Who Really Destroyed the Luftwaffe?

[tango35]

Gentlemen,

I've begun reading a book that claims the USAAF defeated the Luftwaffe, a task that no other Allied AF was capable of. The author argues that the RAF was only able to achieve temporary, local air superiority beyond England, and that the Red Air Force was even less effective at superiority. Only the USAAF had the ability to destroy the GAF. Any thoughts?

Amazon.com: Men Who Killed the Luftwaffe: The U.S. Army Air Forces Against Germany in World War II (9780811706599): Jay A. Stout: Books

To bring the thread back to the beginning :


The Luftwaffe was destroyed by allied airforces, that right; but much earlier the roots to her destrution were made by the german high command it self.
1st : The Luftwaffe especially Göring waited too long to bring a 2nd and better fighter ( Fw 190), and minimized the progress on jet technology
2nd : Neglecting the Radar technology
3rd : Changing through BoB the targets from airfields to cities
4th : Waiting too long to evacuate industries like oil, etc. in the underground



Thomas

 

[drgondog]

To bring the thread back to the beginning :


The Luftwaffe was destroyed by allied airforces, that right; but much earlier the roots to her destrution were made by the german high command it self.
1st : The Luftwaffe especially Göring waited too long to bring a 2nd and better fighter ( Fw 190), and minimized the progress on jet technology
2nd : Neglecting the Radar technology
3rd : Changing through BoB the targets from airfields to cities
4th : Waiting too long to evacuate industries like oil, etc. in the underground



Thomas

Thomas - thoughtful reply, but focused on actions that 'could have been taken if only we could see into the future".

Other similar discoveries 'could have been made early"
1. Speer warned Hitler and Goering that the Americans had far greater potential from a production perspective than Germany and that it was unwise to think of American Industry as only razor blades, automobiles and Hollywood movies.

2. The German High Command had no reason to fear that air superiority over Germany would be seriously challenged, particularly in daylight - and only the USAAF held to a doctrine that a Strategic Bombing force could destroy an opponents industrial capacity.

3. The German High Command believed the war would be over in the East by 1942 and England would either sue for peace or be starved out by U-Boats.

Ergo, no reason for a quantum leap in interceptor technology, no reason to continuously build and rebuild the German Fighter Force, no reason to consider allocating more precious materials (human included) toward 'Defense'.

Had Germany re-considered the wisdom of attacking the USSR, or considered the possibility of a long war - I believe they would have first secured the middle east oil fields rather than piecemeal forces to Afrika Corps and then struck for the Soviet oil fields.

But they didn't do that. They also failed to secure air superiority over England, North Africa, The Med. Conversely the RAF could not achieve air superiority over the Continent and neither could the Soviets. Thus, Stalemate in the air war and consequently high risk to attempt an invasion from the West.

Until the 8th and 12th and 15th AF, bloodied and hurt, took the air war to Germany, took the losses, changed strategy from un-escorted heavy bombers in daylight to deploy a high performance Brit/American 'hybrid' fighter which was the equal of anything the LW had to oppose them.

Make no mistake that a commitment to the Lightning instead of the Mustang might have achieved enough destruction of the LW by June to make the Invasion a success - but that is another speculation.

(The P-38, given its priorities in the MTO and PTO was not allocated in sufficient numbers to provide target escort in Spring 1944. The 8th AF received its full allotment with the fourth and final P-38 (479th FG) in May, 1944. Far too few and too late to make a difference. Additionally the size of the P-38, its inability to chase and catch the Fw 190 and Me 109 in a dive (until ~ June, 1944) would mean many more surviving LW fighter pilots in air to air combat. The P-47 didn't get the range to be effective over middle and eastern Germany until ~ September. Net result is that the LW could more or less successfuly prosecute its strategy of avoiding US fighters and contine to hit the bombers hard over most of the critical oil and chemical refineries. Quite possibly the 8th and 15th AF would have suffered too many casualties to be politically acceptable)


In my opinion the introduction of the Mustang had two major results.

First, the P-51, combined with a large pool of fresh but experienced fighter pilots in the 8th AF, enabled a wholesale mauling of the LuftFlotte Reich single and twin engine day fighter force. This included replacements which were stripped from Ost and Sud to try to stem daylight Strategic bombing.

