Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
...
If the strategic bombing campaign had not occurred, I doubt the Soviets could have taken Berlin. If the allies had not won air supremacy in the west, Normandy would have probably ended in defeat.
The air campaigns were crucial to the outcome of the war IMO
Lancaster required 5 'brains' to operate (from Wiki: pilot, flight engineer, navigator, bomb aimer, wireless operator). Mosquito required 2.
B-17 required 6 'brains' to operate, while US mediums required from one to four.
So the man-power exchange is positive in my eyes.
Hello Tomo
I was thinking B-24 vs B-26 (IIRC 2 pilots, navigator, vs 2 pilots, navigator/radio operator) if we thing those whose training was the most expensive.
and Lanc vs Wimpy (pilot, navigator, flight engineer(?) vs pilot, navigator)
IMHO Mossie was a light bomber
Full crews 7-10 vs 7 and 7 vs 5-6
Juha
Not quite so positive. Even the "brains" were not interchangeable. Many, but not all, US navigators and bomb aimers were men who had 'washed out' of flight school.
And you still need to double the size of of your flight schools to do the training.
US mediums weren't quite a 1:2 exchange in manufacturing effort, at least not in engines. B-17 were powered by four 9 cylinder engines. B-26s were powered by two 18 cylinder engines.
It might still take until 1944 to really start swamping the Axis with numbers and in the mean time all those AA guns have been distributed closer to the front.
Could the Allied Strategic bombing campaign have been done smarter or more effective?
Certainly.
Should it have been abandoned, or never started, altogether?
Like other posters, I smell a rat in the total absence of any mention of the Soviets role in defeating Germany. While I am supporter of the strategic bombing campaigns, they alone did not win the war. The USSR invading Germany and seizing it's capital won the war...
However, the Western allies did totally shatter the LW. Of that there is no doubt.
USA produced many other 2-engine bomber types that used far less crew (A-20, Martin 167 187). Sure enough, both Boeing Consolidated would've came out with 2-engine plane to be produced in lieu of -17 -24.
For Tail End Charlie -
Here are some quotes from folks Not American, Not Brit, not somebody's grandfather on the forum - regarding opinions regarding air superiority..
The Reich's Ex-leaders Explain Why They Were Beaten - World War 2 Talk
It is a lot easier to train gunners than pilots. for twice the number of bomber pilots you need (assuming you can recruit/draft enough pilots) twice the number of primary trainers, twice the number of basic trainers, twice the number of advanced trainers and twice the number of multi engine trainers. Plus instructors plus extra fuel for all those training planes. You also need the extra navagator/bomb aimers.Of course the brains were not interchangable, but, with focus going to train medium bomber crews, both UK USA would've cater for crews fot those bombers.
Boeing and Con could have produced 2 engine planes (although a few thousand B-24s for maritime patrol and long distance cargo would still have been useful) but this would have had to have been decided in 1939-40. It also means the Pacific would have been much more difficult. Mission distances there being much longer, Little 'strategic bombing' in the European sense being done there until the B-29 showed up. Bombing enemy naval bases and such being more grand tactical.As for the ratio between bomber types, think it would be easy for Boeing Con to produce 2-engine jobs. Or to produce turboed version of Martin A-22, or turboed version of A-20A, or to produce P-38 with Twin Wasp instead of Allison onboard.
As for those (German) AAA that is now nearer to the front, the 60 000 of new bombers would cater for those.
Hi TP
The other thing that bedevils this alternate scenario of yours is the non-combat attrition effects. In wartime it is simply not possible to sit passively by. Your forces need to remain active....to train, patrol command the airspace over friendly territory. That last mentioned excecise in the case of the british required that they at least push the Germans back over North Western France, which was the major achievement of the RAF against the LW in 1941, allbeit at a pretty heavy cost.
The point is that even in times of light engagement, aircraft are lost at a pretty alarming rate. During the so-called "phoney war" of 1939-40 the German bomber forces were losing between 4 and 7% of the force structure every month. Similar loss rates applied to the allied air forces, though it appears to have dropped as the war progressed. Therefore, if you are trying to maintain a force structure of 90000 aircraft in your frontline airforce, you are going to be losing about 7000 aorcraft per month. No country can sustain that level of attritional losses.
