Who Really Destroyed the Luftwaffe?

[Gixxerman]

I would say it would take more than a few days to repairs this damage.

I've often wondered just what they did do with that sort of damage and how the hell do you fix it quickly?
I've recently been reading that the large bombs used in the mix have an effect on the ground making it mushy and ruin it's normal ability to take load/weight and the ground has to be reinforced and packed down to return to a usable state.

 

[fastmongrel]

I've often wondered just what they did do with that sort of damage and how the hell do you fix it quickly?
I've recently been reading that the large bombs used in the mix have an effect on the ground making it mushy and ruin it's normal ability to take load/weight and the ground has to be reinforced and packed down to return to a usable state.

You can temporarily fill craters and replace the rails but your right the ground needs to be consolidated for it to be a proper job. Probably what they did was throw as much rubble in to the crater as they could and top it off with ballast. Then as the fill settled they would have to add to and repack the ballast under the rails to try and keep the rails level. This could go on for months and need repacking daily depending on traffic frequency and speed, speed is the real damager to rail beds. Fixing damage to rails can be repaired surprisingly quickly but needs large quantities of men and materials, the faster the fix the more remedial work required.

 

[michaelmaltby]

@Vacca: "... a two sided attack on Russia would have decimated that country in short order ..."

I wouldn't be too sure of that if I were you .

Stalin didn't call up his reserves from Siberia until the thrust began to diminish in front of Moscow. They were seasoned troops out there - fresh off of Zhukov's successful campaign June-Sept '39. They would love to have tackled the Japanese again .

If Japan had waited until the Siberian troops were committed to Moscow, and then attacked Russia - they would have been attacking in December-January '41-'42. Hardly campaigning weather in Siberia.

Japan was totally bush-whacked by the USSR in 1939 - they had no idea how impressive Soviet industrial capability was - and they weren't looking for a Round Two. On the other hand, they thought that the USA might "stagger" after Dec 7, '42. Wrong again.

MM

 

[tomo pauk]

Engaging Russia while still having to pacifise China would be a major task for Japan. Plus, it would mean IJN being mostly inactive - not something IJN brass would want.

 

[syscom3]

Rail lines are not marshaling yards.

"rail lines" means everything inclusive to rail transport.

The German method of repair was simple and fast. Bring in as many forced laborers as required to fill in the craters and fix the main lines coming into the rail yards. Then fix the other tracks as needed.

That picture you provided, could have had the main lines in operation within a day, and the whole thing repaired within a few days more.

 

[Milosh]

Although prior to September 1944, there had been sporadic attacks on the German transportation system, no serious deterioration in its ability to handle traffic was identified by the Survey. The vastly heavier attacks in September and October 1944 on marshalling yards, bridges, lines, and on train movements, produced a serious disruption in traffic over all of western Germany. Freight car loadings, which were approximately 900,000 cars for the Reich as a whole in the week ending August 19 fell to 700,000 cars in the last week of October. There was some recovery in early November, but thereafter they declined erratically to 550,000 cars in the week ending December 23 and to 214,000 cars during the week ending March 3. Thereafter the disorganization was so great that no useful statistics were kept.

USSBS

It would seem the Germans couldn't keep up with repairing the damage.

 

[BombTaxi]

"rail lines" means everything inclusive to rail transport.

The German method of repair was simple and fast. Bring in as many forced laborers as required to fill in the craters and fix the main lines coming into the rail yards. Then fix the other tracks as needed.

That picture you provided, could have had the main lines in operation within a day, and the whole thing repaired within a few days more.

Hmm... The rail lines are smashed. The city streets are blocked with rubble and craters. How do you bring the labourers in? How do you remove the smashed railcars and locomotives? How long does it take to level the ground again? Where do you get the specialists to supervise the work? How, once the tracks are fixed, do you replace the lost locos and cars? And what happens to traffic that needs to use the route while the damage is being repaired?

I think a few days is both naive and overly simplistic...