Second, the footprint of the Mustangs, as well as the strategy of dropping to the deck and shooting up targets of opportunity (Rail, Barges, Airfields) placed a strain on Luftwaffe re-supply to airfields, stripped available aircraft from the operational rosters, and strained rail transport logistics. The amplified control of the air by all Allied fighter forces from France to the Netherlands set the table for complete control of daytime logistics and troop movements when the Normandy campaign started.

Third, the threat of the strategic oil campaign was so dire that the LW had to commit to stopping it - forcing the LW to engage the Mustangs whether they wanted to or not. A losing proposition given the resources continuing to pour into ETO from America and the increasing dire air situation in the East as a result of re-inforcing LuftFlotte Reich.

I agree your points - but suggest they are more to the point of why the Luftwaffe was never as strong or technologically superior as they needed to be to maintain air superiority over an as unyet forecast threat.

 

[pbfoot]

But they didn't do that. They also failed to secure air superiority over England, North Africa, The Med. Conversely the RAF could not achieve air superiority over the Continent and neither could the Soviets. Thus, Stalemate in the air war and consequently high risk to attempt an invasion from the West.

.

I respect your stance but disagree about the fact that Fighter Command and 2 TAF would not be able to control the skies over a channel beachhead . IMHO the LW picked and chose when a where to fight a cross channel invasion would have made that a moot point and the LW would have been forced out and into combat . Obviously neutering the LW over Germany was a better option . Portal should shoulder a huge part of the blame in respect to the fact Fighter Command lacked long range fighters as he insisited that it was impossible to have range to go hand in hand with agility and speed

 

[drgondog]

I respect your stance but disagree about the fact that Fighter Command and 2 TAF would not be able to control the skies over a channel beachhead . IMHO the LW picked and chose when a where to fight a cross channel invasion would have made that a moot point and the LW would have been forced out and into combat . Obviously neutering the LW over Germany was a better option . Portal should shoulder a huge part of the blame in respect to the fact Fighter Command lacked long range fighters as he insisited that it was impossible to have range to go hand in hand with agility and speed

We may be quibbling - but - RAF did not control the skies over Dieppe, nor IMO did RAF at any time prior to Normandy have the resources to defeat and maintain control over the Beach head in the face of an undiminished Luftwaffe reserve available from Germany. I agree this is only my opinion and I respect yours.

Ditto the combined TAC and Fighter Command and 8th and 9th AF - particulary in attempting to protect the shipping and movement of supplies from ship to shore - as well as securing the Allies freedom of movement during the day.

Agree on Portal. The real issue circa December 1943- January,1944 is the RAF (and LW) were approaching exhaustion - ditto USAAF Daylight Strategic Force. Several punchdrunk fighters nearing exhaustion and trying to persevere in the face of incredible losses. Further, RAF and USAAF were facing only JG2 and JG26 on the Channel - with far more fighters in reserve east of France and Holland.

In the West only the US had the reserves of fresh faces (troopers and airmen)and the US was approaching a 'pain point' even with what looked like inexhaustable resources. The bond drives in the US had reached a point of maxing out and the war was becoming almost too expensive to continue at the current pace.

 

[Civettone]

Wow, Parsifal, that is great. Simply saying my comments lack any veracity because I didnt provide sources.
Anyway, hstart with this Axis History Forum • View topic - Soviet Far East
(I just hope you won't dismiss it as just an internet source)

And your ratio comments are completely misplaced. You are confused about the meaning of the 3:1 superiority. You give examples of how locally a superiority has to be formed to break through the enemy lines, Schwerpunkt as the Germans called it. That is the correct way. But then you want to apply it to overall forces in an offensive. That just doesn't make sense: just look at overall forces in all major battles in WW2. Hardly ever such superiority. 70k vs 40k is actually quite high.
I often read about this misuse of the 3:1 ratio in American (and British?) opinions/posts.

And about neutral shipping, you are also not thinking it through, sorry for saying. The Japanese were not at war with the Russians and had no cause to attack neutral ships supplying the Russians. In fact, there was little neutral ships to destroy in Japanese controlled territory: what would those ships supply as the entire area was occupied by the Japanese. The German situation is completely different: neutral ships were supplying Britain who the Germans were at war with.

Kris

 

[Nikademus]

A Japanese attack on Russia during 41 could very well been the straw that would have broken the USSR's back. Nomanhan is often viewed as a one sided a$$ kicking that permenantly put the Japanese off in regards to the Russians but this is untrue. In terms of total casualties they gave as good as they got. Whilst garnaring a grudging respect for the Russians, the Kw. Army was anything but not wanting a rematch, only this time not primarily involving a single green division based on a new triangular structure of organization.