If the allies had done nothing from say 1942, with an estimated aircraft delivery rate of about 1800 aircraft per month (disregarding trainers aircraft retained in the US and the like), and a monthly attritional rate of 7%, they might have a force structure of 24000 aircraft, instead of the 20000 they actually fielded.
Conversely, the Germans, who maintained a force structure of around 5000 aircraft for the latter part of the war, lost a much greater percentage of their new production to enemy action. release the pressure on them , a number of things begin to happen...Firstly, they get time to train their piloits properly, secondly, they gain the ability to stockpile their oil, and thirdly, because a much bigger percentage of their aircraft were historically shot down, rather than just fall out of the sky, their force structure begins to grow, and astronomically. If the germans are assumed to have an effective delivery rate of 1000 machines per month, and they too are suffering atrition of 7%, then froma force of 5000 in 1942, one can expect the LW to have reached a strength of around 14200 aircraft by the end of 1943....in other words the ratio of forces actually tips in favour of the germans, from 4 or 5 to 1 against them in the real campaign, to about 1.6 to 1 in this hypothetical.
Relieving the pressure on a weaker force only benefits the weaker force
Indeed, Mossie was called light bomber by RAF, and I may agree that A-20 -22 were light bombers, but then how we should call Japanese 2-engined bombers? IIRC JApanese called them heavy bombers?
The same thing at tanks - Italians called 25 ton tank heavy (pesante), Germans called 48 ton a medium one.
Back to bombers - if we go by the usage, Mossie is hardly light bomber, since it was used along with heavy bombers...
Stuff for a new thread
It is a lot easier to train gunners than pilots. for twice the number of bomber pilots you need (assuming you can recruit/draft enough pilots) twice the number of primary trainers, twice the number of basic trainers, twice the number of advanced trainers and twice the number of multi engine trainers. Plus instructors plus extra fuel for all those training planes. You also need the extra navagator/bomb aimers.
These people are not all that easy to get in large numbers. Just like in the army not every soldier could be turned into an artilleryman or even a tanker.
Sure just about any strong back could shove a shell in the breech but how many people could read the maps, survey the firing positions, apply the atmospheric corrections to the trajectory tables and all the rest of the math stuff that gunners do for a successful shoot?
There was a more limited pool of qualified candidates than you might believe.
Boeing and Con could have produced 2 engine planes (although a few thousand B-24s for maritime patrol and long distance cargo would still have been useful) but this would have had to have been decided in 1939-40. It also means the Pacific would have been much more difficult. Mission distances there being much longer, Little 'strategic bombing' in the European sense being done there until the B-29 showed up. Bombing enemy naval bases and such being more grand tactical.
It doesn't matter how many twin engine bombers you have, with or with-out turbos, if they can't reach the target they are useless.
Aside from taking pictures, what does a turboed A-22 do? since we know (now) that the higher the altitude the worse the accuracy trying to use large numbers of high flying planes with 2,000lb bomb loads isn't going to give very good results.
Turboing the A-20 also gets you what? a very fast bomber at high altitude with a small internal bomb load and not much greater range, especially if you use the power.
A twin wasp P-38 is a real joke. Less power, more drag. a real recipe for success?
or would the anti-aircraft guns cater to the bombers? Trading bombers for dug in AA guns doesn't seem to be a good economic balance.
Especially if you are leaving the gun and ammunition factories total unhindered to make good their losses.
Eg. B-17 was produced in 4000 copies before 1943 - so 7000-8000 2-engined planes could've been produced AND put into usage well before eg. invasion of Sicily. Almost same number of B-24s, for the same math - making cca 15 000 new 2-engined bombers to pound Sicily, Kursk, France, the atolls etc
How do you KNOW 2-3 years beforehand what the ranges to the desired targets are so you can produce the desired bombers and if you build ALL twin engined planes how much flexibility do you loose? the ability 2-3 years down the road to choose alternative targets.