Wildcat during the Battle of Britain

[nuuumannn]

The best use for the Wildcats would be with the FAA who no doubt would take as many as they could get their hands on.

And this is the reality of it.

no F4F Gladiator or Defiant could fill that roll.

(With salad or eggs? ) There was no way the RAF was going to equip with the F4F. None whatsoever and why would it need to? The hypothetical is that if it had them it would use them, not leave them on the ground, regardless of their weaknesses in performance. It's pretty obvious. As I have repeatedly pointed out, regardless of their performance, Fighter Command would be foolish to leave them on the ground. YOUR argument is silly in that if they had them they wouldn't use them. Dowding believed he didn't have enough squadrons - using Gladiators, Defiants, Blenheims was an option they couldn't ignore.

It's worth noting that the Curtiss Hawk 75, or Mohawk first arrived in Britain in July 1940. It took nearly a year before they were introduced into service with the SAAF after being shipped to Mombasa from Britain. Theoretically there was the possibility that they could have been used in action as they were ex French examples but were immediately issued to Maintenance Units to undergo fitting of British equipment (and a re-arrangement of the throttle assembly!), at which point they were kept in reserve.

The FAA needed Martlets and ordered them because of the lack of a modern single-seat fighter on its carrier decks. The Firebrand, which it was placing its single-seat fighter hopes was a couple of years away (or so it believed) and the Martlet and Sea Hurricane were stop-gaps, particularly since its efforts to get the Sea Spitfire pre-war bore no fruit.

 

[slaterat]

I suppose if they had access to a couple hundred Martlet Is, the RAF would of used them, but that was not the case. The Martlet 1, Hawk 75, Brewster Buffalo ect were all lacking in crucial areas of performance, firepower or protection in the summer of 1940.

 

[PAT303]

YOUR argument is silly in that if they had them they wouldn't use them.

And use them for what exactly, they couldn't catch anything, even then they did they would only get one pass and as SR pointed out if any G was applied in the fight the guns would jam. To answer the original question as to what effect would the F4F have in the BoB, none.

 

[PAT303]

protection in the summer of 1940.

The Martlet's had a full protection kit installed as per RAF/FAA doctrine.

 

[stona]

The hypothetical is that if it had them it would use them, not leave them on the ground, regardless of their weaknesses in performance. It's pretty obvious. As I have repeatedly pointed out, regardless of their performance, Fighter Command would be foolish to leave them on the ground. .

But even in a hypothetical scenario, I doubt you would have seen them in 11 or 12 Group, maybe based in the west of 10 Group, out of harm's way. They would have either not been committed at the sharp end, most likely given the British assessment of the type, as it existed in 1940, or suffered a fate similar to the Defiant.

Dowding did feel he had too few squadrons, he had done since before the war, but once the fighting started aircraft numbers were never the real issue, it was pilots.
There were only three weeks between that ending on 6 July and that ending on 2 November in which the British suffered a net loss of S/E fighters. The same cannot be said for operational pilots. It can't even be said for pilots, period.
In this period the British produced 1,047 Hurricanes and 620 Spitfires a combined total of 1,667 S/E fighters. In 18 weeks the British almost matched the entire year's output of Bf 109s in Germany, 1,719.

Blenheim fighters took no meaningful part in the BoB, except to be mistaken for German aircraft and shot down by 'friendly' fire. No.1(RCAF) Squadron managed to shoot some Coastal Command Blenheims down on its debut in the BoB, which caused a diplomatic incident. This was not the only occasion something similar happened.

Defiants were eventually found out and sent to Scotland.

The Whirlwind was kept well away from the action and/or close to the Westland factory.

The Gladiator was not considered a front line fighter.

Fighter Command didn't need a second rate foreign fighter with all the supply and logistical issues that entailed as it fought the Battle of Britain.

Edit: As of 10 July 1940 Fighter Command comprised 56 squadrons of which 6 were Blenheim and 2 Defiant. There were no Gladiator squadrons. The other 48 squadrons were all Spitfire or Hurricane units.

 

[Admiral Beez]

The best use for the Wildcats would be with the FAA who no doubt would take as many as they could get their hands on.

One challenge is carrier compatibility, as the non-folding Wildcat can't fit down the lifts of HMS Ark Royal, Illustrious, Victorious, Formidable or Hermes. With HMS Glorious and Courageous gone and some years before HMS Indomitable, Implacable, Indefatigable and the CVEs enter service, the FAA Martlets can only serve on HMS Furious, Eagle (forward lift only) and Argus.

When the FAA received non-folding Martlets in 1941/2 the Air Ministry ordered retrofit kits from Grumman and converted them to folding wing models. But that won't be an option until well past the BoB.

 

[Glider]

One challenge is carrier compatibility, as the non-folding Wildcat can't fit down the lifts of HMS Ark Royal, Illustrious, Victorious, Formidable or Hermes. With HMS Glorious and Courageous gone and some years before HMS Indomitable, Implacable, Indefatigable and the CVEs enter service, the FAA Martlets can only serve on HMS Furious, Eagle (forward lift only) and Argus.

When the FAA received non-folding Martlets in 1941/2 the Air Ministry ordered retrofit kits from Grumman and converted them to folding wing models. But that won't be an option until well past the BoB.

Use a deck park. It was common practice from the mid war period and used on the Audacity. Admittedly it was a nuisance but it was done and given the option of depending on the (almost total lack) of alternatives, I would suggest it was an effort worth making.

 

[nuuumannn]

I doubt you would have seen them in 11 or 12 Group, maybe based in the west of 10 Group, out of harm's way.

