Who was responsible for the USAAF debacle in the Philippines - Dec 1941 (1 Viewer)

Who was to blame for the FEAF debacle?

  • Richard Sutherland

    Votes: 0 0.0%
  • Nobody - Just bad luck.

    Votes: 0 0.0%

  • Total voters
    23

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Not much that Mac can do about the national psyche and readiness for war. i agree. however, Mac is still guilty of disregarding direct war warnings issued from the 27 November onwards, and direct orders that were attached to those warnings . He was directed to prepare and execute immediately on the commencement of hostilities the operational plan for RAINBOW 6. This meant specifically air attacks on land targets in southern Formosa. Instead Mac, and his command descended into a kind of atrophy that failed to seriously attempt these orders, and led directly to the loss of most of the airpower assets under his comand in the first 48 hours of the battle.

Therein lies your reasons (at least the direct ones) for the defeat of the FEAF so easily. Command paralysis, and at its head is General Macarthur.

I am incidentally a big fan of Mac and his effort later, even in this campaign. His retreat to Bataan was nothing shoirt of brilliant. but his handling of his orders regarding the air assets under his command, was abysmal
 
Ren, Two uncles in the Guadacanal campaign! What stories they must have told! Reading Hornfischer's detailed descriptions of the battles from the personal perspective DID raise the hair on my neck. I wonder what your uncle thought of his CO Capt. Bode? I got the impression he was something of a martinet and distanced himself from his crew.
 
Pars, I have long held a low opinion of Mac despite his later brilliance. As I get older, and read (learn?) more, I become more accepting of Ren's observation "No commander fails to make mistakes..." Nimitz is supposed to have said, "every dog deserves two bites" and was reputed to give subordinates the opportunity to learn from their mistakes. Yet I still find it difficult to give Mac or Kelly Turner or Halsey their just due, probably because so often their advocates sometimes seem reluctant to acknowlege their icons feet of clay. But of course, I didn't walk an inch in their shoes and have little right to judge.
 
I just finished the biography on George Marshall which is the most illuminating view I have ever had on the events and the communications from late November through December 7/8.

It is complex. From the biography Marshall accepts the blame for the combined screw ups simply because he was Chief of Staff of the US. Having said that he alerted MacArther and MacArthur responded "I'm on it". I voted MacArthur in this poll with mixed feelings simply because he did issue orders to Brereton, including instituting long range patrols. Brereton failed to execute properly and now I am in the camp of Ren and several others here.

Our Air Force was expanding rapidly, few had ever fired a shot in air combat, nobody knew about the zero and everybody was confident that the forces in PI were adequate for coastal and air defense - and were wrong.

Marshall also had culpability in another strange way. He did not like to use telephones. He received the Looooong 13 point instructions to Japanese Ambassador decoded from Magic early Sunday am and started reading it carefully from the Top rather than skipping to the 'war' part immediately. By the time he finished only a couple of hours were left and he issued orders for an emergency order via Signal Corps. As fate would have it, executing the order on Sunday morning didn't work out. Marshall SHOULD have picked up the phone to follow up - ditto Admiral King.

In my opinion the major cause of the fiasco was threefold. First and foremost we were not prepared mentally for War and certainly not from Japan. Second, the training that would have ensued had we been prepared to fight would have manifested itself all the way down to taking ammo out of the Hawaii ammo bunkers, maintaining long range recon, daily scrambles of fighter assets, ships out of Pearl harbor, dispursed aircraft in PI and HI, etc, etc

Last, Marshall should have been in direct telephone contact with his commanders to make sure they were aware of the high reliabilty of the intelligence warnings with detailed discussion about contingency plans. There were in fact several plans but even those were screwed up relative to communications.

Net US Congress and American people - fault number one - for emasculating our military between wars, and not being prepared for a war that we believed could escape. Fault numer two - Immediate air commanders on PI and HI for not instilling wartime mentality on their troops. Fault number three - Marshall and King for not following up in direct communications with their Theatre commanders to ensure that they understood the seriousness of the potential war threat (with as yet unkown target) and hear in detail what they were doing to be prepared.