 

[parsifal]

I believe the war would have ended much sooner (despite Hitler's blunders earlier on, and even his massive blunder in attacking Russia) if Japan had opted to go with the original plan of attacking Russia jointly, instead of independently attacking America. While the US would probably still have entered the war at some stage (Roosevelt was looking for a way in), a two sided attack on Russia would have decimated that country in short order and might even have led to the US being defeated (if they had entered under those circumstances).

Why do you think this would be possible? The only way japan could muster enough logistic support to even consider attacking the Russians in Siberia, would be to undertake an extensive withdrawal from China. They might coneivably pull out of mainland China,retaining control of Manchuria. This would free up some ground troops, but it would also mean allowing the Chinese the ability to recover their lost territories, and gain access to the all important seaports. The Japanese would need to draw on all their air resources, which means the allies would be free to re-equip the rejuvenated Chinese. The Japaese would go to war, conceivably in 1941, with the germans, with about 20 divs in their offensive. Their first order of priority would be to capture Vladivostock, which in 1941 was one of the most thoroughly fortified positions in the world. They would be battling approximately twice as many russians as themselves, who had already shown themselves to be superior to the Japanese in ground fighting in 1939....these are not your untrained chaff, they are the Siberians....the toughest soldiers on earth at that time, and subsequaently able to defeat the Germans at Moscow. The best troopps on earth, in fortified positions, and outnumbering their opponents, who have the added disadvantage of attacking....you do the math.


Still confident that the japanese can defeat the Soviets in the far East????

 

[riacrato]

Best troops on earth? I think it takes a bit more than being "tough" to qualify.

 

[parsifal]

Best troops on earth? I think it takes a bit more than being "tough" to qualify.

They defeated the cream of the German army whom prior to that point had carried just about every action in their favour. The only exception I can think are the Australians at Tobruk.

Your right though, it takes more than toughness to be the best soldiers. Evidently the the Siberians possessed whatever it took to achieve that

 

[riacrato]

"They" were hardly the only Soviet force participating. But I get the picture:

Germany has 2nd largest GDP = Germany must've been able to build more tanks than USSR
Defeating certain Wehrmacht units = best troop on earth

Your way of getting a point across is gross oversimplifications and now you add macho-talk to it, have fun with that.

 

[parsifal]

"They" were hardly the only Soviet force participating. But I get the picture:

Germany has 2nd largest GDP = Germany must've been able to build more tanks than USSR
Defeating certain Wehrmacht units = best troop on earth

Your way of getting a point across is gross oversimplifications and now you add macho-talk to it, have fun with that.

Basically you are getting the picture. Napoleon once said simplicity is the mother of military success. Trying to cloud issues with irrelevant details is a convenient way of avoiding the truth I would suggest.

These are the facts...germany possessed one of the largest economies in the world at that time, and still does. She has enjoyed that position in the world stage since approximately 1880.

The Germans possessed the strongest miliary force in 1939, except perhaps at sea, not because their troops were the toughest on the block, or necessarily the best trained, but really a combination of factors....equipment, doctine, espit de corps, leadership etc. They were not defeated until the Australians, and then the Russians did so.

The Russian victory, led by the Siberians (but supported by other formations, admittedly....inthis regard you are correct, but so too were the germans supported by Italians, hungarians etc) trumped this combination by tough soldiers, well led, and equipped for the purpose and deployed with victory in their nostrils. They also had weather on their side, and advantages in numbers, but these were circumstances worked to advantage because the army using them had engineered the circumstances to their advantage, just as they had done, using different natural events, in 1939, against the Japanse. Good soldiering means using all your strengths, and all the advantages, not just believing your own proapganda about how good you are. complain all you like, the label "best troops in the world" is a combination of factors, and the Russian Siberians can validly lay claim to that title in 1941. The Germans cannot.

 

[syscom3]

Hmm... The rail lines are smashed. The city streets are blocked with rubble and craters. How do you bring the labourers in? How do you remove the smashed railcars and locomotives? How long does it take to level the ground again? Where do you get the specialists to supervise the work? How, once the tracks are fixed, do you replace the lost locos and cars? And what happens to traffic that needs to use the route while the damage is being repaired?

