Who Really Destroyed the Luftwaffe?

[parsifal]

No air campaign, whethe3r it be "tactical", strategic", army support, or aeronaval in nature can win wars, or take territory. But winning the air caqmpaign makes things possible.

If the strategic bombing campaign had not occurred, I doubt the Soviets could have taken Berlin. If the allies had not won air supremacy in the west, Normandy would have probably ended in defeat.

The air campaigns were crucial to the outcome of the war IMO

 

[tomo pauk]

...

If the strategic bombing campaign had not occurred, I doubt the Soviets could have taken Berlin. If the allies had not won air supremacy in the west, Normandy would have probably ended in defeat.

The air campaigns were crucial to the outcome of the war IMO

If the W. allies skipped all strategic bombing campaign, they would've fielded cca 90 000 (90K) medium bombers more, if we take 1:2 ratio for exchange between 4-engined and 2-engined bomber. (USA produced 30K of B-17s B-24s, while UK produced 15K of 4-eng bombers).
With 1/3rd of those 90K going for West, East and Pacific fronts each, I take it Axis forces would've been swamped even more than they were historically.

 

[Juha]

Hello Tomo
in your scenario Allieds would have to had train a twice as many multi-engine pilots and navigators than they historically had.

Juha

 

[tomo pauk]

Lancaster required 5 'brains' to operate (from Wiki: pilot, flight engineer, navigator, bomb aimer, wireless operator). Mosquito required 2.
B-17 required 6 'brains' to operate, while US mediums required from one to four.

So the man-power exchange is positive in my eyes.

 

[Juha]

Hello Tomo
I was thinking B-24 vs B-26 (IIRC 2 pilots, navigator, vs 2 pilots, navigator/radio operator) if we thing those whose training was the most expensive.
and Lanc vs Wimpy (pilot, navigator, flight engineer(?) vs pilot, navigator)
IMHO Mossie was a light bomber

Full crews 7-10 vs 7 and 7 vs 5-6
Juha

 

[Shortround6]

Lancaster required 5 'brains' to operate (from Wiki: pilot, flight engineer, navigator, bomb aimer, wireless operator). Mosquito required 2.
B-17 required 6 'brains' to operate, while US mediums required from one to four.

So the man-power exchange is positive in my eyes.

Not quite so positive. Even the "brains" were not interchangeable. Many, but not all, US navigators and bomb aimers were men who had 'washed out' of flight school.
And you still need to double the size of of your flight schools to do the training.
US mediums weren't quite a 1:2 exchange in manufacturing effort, at least not in engines. B-17 were powered by four 9 cylinder engines. B-26s were powered by two 18 cylinder engines.
It might still take until 1944 to really start swamping the Axis with numbers and in the mean time all those AA guns have been distributed closer to the front.

Could the Allied Strategic bombing campaign have been done smarter or more effective?
Certainly.
Should it have been abandoned, or never started, altogether?

 

[tomo pauk]

Hello Tomo
I was thinking B-24 vs B-26 (IIRC 2 pilots, navigator, vs 2 pilots, navigator/radio operator) if we thing those whose training was the most expensive.
and Lanc vs Wimpy (pilot, navigator, flight engineer(?) vs pilot, navigator)
IMHO Mossie was a light bomber

Full crews 7-10 vs 7 and 7 vs 5-6
Juha

USA produced many other 2-engine bomber types that used far less crew (A-20, Martin 167 187). Sure enough, both Boeing Consolidated would've came out with 2-engine plane to be produced in lieu of -17 -24.

Mossie was light if we count the weight, medium if we count engines, and heavy if we count the capabilities
No Grand Slam though 8)

 

[tomo pauk]

Not quite so positive. Even the "brains" were not interchangeable. Many, but not all, US navigators and bomb aimers were men who had 'washed out' of flight school.
And you still need to double the size of of your flight schools to do the training.
US mediums weren't quite a 1:2 exchange in manufacturing effort, at least not in engines. B-17 were powered by four 9 cylinder engines. B-26s were powered by two 18 cylinder engines.
It might still take until 1944 to really start swamping the Axis with numbers and in the mean time all those AA guns have been distributed closer to the front.

Could the Allied Strategic bombing campaign have been done smarter or more effective?
Certainly.
Should it have been abandoned, or never started, altogether?