Back to the Poll. At PI, the buck stopped with MacArthur. He was the only one of the senior commanders (PI and HI) that escaped blame and punishment. Thank God he did - because I personally consider him to be the best military mind our country has ever produced. Arrogant - yes. But if he was ignorant of airpower on December 7 he more than made up for it with his SW PTO Campaigns in the incredible blend of air, sea and ground tactics.
 
Bill, a very good post, IMO, and very informative. Mac did seem a little (a lot) foggy in the early going in PI but really did good work later in WW2, after Japan surrendered and in Korea. He was a giant. To me, one can pick any "giant" in history and point out where he blundered. An example is Mac. Another might be R E Lee, in my mind probably the greatest battlefield general in American history. Well, Malvern Hill was a disaster. Probably much worse than the third day at Gettysburg where there were extenuating circumstances, IMO.

How about this? Many historians consider that Lincoln was our greatest president. That is what I was taught in school. The only thing my history classes did not focus on was: Lincoln ordered that Fort Sumter be resupplied which precipitated the bombardment. At that time, Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky had not seceded. Lincoln then ordered that 75000 of the state militias be called up to put down the insurrection. The states that had not seceded had by far the most men available for war but declared they would not stand still to see their militia used to attack their fellow southerners. The fat was in the fire. Sounds like Lincoln made a big mistake to me and lost any chance for a peaceful resolution of the problem and more than 600000 good men died when the population of the US was only around 30M. Grant made a big mistake at Cold Harbor among several and had around 7000 casualties in a half hour.

Placing the blame often depends a lot on one's perspective and how deep one delves into the subject. And sometimes bad stuff just happens.
 
My recollection is that my uncle was not fond of Bode. On the other hand the other uncle was fond of Captain Zacharias who commanded SLC when war broke out. He said that the crew of SLC was disappointed that they did not get to sink the Japanese picket boats encountered which caused the early launch of Doolittle. He also reflected on how exposed they felt on SLC when the scout plane caught on fire and had to be jettisoned the night of Cape Esperance. The Boise had one turret blown up and he said he had trained that turret crew and that he was absolutely certain that SLC was responsible for sinking Furataka. Every other ship probably felt the same. I asked if he was scared when standing on deck next to his five inchers in open mounts with shells and torpedos whizzing about and only a steel helmet for protection. He said that they were so excited while firing full broadsides they felt invincible and forgot to be scared. At that range at Esperance a broadside was ten 8-inchers and four 5-inchers. The uncle on Chicago said that prior to Savo, the Australians, when Chicago was in port treated them like royalty but when they limped back in after Savo for temporary repairs they were shunned because the word was that Chicago had abandoned Canberra. He was transferred out before Rennel Island where Chicago was sunk.
 
Ren,

Big well deserved salute to your uncles! I was surprised at learning of the SLC scout plane incident... One of those crazy, inexplicable, heart-stopping events that seem to happen in combat when everything is on the line.

Drgon, what is the title of the Marshall Bio. Stepping up to accept responsibility for the disaster is the mark of a great commander, although of course it may be professional suicide. I wonder whan he did this. Was it well after the event and after the war or before?

"nobody knew about the zero and everybody was confident that the forces in PI were adequate for coastal and air defense" We are probably all aware of the reports by Chennault coming out of his China experience but of course, they were largely ignored. I think a case can be made (or would at least like to see it explored, if it hasn't already come up. I am a newbie so maybe its already been argued to death.) that the forces in the Phillipines might have been up to the task, if The FEAF hadn't been lost on the first day of the war. If not already discussed, it might be a logical progression for this discussion. Asked diffferently: how long could have the FEAF survived if it had been allowed to respond appropriately to the initial Japanese assault. Appropriately meaning, surviving the initial shock of the Zero long enough to read and absorb the Chennault reports and adopt the AVG's tactics. At Pearl, we had two pilots (Welch and Taylor) who in some sense at least were prepared for the attack and enjoyed some success in responding to it. If we inflate that to include a third of the fighters at Clark and out-lying fields employed on rotating CAP, I would expect the results to have been quite different. I mean, the AVG was effective wth about as many aircraft. But I haven't looked at the differences in the Japanese Order of Battle between China and the Phillipines.
 
