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The SBD pilots had considerable training in scouting and navigation - the "scouting" part was a vital function of Naval Ops before radar and the scouts were the first line of defense for the fleet, so it was a very serious and integral part of USN training in the 30's.For an undertrained navy that hadn't spent the last decade full out training for war, yup.
Yeah, I'll give you that, but we were talking about the submarine force. I believe that submariners were very restricted in torpedo training due to cost. I think that kind of fiscal folly must have extended to the rest of their training. I'm guessing you might have documentation that proves my point.[/QUOTE]The SBD pilots had considerable training in scouting and navigation - the "scouting" part was a vital function of Naval Ops before radar and the scouts were the first line of defense for the fleet, so it was a very serious and integral part of USN training in the 30's.
In my view Midway was dumbass.
Get the USN in range of your own land based bombers and recon. Much better.
Saratoga actually arrived at Midway on the last day of the battle.
Good catch, I skipped to the OOB section at the back, strange they don't have the BB's listed or I need new glasses...That would be even better if they were sitting in port doing nothing. The fuel wasted in the Yamato, Mutsu, and Nagato could get the old battleships to Midway.
Actually Shattered Sword mentions the old battleships in Chapter 3. They formed the Aleutian Screening Force. They are listed in Appendix 2 of my version of Shattered Sword.
Or rather don't make large, complicated offensive plans that rely on your enemy doing exactly what you want them to do.
Also speaking to Nagumo (and Yamaguchi) charging after the Americans, it was part of the fabric of the IJN to ALWAYS be on the offensive. Once Hiryu was the only remaining IJN CV and knew where TF16 was, no admiral in the Japanese fleet would have even thought of not heading straight for the enemy. Defensive minded they were not.
Totally agree, myself I've often pondered what would have happened if Hornet air group doesn't score a big goose egg and plants a few on Hiryu during the 10:20-10:30 attack. The USN puts paid to all four IJN carriers in a fell swoop, which could have easily happened. With three fully functional American CV's bearing down on you the IJN is really forked. Not to mention after a few extra weeks in the dockyard, how valuable would Yorktown's flight deck have been during the Solomons Campaign? The Battle of the Eastern Solomons would have shaped up somewhat different for starters.Undoubtedly. It's a fascinating example of how chance can turn great events. If the Arashi isn't there to follow, does McClusky still locate the carriers? What if Best and his two wingmen hadn't aborted their dive on Kaga to attack the Akagi instead? So many small moments that add up to the larger story. Change one of them; how much does the larger story change?
There's no way to answer that, but the thread that leads from one moment to the next to the next I find intriguing to contemplate.
You can go one further and look to the earlier attacks: if Henderson's VMB Dauntlesses had been better trained and attacked from above instead of a shallow attack solution or any of the torpedoes launched had been effective.Totally agree, myself I've often pondered what would have happened if Hornet air group doesn't score a big goose egg and plants a few on Hiryu during the 10:20-10:30 attack. The USN puts paid to all four IJN carriers in a fell swoop, which could have easily happened. With three fully functional American CV's bearing down on you the IJN is really forked. Not to mention after a few extra weeks in the dockyard, how valuable would Yorktown's flight deck have been during the Solomons Campaign? The Battle of the Eastern Solomons would have shaped up somewhat different for starters.
I agree with you BUT Admiral Yamamoto thought this was their one best shot to finish off the remains of the USN and get the last six months to continue running wild. This plan was counter to the Kantai Kessen plan which called for the USN to come to the Japanese. Instead the IJN came out to US forces and were sniped and harried along the way rather than the other way around.IJN had a small window to get up to tricks.
Shokaku and Zuikaku were dangerous opponents in 1942.
Go boom in 1944.
So like at Midway it's a close run thing but only on the day. By late 1943 the Essex class were appearing and so yeah....
The IJN would have been far better off trying to get as much territory as possible rather than trying a attrition battle with an enemy that can churn out ships like a conveyor belt.
GrauGeist posted a great link on the "Was dive bombing accurate" thread regarding Admiral Nagumo's take on the battle for those of us unfamiliar with it. Just like you said. Speaking to an audience who cannot see the play. With plenty of what he thinks the audience wants to hear. Reality not included.Reading through KdB's radio log, the emphasis on offensive -- even when it was clearly a lost cause -- is clear. Nagumo, signaling back to Main Fleet always emphasizes attack even after he'd lost that capability. It reads like someone speaking to an audience who cannot see the play.
With plenty of what he thinks the audience wants to hear
GrauGeist posted a great link on the "Was dive bombing accurate" thread regarding Admiral Nagumo's take on the battle for those of us unfamiliar with it. Just like you said. Speaking to an audience who cannot see the play. With plenty of what he thinks the audience wants to hear. Reality not included.