Why was Nagumo in command at Santa Cruz?

[GrauGeist]

For an undertrained navy that hadn't spent the last decade full out training for war, yup.

The SBD pilots had considerable training in scouting and navigation - the "scouting" part was a vital function of Naval Ops before radar and the scouts were the first line of defense for the fleet, so it was a very serious and integral part of USN training in the 30's.

 

[SaparotRob]

The SBD pilots had considerable training in scouting and navigation - the "scouting" part was a vital function of Naval Ops before radar and the scouts were the first line of defense for the fleet, so it was a very serious and integral part of USN training in the 30's.

Yeah, I'll give you that, but we were talking about the submarine force. I believe that submariners were very restricted in torpedo training due to cost. I think that kind of fiscal folly must have extended to the rest of their training. I'm guessing you might have documentation that proves my point.[/QUOTE]

 

[SaparotRob]

The above reply is what happens when I try to use a smiley face.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

In my view Midway was dumbass.

Get the USN in range of your own land based bombers and recon. Much better.

Agreed. Pulling the USN away from its bases, and elongating its supply train at a time when the fleet train wasn't very robust, would have several advantages for the Japanese, so long as the assets you mention above are available.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Saratoga actually arrived at Midway on the last day of the battle.

I think she arrived at Pearl on 6 Jun, but was carrying so much cargo and crated airplanes she was unable to depart for a day and thus rendered moot to the battle. And iirc, she didn't ferry the Army planes until a week or two later. When she arrived near the battle area on 7 Jun, she was carrying Navy planes to replace our battle losses.

That Japanese sub and the repairs it forced essentially scratched her from the battle all the same, which was my original point.

 

[Shortround6]

The US had quite a history of unrealistic war games, (so did other countries) in which judges decided if attacks were successful or not and the amount of "damage" inflicted.

For the US submarine forces the Judges (with no actual torpedoes fired.) often declared the subs destroyed if even spotted and underplayed the effects of a "successful" attack.
Since promotion to a higher rank often counted the performance in the annual war games getting your sub "sunk" (spotted) could be detrimental to one's career. This tended to breed over cautious commanders since the judges usually wouldn't credit a sub with sinking large surface ships?

 

[The Basket]

Part that's missing is the Washington Treaty did not allow new bases to be built or new fortification on colonial territory.

So USN could not build new bases and ports in the Philippines which made it less likely to base the Pacific fleet there. Although the status quo could be kept.

War Plan Orange was a banzai charge into a great Jutland 2: Tokyo Drift by the Americans across the Pacific. The IJN would also banzai charge like suicidal lemmings straight back at them. It would have made Trafalgar look like a boating trip at the local pond.

Night fighting with lots of torpedo action followed by 18 inch shells fired by 5 Yamatos v 6 Iowa's.

Make Midway look like invading Iceland.

 

[Peter Gunn]

That would be even better if they were sitting in port doing nothing. The fuel wasted in the Yamato, Mutsu, and Nagato could get the old battleships to Midway.
Actually Shattered Sword mentions the old battleships in Chapter 3. They formed the Aleutian Screening Force. They are listed in Appendix 2 of my version of Shattered Sword.

Good catch, I skipped to the OOB section at the back, strange they don't have the BB's listed or I need new glasses...

 

[The Basket]

Reading a book and Nagumo was called timid which I thought was unfair.

Must be said that Nagumo was part of the fleet faction and so backed the winning horse in that race.

Fleet Faction was a radical naval group who consider the naval treaties to be a kick in the face to the IJN and a stop to IJN greatness. The believed that Japan should build what they want and how they like it.

In reality, the Japanese economy was the biggest stop and that the USN and RN may tag team them with far more warships was seemingly not part of the chat.

Reality was never a IJN strong point.

The Treaty Faction had sane ideas and viewpoints such as the problems with the economy and facing overwhelming might and tried to be more diplomatic and pragmatic. No prizes for guessing who lost and the losers got retired.

Also look at Admiral Abe and Kondo. Abe was kicked out of the navy and Kondo who was in with the in crowd wasn't. Kept his rank.

 

[yosimitesam]

Or rather don't make large, complicated offensive plans that rely on your enemy doing exactly what you want them to do.

Very, very true. For 'Operation Crusader', the British did the same thing, assuming Rommel would come out and fight at Gabr Saleh, a featureless and unimportant spot in the middle of the desert. Not only did he not 'come out and fight', he actually ignored them, thinking the whole thing was just a 'raid' and was concentrating on taking Tobruk.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Also speaking to Nagumo (and Yamaguchi) charging after the Americans, it was part of the fabric of the IJN to ALWAYS be on the offensive. Once Hiryu was the only remaining IJN CV and knew where TF16 was, no admiral in the Japanese fleet would have even thought of not heading straight for the enemy. Defensive minded they were not.

