Who was responsible for the USAAF debacle in the Philippines - Dec 1941

[FLYBOYJ]

Read my ex's grandfather's book, "Surviving the Day." he talks about the situation at Baatan.

Surviving the day: an American POW ... - Google Books

 

[parsifal]

looks like an intersting book....I will try and get hold of a copy. At the risk of being crass, what does he say with respect to preparedness of the air corps in the Far East. Was there any chance for a different outcome. Did Brereton and Mac screw the pooch?

 

[FLYBOYJ]

looks like an intersting book....I will try and get hold of a copy. At the risk of being crass, what does he say with respect to preparedness of the air corps in the Far East. Was there any chance for a different outcome. Did Brereton and Mac screw the pooch?

From what I remember he did speak about the disorganization throughout the Pacific but he really didn't have bad words for Mac (he was on his staff). He was upset about surrendering, he felt we should have attempted to resist especially after what he witnessed as a POW.

 

[JoeB]

The result of faulty training.

During my 20 years in the U.S. military unit commanders were held accountable for training. Gen. Brereton was the FEAF commander. If his P-40 pilots didn't employ proper aerial tactics and his bomber pilots couldn't hit the broad side of a barn it was his fault.

Yes, in a military (or civilian for that matter) organization, it's usually better to err on the side of holding specific leaders accountable, even if some of the factors that led to their failures are far broader than their own units, or beyond their control.

But as later historians, we should look at the big picture, and not have a strictly kneejerk reaction of blaming relatively low level commanders, which even Brereton was relative to some of these problems. The USAAC was rapidly expanding in 1941, and was thoroughly suffused with problems of both training and material unreadiness, plus just inexperience. For example on the material side, the best fighters of the FEAF, their P-40E's (they also had P-40B's like the AVG, as well as obsolescent P-35's) were plagued by gun problems (with the hydraulic gun chargers).

The AVG can't be directly compared to the USAAC, nor to contemporary British/Commonwealth fighter units which it also significantly outperformed in fighter combat with the Japanese in 41-42. The very basic difference was that virtually all AVG members were high-hour peacetime military pilots (of Army, Navy and Marines), although almost all lacked actual combat experience. In contrast typical units in the rapidly expanded USAAC had lots of green pilots, with not a lot of hours *nor* any combat experience; and the Brit/CW fighter units, in an air arm still expanding despite heavy pilot losses in 1939-41, had some combat experienced leaders, but were mainly composed of even more hastily trained and inexperienced men; and the Far East units were sucking hind tit even within that overall situation.

Also, the AVG was able to gain fighter combat experience facing almost exclusively JAAF Type 97 (later 'Nate') units, before commonly facing Army Type 1's (later 'Oscar') in spring of 1942. The USAAC units were immediately faced by a strong force of JNAF Zeroes, and actually didn't do as badly against them in just kill ratio terms as most other Allied units at the time (but *ongoing* ground losses, even after Dec 8, are what bascially neutralized the USAAC fighter force), or even as badly as USAAF P-40 units did in the DEI v the same Zero units a few months later. But still the FEAF fighter units were not equal to the Zero units in air combat.

But again in this context, something like basic airfield defence measures are a much more realistic 'what if' improvement for the FEAF compared to changing basic material/training readiness problems of the whole AAC, whole US as was mentioned. Again, the US air bases on Luzon were well protected and eliminated further ground losses after a few days, whereas USAAC/F meeting the JNAF on equal terms in fighter combat took a lot longer.

Again re: F4F range the 325mile figure was real, presumably even conservative (considering that the official figure for no tanks was only 105, but the general opinion was that the F4F was capable of ~175 mile radius escorts w/o drop tank, albeit with little margin for error). However the 325 figure was not relevant to the heyday of the F4F's career in 1942, because the 58 gal drop tank was only used in late '42, and apparently not two at a time. The 2 tank capability was relevant to some 1943 Solomons ops, and to the CAP endurance of FM's from escort carriers later in the war. But 325mile radius offensive carrier strikes (or anywhere close) by F4F's from the big carriers? no not that I know of.

Joe

 

[davebender]

The Iba radar station was operational from October 1941.

By October 1941 FEAF had 81 modern P-40 fighter aircraft. An additional 24 crated P-40Es arrived Nov 25, 1941.

FEAF received an additional 140 fighter pilots between February and October 1941.

