Rosco P. Coltraine
Airman
- 21
- Jan 12, 2012
Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
Thankfully the RLM were rather incompetent.1936 DB601 engine program funding for factory construction was reduced from 50 million RM to 20 million RM. A 60% cut. If the original RLM proposal had been approved there would have been plenty of DB601 engines available by 1940. The He-100 and Fw-187 could both enter production during 1940 without effecting Me-109 and Me-110 production.
But did they want that?Internal Fuel Capacity.
340 liters. Me-109.
535 liters. Fw-190A.
1,100 liters. Fw-187.
1,270 liters. Me-110.
If Germany wants a high performance day fighter with serious range / endurance then nothing comes close to the Fw-187 prior to the 1945 Do-335. The Falke could do for 1940 Germany what the P-51 did for the USA during 1944 and 1945.
Internal Fuel Capacity.
340 liters. Me-109.
535 liters. Fw-190A.
1,100 liters. Fw-187.
1,270 liters. Me-110.
If Germany wants a high performance day fighter with serious range / endurance then nothing comes close to the Fw-187 prior to the 1945 Do-335. The Falke could do for 1940 Germany what the P-51 did for the USA during 1944 and 1945.
While Ernst Heinkel and his company are remembered chiefly for his long-serving He111 medium bomber, it's often forgotten that early in the Nazi era his company was Germany's most prominent.
Yet the He112 did enter limited production for export to Hungary, Romania, Spain and the Japanese navy. It was loved by its crews as a flying machine but its heavy maintenance made it unpopular amongst the leadership and difficulty in obtaining spares led to it quickly becoming phased out of Japanese service.
With spares easier to obtain in Europe, it did see combat in Hungarian and Romanian service from 1941 and proved very effective despite having no development since 1937-8.
With the benefit of hindsight I can't help but be thankful that the RLM didn't also accept the He112 for production and service as a second fighter type. The Bf109 really served far too long and the weakness of the airframe was evident with later Me109 versions by 1944 where to get enough high-altitude speeds to match the Mustang Me109's were stripped of Armour and armament and sacrificed much agility. Could've the more advance He112 been easier to develop and improve further?
And how useful could've another fighter type (using the Junkers Jumo engine) been for the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain and during the industrial disruptions of the Allied bombing campaigns?
What's more is that Heinkel on his own initiative decided on a radical development of the He112 which resulted in the even more advanced He100 fighter of 1940. Despite this aircraft breaking speed records, having overwhelming positive feedback and being easier to produce than the He112 the RLM again wasn't interested.
This time its main reason for its rejection was the fact it used the same Daimler-Benz engine already prioritised for the Bf109 and the Bf110. In hindsight, could've the Luftwaffe given up on the Zestorer concept that led to the Bf110 and sent those two engines needed for one Bf110 to build two He100's?
So it may have been ideal as an escort fighter in the Battle of Britain. And then as a long-range fighter in the Mediterranean. Or at least (in those two roles) much better than the Bf110. Is that worth investing in?
And would it handle a dogfight with the best of the single-engined fighters such as the Spitfire well? that was the big drawback of all twin-engined fighters including the P-38 in that they almost always had dogfighting disadvantages against single-engined fighters. I could be wrong but I think no Bf110 ever shot down a Spitfire in a dogfight.
Thankfully the RLM were rather incompetent.
But did they want that?
What role in the Luftwaffe would it fill?
Germany had no program of heavy strategic bombing needing an escort fighter. Aside from the battle of Britain (where unsuitable tactical medium bombers were impressed for strategic bombing) Germany never had the immediate need nor resources for strategic bombing and an escort fighter like the Fw187.
The P-51D had a internal capacity of 1018 litres, and that just feeding one engine. With the ability to carry 2x 416 litre tanks for another 832 litres.
The Tank 152-H1 has also 1035 liters internal capacity.If Germany wants a high performance day fighter with serious range / endurance then nothing comes close to the Fw-187 prior to the 1945 Do-335. The Falke could do for 1940 Germany what the P-51 did for the USA during 1944 and 1945.
With the benefit of hindsight I can't help but be thankful that the RLM didn't also accept the He112 for production and service as a second fighter type.
The Bf109 really served far too long and the weakness of the airframe was evident with later Me109 versions by 1944 where to get enough high-altitude speeds to match the Mustang Me109's were stripped of Armour and armament and sacrificed much agility. Could've the more advance He112 been easier to develop and improve further?