Though the hokushin faction (Go-North) was ultimately defeated by the nanshin faction by 8/41 (Go-South), the Japanese did begin mobilization and begin implementing a phased plan to stage a major offensive.

 

[parsifal]

Wow, Parsifal, that is great. Simply saying my comments lack any veracity because I didnt provide sources.
Anyway, hstart with this Axis History Forum • View topic - Soviet Far East
(I just hope you won't dismiss it as just an internet source)

And your ratio comments are completely misplaced. You are confused about the meaning of the 3:1 superiority. You give examples of how locally a superiority has to be formed to break through the enemy lines, Schwerpunkt as the Germans called it. That is the correct way. But then you want to apply it to overall forces in an offensive. That just doesn't make sense: just look at overall forces in all major battles in WW2. Hardly ever such superiority. 70k vs 40k is actually quite high.
I often read about this misuse of the 3:1 ratio in American (and British?) opinions/posts.

And about neutral shipping, you are also not thinking it through, sorry for saying. The Japanese were not at war with the Russians and had no cause to attack neutral ships supplying the Russians. In fact, there was little neutral ships to destroy in Japanese controlled territory: what would those ships supply as the entire area was occupied by the Japanese. The German situation is completely different: neutral ships were supplying Britain who the Germans were at war with.

Kris

Hi Kris

Wow Kris!!! You do understand the need to prove your statements dont you. I dont mean to lecture you, but this is basic debating criteria, my friend.....your comments do lack veracity when you make claims and dont back them up. If you dont back up your statements, you can say anything, but dont expect me to accept them.....

Please correct me if Im wrong, but your position appears to be based on the posting by a particular individual of that forum. If not, please cut and paste the relevant excerpts, with acknowledgment of who said it so we can look a little closer. For the moment, because you omitted (or just decided not ) to do this, you are going to have to put up with my own inadequate analysis

Well its a start, and no Im not going to dismiss it just because its an Internet source. But lets be clear about this, this is an extract from a forum site, not properly referenced, nor have you undertaken any indepth analysis of your source. Not a good start, or indicatigve of a a thorough investigation....

The guy you are appearing to rely on as your main source is not "official source" is it, nor is he even quoting official sources, is he......

Further, this guy repeatedly states in his post that it is exceptionally difficult to pin down numbers. But what really makes me smell a rat , and a dead one at that, is that he is not even quoting manpower figures for the Far Eastern Fronts at al, and when he does quote figures, he appears to be looking at front line strengths only. You do realize that dont you????

The Zabaikalsky Military District was the area east of Baikal, basically to the northwest of manchuria, and on the far side of the Black Mountains. It was not part of the Far Eastern Military District. The poster fails to answer these questions in anything like a competent way IMO.

Here is a link to a site which I think approaches a level of competency. It provides some details of troop strengths and gives a lot of detail on the military fortifications. Just glancing at the extent of fortification, one is drawn to the inescapeable conclusion that your guy is blowing it out certain parts of his anatomy, to be brutal about it. Look at the Link, determine the extent of the frontage, and then count the number of gun emplacements strongpoints....the Russians called these agglomerations "fortified regions" or "fortified zones". The numbers of troops needed to man a region or a zone might vary from 10000 to about 30000 men typically. Judging by the sheer scale of the works put into place, i would wager that many of these regions manned at least 30000 men. This was a scale of fortification that rivalled the maginot line, except that whereas the French Fortifications were about 140 km, this line was 1400 km. The French needed a minimum of 200000 men to man their dfences....how many more do you think they needed to man their Siberian defences?

Fort 35 - USSR Far East fortification

Relevantly this site I have provided you says this about manning levels.