I think a few days is both naive and overly simplistic...

Bring the laborers in on the undamaged tracks coming into the city. Give them shovels and some threats. And watch how well they can clear things up. And a couple of bulldozers can fill in the craters without difficulty.

Specialists are needed? Why do you suppose the Germans did not have specialists?

Replacing lost rail cars and loco's? The Germans never were short of them considering they had stolen all they could need from the occupied territories.

As for the damaged rail stock needing to be removed; nothing sophisticated about using cranes to move them out of the way as the mains are repaired. Done all the time with derailed rail cars in peacetime.

And the transport system being shutdown while repairs are needed? You can reroute the trains, but that entails adding traffic to an already congested network. That causes inefficiencies. But it only lasts a few days so its not a crippling type of loss.

 

[Civettone]

Why do you think this would be possible? The only way japan could muster enough logistic support to even consider attacking the Russians in Siberia, would be to undertake an extensive withdrawal from China. They might coneivably pull out of mainland China,retaining control of Manchuria. This would free up some ground troops, but it would also mean allowing the Chinese the ability to recover their lost territories, and gain access to the all important seaports. The Japanese would need to draw on all their air resources, which means the allies would be free to re-equip the rejuvenated Chinese. The Japaese would go to war, conceivably in 1941, with the germans, with about 20 divs in their offensive. Their first order of priority would be to capture Vladivostock, which in 1941 was one of the most thoroughly fortified positions in the world. They would be battling approximately twice as many russians as themselves, who had already shown themselves to be superior to the Japanese in ground fighting in 1939....these are not your untrained chaff, they are the Siberians....the toughest soldiers on earth at that time, and subsequaently able to defeat the Germans at Moscow. The best troopps on earth, in fortified positions, and outnumbering their opponents, who have the added disadvantage of attacking....you do the math.


Still confident that the japanese can defeat the Soviets in the far East????

How horribly simplistic? In 1939 the Russians had a 2:1 superiority in manpower. In 1942 the Japanese had a 2:1 average.
Just look at a map please ... 8) Cut the railroads near Mongolia and you have the Vladivostok peninsula by the balls. Then you can take the northern Kuris island and start exploiting the oil fields there.

Kris

 

[parsifal]

How horribly simplistic? In 1939 the Russians had a 2:1 superiority in manpower. In 1942 the Japanese had a 2:1 average.
Just look at a map please ... 8) Cut the railroads near Mongolia and you have the Vladivostok peninsula by the balls. Then you can take the northern Kuris island and start exploiting the oil fields there.

Kris

Cutting the transsiberian railway would have virtually no effect. Vladisvostock was the base of the far eastern military district, and was supplied for something like 5 years for a garrison of ovewr 200000 men. It was fully supported by the Industrial combines of the Far Eastern Command....such as the great tank factories at Kharbarovsk.

Cutting the rail line is no easy feat either. The majority of the border on the northern flank of Manchiria, had the obstacle of the Amur River, several mountain ranges and and swamps. The japanese might be able to march to the line, then what????? Thery are faced with forces from the east and the west, a river that is one of the major rivers of the world, and unbridged. The Japanese wo0uld be unsupplied, cut off and isolated. they would be fighting an enmy superior in strength and well supplied. It doesnt need to be anything other than simplistic to work out what happens there.

As for being outnumbered....untrue. The Russians were able to pull out a force of around 50 Divs in December 1941, and still retain a modicum of forces in the far East to keep an eye on the japanese. Im not sure how many troops were retained in the far east after Typhoon, but I have read somewhere it was of the order of 200K troops. From June to December 1941, the Russians probably had in the order of 80-100 Divs, against which the Japanese might be able to field 20 or 25.

