more mortars for one thing) and the artillery support got better.
It is also "paper" establishments which were often modified in the field, especially in difficult terrain.

However this is different than squad/platoon/company "firepower." That is organic weapons to the Squad/platoon/ Company.

The US used a different "mix" of weapons and different structure than the British (I don't know where the Australians fell). with, for instance the British often using a 2in (51mm) mortar at platoon level, but usually for smoke or signalling? The US often used a pair of 60mm mortars at company level, High angle fire at lower levels being rifle grenades (and I doubt they were plentiful). The US company also had (usually) a pair of M 1919 air cooled belt feed guns, the battalion guns being water cooled 1917s. The British battalion having NO organic Vickers guns although a platoon might be on more or less permanent loan. And in some cases might loan a gun or pair of guns to a company for certain duties/missions? Or a 3in mortar?
There is a lot of difference between paper establishments and what was actually done. However paper establishments are probably our best guides to doctrine. because as doctrine changed due to combat lessons, the paper establishments changed, often not as quick but not lagging too much as printed manuals and paper establishments were all that some officers had to go on.

The US squads/platoons were blessed/cursed with the BAR. Blessed in that it was a rugged, reliable weapon. Cursed in that it could NOT provide the firepower/support of the Bren or MG34/42. A Bren was good for, (depending on how you count such things) another 40 rounds per minute or 50% more rounds per minute than a BAR. Even more in desperate circumstances but even the Bren only had about 6 minutes of fire at the "book" rate and with the "book" ammo load. If supply was sketchy?
The US depended on the Garand to provide a greater part of the squads firepower (direct fire) than most other armies.
However to be effective it requires training, and it requires leadership.
In the early combats, North Africa, New Guinea not only were the troops green, the entire command structure was green.

The semi auto provides for a higher volume of aimed fire in a given period of time than a bolt rifle. HOWEVER that volume of fire can only be, due to supply as you say, used for a limited amount of time. Very useful for breaking contact in an ambush, Useful in the final stage of an assault or to cover a maneuvering unit getting into or out of a position. WHEN to use the extra firepower in the squad/platoon is a judgement call by the squad/platoon leader as is the decision as to when to cease fire. Poor troops with poor leaders will not have the fire discipline. However poor or green troops can also use up ammo at a high rate using bolt rifles. 10-15 rounds per minute for 3 minutes will cut into a 30-50 round supply pretty quick.
Semi auto rifles should not be used as barrage weapons anymore than bolt rifles should be.
However the US did have a command/control problem. It is relatively easy for a corporal (squad leader) to direct the fire of ONE machine rifle or LMG and a small group of riflemen. It is much harder for the same corporal/SL to direct the fire of one machine rifle/LMG plus 6-8 semi auto riflemen. Yes some of them will imitate John Wayne and the more time the squad leader spends correcting them the less time he is directing the main gun or paying attention to the tactical situation. The M1 Garand only held 8 rounds so pauses to reload came fairly often, squad mates or squad leader should have been able to corral the cowboys, assuming that most of the squad kept their heads.

Unfortunately some officers (green) did rely on the rifles to much. I believe, but could be wrong (correction welcome) that some of the troops on New Guinea left the battalion heavy weapons (81mm mortars?water cooled machine guns?) behind in order to gain speed. This was an order from the top, not from the squads/platoons. and then wound up out of 105mm howitzer range?

Now the real question is would the US forces, changing nothing else, have done better or worse using 5 shot bolt action M1903s instead of the M1 Garand in the first few years of the war?
Same training, same leaders, same issue of BARs, same belt feed guns, same mortars.

This is in regard to US doctrine and training during the early part of WW II (early for America being 1942 early 1943)

see videos :
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mrkp025iKr0&t=4634s


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QoZ_usoFVSc


At one point the captain doing the instructing makes the comment that they are not interested in rounds per minute but hits per minute.

How practical these techniques were in the field or how well the troops followed them I have no idea.