What's more is that Heinkel on his own initiative decided on a radical development of the He112 which resulted in the even more advanced He100 fighter of 1940. Despite this aircraft breaking speed records, having overwhelming positive feedback and being easier to produce than the He112 the RLM again wasn't interested.
This time its main reason for its rejection was the fact it used the same Daimler-Benz engine already prioritised for the Bf109 and the Bf110. In hindsight, could've the Luftwaffe given up on the Zestorer concept that led to the Bf110 and sent those two engines needed for one Bf110 to build two He100's?
Junkers WERE the leaders, until Hugo Junkers ran foul of the Nazis. After they placed him under house arrest (and effectively caused his early death) their status gradually diminished considerably. Other than the Ju88 they never produced any more stand-out aircraft.I don't think that's correct. The most prominent and by far the leader of technology, engineers and skilled workers was Junkers!
What do you base that opinion on?Also I doubt that the He 112 had much more potential then the Bf 109.
Kurt Tank didn't design the Fw190 until some time later.The second LW fighter was the FW 190 and as we know it had the most potential from all LW fighters because it could be matched with radials and inline engines and was more robust and one of the best gun plattforms of all WWII fighters. The FW 190 was at the timeline between 1936-1940 the logical consequence to bring the BMW company with it's radial engine in action and production.
I'm aware of the evaporator cooling system and the considerable technical problems it introduced.The He 100 D-0 wasn't a good concept because of it's water evaporation cooling system.
I wasn't suggesting switching production from the Bf109 but from the not-very-useful Bf110. I'm pretty sure that two He100's would be more useful than one Bf110.And the He 100 D-1 was far too late to switch the production.
I'm not disputing that the Fw187 was a very good aircraft.As Dave has written the destroyer concept with the Bf 110 was too much destroyer and less long range fighter.
The Fw 187 had solved this problem, it was much more fighter with the possibilty to handle all other tasks of the Bf 110 because of it's very good payload.
That's totally incorrect!
The LW had a program of heavy strategic bombing with the needing of an escort fighter.
Ural Bomber and Bomber A!
This was the reason, that at the advertisement of the destoyer one main feature was long range escort fighter.
With the death of General Wever and the replacement of Genral Wimmer both in 1936, the incompetent people for strategic planning took the lead at the LW (Göring, Udet, Kesselring, Jeschonnek)
Walther Wever (general) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Well those dilemmas weren't anything on the industrial problems the French and Italians failed to overcome!The ultimate problem of the german economy/war economy was, that they had no specialists and no experience with mass production. All this must be learned between 1934/35-1944 with a very slow learn effect graph.
At the 1930..... assembly lines with for a example the size of Ford at the USA were non existent in germany and there were no experience nor men with profound knowledge.
All the production specialists for the Volkswagen factory at 1938, were all poached away from Ford USA! Most of them were former german emigrants.
An other example was the production of the Pz III. The whole production time from 1938-1942/43 there were no assembly lines!
Some of this problems were homemade because at the most advertisements at the 1930.... the Opel and Ford companys with by far most experience in mass production in germany, weren't involved, because the Nazi's had fear that technology would be transfered to the USA.
I'm pretty sure that they removed the cockpit armour to save weight.1944 Me 109 was not stripped of anything sorry you have that wrong..
I'm pretty sure that the He112 had markedly better turn performance thanks to its eliptical wing. Just like the Spitfire enjoyed an advantage in turn performance over the Bf109.also I do not believe He 112 had anything to offer over Bf 109, that is why it lost.
I've never heard that.Final coffin in trial of 109-112 was that He 112 had much inferior handling.
But why couldn't the Luftwaffe cut-back production of the Bf110 for a second fighter type?Yes because all Heinkel had was prototype, meanwhile 109E was come off from assembly line 2 years.. and Mtt tooling up for 109F in 1940 which was far more suited for actual frontline work, been tried and tested and had similar performance than He 100. Main advantage of He 100 was speed, but this was achieved by a impractical radiator solution, and by clipping off 1,5 sq. m. from wing compared to Me 109.
The Bf110 was relegated to ground attack because of its failures in the Battle of Britain (although it would again achieve air-to-air successes in Barbarossa and as an inteceptor of daylight bombers before the USAAF organised effective fighter escorts). And was the Bf110 really crucial as a night-fighter? and couldn't it just have re-entered production if needed? Carrying bombs and nightfighter radar wasn't actually the Bf110's job anyway, it's job was to shoot down other aircraft which is a job I'm certain the He100 would've been overall better at.I do not think. He 100 couldn't do same job as Me 110. It could not have range, because it is VERY small, it could not deliver bombs, it could not use for ground attack the same, nor as night fighter.
