Who was responsible for the USAAF debacle in the Philippines - Dec 1941

[drgondog]

I think "recent research has revealed" that the AVG never fought against the Zero as there were no IJN units in Southern China during the AVG's lifeline.

Joe - I basically agree simply because there is no evidence of IJN in China in my reference sources (other than below) which was a Japanese Army theatre. Having said that, there sre several different AVG pilots which did claim Type 0 and there is no evidence that they were mistaking the Zero for another fighter.

According to Zero " Inside story of Japan's air war in the pacific" by (Designer of the Zero) and Jiro Horikoshi and Masatake Okumiya (JNAF Commander who fought from 1937 to EOW, the Zero was attached to China ops and flew first combat mission on August 19, 1940 over Chunking and remained with 12th Air Corps and flew at least until mid September, 1941 in China. According to the authors the JNAF pilots learned a great deal about long range escort while in China.

The authors were silent regarding ops against AVG following Pearl Harbor, focusing from there on PTO.

 

[drgondog]

oops - just picked up Toland's "The Flying Tigers" and there are specific references to Zero's flying escort to Rangoon and Mingaladon on December 23rd, 1941 that the AVG opposed, but the actual combat was with I-97s.

Several engagements in China against Zeros are cited for late February, March and April, 1942. The latter coincides with the Type 0 claims by Hill, Older etc.and they do make a distinction between Type 97, Type 0 and Oscar as different aircraft (See Stars and Bars by Olynyk).

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Joe - I basically agree simply because there is no evidence of IJN in China in my reference sources (other than below) which was a Japanese Army theatre. Having said that, there sre several different AVG pilots which did claim Type 0 and there is no evidence that they were mistaking the Zero for another fighter.

According to Zero " Inside story of Japan's air war in the pacific" by (Designer of the Zero) and Jiro Horikoshi and Masatake Okumiya (JNAF Commander who fought from 1937 to EOW, the Zero was attached to China ops and flew first combat mission on August 19, 1940 over Chunking and remained with 12th Air Corps and flew at least until mid September, 1941 in China. According to the authors the JNAF pilots learned a great deal about long range escort while in China.

The authors were silent regarding ops against AVG following Pearl Harbor, focusing from there on PTO.

Good info Bill - you might remember discussion about this on a previous thread. I have come up with the same info. It seems that the IJNAF left southern China prior to the AVG's birth. In the end, I believe that some of the April reports by AVG pilots mentioning type 0 in combat were the result of mis-identification.

I posted this previously - A partial list of AVG "victims." Not one IJN NCO or Officer

http://www.warbirdforum.com/jaafloss.htm

 

[renrich]

The Zero was easy to mistake for something else. The first USN pilots to see them ( and they had lots of intelligence about them,) identified them as a VB because they thought they had a two person canopy.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

LCDR Paul Ramsey CO of VF-2 apparently reported downing two Me(Bf)-109s at Coral Sea on May 8, 1942!

 

[oldcrowcv63]

That strikes me as a pretty serious misidentification of a A6M for a high-time pilot, but in the midst of a fight I imagine correct ID of your opponent's A/C takes a back seat to killing him.

 

[parsifal]

I know there was Naval units in southern Indochina at the start of the war, initially there was a force of 25 Zeroes called the Yawata detachment. after the demise of the FEAF this force was modestly expanded.

AFAIK (and i am not 100% certain), the IJN flotillas did not transfer to the CBI in 41 or early 42. They fought initially over Malaya, and then the NEI. Around March or April most of the Naval air assets were transferred to Rabaul, New Guinea and the Marshalls.

I have read reports of Zeroes operating over burma later in the war, along with some betty bombers. However, these were not really permanent deployments, and I admit my sources are neither good or specific.

 

[drgondog]

I know there was Naval units in southern Indochina at the start of the war, initially there was a force of 25 Zeroes called the Yawata detachment. after the demise of the FEAF this force was modestly expanded.