FEAF had plenty of fuel. An IJA report dated Feb 20, 1942 states that to date they have captured 107,964 liters of aviation gasoline and 1,402,954 liters of regular gasoline.

Gen Brereton arrived in Manila Nov 4, 1941 to take command of FEAF.

The big picture.
By November 1941 FEAF was well equipped with modern fighter aircraft, pilots, fuel and early warning radar. Gen Brereton had 34 days in which to train his command.

 

[JoeB]

The Iba radar station was operational from October 1941.
The big picture.
By November 1941 FEAF was well equipped with modern fighter aircraft, pilots, fuel and early warning radar. Gen Brereton had 34 days in which to train his command.

No that's not the really big picture, but a lot of stuff specific to the PI which I obviously know already if I recommended Bartsch's highly detailed book on the topic (and yes I did read it). The larger picture of the *whole USAAC* was n organization which had so rapidly expanded, from very small in 1939-40, though still a long way to go in 1941 that there were a lot of flaws in the details, and a pervasive lack of operational experience by most air crews, and combat experience by *any* air crews. This is easily seen by the fact that Army fighters didn't perform very well against Japanese Navy fighters for many months after the PI campaign; and also Army bombers hit hardly any Japanese ships for many months after. Your point would have validity if we saw other USAAF units quickly inflict serious losses on the Japanese in the period immediately following, but that's not the case.

A lot of the factors were clearly much larger than PI situation, like general level of training and unit cohesion (long time together training at least) and complete lack of combat experience, which more senior JNAF pilots often had. There was a lot more than 34 days to deal with this, don't know how you calculate that, but clearly not enough, since again the same issue affected USAAF units in PTO for much of the rest of '42, hell they were often roughly treated by the Germans even in early 1943 for the same reasons.

In contrast to these truly bigger picture issues, the FEAF could have further dispersed and protected its bases. That was more a matter of a mental gap out by leadership. The basic qualitative problems v the JNAF were just not solvable without hard experience, such basic lack of experience and preparedness on a whole air force, whole national, basis never is.
Joe

 

[parsifal]

I wouldnt limit the Japanese combat experience to just the japanese senior airmen. I think the majority of their airmen had considerable combat experience

 

[buffnut453]

But to clarify Buffalo statistics, the longest range F2A was F2A-2 without armor or fuel tank protection, ie equivalent configuration to the Zero Model 21.

Sorry to nitpick, Joe, but the longest range Buffalo was the F2A-3 not the -2. And the -3 had armour plate and fuel tank protection. What's not clear is whether you're quoting the range for the -2 without armour plate or the -3 without armour plate. Can't dig into my test reports right now to find the answer for myself - I may if there's more interest in this topic.

 

[parsifal]

Id be interested to know Mark, but not from a theoretical maximum combat range perspective. Id like to know from an operational range perspective....what were the longest ranged ops the Buffalo was engaged in

 

[Arossihman]

I still believe it was MaCarthurs arrogance which led to poor decision making from him and some of the men who answered to him.....IMO the guy was kind of power hungry and did'nt have much time for warning or constructive criticism. This was to be his main downfall in my book.

 

[parsifal]

Well in the context of the forum topic, just before the outbreak of hostilities, hes was given a war warning 27 November and told to carry ourt strikes in accordance with Rainbow 5 warplan. That means he should have had his B-17s at a high rediness state to attack from that point on, but in the end, they werent ready to attack on the 8th.

When Japanese transports were first spotted heading south on the 26th November, Stark wanted to attack them with PI based B-17s, I believe he was supported by Mac. They were both overruled by Roosevelt. "we want the Japanese to fire th first shot". They were specific orders given to the FEAF by Washington on or about the 1st December, in the lead up to war.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

I've seen a number of quotes that the F2A-3 had a ferry range of 1,680 miles. a few years back, I spoke to Don Cheek (who seemed to prefer the F2A-2 to the F4F-3) who said that when he and his squadron mates got rock happy in Hawaii they joked about flying the F2A-3 home to the mainland! That seems extraordinary but that's what he told me. The F2A-3 was apparently equipped with a fuel capacity of 240 gallons and there are reports of pilots flying 5-6 hour patrols! (Maas, Page 37)

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Damn memory... I mean Tom Cheek. Well I said it was "some years ago" and nowadays, I can barely remember why I came into a room a few minutes after entering.