Bill, a very good post, IMO, and very informative. Mac did seem a little (a lot) foggy in the early going in PI but really did good work later in WW2, after Japan surrendered and in Korea. He was a giant. To me, one can pick any "giant" in history and point out where he blundered. An example is Mac. Another might be R E Lee, in my mind probably the greatest battlefield general in American history. Well, Malvern Hill was a disaster. Probably much worse than the third day at Gettysburg where there were extenuating circumstances, IMO.

Marse Robert is one of several War of Northern Agression giants that I have studied in depth. I would offer Stonewall jackson as Lee's near equal, however.

How about this? Many historians consider that Lincoln was our greatest president. That is what I was taught in school. The only thing my history classes did not focus on was: Lincoln ordered that Fort Sumter be resupplied which precipitated the bombardment. At that time, Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky had not seceded. Lincoln then ordered that 75000 of the state militias be called up to put down the insurrection. The states that had not seceded had by far the most men available for war but declared they would not stand still to see their militia used to attack their fellow southerners. The fat was in the fire. Sounds like Lincoln made a big mistake to me and lost any chance for a peaceful resolution of the problem and more than 600000 good men died when the population of the US was only around 30M. Grant made a big mistake at Cold Harbor among several and had around 7000 casualties in a half hour.

Litttle known fact. Attorney General Black, former former Chief (PA or MD??) State Supreme Court, at Lincoln't request, issued an opinion regarding the consequences to the Union if he (Lincoln) ordered Federal troops to invade and supress the rebellion. Black's opinion was that such action would constitute a dissolution of the Union - which is why Lincoln attempted to first order the Stae militia's (which he had no authority to do) to quell the rebellion.

Of course the issue was never tested in Court... thankfully, now.


Placing the blame often depends a lot on one's perspective and how deep one delves into the subject. And sometimes bad stuff just happens.

MacArthur, Lee and Patton are the US military leaders most often studied in foreign military academies.
 
Going back I see that the issue of FEAF survival has indeed already been subject to some examination by JoeB, Parsifal and others. Yes, 'the war of Northern aggression,' as I (a native of NJ) have heard so often since coming to live in rebel territory!
 
Ren,

Big well deserved salute to your uncles! I was surprised at learning of the SLC scout plane incident... One of those crazy, inexplicable, heart-stopping events that seem to happen in combat when everything is on the line.

Drgon, what is the title of the Marshall Bio. Stepping up to accept responsibility for the disaster is the mark of a great commander, although of course it may be professional suicide. I wonder whan he did this. Was it well after the event and after the war or before?

"Marshall-Hero For Our Times" by Leonard Mosely - Marshall accepted blame but did not publically discuss it. According to the author Marshall was gravely concerned about a political crisis surrounding Roosevelt at this critical time. I will have to check on any statements he made regarding his observations but they were after he finished up as Secretary of State. He is also my personal WWII leader favorite, second only to Churchill. Marshall was a giant.

"nobody knew about the zero and everybody was confident that the forces in PI were adequate for coastal and air defense" We are probably all aware of the reports by Chennault coming out of his China experience but of course, they were largely ignored. I think a case can be made (or would at least like to see it explored, if it hasn't already come up. I am a newbie so maybe its already been argued to death.) that the forces in the Phillipines might have been up to the task, if The FEAF hadn't been lost on the first day of the war. If not already discussed, it might be a logical progression for this discussion. Asked diffferently: how long could have the FEAF survived if it had been allowed to respond appropriately to the initial Japanese assault. Appropriately meaning, surviving the initial shock of the Zero long enough to read and absorb the Chennault reports and adopt the AVG's tactics. At Pearl, we had two pilots (Welch and Taylor) who in some sense at least were prepared for the attack and enjoyed some success in responding to it. If we inflate that to include a third of the fighters at Clark and out-lying fields employed on rotating CAP, I would expect the results to have been quite different. I mean, the AVG was effective wth about as many aircraft. But I haven't looked at the differences in the Japanese Order of Battle between China and the Phillipines.

In retrospect, given the disaster at Pearl harbor and Japanese dominance quickly in Singapore, Java, etc, the USN was in no position to provide logistics support to PI. Even if FEAF had survived the events of the first couple of weeks I think the outcome would have been the same. The B-17D's were largely ineffective against the IJN so their ability to sustain attacks by IJN fighters during the invasion processes are doubtful at best - and the FEAF had nothing else but a few B-18s to attack the Japanese navy. Pure speculation on my part but with no hope of re-supply until after Midway at the earliest, the attrition on FEAF would have the same result, the invasion would have had the same result and the defeat of US in PI would have been same, albeit longer.