Bush bashing across the trackless wasteands to "cut the trans-siberian railway would have achieved nothing. The rail line was not a supply line...the region was an autonomous military district. It would have just hastened the defeat of the Japanese even quicker.

nearly fs shared border

 

[Shortround6]

Bring the laborers in on the undamaged tracks coming into the city. Give them shovels and some threats. And watch how well they can clear things up. And a couple of bulldozers can fill in the craters without difficulty.

Bring in laborers instead of food for the people already there? Instead of parts or raw materials for the factories that are left? Bring in anything takes up space on the rails that you need to "by pass" the damaged marshaling yard.

Specialists are needed? Why do you suppose the Germans did not have specialists?

The Germans had them, they just didn't have enough of them. Nobody did. Specialist were in short supply trying to maintain the rail systems as it was without large scale bomb damage.
Track wears with use, roadbeds washout or settle in normal use. Wartime, heavy traffic accelerates the wear and settling. The specialists (with their unskilled helpers/laborers) are stretched thin trying to maintain what they have without it being blown up.

Replacing lost rail cars and loco's? The Germans never were short of them considering they had stolen all they could need from the occupied territories.

Since even the US was short of rail cars and locomotives during war I don't think the Germans had anywhere near enough. And the "stolen" locomotives and rolling stock were needed in the areas of Europe they originated in as long as the Germans held those areas. As they were pushed back and the area shrank they might get some benefit but again, These locomotives and rolling stock needed maintenance, they wore out and needed repairs and refits. Foreign equipment, being non-standard (just like all the captured trucks) presented a challenge to keep running.

As for the damaged rail stock needing to be removed; nothing sophisticated about using cranes to move them out of the way as the mains are repaired. Done all the time with derailed rail cars in peacetime.

You are right, it is not sophisticated, but again, the peace time need for cranes and operators and riggers for derailments is a tiny fraction of the what is needed for a marshalling yard that was the target of a major bombing raid. How many 100 ton and above cranes do you think any major rail route had on hand before the war?
How many heavy cranes do you think got built after the war started?
You also have to repair the rails as you go. You have to repair the rails/roadbed to get the crane/s to the first big object to be moved, move it, repair the next few dozen or hundred yards of track, move the crane, move the next car or cars or locomotive, repair more track, move crane again and repeat, over and over. Most peacetime derailments only involve a few cars or a dozen, not hundreds. Most peacetime derailments leave a parallel undamaged track for the cranes to work from.

And the transport system being shutdown while repairs are needed? You can reroute the trains, but that entails adding traffic to an already congested network. That causes inefficiencies. But it only lasts a few days so its not a crippling type of loss.

This is true if it is a mainline piece of track that is cut. It is easy to repair and there are usually alternate routes. Marshaling yards are another story. They are hubs where many lines meet. Alternate routes may require many hours of addition travel time. Marshalling yards are also were trains are formed up or broken up for movement. A train may come in from point "A" with 50 cars carrying 10 different types of cargo bound for 12 different locations. The marshalling yard is where this train and others like are broken up and reformed so the cars destined for point "B" are all put in one train and all the cars for point "C" are put in another train and so on. Rerouting around the destroyed yard doesn't get the distribution done and leads to major disruption in the efficiency of the railway in that area.

Both the American and British rail systems were in worse physical shape in 1945 than they were in 1939 in both railbed/rails/bridges and in rolling stock/motive power. While total capacity had increased the infrastructure had not been maintained to prewar standards and much of the rolling stock/motive power was on borrowed time.
That is without being bombed.

 

[Civettone]

Cutting the transsiberian railway would have virtually no effect. Vladisvostock was the base of the far eastern military district, and was supplied for something like 5 years for a garrison of ovewr 200000 men. It was fully supported by the Industrial combines of the Far Eastern Command....such as the great tank factories at Kharbarovsk.

Cutting the rail line is no easy feat either. The majority of the border on the northern flank of Manchiria, had the obstacle of the Amur River, several mountain ranges and and swamps. The japanese might be able to march to the line, then what????? Thery are faced with forces from the east and the west, a river that is one of the major rivers of the world, and unbridged. The Japanese wo0uld be unsupplied, cut off and isolated. they would be fighting an enmy superior in strength and well supplied. It doesnt need to be anything other than simplistic to work out what happens there.