So in other words the Bf110 and the Zestorer concept were obsolete by 1940?Bf 110 was built simply because in mid-1936s engines were simply too weak, so that one would suffice power for requirements in carry capacity.
But at the end of the day, I was wanting to discuss whether the He112 and/or He100 should've entered production and Luftwaffe service at some stage as another Jager type to compliment the Bf109 at the expense of the b=Bf110
Based on which facts?For starters, the He112 was much more technologically advanced than the Bf109.
Kurt Tank didn't design the Fw190 until some time later.
While it was undoubtedly an excellent aircraft, the main reason for its adoption by the RLM was because it used the more available BMW 801 as its powerplant.
And remember that it wasn't until it was fitted with the Junkers Jumo powerplant in the "Dora" versions that it enjoyed great performance at altitude.
Prior to the Dora's becoming availadle the Fw190 wasn't so much the Luftwaffe's "second fighter" sharing the Bf/Me109's role but more filling the different role of the "multi-role" low-altitude fighter that was so valuable in the tactical battles on the eastern front.
And in any case the Fw190 wasn't able to enter service until late 1941. The He112 could've entered service in 1937 and the He100 in 1940.
Did you miss the part about General Walther Wever perishing in 1936?
Wever was the Ural Bomber, without him the project died. So the Luftwaffe never had a strategic bomber force and thus no strategic bombing program, as was evident in 1940. So there was no need for the Fw187.
And I also have to question your judgement when you consider its abandonment incompetence. With the hindsight of;
1) how German industry would struggle to equip and supply the existing tactical-oriented Luftwaffe, the Panzerwaffen and the Ubootflotten.
2) the poor return on the British and US investments in strategic bombing.
I can curse the fact that Wever wasn't able to waste German resources on attempting to build a strategic bomber force. There's a good chance that even if he'd selected the Ju-89 for production, it wouldn't have been able to equip many wings anyway and possibly would've been abandoned.
The UK was able to build its strategic bomber force by sacrificing building a very large armoured force. The USA simply enjoyed a much larger industrial capacity.
And why even mention the Amerikabomber? the whole project was very pie-in-the-sky.
The Germans never even had strategic bombers to have a strategic bombing project with. So as impressive as the Fw187 was, what role could it possibly fill?
With the death of General Wever and the replacement of Genral Wimmer both in 1936, the incompetent people for strategic planning took the lead at the LW (Göring, Udet, Kesselring, Jeschonnek)
No matter how good a twin-engined fighter could be it would always struggle to match the agility of a single engined fighter. Even Kelly Johnston's P-38, possibly the lightest and most agile of twin-engined fighters, struggled against single-engined fighters.
Junkers WERE the leaders, until Hugo Junkers ran foul of the Nazis. After they placed him under house arrest (and effectively caused his early death) their status gradually diminished considerably. Other than the Ju88 they never produced any more stand-out aircraft.
Udet and Goering both blame Erhard Milch for rejection of the 1938 He-177B proposal (4 Jumo 211 engines).
Goering cannot escape some blame as he was Milch's boss. However I tend to think Milch was the main reason for this decision. And many other bad decisions too such as cancellation of the DB603 engine program during 1937, cancellation of Me-210C and Ju-252 aircraft programs during 1942.
The ultimate problem of the german economy/war economy was, that they had no specialists and no experience with mass production. All this must be learned between 1934/35-1944 with a very slow learn effect graph.
Some of this problems were homemade because at the most advertisements at the 1930.... the Opel and Ford companys with by far most experience in mass production in germany, weren't involved, because the Nazi's had fear that technology would be transfered to the USA.
Ju 88-program, which was established by Göring in mid-1938 and was aimed at exploiting economies of scale
Three state of the art aircraft engine plants that were producing a total of 1,700 engines per month by the fall of 1942.Magdeburg 24267 July 1937 to Aug. 1944
Kothen 20911 1938 to Feb. 1944
Leipzig 17032 1942 to Aug. 1944
I can see you've got an Fw187 as your avatar and I'm assuming you're a fan of it (it had undoubted great potential) but in hindsight were they really worth the RLM's investment in? what they did best for the Luftwaffe could've been done well by single-engined fighters and single engined fighter could do what the heavy fighter couldn't.