 

[renrich]

To pin the blame on Mac or any of his subordinates is one way to handle the situation but the fact is that practically all of the US Military, the political system and the electorate were unprepared for war. The Japanese had the initiative, the doctrine, the weapons, the experience, the training and the will to be successful. It took at least six months for the US to begin to catch up. An example of poor doctrine was that the US was convinced that heavy bombers could prevent a sea borne invasion. That is the reason the PI had more B17s than any other US base. Even if the B17s had not had the losses they were practically useless against ships. McDowell was fired after First Bull Run, the commanders at Pearl were fired, it is fortunate that Mac was not fired.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Wish I could agree Ren, but there are too many 'stories' about Mac ignoring his responsibilities for personal gain and pleasure to give him a pass without a thoroughinvestigation. Moreover, The suggestion that the war came as a shock to everyone, especially the top brass is a little too self-serving. The Japanese attack on the Phillipines is exactly what the US was preparing itself to handle by its forward basing of B-17s and moving the battle fleet to Pearl. When News of the attack on Pearl came and SecDef Knox responded with "...this MUST mean the Phillipines" suggests the thought processes necessary for an appropriate response were already engaged. How effectively they were engaged is another matter. ultimately Mac was the guy in charge although non-flying commanders typically deferred to their senior flight officers so I think Brereton must share the responsibility for tactical employment that was abysmally organized. There are professionals who say our war effort suffered due to the loss of Kimmel (I can't speak for Short). The leadership qualities evident during the initial South Pacific offensivein the Solomons left a LOT to be desired and suggest there may be a strong case to be made there. How the Pacific campaign would have been waged if Kimmel had been given a pass and retained as CINCPAC is perhaps worthy of a war college thesis. (imagine Ghormley replaced by Nimitz?) Of course all of this is the most (worst?) unbridled speculation. For me, Halsey's greatest moment as a leader came November 28th 1941, a week before the Pearl Harbor attack, when he informed his fliers to act according to the pre-existence of a state of war and gave the order to shoot-first and argue later. It didn't take competence to recognize or respond to the imminence of war. The rest of Halsey's career was blunder piled upon blunder with an icing of fighting spirit and bluster the bluejackets and press loved.

 

[renrich]

oldcrow, you misunderstand me. I am not saying that the US was surprised by the attacks and the onset of war or that the war was a shock. I am saying that all or most of all of the US was unprepared for war both physically and emotionally. The previous Pacific Fleet CO had told the administration that PH was not safe for the fleet and could not be successfully defended. He wa overruled and retired. Our soldiers were training with sticks instead of MGs. The Air Corps was only gradually getting up to speed. The USN did not have enough patrol planes to cover all the sectors out of PH and there was an actual shortage of Navy fighters so that after the war had begun some of the VFs were equipped with both Grummans and Brewsters or two different models of Grummans. There were all types of intelligence failures and even the Doolittle Raid was ill conceived, a public relations stunt and may have pro longed the war and could have been a catastrophe. Undoubtedly, Mac would have probably been fired if not for his exalted reputation and the administration needed a hero. No commander fails to make mistakes, even Bobby Lee. History judges too by different standards. Grant is exalted because he knew how to overcome his enemy with superior numbers and by grinding him down and getting his soldiers killed by the bushel. As you say, Halsey has a great reputation but seemed to blunder a lot while Fletcher without the great rep upon close examination did a very good job.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Sec Nav Knox that is...

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Gotta agree with you Ren. Especially about Fletcher. WRT to Mac, even now its difficult to reflect on the FEAF tragedy without frustration. It astonished me he escaped the ax.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Just finished reading Neptune's Inferno and am just as astomished at the Savo Island debacle as the loss of the FEAF just one day after PH. Seems like some commanders were still suffereing the effects of the peacetime mindset even 9 months after the Pearl Harbor attack!

 

[renrich]

Think about it like this. Mac commanded a regiment ( ?) in WW1. He was born at a frontier fort during the Indian Wars(I think) What the heck does he know about air power? In fact, a lot of the Army Air Corps had a bunch of mistaken notions about Air Power. They had radar at PH but barely knew how to use it. To me, one of the most astounding accomplishments during WW2 was that less than one year after December 7, The Anglo American invasion of North Africa took place largely with American forces.

One of my uncles was in Chicago at Savo Island. He was a career Navy man, a Chief Gunners Mate and one of his brothers was in Salt Lake City. His account of the Savo Island will raise the hair on your neck and the other's account of the Second Battle of Savo (Cape Esperance) will too.