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I know that not every man can fly an aircraft, let alone to fly it efficiently in presence of enemy fire. But, if 2 men (pilot + navigator/bombardier) can fly Mosquito during night and make their presence important over German-held Europe, and live to tell about that, then there is no doubt that US could've fielded something similar.
IIRC the main complain from General Kenney was that he lacked bombers, not that ones he commanded were of short range.
Where is the front line in the Pacific?The targets are located just after the front line.
Trying to use planes to get in fast and at high alt, make shallow dive and pepper enemy from lower altitude would've worked just fine.
Vs what? Up to 2 X 1600Hp in later P-38s. B-24s had zero issues with their engines? Some P-38 issues were with the turbo controls, those go away if you keep the same turbos but change engines? Some early P-38s were lost because only one engine had a generator. Loose that engine the electric controlled props screw up. if you don't fit dual generators to your R-1830 powered plane you haven't solved that problem. I could go on but perhaps this should have thread of it's own?2 x 1200 HP, zero issues, more survivability.
Many of those tens of thousands were 20mm and 37mm were they not?Germans have had tens of thousands AAA pieces by 1943 and further, yet that did not stop Allies to use their air forces to a devastating effect.
By what time the effects of strategic bombing were taking dent to the AAA it's ammo factories?
In other words, the bombers would lack targets in Europe/Med, within their reach? Then we are in disagreement
That is only partially true. Especially the Blitzkrieg principle is really not that innovative.Kris, I think your comments hold true for the latter stages of the war, where Germany was suffering from crippling manpower shortages. But German pilots early in the war, like their counterparts in the other belligerent nations were very highly trained. While the Nazi leadership and it's apparatchiks may have trumpeted the virtues of the Aryan warrior, the commanders of the armed forces, for the most part, understood that excellently trained and motivated men with top-class equipment are what win wars. In this they were simply continuing a tradition going right back to the Prussian armed forces. It was also reflected in the German approach to war-fighting. Blitzkrieg was not a philosophy based on elan and Aryan vigour, but an extremely carefully thought-out means to bring overwhelming force to bear at critical points. You need trained thinkers, not zealous berserkers, to make that work.
I think you are mistaking.In the case of Britain the alternative.... a continental land based strategy based on a mass ground army, was simply not a feasible option. Even as it stood, with just 13 divisions in the frontline in Europe in 19844, the British suffered such acute manpower shortages, that wholsale unit disbandments were the norm rather than the exception. This explains a lot behind Monty's caution....every man lost was a man lost for good, with little possibility fore replacement. Britiain determiined from the outbreak of the war that she simply could not field a mass army, and suffer the same casualty rates as had been sustained 20 years earlier. The 55000 aircrew lost during WWII pale into insignificance compared to the 2 million casualties suffered in the battlefields of France. The British lacked the resources to do that, AND fight a modern war of machines and production. They rightly chose the development of a strategic bomber force, to hit the germans in the only way possible. They courted, and succeeded in forming a grand alliance with the Russians and the Americans, to defeat evil.
For Tail End Charlie -
Here are some quotes from folks Not American, Not Brit, not somebody's grandfather on the forum - regarding opinions regarding air superiority..
The Reich's Ex-leaders Explain Why They Were Beaten - World War 2 Talk
I would say it would take more than a few days to repairs this damage.
Actually, the Germans were able to repair rail line damage quite quickly [in Germany proper].
The destruction or damage of the engines caused the most grief, but that was only temporary. At most that method only introduced inefficiencies into their industrial and manufacturing production.
Germany started to run severely short of oil when they were really on the back foot after Kurk the situation became critical when they lost Belaruss and oil supplies dried up completely when Rumania was overrun. The Luftwaffe played very little part in this
The Pacific war ended when the emperor ordered the military to stop fighting and surrender, if Japan had a fruit cake like Hitler in charge then the USA may have had to keep bombing until the early 1950s.
Just some musing on this topic I don't deny fpr a moment that the USAAF delivered the knockout blow to the LW in 44 but it not the same LW as it was from 39-43 . The LW IMHO had been getting weaker and weaker not in aircraft but in the skill sets of its aircrew . 5 years of combat against Fighter Command , Red AF , Bomber Command , Coastal Command had to have taken a major toll .
There are many quotes there from people under interrogation.
consider Goerings quotes.
He was the head of the Luftwaffe and second in command of the German Millitary.
In 1944 he had seen Germany kicked out of Africa, kicked out of the mediterranian, lose the battle of the Atlantic, advance to Moscow Leningrad and Stalingrad and the Caucasus but seize nothing and then retreat he was on the brink of losing Belaruss and Rumania but what really really gripped his mind was a mustang over Berlin.
Oh, I understand now. Goering was paid by NAA to endorse the Mustang, as the numerous fighter pilots of the Reich that considered it the most 'dangerous' of the Allied fighters in the battle for air superiority over Germany.