Of course the brains were not interchangable, but, with focus going to train medium bomber crews, both UK USA would've cater for crews fot those bombers.
As for the ratio between bomber types, think it would be easy for Boeing Con to produce 2-engine jobs. Or to produce turboed version of Martin A-22, or turboed version of A-20A, or to produce P-38 with Twin Wasp instead of Allison onboard.
As for those (German) AAA that is now nearer to the front, the 60 000 of new bombers would cater for those.

As for strategic bombing campaign - it served the purpose of aiding defeating Axis. But (always a but), the Germans it's allies were driven home many miles experiences many bitter defeats before the campaign put the dent to their capabilities.

 

[drgondog]

Like other posters, I smell a rat in the total absence of any mention of the Soviets role in defeating Germany. While I am supporter of the strategic bombing campaigns, they alone did not win the war. The USSR invading Germany and seizing it's capital won the war...

However, the Western allies did totally shatter the LW. Of that there is no doubt.

@TP and BT - of course. The 'selected quotes' were extracted and represent a microcosm of opinions.

I doubt that the US (and certainly Britain and Commonwealth after WWI) would have willingly sustained the casualties that Sovs took to defeat Germany in the East. The East was the meat grinder for the Wermacht and the West was the meatgrinder for the LW.

 

[Shortround6]

USA produced many other 2-engine bomber types that used far less crew (A-20, Martin 167 187). Sure enough, both Boeing Consolidated would've came out with 2-engine plane to be produced in lieu of -17 -24.

The A-20s were sorely lacking in range, and had the same problem as a Hampden, if the pilot was hit there was no way for another crewman to take over the controls, even to hold the plane steady for other crewmen to get out.
Yes the rear seater had a stick but I think it was normally stowed? and he couldn't see squat.

Maryland was a nice plane for it's time and did a lot of good reconnaissance work, but lets face it, it was a Blenheim on steroids. It also had the same problem as above.

Baltimore was more of the same, short range, limited bomb load.
It could have been developed but why?
B-25 with the same engines could go further and carry more bombs.
Using 6-8 men in two aircraft to carry the same bomb load to a target as 6-10 men in a single aircraft isn't really saving a whole lot.

 

[parsifal]

Hi TP

The other thing that bedevils this alternate scenario of yours is the non-combat attrition effects. In wartime it is simply not possible to sit passively by. Your forces need to remain active....to train, patrol command the airspace over friendly territory. That last mentioned excecise in the case of the british required that they at least push the Germans back over North Western France, which was the major achievement of the RAF against the LW in 1941, allbeit at a pretty heavy cost.


The point is that even in times of light engagement, aircraft are lost at a pretty alarming rate. During the so-called "phoney war" of 1939-40 the German bomber forces were losing between 4 and 7% of the force structure every month. Similar loss rates applied to the allied air forces, though it appears to have dropped as the war progressed. Therefore, if you are trying to maintain a force structure of 90000 aircraft in your frontline airforce, you are going to be losing about 7000 aorcraft per month. No country can sustain that level of attritional losses.

If the allies had done nothing from say 1942, with an estimated aircraft delivery rate of about 1800 aircraft per month (disregarding trainers aircraft retained in the US and the like), and a monthly attritional rate of 7%, they might have a force structure of 24000 aircraft, instead of the 20000 they actually fielded.

Conversely, the Germans, who maintained a force structure of around 5000 aircraft for the latter part of the war, lost a much greater percentage of their new production to enemy action. release the pressure on them , a number of things begin to happen...Firstly, they get time to train their piloits properly, secondly, they gain the ability to stockpile their oil, and thirdly, because a much bigger percentage of their aircraft were historically shot down, rather than just fall out of the sky, their force structure begins to grow, and astronomically. If the germans are assumed to have an effective delivery rate of 1000 machines per month, and they too are suffering atrition of 7%, then froma force of 5000 in 1942, one can expect the LW to have reached a strength of around 14200 aircraft by the end of 1943....in other words the ratio of forces actually tips in favour of the germans, from 4 or 5 to 1 against them in the real campaign, to about 1.6 to 1 in this hypothetical.

Relieving the pressure on a weaker force only benefits the weaker force

 

[jim]

For Tail End Charlie -

Here are some quotes from folks Not American, Not Brit, not somebody's grandfather on the forum - regarding opinions regarding air superiority..