"It is well known that the German aggression that commenced on 22 June 1941 led the Soviet Union to the edge of catastrophe. The troops of the Western Special and later the Kievsky Special Military Districts were nearly broken and the situation with the troops of the former Odessky, Baltic and Leningradsky Military Districts were not significantly better. The most economically developed territories in the European part of the country were lost. The sources from which the Soviet Union might quickly replace the losses of troops and arms were the Far Eastern and Zabaikalsky Fronts. However, the threat of Japanese aggression forced the USSR to keep these troops in place. Only in the Autumn of 1941 when the Germans nearly took Moscow were five rifle and two tank divisions transferred from the Far Eastern Front to the combat theatre (one additional tank division was delivered in July). These well-trained troops played a very important role in the defeat of the German troops on the approaches to Moscow. To replace the troops transferred to the combat theatre, the Commander of the Far Eastern Front General of Army I P Apanasenko formed new units based on the very limited local manpower resources. A significant source of these recruits were prisoners of the Gulag, while by Apanasenko's orders they were taken even from Kolyma despite the protests of the local NKVD leaders.122 In this way the troop strength in the Far East was maintained. The second crisis on the Soviet-German front, namely the battle of Stalingrad in July 1942 again required the rapid transfer of eight rifle divisions and three rifle brigades to the European part of the country. These troops played an important role during the fight for Stalingrad and on other parts of the front. Despite the fact that the transfer of these troops also was compensated for by the formation of new units, the overall troop strength decreased slightly. Nevertheless, during entire period of the war the strength of the Soviet troops in the Far East was close to that of the Japanese forces and was even slightly larger 123.. After the defeat of the German forces near Stalingrad, the threat of Japanese aggression significantly decreased in 1943 and General of Army I R Apanasenko was transferred to the Active Army in the position of Deputy Commander of the Voronezhsky Front and was soon killed during the Kharkov-Belgorod Operation. His place was taken by the former commander of the Kalininsky Front, General M A Purkaev."

Frankly, I would prefer this source over the claims made by your friend. The simple visual material suggest strongly higher manning levels than he is prepared to admit. He makes factual errors about basic facts like military districts that demonstrate to me he does not know what he is talking about, despite saying he is russian (I even question that given the language and tone of this posts. I suspect he might be latvian or estonian, or similar to be honest)


With regard to this 3:1 superiority issue, no i am not misusing it. The key to understanding this is mobility. The Germans actually attacked the Russian with an inferior number of troops, but because of their superior mobility were able to concentrate where needed. Same situation applies to the Allies. For the relatively static armies of the Russians and the Japanese, this was not possible, or at least, not as possible.

Why is the 3:1 ratio relevant? Because in theory it allows a 1:1 ratio in the assault forces, enough men to maintain an artillery/suppressive fire advantage, plus enough men to expoit a breakthrough and pursue the defeated enemy. Its not a misuse of the theory. Again, I suggest you read its author, Von Clausewits, before dismissing it as bunkum, or trying to come up with some new formula that is all your own....

The reason the neutral shipping issue was raised, was because of your assertion the port or the region would be isolated if the rail line was cut. I firstly question that the line could be cut, but in the second instance, even if it was, the far east would receive oodles of supply from the neutral allied shipping. I dont think the Japanse would attack neutral allied shipping. I understqand what your saying about the destination being to a combatant (in this case the Russians), but during the war, the Japanese would not even attack Nowegian or Greek flagged shipping for the allies (source: The Japanese Submarine Force and WWII, Carl Boyd and Akihiko Yoshida, Bluejacket Books 2002)

 

[michaelmaltby]

Nomonhan: The War Between Japan and Russia, June - September 1939, by Alvin Cookes


This is written from the Japanese perspective and what Parsifal writes is pretty close to what Cookes writes.

".... Parsifal, you have a wrong idea about the Russian military in the Far East during the war. The Russians were on the brink of collapse in 1941 and they stripped the forces in the East to fight the Germans. The divisions were paper divisions, usually at regiment strength and equiped with no modern tanks, no heavy artillery and other obsolete weapons. Sure, you can keep all the forces there but then there is nothing left to stop the Germans in the West.

" .... Again, the Japanese were outnumbered 2:1 at Khalkin Gol and they inflicted more casualties than they received. The total Japanese defeat is not backed up by the casualty numbers. The Soviets suffered horrible losses even with a Japanese army surrounded! And in 1941/1942 the Japanese would outnumber the Soviets 2:1. Do the math. ..."

The Soviets (and the Russians 1904-05) don't do MATH in those situations. Casualties simply didn't matter - to either side.

But to give you an idea of how "incompetent" the Soviets were - they had all the positions the Japanese occupied targeted for artillery coordinates long BEFORE the Japanese invaded across the river.

The Japanese had no idea how many POW's the Russians took and held. In Japan the families were just told that the son or father was dead. And the few Japanese prisoners that were "exchanged" for Russians were led into a room with a desk and a revolver and advised to "end it" for honor's sake.

