I don't quite understand where you are going with this in the context of the discussion. My point was that it's difficult enough for a major technologically advanced project to go smoothly under circumstances where the government isn't a fascist dictatorship, so it's no surprise that the He 177 and the Bomber B, both of which were technologically advanced failed under the Nazis when the entire bureaucracy was a viper's nest full of backstabbing and countermanding in order to gain one-upmanship.
I agree. Whilst I do believe the Fw 187 would have been an excellent aircraft in its 1942 incarnation, it is worth keeping the aircraft and its multifarious uses in context. The problem that I see is that, and Hermann and Petrick tend to be a little guilty of this in their book, with all the subsequent design concepts for the airframe that Tank produced, people tend to believe that the airframe that was produced would have been capable of ALL of them. That's just not the case. Clearly in its initial incarnation, like the Westland Whirlwind, it's too small and offers no growth potential for improvement, or a multi-role specification, which the RLM was initially looking at to begin with.
After the disappointment of not receiving the Zerstorer order, Tank used the airframe as the basis of a number of projects, but these would have been quite different to one another had they been built, unlike using the same basic airframe for the Mosquito. For example, the dive bomber variant drawn up in 1940 shares the same appearance, but you can guarantee it would have been structurally strengthened and undertaken considerable structural redesign as a result of the new role. It was also to have been powered by BMW 801s, so significant design differences between it and the actual aircraft built. In fact, the only resemblance between it and the actual machine is the tail. The forward fuselage looks like a completely different aircraft.
By the time the 1942 variant of the design appears, the two-seater that was built was merely a reconstructed original model, which shares the same defect as the original - just adding a heavy cannon armament and stretching the cockpit to enable it to carry two persons does not immediately turn a single-seat fighter into a multi-role Zerstorer. The same issues of limited internal space and minimal growth potential exist. The drawings of the potential Fw 187C in the book bear this out; there is precious little space for avionics for anything other than a strictly day fighter role and as far as the hope of installing cameras internally for reconnaissance - forget it. Discussion revolves around the 'C model being used as a night fighter, but without an increase in internal volume, including an extension to the nose to include incorporating radar, there's no way that the Fw 187C could have done it, and I am led to believe that the intent was that the Fw 187C was to operate in a day fighter-bomber role only. There also doesn't appear to be any provision for drop tanks either, which limits it's range carrying a bomb load.
The high altitude fighter/night fighter variant, approved by the RLM looks different again, and was likely to have been a different take on the same appearance, and the fuselage appears longer in one of the drawings, with, once again, a redesigned forward fuselage. It is, however a single-seater, which is often not acknowledged by pundits when the night fighter is discussed, space for avionics taking up where the second crewmember of the 'C model sat, although there are no aerials of any kind shown in the illustrations provided. This would have been a proposition for only the most skilled pilots, which severely limits its useability.
So all of this points to the fact that the Fw 187 is severely limited in potential as a design. It is not capable of undertaking other duties other than that which it was strictly designed to do simply because it was too small. Each role would have required a very different airframe to the last because of this, which means that strictly speaking, IT WAS NOT a multi-role aircraft. It could be built as a dive bomber, it could be built as a day fighter-bomber, OR it could be built as a high altitude fighter OR night fighter, BUT NOT all of those things in one airframe.
Could it have pulled off the performance that it is credited with? Quite possibly - it was a great little design, but again, start adding the detritus required of a contemporary combat aircraft and its performance edge begins to be swept away. What performance figures Tank drew up for his fighter should be taken with a grain of salt bearing this in mind. Nonetheless, it would have been an awesome little aircraft, pretty too.
I agree. There was certainly sense in the desire to make the He 177 and Bomber B into reality, but the resources, planning and co-operation was just not there to produce advanced projects of their scope within the industry, plus some of the bizarre decisions coming from the RLM didn't help. This folks, is what happens in a dictatorship. The B-29 is a great example of how a programme should have been structured, with sub-contracting, vast expenditure and effort working toward one goal, so it is a surprise when a closer look is made and all sorts of flaws reveal themselves, not to mention the issues the aircraft suffered with its engines. New technology is hard and even in a bureaucratic system that wasn't the mess that Nazism thrived in didn't work out so well and only advanced with throwing money and even more vast amounts of effort at it. It's just not surprising that these programmes failed under the circumstances they evolved in.
This was for a stuka variant that was a vain attempt at producing the type as a specialist dive bomber to a two-seat, twin engined dive bomber requirement in 1940/1941. No interest from the RLM and Fw was told not to carry out any further work on the type, that is, until May 1942...
...By August 1942, the RLM had stopped all work on the type when the Kampfzerstorer (excuse the lack of umlaut) prototypes were underway. No specific reason was given, but resources were going to be devoted to the He 219 and Me 410. Certainly on paper the Fw 187 variant looked like a winner, but again the age old debate about its ultimate value to the Germans and its impact on production of existing types comes into play - what was Fw NOT doing to have to do to build it? In the Petrick book it explicity states that Tank and co were working nights and weekends to get the thing on paper - their resources were stretched and there was little excess to offer to the programme.