The Reich's Ex-leaders Explain Why They Were Beaten - World War 2 Talk

All these leaders heald key positions and had very good opinions for their sectors of responsibility ( Georing excluded) but they could not see the whole picture. The historic fan of today with acces to many sources has a clearer view. The bombing attacks was obviously a problem but Germany (and Luftwaffe) were already from 1942 in a no win situation . Going in full war economy effort only in 1941 the 1942 defeats came as a result of lack of numbers. Rommel was defeated in Alamein after superb defensive figthting (1-10) only because he did not posses 50 more tanks to counter attack the last British attack. The Staligrand hapenned because lack of german units forced the use of the incapable Rumanians to cover the sides of 6th armee
Jg27 was fighting alone for 2 years in North Africa. Jg2,JG26,JG1 faced the entire UK based alleid forces. Jg5 in Norway was fighting a two front war. In the east after 1941 Jafdwaffe was also terribly outnumberd.
The crushing defeat og Germany in intelligence/espinage war was a decive factor. Ultra was the main reason of the U boats defeat, Rommels supply convoys destruction, Rommels movements and strength, Luftwaffe movements, strength,new eqeuipment etc. Even the soviets managed to steal the Zitadelle s plan (Battle of Kursk)
Finally Germany was in fuel crisis already from 1942,long before the US bombing. In 1943 was critical, the bomber offensive of 1944 just made the situation desperate.Look at the global map the acces that germany had in oil fields and compare it to the alleis acces.Even without bombing germany could not compete . I could add in this category raw materials: magnesium,chromium,nikelium, rubber ,tungsten and many others.
Germany and Luftwaffe were defeated by the combined overhelming numbers of the alleis .( Soviet Union managed to move many factories but only could feed its population after the ukrane loss , because of the Americans. Raw materials were provided as well and ready weapons was valuable in 1942-43-specially modern aircrafs.In no way can claim that defeated germany or Luftwaffe alone.)

 

[Shortround6]

Of course the brains were not interchangable, but, with focus going to train medium bomber crews, both UK USA would've cater for crews fot those bombers.

It is a lot easier to train gunners than pilots. for twice the number of bomber pilots you need (assuming you can recruit/draft enough pilots) twice the number of primary trainers, twice the number of basic trainers, twice the number of advanced trainers and twice the number of multi engine trainers. Plus instructors plus extra fuel for all those training planes. You also need the extra navagator/bomb aimers.
These people are not all that easy to get in large numbers. Just like in the army not every soldier could be turned into an artilleryman or even a tanker.
Sure just about any strong back could shove a shell in the breech but how many people could read the maps, survey the firing positions, apply the atmospheric corrections to the trajectory tables and all the rest of the math stuff that gunners do for a successful shoot?
There was a more limited pool of qualified candidates than you might believe.

As for the ratio between bomber types, think it would be easy for Boeing Con to produce 2-engine jobs. Or to produce turboed version of Martin A-22, or turboed version of A-20A, or to produce P-38 with Twin Wasp instead of Allison onboard.

Boeing and Con could have produced 2 engine planes (although a few thousand B-24s for maritime patrol and long distance cargo would still have been useful) but this would have had to have been decided in 1939-40. It also means the Pacific would have been much more difficult. Mission distances there being much longer, Little 'strategic bombing' in the European sense being done there until the B-29 showed up. Bombing enemy naval bases and such being more grand tactical.
It doesn't matter how many twin engine bombers you have, with or with-out turbos, if they can't reach the target they are useless.

Aside from taking pictures, what does a turboed A-22 do? since we know (now) that the higher the altitude the worse the accuracy trying to use large numbers of high flying planes with 2,000lb bomb loads isn't going to give very good results.
Turboing the A-20 also gets you what? a very fast bomber at high altitude with a small internal bomb load and not much greater range, especially if you use the power.
A twin wasp P-38 is a real joke. Less power, more drag. a real recipe for success?

As for those (German) AAA that is now nearer to the front, the 60 000 of new bombers would cater for those.

or would the anti-aircraft guns cater to the bombers? Trading bombers for dug in AA guns doesn't seem to be a good economic balance. Especially if you are leaving the gun and ammunition factories total unhindered to make good their losses.