That little war was no "lucky break" for the Russians. .

MM

 

[VG-33]

Kris[/QUOTE]

Parsifal, I was already under the impression you were believing this kind of data. I have seen it too but it is Soviet propaganda. Recent research has shown that the figures were inflated. Official Soviet figures are 1.2 million soldiers. In reality 350.000 would have been closer to the truth.

I don't know about soviet propaganda, I can just advice you to not read the Pravda anymore. But looking at accounts, avaible on some russian sites and forums (as Vif2 in 2007), the weakest point for the DalniVostochni Front was reached on november 1941, with 912 000 or 938 000 soldiers depending on sources. By internal documents. And not 350 000 taken from your imagination.

The DVF feeded (also by accounts available on the net) Front Line armies with 2500 tanks, 3-4000 canons and mortars, 250 000 regular men and 100 000 soldiers of independent "march companies". But it was from June 41 to March 1945. For 1941th year it was for about 110 -135 000 men, only.

But on the same time, mobilising population from 15 to 55 years old Apanasenko intergrated in DVF some 200 000 "auxiliaries" he had to feed, train and dress for cruel siberian winter. So total force did not diminished but increased.
About 323 000 mobilsed young men in early 1942 in Moscow, Gorki and Wladimir region were in the way to reinforce internal districts for formations; tank, artillery, paras. More than 200 000 of them served in the "march companies" in the meanwhile on DVF. They replaced "auxiliaries" from spring, on that inactive front. Once formed, went in FL units and were replaced by others.

In All DVF send experienced soldiers, recieved youg ones to teach, but global number was alawys maintained, even increased.

And you are nitpicking on Khalkin Gol. Or you didnt't understand what I said. So one more time, the Soviets outnumbered the Japanese 2:1 (or 70k vs 40k as you said) but still, the Russians received more losses than the Japanese. That's even more impressive if one considers that a Japanese army was encircled and 'destroyed'. With Soviets down from 1.2 million to 350.000 one can consider that the Japanese would have been a lot more succesful.

I don't share your supposals about Khalkin -Gol. After the end of the battle from his memors general Grigorenko, the famous dissident (miliary engineering) had to burn 10 -12 000 dead japanese bodies, afterbattle. Soviet soldiers being properly beared were not concerned. From Gén. reading Yakovlev the tank commander from his own side, it was to be done with his own (rare) fuel stocks. And he had also quoted that number. The fact is more than enough corroborated.

Lastly, I think we were talking about how the Japanese would invade Russia instead of attacking the US. That doesn't mean they would attack on June 22. In fact, that would have been illogical given the German-Japanese cooperation. The Japs were not informed until very late, probably because of security reasons. The Japanese would have to decide to attack the SU after June 22, probably after seeing the immense German successes in the first weeks. This would mean that the Russians would already be hard pressed when the Japanese attack them in their rear.


Kris

I have red some stupid posts, never at that level. Just take a train and see what siberia look like on soviet (russian) boarders. It's 2-3 inab/km², some primary swampy forest you couldn't progress more than 300-500 meters an hour with roten dead trees everywhere, even with no ennemy opposition, no heavy bag, + 40°C in summer with mosquitos pearcing through 1 cm thick boots, - 60°C in winter. In that condition a single "Dersuu Zala"* would decimate an entire japanese company within 1 or 2 days...

Image it even wilder , 70 years before

*A siberian hunter from Nenets tribe...

I will stop here, don't see other interest. Moreover it's oftopic

With no regards but with advices. Think a little before posting from time to time, travel, read books, pariculary in geography...How is it possible to stay such... ignorant?

This clearly shows that the Japanese were expected to penetrate deep into Soviet territory. This also means that the railroads would also be cut. And how can you expect to receive reinforcements when the railroads are cut?

Yes and they would walk through it simply like in the Schwartzwald forest or Fontainebleau royal wood paths?

 

[FLYBOYJ]

I have red some stupid posts, never at that level.

Think a little before posting from time to time, travel, read books, pariculary in geography...How is it possible to stay such... ignorant?

HEY DIPSHIT - THIS JUST GOT YOU A MONTH IN NEVER NEVER LAND. IF YOU WANT TO BE AN ASS I SUGGEST GOING TO A GAY BATHHOUSE!