AFAIK (and i am not 100% certain), the IJN flotillas did not transfer to the CBI in 41 or early 42. They fought initially over Malaya, and then the NEI. Around March or April most of the Naval air assets were transferred to Rabaul, New Guinea and the Marshalls.

I have read reports of Zeroes operating over burma later in the war, along with some betty bombers. However, these were not really permanent deployments, and I admit my sources are neither good or specific.

The two Japanese authors of Zero were very specific about not only their engagement in China ain 1940 and 1941 but cited several 'Letters of Commendation" including a Unit Coomendation for a September 13, 1940 mission.

Specifically from CIC Shigetaro Shimada, China Area Fleet to !2th Air Corps Commander Lieutenant Shindo, dated October 30, 1940, issued a Unit Citation for the destruction of "all enemy planes" during a mission to Chunking against a numerically superior fighter force. I don't think there is any question IJN had Zero's in China, the question is did the AVG shoot any down while in China (or Burma).

 

[oldcrowcv63]

That September 13, 1940 mission over Chunking was evidently the very one witnessed by Chenault that formed the basis of his report on the A6M. apparently the defending NCAF fighters (Polikarpov I-16s?) were wiped out.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Pure speculation on my part but with no hope of re-supply until after Midway at the earliest, the attrition on FEAF would have the same result, the invasion would have had the same result and the defeat of US in PI would have been same, albeit longer..

The question seems to hinge on the dates and the locale of the airfields to the South of Clark and North of Del Monte of which AFAICT there appears to be only Nichols near Manilla: Clark AFB fell sometime in early January 1942 (Angeles City fell on January 1st), Nichols field on was essentially lost when Mac declared Manilla an open city on Dec 26th with the Japanese apparently showing up on Jan 2. Bataan fell April 9 and Corregidor on May 5th. Del Monte field, a secret base only begun Nov 26 1941 was essentially abandoned as anything but a staging base on December 15. With US forces withdrawing May 1.

Midway was fought June 4, 1942. Watchtower was initiated August 7th. I expect there was some limited amount of spares on hand to keep a fair number of aircraft flying for a while, with cannibalization, although getting what existed south or bringing replacements north from Oz may have been too great a logistical hurdle at that early stage of the war. I doubt there was much in Oz at that time.

Not sure what other airfields might have been able to support fighter and bomber ops north of the Del Monte field on Mindanao. But it does seem unlikely operations could have been sustained anywhere in the PI for 6-8 months without major resupply. On the other hand, from May1st is only about 3 months shy of August 7th. It seems agonizingly close on first glance. There is also perhaps a tendancy for me to attempt to make an analogy with the AVG experience in China where they fought on for about 7 months with great effectiveness and a roughly equal number of fighters (and essentially no heavy bombers). Of course the difference in leadership and geography were probably among the major factors that differentiate the might-have-beens from the what-was.

Curiously, my father was linked to FEAF although he only fought in ETO. The three future leaders of the 355th FG (my father's unit) were Bill Cummings, Thomas (Speed) Hubbard and gerald (Dixie) Dix who went from PI to Java (then to Australia) in the rear guard action flying P-40s.. thence to the States to form the 355th FG in late 1942.
An example of 'difficulties' was that they ran out of .50 cal links and tried to find tinkers in Dutch java who could make them - highest production they could get was 100 per day! Simple issue like that would have killed the FEAF ultimately anyway.