Also see : GI Intelligence Dept.

dated March 1943

For US training material about squad/platoon tactics in the offence.
please note that they are still talking about a 3 man BAR team.

I would like to point out the section on scouts near the end.


"When scouts are fired on, they take cover and try to determine the enemy's position. One scout of each pair crawls to the best nearby firing position and opens fire with tracer ammunition to indicate the target, while the other scout observes and orders necessary changes in range. Having adjusted the fire of the first scout, the second scout also opens fire. If the platoon leader is nearby, one scout may open fire while the other points out the target to the platoon leader."

I have no idea who thought this would actually work in combat, what is the scout on the left saying? up 400yds or up 4 clicks (4 minutes of angle) on the sight? 400yds is a major change and "up 4 clicks" is a total of 12 inches at 300 yds, 16 inches at 400yds. Just being able to see , even with tracers that the firing scout is hitting 16 inches low at 400yds without binoculars is a major achievement.

Point is that the US was NOT teaching spray the area with mass small arms fire before or in the early stages of WW II and so the idea that the M1 rifle was adopted with that doctrine in mind is in error.

Us training doctrine was being formulated in 1942/early 43 with very little practical experience and what experience there was, was also 3-6000 miles away from the officers writing the manuals and making the training films.

I don't know when the US shifted over to the mass infantry fire power doctrine (as opposed to using mass artillery support/firepower)
but I believe it was later than 1942/43.

This does not mean that some officers might not have been advocating it or writing papers/articles about it. Just that it doesn't seem to show up in period training materials.

With the distance from the front lines and the time lag the training materials may not reflect what the troops were actually doing or improvising but that isn't "doctrine" either.

Among the choices, the M1 seems to be in a league of its own. If I had to choose among that lot - no brainer - M1.

Among the others, I'd go with one not on the list. An "other." I'd choose the M96/M38 or M38 Swedish Mauser. I've owned or shot all of the guns on that list and the one I would take with me anywhere (besides the M1) is the Swedish Mauser. The quality of manufacture is superb, whether it came out of a Gustav or Husqvarna factory. The quality of the steel is second to none. The 6.5 x 55 catridge is about as pleasant a round as you can shoot. The long bullets, with high sectional density and ballistic coefficient, had incredible penetration and good trajectory Its small ring (but still very robust) action, slim proportions, light recoil, effective round, hard and corrosion resistant steel, reliability and accuracy make it one of the best, if not the best, bolt action service rifle ever fielded by any nation.

The M-1 Carbine was pretty much a piece of rubbish as a "battle" rifle but then it's original intention was to replace the .45 automatic pistol. One old team mate of mine once described not being able to keep all his shots on a 4ft by 5ft target at 200yds with one. How old it was and in what condition I don't know. He had set an NCAA record in his collage years and was a member of the Army MTU in the 1960s for several years so his personal ability wasn't the problem.

I hear this alot and I have not shot one that I did not like/enjoy!The rifle in a full stock not the para is more accurate and I Would never intend to use that rifle out beyond 150yds myself.I reload my rounds to 1900-2000fps FMJ and use to be able to make a can dance from 25-75+yds as fast as it came back down off it went again using just the front site.I agree outside of a 100yds it is no tack driver but it's not pushing 2600-3000fps either but if 110g can do damage out of a handgun @1200fps what do you think 2000fps ?

38super,357mag among some HG's pushing 1300-1500+fps with 110-158g

Swedish Mauser ww2?
That's a pickle. One could argue that Swedish Mauser did see combat in ww2 so are eligible. But I would have to get a stewards enquiry on that one. But I respect your choice.

The M1 carbine has no place in any discussion about good rifles! It wasn't a front line gun but a secondary weapon for rear troops which got used wrongly. As a replacement for the 1911 then ok then. But it wasn't a M1 Garand replacement. It was lighter and handier so I can see the attractions if you had to lug a rifle across a field but not a combat rifle.

The Basket said:

The M1 carbine has no place in any discussion about good rifles! It wasn't a front line gun but a secondary weapon for rear troops which got used wrongly. As a replacement for the 1911 then ok then. But it wasn't a M1 Garand replacement. It was lighter and handier so I can see the attractions if you had to lug a rifle across a field but not a combat rifle.