 

[parsifal]

Another thing I forgot to mention about this Far eastern option are the limitations on Japanese artillery. I think any battle in this area would be primarily an artillery battle, and in particular would require lots of heavy artillery to silence the Russian forts. Japanese artillery, in my opinion was generally good at the lighter types, but less good, and far less numerous, at the hevy calibre end of the equation. One only has to look at their efforts on Corregidor to realize they were not particuarly good at heavy artillery shoots

 

[BikerBabe]

Who really destroyed the Luftwaffe?

Hmmm, where were Jan at the time???

 

[bobbysocks]

Who really destroyed the Luftwaffe?

Hmmm, where were Jan at the time???

probably falling off his chair and spilling a cuppa all over the attack plans...

 

[jayastout]

Wow.

I know this thread is a gajillion years old, but I only just now stumbled across it. I'm the author of the book (The Men Who Killed the Luftwaffe) that the OP referenced. I recognize that the title is a bit simplistic--and antogonistic to some--but it's tough to put qualifiers into a title. And the book does indeed mention the contributions of the the RAF and the Soviets, and in fact declares that the RAF might well have saved the West during the BoB.

Certainly the victory over the Luftwaffe was a shared one.

But, for the reasons outlined in the book, and stated by some here, I stand by my assertion that it was the USAAF that forced the Luftwaffe's hand and struck the killing blows. Were it not for the USAAF, the Luftwaffe would have remained a formidable force for much, much longer.

Happy New Year to all.

 

[Crimea_River]

This dog's been asleep for 6 years. Time to let go me thinks. Happy New Year to you too.

 

[BiffF15]

Wow.

I know this thread is a gajillion years old, but I only just now stumbled across it. I'm the author of the book (The Men Who Killed the Luftwaffe) that the OP referenced. I recognize that the title is a bit simplistic--and antogonistic to some--but it's tough to put qualifiers into a title. And the book does indeed mention the contributions of the the RAF and the Soviets, and in fact declares that the RAF might well have saved the West during the BoB.

Certainly the victory over the Luftwaffe was a shared one.

But, for the reasons outlined in the book, and stated by some here, I stand by my assertion that it was the USAAF that forced the Luftwaffe's hand and struck the killing blows. Were it not for the USAAF, the Luftwaffe would have remained a formidable force for much, much longer.

Happy New Year to all.

Jay,

Welcome aboard. There are some very interesting topics / discussions in here and look forward to your contributions.

We might have done some DACT along the way. I flew at Eglin from 1992-1997 (60th & 58th FS, F-15C), then Jacksonville from 1997-2009 (125thFW, F-15A).

By the way I enjoyed both Blue Noses and The Men Who Killed the LF!

Cheers,
Biff

 

[parsifal]

Ive said this so many times before. Whenever these old threads come up and I see some of the things we have said in the heat of the moment it make me want to tear my keyboard out of the socket sometimes.

I need to work on my communication skills. Im not backing away from where I ended up in this discussion, but Im disappointed with myself about the way I said it.

 

[The Basket]

Er....
So the Luftwaffe was destroyed by the Americans in 1944?
I would call that a very controversial subject!

 

[stona]

The discussion has been moot since Milosh gave the relevant statistics waaaaay back in post #23.

The destruction of the Luftwaffe as an effective fighting force was the one unequivocal victory of the combined bombing offensive, and it was almost entirely an American one. It was largely the USAAF that defeated the Luftwaffe, and had their been no losses in the East the USAAF would still have defeated the Luftwaffe, the figures speak for themselves. It really is as simple as that.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Glider]

I haven't looked at the data in sufficient detail to make any personal conclusions but when looking at the stats in posting 23 there is a large question mark over the German Loss figures, which is.

Unfortunately, Groehler obtained his "losses" by combining operational and non-operational "total losses" and "damaged" - a very strange thing to do, unless this helped him prove his thesis. According to other data in the original article, the "losses" in this table are about twice the "operational losses", but there are not enough data in the latter category to tabulate. There are other peculiarities - Groehler put the Balkans in the west, and we had to follow suit - but we take what we can get. Assuming that all his loss numbers are off by roughly the same proportion, conclusions based on comparisons should be valid, but to emphasize Groehler's dubious practice we'll put quotes around his "losses".

The end result is of course the same but it looks as if the Luftwaffe held their own until the end of 43 and it wasn't until 44 when control was lost

In reality its my belief that the Luftwaffe lost because they never had the resources to fight on two fronts and both front played their part in the victory