This forum has some serious heritage. to your dad, Ren's Uncles and FlyboyJ's granddad. A generation of heroes.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

I just finished Bloody Shambles by Chris Shores. I had it totally wrong. Mac's airforce was not entirely wiped out the first day. Apparently, 75% of FEAF fighter force (mainly P-40s) survived the air battles and bombings of December 8th. What I didn't appreciate was the impact of roughly 100 covering IJN A6M escort fighters piloted by combat veterans over the span of a week's worth of air battles pitted against the relative novices of FEAF. I also didn't appreciate the evident loses due to the risky flying practices that desparation forced on the losing FEAF as it fought to survive. I was astonished at how many aircraft accidents occurred (many multi-aircraft) that lost valuable fighters and bombers before they saw action. While the losses included pilots, in the end there were apparently far more pilots than planes. Brereton comes off as a reasonably competent commander whose air force was simply overwhelmed by numbers and the poor logistical state of his command that he didn't have an opportunity to correct.

 

[buffnut453]

The two Japanese authors of Zero were very specific about not only their engagement in China ain 1940 and 1941 but cited several 'Letters of Commendation" including a Unit Coomendation for a September 13, 1940 mission.

Specifically from CIC Shigetaro Shimada, China Area Fleet to !2th Air Corps Commander Lieutenant Shindo, dated October 30, 1940, issued a Unit Citation for the destruction of "all enemy planes" during a mission to Chunking against a numerically superior fighter force. I don't think there is any question IJN had Zero's in China, the question is did the AVG shoot any down while in China (or Burma).

Bear in mind the AVG's first combat came after the attack on Pearl Harbor. By that time, all the A6Ms had been withdrawn from China (presumably because they were needed for IJN-specific operations aboard carriers). The AVG did come up against the Ki-43 which can be very easily mistaken for an A6M. IIRC Allied intelligence didn't identify the Ki-43 as a separate type, distinct from the A6M, until 1943.

 

[parsifal]

Bear in mind the AVG's first combat came after the attack on Pearl Harbor. By that time, all the A6Ms had been withdrawn from China (presumably because they were needed for IJN-specific operations aboard carriers). The AVG did come up against the Ki-43 which can be very easily mistaken for an A6M. IIRC Allied intelligence didn't identify the Ki-43 as a separate type, distinct from the A6M, until 1943.

hi buffnut

I agree that the oscar was frequently mistaken for a zero...in fact most Japanese fighters were referred to as Zeroes in that first year, but it seems inconceivable that allied intell would not separately identify the oscar as a separate type for over a year. That just seems not right. I will do some checking and see what comes to the surface

 

[buffnut453]

I'm trying to recall where I read about late identification of the Ki-43 but I just can't recall where I found it. Bear in mind that the Ki-43 only entered service in Aug 41 and its main operational areas were in locations where Allied intel didn't have much of a footprint. I believe it was during the Solomons Campaign that the Ki-43 was first identified.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

The contrast with the AVG experience, previously seemed to me to argue that FEAF leadership was responsible for a major failure that could have been averted. However, reading Bloody Shambles, I have come to believe the AVG benefited from being confronted by generally smaller numbers of strike aircraft and escorts attacking single specific targets. The AVG also enjoyed a well developed early warning network and well established, intelligent post-launch tactical doctrine. In contrast, the Phillipine debacle seems more an organizational failure rather than a purely tactical one. I don't get a strong sense (in Bloody Shambles) that Brereton had organized any kind of an early warning system coupled with fighter direction. Indeed it seems he simply didn't have time to do much organization and was primarily focused on improving the training of his generally inexperienced aircrews.
On December 8, the fighters were launched in the expectation the attack that eventually materielized but while waiting its appearance, they simply milled about aloft burning AVgas without a clear idea the major threat axis or what to do before the raids materielized. They seemed dedicated to defend Clark, but Iba was in some sense even more important to defend with its RADAR. I didn't get a sense the RADAR was even employed in an early warning capacity. The large number of well escorted raids on multiple targets apparently caused some confusion among the large number of FEAF fighters airborne that day.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Specifically from CIC Shigetaro Shimada, China Area Fleet to !2th Air Corps Commander Lieutenant Shindo, dated October 30, 1940, issued a Unit Citation for the destruction of "all enemy planes" during a mission to Chunking against a numerically superior fighter force. I don't think there is any question IJN had Zero's in China, the question is did the AVG shoot any down while in China (or Burma).