Had it gone into production, we could have expected to see it in late 1943/early 1944 entering squadron service, but then what? Even with it in service in high-ish numbers - difficult to predict what kind of numbers, given the politics that surrounded the He 219 development and the delays that afflicted the Me 410 programme, both of which worked on a similar timeline to what we are guesstimating our Fw 187 Destroyers are working to, the type is effective, but to what extent? Is it going to change the course of the war effective? Probably not with the growing resources available to the Allies and their foot hold in Europe (not to forget the Soviets advancing from the East), but obviously it would have boasted excellent performance, and could have been a contender for one of the war's most brilliant multi-role aircraft, but for one thing; the previously mentioned unpredictability of the personalities at work in the RLM, the aviation industry and the armaments industry.
There's no guarantee this aircraft, had it gone into service would have been anything more than being remembered as an excellent type that served with the Luftwaffe, but what we can guarantee is that the German hierarchy would have induced delays that would have made the programme as dysfunctional as everything else they were working on.
The original Fw 187 concept, with DB600/601 engines merely fulfilled the same requirements as a single seat fighter but by keeping the aircraft light and compact a two engine fighter had 50-60% greater range and better speed than a single. Doing anything else to it would be as silly as mounting a rear gunner and/or dive brakes to a Me 109 or Spitfire. Once they stepped beyond that the idea of it being a P-38 or Whirlwind like fighter it was dead.
Without this the Luftwaffe had no long range escort, recon etc until 1945 when 10 examples of the 750 mile range Ta 152H-1 with wing tanks were delivered.
Ernst Udet wasn't worried about the range of his fighter force when he allowed Fw 187 development to continue but only with Jumo 210 engines thereby saving the program but guaranteeing that the airframe would not be viable when a production decision could have been made.
Udet was worried about the supply of DB601 and Jumo 211 engines and the Fw 187 wasn't getting any of these.
Here is the thing: the men in charge of Luftwaffe procurement and German aircraft production: Milch, Udet and Jenkonshenk all opposed significant investment in heavy or 4 engine bombers.
Why would you need a long range fighter? A large number of interceptors was needed.
They favoured aircraft that could support the German Army tactically with precision bombing. Dive bombers were particularly favoured and, "zerstoerers" which had a ground attack role.
This is actually sensible. The nightmare scenario for Germany was an invasion by France (they'd done so when they occupied the Ruhr and attempted to anex the Sarr) and a concurrent invasion by Poland (one both both highly plausible, Poland and to defeat that thereat a large and well equipped and supported German Army would be needed. No point strategically bombing your enemy and waiting for his production to decline when his army is already half way into your country. To add to this Italy, Czechoslovakia, USSR and UK migh jump in to such a war. Treaties diffused USSR and Italy tensions.
What also needs to be referenced here is the von Schlieffen "plan" which was claimed to be a plan by the Kaisers Germany to invade all of Europe and the world.
The actual 'plan' was unearthed in 1955 in East Germany and rediscovered after German Unification. You can read about this in "Terrence Zubehor's The real German war plan"
It wasn't a plan but a military simulation exercise of 1905. When Germany bumbled into WW1 like every other nation the German high command had to send officers to von Schlieffen's daughters home (he and his wife having passed on) to collect his hand written notes and plans for the simulation exercise.
Post war a combination of allied propagandists seeking to impose German war guilt and hide their own incompetence, German leftists seeking to discredit conservatives and most of all the German High Command itself, who didn't have a plan, presented this exercise as a plan rather than what it was.
In order for Germany to successfully defeat France at the Marne it needed at least 60% more divisions.
The reason it didn't have those divisions is because Tirpitz got his navy built.
In the minds of nearly any German officer at the time was that not primarily supporting the army is what caused German defeat. They weren't going to make the same mistake in WW2 and invest money on the High Seas fleet or its equivalent a 4 engine long range strategic bomber force.
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The mess with Bomber A (He 177), Bomber B (Ju 288, Fw 191, Do 317) has got some history.
When the Ju 89 and Do 19 were cancelled in 1936/37 what was called Bomber A (He 177) was immediately begun. The long range strategic bomber wasn't ignored but only one type was built. I'm not sure to what degree Udet, Jenkonshenk and Milch supported it.
The opportunity for a 4 engine aircraft such as a Do 19 with 4 x 1000hp radials able to support the German navy from 1939 was thus lost. There were no plans for war with Britain so no real plans were made or unrealistic assumptions of bomber range used. Hitler in fact forbade preparing for war with Britain in any way for this.
Either way it was only 1 bomber (the He 177). Britain had 4 less ambitious designs (Stirling, Halifax, Manchester/Lancaster, Warwick) and spread the risk.
The US also had multiple 4 engine bomber designs.
Germany couldn't afford that. However in 1939 and 1940 Ernst Heinkel pressed the Luftwaffe to allow the development of the He 177 as a separate 4 engine bomber and the remove the dive bombing requirement. The answer to him was that that funding for the program couldn't be justified unless the He 177 was also a dive bomber and Heinkel kept going as best it could.
Bomber B also died on the back of its engines. The engine that could have powered it Jumo 222, DB604, BMW 802, DB606 and DB610 all were cancelled because they weren't the front runner (DB604, BMW 802) or had absurd requirements for power or restrictions to bearing materials due to tin shortage fears, technical problems etc.
To compound this the DB606 seemed to work without trouble in the He 119 and Me 261 Adolophine. An extreme misplaced sense of material shortages often drove the Germans into absurd measures such as insufficient nickel in their jet engines or tin in the bearings of the Jumo 222.