It was all the enlisted submarine torpedomen's and aviation ordnancemen's faults! If you don't believe it, just ask the Admiral in Charge at BuOrd. "Drunk on fuel alcohol, the lot of 'em!"
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It was all the enlisted submarine torpedomen's and aviation ordnancemen's faults! If you don't believe it, just ask the Admiral in Charge at BuOrd. "Drunk on fuel alcohol, the lot of 'em!"The USN didn't know either. Or at least, it was in serious denial about problems with its submarine torpedoes.
In fact they were in denial. The history of US torpedoes is sad stoy.The USN didn't know either. Or at least, it was in serious denial about problems with its submarine torpedoes.
If the Yamato was too precious to be risked in combat she should have been left at home. A ship that cannot be lost is worse than useless. The 8 destroyers screening the useless battleships could have reinforced the carriers screen.You will not sink Yamato but you can easy enough mission kill her.
Or reduce her speed so she becomes a piñata for every sub in town.
Yamato become too precious to use when a faster Kongo or cruiser will do.
I wonder about that. If Mavis had been patrolling out of Midway, do you think the Doolittle strike force would have got by undetected? I bet Yamamoto and maybe some others were wondering the same thing. Mavis had pretty long legs.Neither the Aleutians nor Midway offered much to Japan's defensive perimeter.
What US battleships are there to fight? The South Dakota's and the North Carolina were not ready for prime time and were working up in the Atlantic. The Washington was in the UK. The older battleships were resting on the mud in Pearl Harbor or under repair on the west coast. The Japanese should have been aware of that.Can you confirm the battleships used in the Aluetian campaign?
Yamato and her sisters were for Tsushima style decisive battle and not for shelling islands. Kongos can do that.
Imagine a video game and you get to the last level to fight the bossman.
That was Yamato role.
A ship that cannot be lost is worse than useless.
Can you confirm the battleships used in the Aluetian campaign?
I wonder about that. If Mavis had been patrolling out of Midway, do you think the Doolittle strike force would have got by undetected? I bet Yamamoto and maybe some others were wondering the same thing. Mavis had pretty long legs.
Welcome to the forum!I'm a little late to the game (also new here, hi!) so I will just try to hit a couple points. In the various reading I have done, a big part of having everyone spread out for Yamamoto was his thinking that if he brought the entire fleet en masse, the USN would stay home. That goes back to another point a poster made (several pages ago) about USN being scared.
As far as doctrine, most of the salient points have been covered. One thing that has always surprised me is why the Japanese never employed carriers like Shoho and Zuiho as solely CAP carriers. They could carry 30 A6M's with little issue and allow the big carriers to focus on what they focused on anyway - offense. I never really understood what good it did for Zuiho to run around with a dozen B5N's or D3A's. They learned something from Midway, because by October 1942 Zuiho was only carrying 6 B5Ns and 18 A6M's...why not take the plunge and just go all fighters and handle the CAP? [as an aside, I have read that not every A6M was even equipped with a radio, but they definitely needed more and better CAP organization and communication]
Why did Nagumo turn toward the USN carriers? Not even just Hiryu, but the ENTIRE group of carriers, once the USN carriers were spotted? When they were recovering the Midway strike and obviously vulnerable? I understand the attack mantra, but that doesn't mean you have to be foolhardy....Japanese carrier planes, even in 1944 (philippine sea) had a significant range advantage over the Americans. Why not turn AWAY, recover the Midway strike, put some distance between you and essentially, you control the engagement due to your range advantage. Yes, I know, you have to turn into the wind to recover or launch, but I am pretty sure the prevalent wind direction was not such that they had to head toward the USN to land the Midway strike. The goal of the plan should have been clear - we're here to sink the USN carriers above ALL else. Midway is the bait. Of course, they didn't think the USN carriers would be there when they first hit Midway.
Someone else mentioned the Aleutians operation. Let's remember that a mere 6 weeks before Midway, the Doolittle raid had hit Japan. They got as close to Japan as they did roughly by using the same tactic the Pearl Harbor strike force did - stay north out of the sea lanes and more out of sight. Kiska, Attu etc were seen as another extreme route to do the same thing, and bases to possibly help spot such a force. As far as a distraction, that's counter to the decisive battle plan, isn't it? The Japanese WANTED the USN carriers to come to Midway, they wanted to destroy them. I have read an account or two that stated that hitting Dutch Harbor etc was intended so that the USN carriers engaged at Midway could not interfere...but I have a problem with that cause they hit Dutch Harbor FIRST, on the 3rd of June. In any event, it was not an operation designed as a diversion.