Curiously, my father was linked to FEAF although he only fought in ETO. The three future leaders of the 355th FG (my father's unit) were Bill Cummings, Thomas (Speed) Hubbard and gerald (Dixie) Dix who went from PI to Java (then to Australia) in the rear guard action flying P-40s.. thence to the States to form the 355th FG in late 1942.
An example of 'difficulties' was that they ran out of .50 cal links and tried to find tinkers in Dutch java who could make them - highest production they could get was 100 per day! Simple issue like that would have killed the FEAF ultimately anyway.

As to Chennault reports I am not familiar with his warnings re: Type Zero A6M or equivalent. The AVG, per se did not encounter the Zero IIRC, only the Oscar, until after absorbed into the 23rd FG.
 
Going back I see that the issue of FEAF survival has indeed already been subject to some examination by JoeB, Parsifal and others. Yes, 'the war of Northern aggression,' as I (a native of NJ) have heard so often since coming to live in rebel territory!

My personal favorite is 'Save your Confederate money boys, the South will rise again". In retrospect, the US dollar is closely approaching the Confederate Dollar!
 
Yes, I was aware that most AVG 'modern' opposition was vs Ki-43 Oscars but had also heard he faced some detachments of IJN zeroes deployed to China.in 1940 Can't remember the source. Found it! in Shultz's Maverick War, paperback page 75.
 
You've made me so glad I saved the confederate money collected as a kid when I lived in VA in the 50's. I know its around here somewhere. I never throw anything out unless its green and appears to be alive.
 
Yes, I was aware that most AVG 'modern' opposition was vs Ki-43 Oscars but had also heard he faced some detachments of IJN zeroes deployed to China.in 1940 Can't remember the source. Found it! in Shultz's Maverick War, paperback page 75.

There is a lot of controversy re: Type I, Type 0, Zero, etc. For sure there are no victory credits of IJN Zero's in USAAF Victory Credits listings. Tex Hill was credited with 2 Type '0' and one Zero in April 28/May 5 1942 at the very end of the AVG experience. Both China, both Army. Questions still remain 'Type 0' vs Oscar in that window. For sure the Jap fighters encountered prior to April 1942 were I-97's. Burghard got only I-97'2, Neale only got I-97s, Little credited with one Type 0 in April 1942, Herbst I-97s, Howard I-97s.
 
The PI P40s were able to put up some opposition to the Japanese for quite some time but I don't believe that, even if the AAf in the PI had been handled properly, it would have made much difference in the outcome.

I visited West Point in about 1983 and was impressed when going through the museum that the biggest exhibit there was on Stonewall's Valley Campaign.
 
There is a lot of controversy re: Type I, Type 0, Zero, etc. For sure there are no victory credits of IJN Zero's in USAAF Victory Credits listings. Tex Hill was credited with 2 Type '0' and one Zero in April 28/May 5 1942 at the very end of the AVG experience. Both China, both Army. Questions still remain 'Type 0' vs Oscar in that window. For sure the Jap fighters encountered prior to April 1942 were I-97's. Burghard got only I-97'2, Neale only got I-97s, Little credited with one Type 0 in April 1942, Herbst I-97s, Howard I-97s.

I think "recent research has revealed" that the AVG never fought against the Zero as there were no IJN units in Southern China during the AVG's lifeline.
 
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The Chenault report on the zero was pre-AVG (cited in MW) and I should have edited the first sentences of my post to reflect that it did not describe a circa 1942 confrontation between Zeros and P-40s. Going over MW, It appears the AVG spent some time worring about such a confrontation but I can find no indication in that source that such an event ever occurred. Schultz does claim, some AVG members decided to throw in the towel after hearing Channault describe the performance of the A6M which he apparently observed on September 13, 1940.
 
Ren, reading Killer Angels, I came away with the impression that Jackson was (with most of his less-successful contemporaries) more a classic Napoleonic commander specializing in manuever warfare and artillery whereas Longstreet was more in tune with advances in small arms technology and the implications thereof. Thatwas reinforced reading Longstreet's autobiography.
 

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