Click to expand...

I guess you mean behind enemy lines?secondary troops like the Airborne?

Hello Gentlemen.

Guns. I guess we all know something about them or we would not bother with this thread.

I will state up front that I have not read any of the links posted.
My vote is for the M1 Garand from the choices listed here.

My Son did some research on Assault Rifles a couple years back for a school project and presentation. (Really!)
What he found in an interview with an expert from the National Firearms Museum was that the Sturmgewehr was actually issued in pretty large numbers on the Eastern Front. They were actually entire units (I forget whether this was platoon or company strength) armed with the Sturmgewehr as their primary gun and they formed the high firepower assault force leading attacks.
Perhaps this qualifies the gun as standard issue?

The FG 42 was also pretty common issue though in smaller numbers for Luftwaffe troops.
The Gewehr 43 / Karabiner 43 was also not a bad gun though not nearly as common as some others.

I also have a fair amount of experience with the other rifles mentioned here with the exception of the Arisaka.
I noticed that the SMLE is mentioned specifically but does this mean ALL Lee Enfields or just the SMLE and Rifle No.1 Mk.III or Mk.III*?
Someone had mentioned that the No.4 rifle had a free floated barrel. It actually does not.
There is typically a pressure point near the muzzle.
Although the SMLE / No.1 Mk.III* is a lighter rifle, if properly set up with springs and pressure points, its accuracy is pretty comparable to the No.4.
Most of these British guns that I have gauged tend to have very generous chambers and headspace closer to the NoGo than the Go measurement. Even Long Branch and Savage guns tend to be the same.

The SVT-40 looks cool, but has some inherent accuracy and durability problems and is a poor choice for standard issue.
The pinned muzzle brake can't really be tightened and the receiver is so light that I believe with prolonged use, it will bend.
Although I have not bent one, I have disassembled a couple and found that what should be an easy disassembly of the trigger group from receiver is not because either the parts all need to be individually fitted or they have simply bent with use. I only had a small sample size to examine but they were all bent in the same direction which otherwise seems odd.

The MAS 36 bolt action is pretty darn clumsy as a rifle, very crudely manufactured as were other French guns of this period and doesn't even have a safety. It might make a decent club.

The FN FAL is pretty ergonomic but tends to have really crappy sights and lousy triggers from the ones I have fired.
The front sling swivel also is in a petty goofy location and doesn't help accuracy.

Regarding the disregard of accuracy in procurement of US rifles, this is not supported by history, especially of the M14 Rifle.
There was great concern when the new M14 exhibited extremely poor accuracy and a lot of time was spent to determine whether it was the new ammunition or the rifle or a combination.
Also when Harrington & Richardson began manufacturing the gun, it often would not pass accuracy testing.
This was addressed in time.

Regarding the unreliability and inaccuracy of the M1 Garand:
As with any gun, parts wear out and break.
Some times pieces wear to the point where the gun malfunctions but an eyeball examination reveals nothing.
One common example of this is a kinked recoil spring or a bent operating rod.
The M1 also requires proper lubrication and will misbehave and wear out more quickly without it.
One of the issues discovered in the Pacific campaigns was that a prolonged rain would wash the grease from between the bolt and op rod and cause stoppages after a few rounds.
Better grease helped. The issue was addressed further with adding a roller to the bolt where it was cammed open and closed by the op rod but this feature was only put in production with the M14.

One of the most common reasons for inaccuracy of the M1 Garand is that it must be cleaned from the muzzle.
Aggressive and careless use of the sectioned Parkerized cleaning rod wears away the rifling at the muzzle where it is most important.
Accuracy also depends on a good fit between the action and stock and when parts are exchanged or stocks shrink with age or swell with moisture, the fit changes.
One more less obvious cause of inaccuracy is inaccurate setting of sights by operators who really have no clue. I have personally come across this at least a half dozen times. It is a bit funny to watch a man trying to figure out why he can't get a round on paper at 200 yards when he has never fired the gun before. (Yes, people do not try shots closer in first!