I think evidence shows that there were Zeros in SE Asia in 1940, all removed by December 1941. I think there's more information about this in the book "Japanese Army Air Force Units and Their Aces: 1931-1945"

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Been reading Edmunds, They fought with what they had. The story of the AAF in the SW Pacific 1941-1942. The section on the PI in 1941 is quite interesting with FEAF records showing conflicting versions of what happened on December 8, 1941. Apparently much turned on poor comms and lack of oxygen. Evidently the fighter direction art was better organized than I imagined, but the RADAR showed the Japaneses strike holding at 100 miles out to sea, which subsequently caused much confusion amongst the pilots of the 3rd Pursuit squadron aiborne over Iba field. Their reaction to this delay was essentially chaotic. They had poor ground to air comm and sought to improve it by getting closer to the source of the signals they expected to be hearing. This led to flying between Manilla AHQ and Iba. Without oxygen they couldn't engage the high flying IJ bombers attacking the airfields. It seems USAAF leadership was less a factor than poor comm equipment, possibly failing in the presence of IJ Comm jamming. Still the failure of RADAR to privide better information is puzzling. According to one account, the mission to Bomb Formosa was canceled in favor of local targets to be bombed at the end of the day, so the bombers might have been on the ground in any event!

My reading of this doesn't change my low opinion of MacArthur or Sutherland. I think Brereton was happy to be away from the SW Pacific when it came time to go. There was evidently a lot of tension between him and Sutherland. Sutherland was so much MacArthur's creature that I don't think the two can be separated in a poll. My impression is that Macarthur was the guy in charge and bears the responsibility but Sutherland was a contributing factor by being more of fire wall and incurring the emnity of the aviation leadership. That role continued to Australia and showed up in his relationship with Brett and Kenney who evidently couldn't stand him.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

After the attack on Pearl Harbor, the FEAF (Far East Air Force) had several hours warning, but was still largely caught on the ground and destroyed

Who was to blame?

From Edmunds: They fought with what they had:

Not that many aircraft were actually caught on the ground. It's apparently a very persistent myth that evaporates in the light of facts. Out of 4 P-40 1 P-35 squadrons of 18 planes each, only the 20th consisting of P-40s, based at Clark, were on the ground having just been refueled when the the Japanese attacked. Thus only 18 operational fighters were caught on the ground and destroyed. However, each squadron had a small number of spare aircraft to round out their roster and these were probably eliminated when their fields were hit. Of course, all but two of the B-17's based at Clark were also destroyed leaving only that half of the (15-16 a/c) force based at Del Monte on Mindanao. These were all the old C and D models with no tail gun and far less armament than on the more modern marks.

The radio discipline among the many (~70) airborne fighters was so bad that it apparently amounted to self-jamming of their own comms. Little fighter direction was possible. For example, The fighters over Iba heard (amazingly!) the call of "Tallyho!" at Clark and abandoned their own base-protection mission to the Japanese attack that arrived about 5 minutes after they rushed to Clark Field to go where the action was. Very little Oxygen was available for the pursuit squadrons, so most fighters could not engage above about 18,000 feet, depending on their own physiology.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

After reading Bartsch's Doomed at the Start, I believe my summary above was incorrect. It was a far more complicated post-Pearl Harbor situation for the first three days during which a significant FEAF air force was essentially pissed away to little effect due to misdirection and lack of good command orgainization and decisions.

Ater reading some online bio materiel on The situation in Australia when General George Kenney arrived in the summer of 1942, it is looking to me that the person who initially appeared to have been on the sidelines of this debacle (Richard K. Sutherland) was actually at the heart of it. The logistical and support situation in Australia appeared as bad or worse than what existed in the PI before December 8. It seems to me that Kenney placed much of the blame for the situation on Sutherland.