As for being outnumbered....untrue. The Russians were able to pull out a force of around 50 Divs in December 1941, and still retain a modicum of forces in the far East to keep an eye on the japanese. Im not sure how many troops were retained in the far east after Typhoon, but I have read somewhere it was of the order of 200K troops. From June to December 1941, the Russians probably had in the order of 80-100 Divs, against which the Japanese might be able to field 20 or 25.

Bush bashing across the trackless wasteands to "cut the trans-siberian railway would have achieved nothing. The rail line was not a supply line...the region was an autonomous military district. It would have just hastened the defeat of the Japanese even quicker.

nearly fs shared border

Parsifal, you have a wrong idea about the Russian military in the Far East during the war. The Russians were on the brink of collapse in 1941 and they stripped the forces in the East to fight the Germans. The divisions were paper divisions, usually at regiment strength and equiped with no modern tanks, no heavy artillery and other obsolete weapons. Sure, you can keep all the forces there but then there is nothing left to stop the Germans in the West.

Again, the Japanese were outnumbered 2:1 at Khalkin Gol and they inflicted more casualties than they received. The total Japanese defeat is not backed up by the casualty numbers. The Soviets suffered horrible losses even with a Japanese army surrounded! And in 1941/1942 the Japanese would outnumber the Soviets 2:1. Do the math

Stavka directives #170149 and #170150 issued 16 march 1942 for the Far East fronts clearly show what kind of war Soviet Command expected in the case of Japanese attack. Far East troops should do their best to wear down Japanese in fortified regions during first 7-10 days of war,"defend at all costs" several key positions deep in the soviet territory until reinforcements arrive.
This clearly shows that the Japanese were expected to penetrate deep into Soviet territory. This also means that the railroads would also be cut. And how can you expect to receive reinforcements when the railroads are cut?

Kris

 

[parsifal]

Parsifal, you have a wrong idea about the Russian military in the Far East during the war. The Russians were on the brink of collapse in 1941 and they stripped the forces in the East to fight the Germans. The divisions were paper divisions, usually at regiment strength and equiped with no modern tanks, no heavy artillery and other obsolete weapons. Sure, you can keep all the forces there but then there is nothing left to stop the Germans in the West.

Again, the Japanese were outnumbered 2:1 at Khalkin Gol and they inflicted more casualties than they received. The total Japanese defeat is not backed up by the casualty numbers. The Soviets suffered horrible losses even with a Japanese army surrounded! And in 1941/1942 the Japanese would outnumber the Soviets 2:1. Do the math

Stavka directives #170149 and #170150 issued 16 march 1942 for the Far East fronts clearly show what kind of war Soviet Command expected in the case of Japanese attack. Far East troops should do their best to wear down Japanese in fortified regions during first 7-10 days of war,"defend at all costs" several key positions deep in the soviet territory until reinforcements arrive.
This clearly shows that the Japanese were expected to penetrate deep into Soviet territory. This also means that the railroads would also be cut. And how can you expect to receive reinforcements when the railroads are cut?

Kris

Hi Kris

The hypothetical posed the question that Japan attack Russia instead of independantly attacking the western allies. The assumption here is that Japan not sign the non-agressiuon pact, or break it, and that they attack in concert with the Germans in June 1941.

Throughout 1941, the Soviets maintained a strong military presence in the Far East, until they were absolutely sure that the Japanese were not going to attack. Once they did work out they were not under threat, Zhukov and his army, were trasported to the west. This was a movement of approximately 300000 men and their equipment, it took approximately 3 months to complete (available rolling stock was the main reason for the slower movement of troops in 1941 compared to 1945, plus in 1945 it was only a movement of personnel that occurred, the troops transferred in '45 were re-equipped from local factories).