Finally, the point of the post, why did Nagumo keep his job? A good question, cause Inoue lost his after Coral Sea, which was certainly more successfully than Midway was. Similarly, even though he smoked the allies at Savo Island, Mikawa was eventually rebuked for not hitting the transports and eventually was blamed for the slipshod Guadalcanal campaign and relegated to obscurity largely. So who's left to command Japan's carriers after Midway? Other than Ozawa, I think Nagumo was the only vice admiral with carrier experience. I think the Japanese system could not put a rear admiral in charge of the carrier forces with an experienced vice admiral around. Many have made the point that given the conflicting orders given for the Midway operation, there was little any commander could do to achieve victory, but Nagumo had proven to be conservative and somewhat timid since Pearl Harbor, but he was given a LOT more chances, it seems, than any other admiral in charge of carriers. But if it was me, if I was Yamamoto, after Midway, Ozawa gets the job in July, not November
The fly in the ointment here and with RCAF's idea is that you're attempting to sneak up on a fully alerted base that has VERY long search legs under it. B-17's and PBY's would (and did) spot you coming well before you were in any position to do anything.That's how I was envisioning my ATL, under nightfall, and why I mentioned air-cover for a daylight withdrawal of the BBs: a nighttime shelling a la 13-14 October upon Henderson Field, turn around about 4am, and if needed have a CAP over the battlewagons for the early morning.
I like RCAF's idea, and under the circumstances I mention above, think it could have been doable -- and perhaps better than what unfolded. Making synergy work for you in operations was still a fledgling art at that time, though. I'm definitely guilty of hindsight on that score.
A daylight bombardment would certainly not be wise, as you say. But concentrating their forces and sequencing them well (nighttime BB bombardment, sunrise airstrike?) would, I think, be both possible and have better potentials. They had the numbers and the skill to do it had they decided on it.
Exactly why Yamato should have been left at home. The Decisive Battle in terms of battleships vs battleships was simply not possible at that time.The South Dakota claimed 26 planes shot down at Santa Cruz but the Japanese only lost 13 total (?).
The South Dakota had eight twin 5in gun mounts compared to most Japanese battleships of the time four twin gun mounts. Yamato had six twins at this time. The American guns fired faster and had more ammo. Moving the Battleships up for the Japanese risks a lot and gains little.
I hate to disagree with you Wes, but I doubt Genda would have done much different on the search patterns. Had he had more search aircraft available, i.e. Mikuma, Mogami, Suzuya and Kumano he might have instituted a two phase search, but that wasn't in IJN doctrine yet either so I'm skeptical that he'd change much.Addendum to the above: If Cdr Genda had been on top of his game, instead of in sickbay under the weather, a more effective dawn search might have been launched from KB. The American task forces would likely have been located earlier, while KB had a significant range advantage. What was launched was a standard low probability doctrine search pattern. Given the stakes, Genda likely would have opted (my opinion here) for a more aggressive search if he was in the loop and on top of his game. He escaped from sickbay and dragged himself to Akai's bridge in pajamas to watch the first Midway strike launch.
Per Shattered Sword's Japanese Order of Battle Appendix, I see no IJN BB's listed for the Aleutians operation.
True, but again, it pre supposes PBY's and Flying Fortress' sitting on the tarmac doing nothing.When I say "concentration", I'm meaning a combined fleet in proximity.
Kido Butai was thinly protected by Capitol ships and seperated from the main battle group, which was a considerable distance away.
With the full fleet drawn together and working as a cohesive unit, it would have presented a challenge.
With a layered shelling arrangement of select cruisers closer to the Atoll and battlewagons laying further out with the carriers forming a fluid perimeter with appropriate screens, it would have been a gauntlet for USN attack aircraft.
Probably because Midway was still in American hands when the Doolittle raid launched? Just sayin'...I wonder about that. If Mavis had been patrolling out of Midway, do you think the Doolittle strike force would have got by undetected? I bet Yamamoto and maybe some others were wondering the same thing. Mavis had pretty long legs.
That would be even better if they were sitting in port doing nothing. The fuel wasted in the Yamato, Mutsu, and Nagato could get the old battleships to Midway.Per Shattered Sword's Japanese Order of Battle Appendix, I see no IJN BB's listed for the Aleutians operation.
The fly in the ointment here and with RCAF's idea is that you're attempting to sneak up on a fully alerted base that has VERY long search legs under it. B-17's and PBY's would (and did) spot you coming well before you were in any position to do anything.
I think bringing out half your fleet and then leaving those ships 300 miles behind the battle is dumb, especially when your national oil reserves are dwindling. If Yamamoto wasn't going to use them in the battle, he should have left them at home.