 

[Juha]

Hello Tomo
IMO B-25, B-26 and Wimpy were real mediums, Mossie was a light bomber and Boston, now as its USAAF designation shows was a attack. ie a light bomber, Maryland was designed to same specs as Boston but lost to Douglas entry, so it was also a light bomber and Baltimore was updated version of Maryland

Juha

 

[tomo pauk]

Indeed, Mossie was called light bomber by RAF, and I may agree that A-20 -22 were light bombers, but then how we should call Japanese 2-engined bombers? IIRC JApanese called them heavy bombers?
The same thing at tanks - Italians called 25 ton tank heavy (pesante), Germans called 48 ton a medium one.
Back to bombers - if we go by the usage, Mossie is hardly light bomber, since it was used along with heavy bombers...

Stuff for a new thread

 

[tomo pauk]

Hi TP

The other thing that bedevils this alternate scenario of yours is the non-combat attrition effects. In wartime it is simply not possible to sit passively by. Your forces need to remain active....to train, patrol command the airspace over friendly territory. That last mentioned excecise in the case of the british required that they at least push the Germans back over North Western France, which was the major achievement of the RAF against the LW in 1941, allbeit at a pretty heavy cost.


The point is that even in times of light engagement, aircraft are lost at a pretty alarming rate. During the so-called "phoney war" of 1939-40 the German bomber forces were losing between 4 and 7% of the force structure every month. Similar loss rates applied to the allied air forces, though it appears to have dropped as the war progressed. Therefore, if you are trying to maintain a force structure of 90000 aircraft in your frontline airforce, you are going to be losing about 7000 aorcraft per month. No country can sustain that level of attritional losses.

If the allies had done nothing from say 1942, with an estimated aircraft delivery rate of about 1800 aircraft per month (disregarding trainers aircraft retained in the US and the like), and a monthly attritional rate of 7%, they might have a force structure of 24000 aircraft, instead of the 20000 they actually fielded.

Conversely, the Germans, who maintained a force structure of around 5000 aircraft for the latter part of the war, lost a much greater percentage of their new production to enemy action. release the pressure on them , a number of things begin to happen...Firstly, they get time to train their piloits properly, secondly, they gain the ability to stockpile their oil, and thirdly, because a much bigger percentage of their aircraft were historically shot down, rather than just fall out of the sky, their force structure begins to grow, and astronomically. If the germans are assumed to have an effective delivery rate of 1000 machines per month, and they too are suffering atrition of 7%, then froma force of 5000 in 1942, one can expect the LW to have reached a strength of around 14200 aircraft by the end of 1943....in other words the ratio of forces actually tips in favour of the germans, from 4 or 5 to 1 against them in the real campaign, to about 1.6 to 1 in this hypothetical.

Relieving the pressure on a weaker force only benefits the weaker force

I don't advice that we simply scratch the 45 000 4-engine bombers, but that we build 90 000 2-engined. With 60 000 of those engaged vs. Germany and it's European allies it would be hardly relieving the pressure against them.
Eg. B-17 was produced in 4000 copies before 1943 - so 7000-8000 2-engined planes could've been produced AND put into usage well before eg. invasion of Sicily. Almost same number of B-24s, for the same math - making cca 15 000 new 2-engined bombers to pound Sicily, Kursk, France, the atolls etc

 

[Shortround6]

Indeed, Mossie was called light bomber by RAF, and I may agree that A-20 -22 were light bombers, but then how we should call Japanese 2-engined bombers? IIRC JApanese called them heavy bombers?
The same thing at tanks - Italians called 25 ton tank heavy (pesante), Germans called 48 ton a medium one.
Back to bombers - if we go by the usage, Mossie is hardly light bomber, since it was used along with heavy bombers...

Stuff for a new thread

Timing, comparisons to other aircraft in inventory, and usage all affect the category.

The Whitley is said to be Britain's first Modern (post WW I?) Heavy bomber. According to some sources the was a clause in a treaty banning bombers over a certain weight. The treaty expired and the Whitley was the first bomber designed to exceed that weight. By the time the war starts 4 engine bombers are on the drawing board even if not in service so what category does the Whitley belong in?

As far as the Japanese (and other countries) go, there were plenty of single engine 'bombers' being built/used. Japanese had both the Ki-30 and Ki-32 in use in China. Anything with two engines for them is almost an automatic medium bomber.

or maybe they just called the light and heavy and had no medium category?

Same with tanks. Progress was so quick that somebodies 1938 medium tank was a light tank by 1942.