On the eastern front Germany lost approximately 5 million men killed and a similar number wounded taken prisoner a vast number of tanks self propelled guns and a fantastic number of trucks and supplies but what gripped Goering was a single engined fighter. Germany lost the war in europe as soon as they failed to take Britain or Russia at the first go, what followed was the inevitable demise throuh lack of resources.
I think you missed his point. The USSR was not bombing German industry, the Russian tanks were not destroying Mersebeg, Ploesti, Misburg, etc - the 8th and 15th AF were doing so. Further, the Russians never threatened German industry in the Ruhr, Berlin, Hamburg, Munich, Leipzig, Hamburg, Keil, Bri=unswicke, etc etc etc etc..
That diminutive single engine fighter turned the air battle over Germany from one that the LW was winning to a catstrophic turn of events in which the LW was powerless to stop them from destroying the LW in the air and on the ground throughout Germany, while the Soviets were held to a draw in the east against the LW with far fewer forces.
Further, there was no train or barge or truck transporting sub assemblies from individual factories to major assemply plants - making re-distribution of industry more costly.
Hitler and Goering and most of their cohorts never realised the war they were in. Even in the battle of Britain the RAF was able to replace losses quicker than the LF and what did Hitler do? pick a fight with Russia.
The LW completely destroyed the soviet airforce during Barberrossa and throughout the eastern war had considerable success but it didnt actually matter
What mattered is that the LW could not deg=feat the USAAF in daylight strategic bombing of critical war making industry over Germany. The USSR had ZERO to do with that result.
As far as the oil plan goes, Russia won the first battle when it stopped germany reaching the Caucasus, Germany was always short of fuel. While advancing they had to stop to re supply but while retreating they lost huge reserves of fuel. (I learned that on my CSE history project)
Good for you. The Soviets took Ploesti but is was a mere sheel of pre war capacity due to the 12th and 15th AF attacks. The USSR had zero to do with attacks on critical industry in Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, etc until late 1944 and 1945 when the targets were already crippled past to point of economic viability.
You ask for my credentials, what books I have read, well I have read a lot. I am in France at present and the latest book which I brought with me is "Lancaster" by Leo McKinstry. It is described by the daily telegraph as "excellent". Describing the bombing campaign it goes into the far end of a smelly fart about the various merits of daylight and night time bombing about targets and aims and achievements but it rarely mentions the war in the east.
It is clearly against Harris and clearly for the Oil and Transport plan.
One line does mention the war in the east which says planned raids by lancasters on Belaruss were shelved when it was over run by the Russians. No doubt if the raids took place they would have been a triumph for the "oil plan" but since the country was over run by the Russians it doesnt count.
See the above for what 'did count' from August 1943 through November 1944.
This is typical of post war history there are no "facts" just a miasma of numbers, in the same book it states the latest survey of deaths at Dresden (in 2004) were 18,000 whereas I have read other accounts that state upto 75,000. I dont know how anyone can investigate such an event so long after but hey, he was getting paid. I presume the figures he produced satisfied his sponsors, previous sponsors wanted high numbers lately the fashion is to lower them.
I'm certain the grandsons of the WWII vets could set you straight
Germany started to run severely short of oil when they were really on the back foot after Kurk the situation became critical when they lost Belaruss and oil supplies dried up completely when Rumania was overrun. The Luftwaffe played very little part in this
You continually miss the essential point.
Germany was very clever at building synthetic fuels to augment the petroleum based chemical and gasoline/diesel production. The LW could not defeat the strategic attacks on ANY of the refineries and chemical plants that they managed inside Axis hel territory - the USSR was NOT attacking them in day or night, the USSAF was and later joined by the RAF (successfully) in basically eradicating fuel rpoduction in zones prhibited to the USSR but totally vulnerable to the western allies.
A similar attitude exists for the transport plan. The bombing campaign claims 2,400 locomotives destroyed. The French resistance claim they destroyed 1,800. Congratulations all round except when you add the two together and then accept there were still locomotives in service you wonder what else was in the marshalling yards except locomotives. I have never ever read how you destroy a marshalling yard any way it is a piece of flat land with pieces of steel laid on it, any "destroyed" marshalling yard can be back in service within a week at maximum.
Uh, consider the impossibilty of re-supplying the front lines when your rail capabilty is reduced by 'only 1800' locomotives? How many did the USSR destroy in Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Ftance, Holland, Belgium, Denmark? Greater than zero? Reflect on how the flat cars and box cars were moved from point A to B.. Horse?, yoke pulled by infantry? moved by gaseous emissions after a berr/bratworst orgy?
Re write history at your own peril Hitler committed suicide and the war in Europe ended when Berlin fell to the Soviet Army not to an airforce the LW was by that time irrelevant. The Pacific war ended when the emperor ordered the military to stop fighting and surrender, if Japan had a fruit cake like Hitler in charge then the USA may have had to keep bombing until the early 1950s.