I think I said exactly that a few posts back. I agree with everything you say on this, but again, whether the Blenheim Gladiator or Defiant were suitable or how they were used is beside the point - they were employed because the heads of Fighter Command felt there weren't enough fighters. I feel like I'm repeating myself now...

 

[Admiral Beez]

Send all the RAF Martlets to Malaya, especially in Sept 1940 after Japan invades FIC and is now bristling right across the Gulf of Thailand.

 

[stona]

I think I said exactly that a few posts back. I agree with everything you say on this, but again, whether the Blenheim Gladiator or Defiant were suitable or how they were used is beside the point - they were employed because the heads of Fighter Command felt there weren't enough fighters. I feel like I'm repeating myself now...

With the exception of the Defiants, and we know how that went, first as early as 19 July, the other two were not really used. Blenheims of No 219 Squadron did get involved on 15th August (the Luftwaffe's Black Thursday) when they chased some of Luftflotte 5's Ju 88s out to sea, but they were too slow to catch them.

I disagree that Dowding would have taken anything just to make up the numbers of fighters. He was struggling for pilots as it was. In September both he and Park were adamant that they did not want more squadrons, i.e. more aircraft, they wanted more pilots to maintain numbers in those they already had. That I think is where our opinions differ.

If he said of the Whirlwind, "I cannot put them anywhere in the South because I cannot carry any passengers in that part of the world", told Beaverbrook that he thought careful consideration should be given to the question "whether it is worthwhile persevering with the type at all" and eventually wrote that he recommended that "we cut our losses and do not persevere with the Whirlwind as a service fighter type", why on earth would he welcome a second rate foreign fighter to make up numbers?

 

[Admiral Beez]

I disagree that Dowding would have taken anything just to make up the numbers of fighters. He was struggling for pilots as it was. In September both he and Park were adamant that they did not want more squadrons, i.e. more aircraft, they wanted more pilots to maintain numbers in those they already had. That I think is where our opinions differ.

That's my impression too. RAF Fighter Command pilots were flying three or four sorties a day. That suggests there is a massive pilot shortage, not a need for more aircraft.

If the Martlets are provided at no cost, give them to the FAA, crate them up and send them to Malaya, or leave them in North America until they they be converted to folding wing variants. If they're not free or heavily discounted, decline the aircraft and ask for more ex-USN destroyers.

 

[fastmongrel]

If somebody had worked out how to make pilots on a production line that would have been vastly more useful than a handful of aircraft that didn't fit into the RAF service and supply system.

 

[SaparotRob]

If somebody had worked out how to make pilots on a production line that would have been vastly more useful than a handful of aircraft that didn't fit into the RAF service and supply system.

Quality control issues.

 

[pbehn]

If somebody had worked out how to make pilots on a production line that would have been vastly more useful than a handful of aircraft that didn't fit into the RAF service and supply system.

Well in a way they did, but its harder to increase pilot "production" than aircraft production.

 

[buffnut453]

That's my impression too. RAF Fighter Command pilots were flying three or four sorties a day. That suggests there is a massive pilot shortage, not a need for more aircraft.

The sortie rate didn't have much to do with lack of pilots. Fighter Command squadrons were generally resourced at operational levels. If a particular squadron suffered unsustainable losses, it was withdrawn to a rear area to re-equip with both machines and pilots. For example, despite the high numbers of sorties, most squadrons still divided alert duties between the flights. Such an approach would be impractical if the squadrons were under-resourced for operational pilots.

 

[Admiral Beez]

If somebody had worked out how to make pilots on a production line that would have been vastly more useful

Message to returning WW1 soldiers; Shag and repeat. 1919-1920 our nascent pilots are hatched. 1935, flight training. 1939, Spitfire.

 

[stona]

That's my impression too. RAF Fighter Command pilots were flying three or four sorties a day. That suggests there is a massive pilot shortage, not a need for more aircraft.

I don't know about a massive shortage, but there was a shortage. Once the stabilisation system was introduced following the 7 September conference at Bentley Priory a number of Class C squadrons was created. These only retained three operational pilots and were essentially non-operational training units. Evill, Dowding's Senior Air Staff Officer and right hand man, hoped that each C Class squadron would produce five operational pilots every week.

At that meeting, Park told Sholto-Douglas directly that it was better to have twenty one squadrons with twenty one operational pilots each in 11 Group than to have a larger number of understrength squadrons. In the end he had to settle for a minimum of sixteen operational pilots in an A Class squadron.

 

[Admiral Beez]

If not the Wildcat, what US aircraft would Britain welcome in the BoB? Curtiss P-40?

 

[fastmongrel]

If not the Wildcat, what US aircraft would Britain welcome in the BoB? Curtiss P-40?

Depends they have to be able to operate off the standard grass runways and be able to climb fast. I think either AV8Bs or F35s as long as they have cannon as an ASRAAM missile would be a bit overkill.

 

[pbehn]

I don't know about a massive shortage, but there was a shortage. Once the stabilisation system was introduced following the 7 September conference at Bentley Priory a number of Class C squadrons was created. These only retained three operational pilots and were essentially non-operational training units. Evill, Dowding's Senior Air Staff Officer and right hand man, hoped that each C Class squadron would produce five operational pilots every week.

At that meeting, Park told Sholto-Douglas directly that it was better to have twenty one squadrons with twenty one operational pilots each in 11 Group than to have a larger number of understrength squadrons. In the end he had to settle for a minimum of sixteen operational pilots in an A Class squadron.

For Park a squadron had to mean something. If a squadron only had 12 pilots and 12 serviceable planes in the morning, by the time it had been scrambled 3 times what would be left for a fourth call?