However it is wrong to suggest that the defences were completely denuded after the movements to the west in the last quarter of 1941. 1st and 2nd Far Eastern Fronts immediately raised levies to replace those troops that had been transferred. The records I have show the Soviet Far eastern forces at about 1.2 million men, dropping to 0.9 by November, and then returning to just over 1 million men in the first quarter of 1942. thereafter the figures remained remarkably static, though I am fairly certain that the properly trained elements would on a routine basis be shipped west. There were fluctuating numbers of aircraft, but a typical figure was around 2500 aircraft at any given time, except in the fall and winter of 1941 and early 1942, when it was about a thord of that total.

The reason that such strong forces were maintained in the east was primarily because Stalin was paranoid about a two front war, (and hence the existence of the Stavka directives you refer to....issued incidentally at a time the far Eastern Garrisons were at their weakest....esentially "what do we do until the forces are replaced???" You omit some important supplements from these directives, incidentally, about how and the timing of the raising of those replacements), and as a consequence, never let his force levels in that theatr drop too low. There was never any time when the Japanese forces achieved a 2:1 majority, I'd like to know your source for that claim for verification. Mine is principally a book I have called "The Soviet War Against Japan" It may be argued that if they could reinforce Manchuria from China they would reach a 2:1 advantage, but it never happened historically.

By early 1945, before the big transfer of personnel occured there were just over a million troops in the Far East, organized into 32 Rifle Divs, 12 Infantry Brigades, 8 Tank Brigades two Tank and one Mech Corps. Against this number the japanese had 1.2 million men, organized into 40 Inf, 7 Cav 23 Independant brigades and 2 armoured brigades. The Japanese maintained a force of about 1200 aircraft throughout the war, though again they would temporaily increase this by another 500-1000 if China were abandoned.

Your claims about Khalkin Gol do not accord to my main sources. In this case I rely on the book "Dirty Little Secrets of WW 2" by Dunningan and Nofi
and an article writen by a colleague of theirs, Richard Berg some years earlier in "Strategy Tactics"According to these sources, the Soviets were initially outnumbered by about 3:1 by the attacking Japanese, However as the Soviets poured additional troops into the battle, the balance did tip in their favour, such that in the finish about 70000 men were used to encircle 40000 Japanese troops. What isnt included in this is that the Japanese were pouring another 3 divs into the battle, or about an additional 50-60000 men. For an offensive operation, an advantager of 3:1 is the normal advantage needed. The Soviets when on the defensive were outnumbered about 3:1, and when on the attack, they outnumbered the Japanese by about 70/40. Thats not even 2:1, and well short of the idel 3:1 generally regarded as necessaary for an offensive.

In terms of casualties, there is no evidence I know of that the Soviets were slaughtered. The sources I quoted report total Japanese caulaties at 18000 killed or wounded, with another 3000 captured. Total casualties were therefore about 22000 Japanese. On the Soviet side, there were 23000 casualties, killed or wounded (8000 dead, 15000 wounded) . Soviets taken prisoner were never reported, but if we assume a similar or lesser number to the japanese (on the basis that the Soviets maintained resistance and were not forced to surrender), Soviet losses are likely to be in the order of 25000. Thats hardly a one sided massacre. In the air, the Soviets appear to have achieved pretty credible reults as well, far from the usual one sided massacres claimed in most western accounts (which are exclusively based on Japanese claims).

One thing worth noting is that with no attack on the west the Far east will receive unfettered reinfocement and re-supply from the allies. Japan historically was scrupulous in not attacking Rusian flagged Lend lease ships headed for Vladivostock. In this scenario, i think it reasonable to assume they would observe the same to neutral allied shipping, given the Japanese had not attacked the allies as originally posed

 

[Civettone]

Parsifal, I was already under the impression you were believing this kind of data. I have seen it too but it is Soviet propaganda. Recent research has shown that the figures were inflated. Official Soviet figures are 1.2 million soldiers. In reality 350.000 would have been closer to the truth.