As far as the Mossie goes, just because you fly it along side of heavy bombers on the same night/mission doesn't mean it is a heavy bomber.
Heavy bombers carrying double to triple the bomb load.

 

[tomo pauk]

It is a lot easier to train gunners than pilots. for twice the number of bomber pilots you need (assuming you can recruit/draft enough pilots) twice the number of primary trainers, twice the number of basic trainers, twice the number of advanced trainers and twice the number of multi engine trainers. Plus instructors plus extra fuel for all those training planes. You also need the extra navagator/bomb aimers.
These people are not all that easy to get in large numbers. Just like in the army not every soldier could be turned into an artilleryman or even a tanker.
Sure just about any strong back could shove a shell in the breech but how many people could read the maps, survey the firing positions, apply the atmospheric corrections to the trajectory tables and all the rest of the math stuff that gunners do for a successful shoot?
There was a more limited pool of qualified candidates than you might believe.

I know that not every man can fly an aircraft, let alone to fly it efficiently in presence of enemy fire. But, if 2 men (pilot + navigator/bombardier) can fly Mosquito during night and make their presence important over German-held Europe, and live to tell about that, then there is no doubt that US could've fielded something similar.

Boeing and Con could have produced 2 engine planes (although a few thousand B-24s for maritime patrol and long distance cargo would still have been useful) but this would have had to have been decided in 1939-40. It also means the Pacific would have been much more difficult. Mission distances there being much longer, Little 'strategic bombing' in the European sense being done there until the B-29 showed up. Bombing enemy naval bases and such being more grand tactical.

IIRC the main complain from General Kenney was that he lacked bombers, not that ones he commanded were of short range.

It doesn't matter how many twin engine bombers you have, with or with-out turbos, if they can't reach the target they are useless.

The targets are located just after the front line.

Aside from taking pictures, what does a turboed A-22 do? since we know (now) that the higher the altitude the worse the accuracy trying to use large numbers of high flying planes with 2,000lb bomb loads isn't going to give very good results.
Turboing the A-20 also gets you what? a very fast bomber at high altitude with a small internal bomb load and not much greater range, especially if you use the power.

Trying to use planes to get in fast and at high alt, make shallow dive and pepper enemy from lower altitude would've worked just fine.

A twin wasp P-38 is a real joke. Less power, more drag. a real recipe for success?

2 x 1200 HP, zero issues, more survivability.

or would the anti-aircraft guns cater to the bombers? Trading bombers for dug in AA guns doesn't seem to be a good economic balance.

Germans have had tens of thousands AAA pieces by 1943 and further, yet that did not stop Allies to use their air forces to a devastating effect.

Especially if you are leaving the gun and ammunition factories total unhindered to make good their losses.

By what time the effects of strategic bombing were taking dent to the AAA it's ammo factories?

 

[Shortround6]

Eg. B-17 was produced in 4000 copies before 1943 - so 7000-8000 2-engined planes could've been produced AND put into usage well before eg. invasion of Sicily. Almost same number of B-24s, for the same math - making cca 15 000 new 2-engined bombers to pound Sicily, Kursk, France, the atolls etc

You can't pound the atolls if you can't reach them. Pounding Sicily doesn't really do anything except get you into a pure war of attrition. It has little or no worth to the Axis, unless I am missing something like mines or oil fields?
I am not sure if the Germans really care if you pound France. aside from the U-boat ports and few factories around Paris you are once again in a war of attrition which the Germans can decide to participate in or not and they decide at what level.

And as before, even if you are going to pound these closer targets do you use 2 planes carrying 3,000lbs of bombs or one 4 engine plane carrying 6,000lbs?
How do you KNOW 2-3 years beforehand what the ranges to the desired targets are so you can produce the desired bombers and if you build ALL twin engined planes how much flexibility do you loose? the ability 2-3 years down the road to choose alternative targets.

 

[tomo pauk]

In other words, the bombers would lack targets in Europe/Med, within their reach? Then we are in disagreement

How do you KNOW 2-3 years beforehand what the ranges to the desired targets are so you can produce the desired bombers and if you build ALL twin engined planes how much flexibility do you loose? the ability 2-3 years down the road to choose alternative targets.

The military theorists have had many ideas for the upcoming wars, from grand strategies down to what rifle caliber would be ideal. Many times the failed, either partially or completely.
We talk about a past war.