- Ivan.

The Basket said:

Swedish Mauser ww2?
That's a pickle. One could argue that Swedish Mauser did see combat in ww2 so are eligible. But I would have to get a stewards enquiry on that one. But I respect your choice.

Click to expand...

Used by the Finns against the Soviets.

The Swedish Mauser was not standard issue for the Finns. And Sweden were not combatants
The MAS-36 is good.
FG-42 was built in small numbers.
Garand is not good with mud so not end of the world but has to be taken into account.

The question asked was what the best standard issue rifle was. It didn't say among combants. The Swedes stood ready to defend their neutrality with their Mausers. And the Swedes gave a large quantity of Mausers to the Finns prior to the Winter War and Continuation War which were issued to troops and used against the Soviets.

The Basket said:

The Swedish Mauser was not standard issue for the Finns. And Sweden were not combatants
The MAS-36 is good.
FG-42 was built in small numbers.
Garand is not good with mud so not end of the world but has to be taken into account.

Click to expand...

All of your points are good but there is more to each one that isn't stated.

First of all, as for the Finns, Can ANY rifle be considered standard issue for them?
The mot common rifles were captured and rebuilt Mosin-Nagant M27 and M28 which are quite superb examples and possibly the best M-N rifles ever issued, but they were originally manufactured by the Russians.
Just about everything the Finns used was manufactured elsewhere.
Swedish Mausers do tend to be amazingly accurate even if the marking disc indicates a bit of wear.
The Finnish M27 tends to be extremely accurate as well.

Regarding MAS 36: I suppose we can all have our opinions, but what do you mean by "Good"?
At one point I did a fair amount of shooting with one and other than it not malfunctioning during the time I shot it, there was nothing impressive about it other than the feeling that it was heavy and solid.
Everything about it was crude: Finish, sights, balance. Operation was not terribly smooth.
It kind of impressed me as the kind of rifle that would serve well in the "Planet of the Apes" movies.

Agreed that the FG 42 was pretty rare, but so were Luftwaffe troops.

Regarding guns and mud:
None of these guns Is particularly good in mud. As with any cartridge rifle, a little mud or sand in the right place will stop things up pretty well. The Garand does have a very exposed mechanism, but even if the semi auto operation stops working, it can still function as a straight pull rifle.
There is of course the danger of an out of battery explosion if the op rod is not fully forward though. In theory this should be very unlikely with the interaction of the receiver bridge on the firing pin tang, but the correct amount of garbage in the chamber can increase chances.
One of the good things about an exposed mechanism is that it is pretty easy to clean out and the gun only takes a few seconds to field strip down to its three major assemblies.
While target shooters are pretty religious (as am I) about properly lubricating the gun, my belief is that there is only one critical area on the gun that absolutely requires lubricant and almost anything will do if one is concerned only about functioning.

- Ivan.

While target shooters are pretty religious (as am I) about properly lubricating the gun, my belief is that there is only one critical area on the gun that absolutely requires lubricant and almost anything will do if one is concerned only about functioning.

- Ivan.

I still am some what but once I started thinking about it on my semi which is 70% of the rifles I started with my M1a going 200-400rds once or twice just going in a real fire fight an M14 would or 16 might go that easy before cleaning.The M1a still shoots for me 1 1/4 - 1 3/4" groups after 2-3k rounds and yes the MOA after not cleaning did change but it still function well.

To be known I voted the M1 Garand one thing about semi's the tolerances are looser unlike the bolt but then all ammo is factory in war.

The MAS-36 is what it is and is certainly better than a Lebel. The issue is not what's good but good enough.
The Finns had the procurement choice of Beggers v Choosers and the fact they used Mosins was closer to the begger camp. I doubt a Mosin would be first choice in anyone's army.
Swedish neutrality is an interesting one.
Personally I find the Pederson or the Johnson far more interesting engineer rifles over the Garand.