Reading through KdB's radio log, the emphasis on offensive -- even when it was clearly a lost cause -- is clear. Nagumo, signaling back to Main Fleet always emphasizes attack even after he'd lost that capability. It reads like someone speaking to an audience who cannot see the play.

 

[The Basket]

The obvious thing to do was for Hiryu to head west and cheese it at flank speed.

But that's not the way. Hiryu at Santa Cruz or the later Guadalcanal campaign could have been useful.

But banzai charge straight into the enemy is not ideal.

 

[Peter Gunn]

Undoubtedly. It's a fascinating example of how chance can turn great events. If the Arashi isn't there to follow, does McClusky still locate the carriers? What if Best and his two wingmen hadn't aborted their dive on Kaga to attack the Akagi instead? So many small moments that add up to the larger story. Change one of them; how much does the larger story change?

There's no way to answer that, but the thread that leads from one moment to the next to the next I find intriguing to contemplate.

Totally agree, myself I've often pondered what would have happened if Hornet air group doesn't score a big goose egg and plants a few on Hiryu during the 10:20-10:30 attack. The USN puts paid to all four IJN carriers in a fell swoop, which could have easily happened. With three fully functional American CV's bearing down on you the IJN is really forked. Not to mention after a few extra weeks in the dockyard, how valuable would Yorktown's flight deck have been during the Solomons Campaign? The Battle of the Eastern Solomons would have shaped up somewhat different for starters.

 

[The Basket]

IJN had a small window to get up to tricks.

Shokaku and Zuikaku were dangerous opponents in 1942.

Go boom in 1944.

So like at Midway it's a close run thing but only on the day. By late 1943 the Essex class were appearing and so yeah....

The IJN would have been far better off trying to get as much territory as possible rather than trying a attrition battle with an enemy that can churn out ships like a conveyor belt.

 

[GrauGeist]

Totally agree, myself I've often pondered what would have happened if Hornet air group doesn't score a big goose egg and plants a few on Hiryu during the 10:20-10:30 attack. The USN puts paid to all four IJN carriers in a fell swoop, which could have easily happened. With three fully functional American CV's bearing down on you the IJN is really forked. Not to mention after a few extra weeks in the dockyard, how valuable would Yorktown's flight deck have been during the Solomons Campaign? The Battle of the Eastern Solomons would have shaped up somewhat different for starters.

You can go one further and look to the earlier attacks: if Henderson's VMB Dauntlesses had been better trained and attacked from above instead of a shallow attack solution or any of the torpedoes launched had been effective.
Or at the very least, the stricken B-26 had struck the Akagi's bridge instead of narrowly missing and plunging into the ocean.

 

[SaparotRob]

IJN had a small window to get up to tricks.

Shokaku and Zuikaku were dangerous opponents in 1942.

Go boom in 1944.

So like at Midway it's a close run thing but only on the day. By late 1943 the Essex class were appearing and so yeah....

The IJN would have been far better off trying to get as much territory as possible rather than trying a attrition battle with an enemy that can churn out ships like a conveyor belt.

I agree with you BUT Admiral Yamamoto thought this was their one best shot to finish off the remains of the USN and get the last six months to continue running wild. This plan was counter to the Kantai Kessen plan which called for the USN to come to the Japanese. Instead the IJN came out to US forces and were sniped and harried along the way rather than the other way around.

 

[SaparotRob]

Reading through KdB's radio log, the emphasis on offensive -- even when it was clearly a lost cause -- is clear. Nagumo, signaling back to Main Fleet always emphasizes attack even after he'd lost that capability. It reads like someone speaking to an audience who cannot see the play.

GrauGeist posted a great link on the "Was dive bombing accurate" thread regarding Admiral Nagumo's take on the battle for those of us unfamiliar with it. Just like you said. Speaking to an audience who cannot see the play. With plenty of what he thinks the audience wants to hear. Reality not included.

 

[The Basket]

The Yamamoto 6 month thing is not rocket science as America was not ready and you can see from ww1 how long it took America to spin up.

In my view the enemy of the IJN was not USN but time.

Go nuts and grab what you can and then negotiate to keep what you got.

And if it goes badly then say to America to take it from you.

Oddly we have a historical Japanese footnote with Toyotomi Hideyoshi who unified Japan and then invaded China and Korea because it was the megalomaniac thing to do Over reach is never a good thing.

 

[GrauGeist]

With plenty of what he thinks the audience wants to hear

In Imperial Japan (much like Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia), "yes men" lived longer...

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

GrauGeist posted a great link on the "Was dive bombing accurate" thread regarding Admiral Nagumo's take on the battle for those of us unfamiliar with it. Just like you said. Speaking to an audience who cannot see the play. With plenty of what he thinks the audience wants to hear. Reality not included.

That's exactly the record I was referencing. One almost has to read between the lines to see the stunning defeat suffered by KdB.