And you are nitpicking on Khalkin Gol. Or you didnt't understand what I said. So one more time, the Soviets outnumbered the Japanese 2:1 (or 70k vs 40k as you said) but still, the Russians received more losses than the Japanese. That's even more impressive if one considers that a Japanese army was encircled and 'destroyed'. With Soviets down from 1.2 million to 350.000 one can consider that the Japanese would have been a lot more succesful.

Also be careful when using the 3:1 advantage, this is mainly an American (or Anglosax) premise which is overly simplistic. Most major military victories in history did not follow this 3:1 ratio.

Lastly, I think we were talking about how the Japanese would invade Russia instead of attacking the US. That doesn't mean they would attack on June 22. In fact, that would have been illogical given the German-Japanese cooperation. The Japs were not informed until very late, probably because of security reasons. The Japanese would have to decide to attack the SU after June 22, probably after seeing the immense German successes in the first weeks. This would mean that the Russians would already be hard pressed when the Japanese attack them in their rear.

And the Germans attacked any ship that supplied England. I don't see any reason why the Japanese wouldn't. In fact, given the complete Japanese naval superiority, it could simply stop, inspect and send back any ship coming into Russian waters. Just look at what Israel does with ships heading to Gaza.

Kris

 

[parsifal]

Hi Kris

You'll need to quote your sources if you want your claims of Soviet propagandsa to be taken seriously. Saying "Oh thats just Soviet propaganda....new research shows it to be false!!" is fine but you need to back that up. The claim lacks any veracity without sources, and can only be treated with a large amount of disbelief until it can be verified. Ive given you my sources, which you appear to dismiss, without even bothering to check them. I would suggest you need to provide some basis for the claims you make, in order to be taken seriously. The sources I have quoted are fairly recent, and are usually pretty reliable. There are other sources that tend to back that up as well.

I dont think I am nitpicking by corecting your statements about the force ratios. In the first place, it was the Soviets who were outnumbered, which tipped gradually in favour of the Soviets to around 70/40. thats still not 2:1, its 1.75:1, also it takes no account of the reserves the Japanese were preparing to send into the fight. There is nothing in your post to suggest that these figures are incorrect or overblown, and i put it to you that Soviets were conducting an offensive with the slenderest of margins in numerical advantage. that they won is, at least in part due, to the superiority of the army engaged. This was not your typical Soviet chaff, it was the best of the best, and it showed in the results.

Now, saying the 3:1 advantage is an American idea is just plain wrong. It actually originates from German sources (suggest you read Clausewitz to understand its origins). It was adopted by the Americans and the british after their experiences in WWI. It is standard material in most modern officer training manuals, and is not a uniquely American, or Anglosaxon concept at all. It was used by the French army, the German army, the italians, even the japanese (though they often ignored it), In fact 3:1 represents a rather low advantage in numbers. Generally to be successful at 3:1, there has to be some kind of force multiplier at work, like airpower, or mobility. For the German offensives in 1941, for example, they used mobility and speed to achieve typical local numerical advantages of about 6:1, plus their all arms integration and air power at the Schwerpunkt to deliver the decisive blows. During the Soviet counteroffensivesm of 1944, though the overall front advantage might be 4:1 (for example), they would usually aim for much higher concentrations or advantantages along the MLA. So an advantage of only 1.75:1 is cutting it very fine....IMO they had to be relying on some other Force multiplier to tip the balance. I think they relied on their superior armour, their supewrior artillery, and their superior Infantry to win the battle.


So far as attacking neutral shipping, well thats one difference between the Japanese and the Germans. The germans would not hesitate to attack neutral shipping, the japanese never did. Unless the Japanese leopard is about to grow new spots, why would they behave any differently to the way they did historically. they never attacked neutral shipping entering Vladivostock (indeed, they showed a partial aversion to attacking any shipping at all really) , even when that shipping was obviously allied in reality. In this case it would be allied, but the allies to the japanese in this scenario I assume are neutral (unless you want to explore a two fron war scenario for the japanese). I think the japanese would be scrupulous in not attacking allied shipping because they would be afraid of triggering war with the "neutral" allies