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The best use for the Wildcats would be with the FAA who no doubt would take as many as they could get their hands on.
no F4F Gladiator or Defiant could fill that roll.
YOUR argument is silly in that if they had them they wouldn't use them.
protection in the summer of 1940.
The hypothetical is that if it had them it would use them, not leave them on the ground, regardless of their weaknesses in performance. It's pretty obvious. As I have repeatedly pointed out, regardless of their performance, Fighter Command would be foolish to leave them on the ground. .
One challenge is carrier compatibility, as the non-folding Wildcat can't fit down the lifts of HMS Ark Royal, Illustrious, Victorious, Formidable or Hermes. With HMS Glorious and Courageous gone and some years before HMS Indomitable, Implacable, Indefatigable and the CVEs enter service, the FAA Martlets can only serve on HMS Furious, Eagle (forward lift only) and Argus.The best use for the Wildcats would be with the FAA who no doubt would take as many as they could get their hands on.
One challenge is carrier compatibility, as the non-folding Wildcat can't fit down the lifts of HMS Ark Royal, Illustrious, Victorious, Formidable or Hermes. With HMS Glorious and Courageous gone and some years before HMS Indomitable, Implacable, Indefatigable and the CVEs enter service, the FAA Martlets can only serve on HMS Furious, Eagle (forward lift only) and Argus.
When the FAA received non-folding Martlets in 1941/2 the Air Ministry ordered retrofit kits from Grumman and converted them to folding wing models. But that won't be an option until well past the BoB.
I doubt you would have seen them in 11 or 12 Group, maybe based in the west of 10 Group, out of harm's way.
I think I said exactly that a few posts back. I agree with everything you say on this, but again, whether the Blenheim Gladiator or Defiant were suitable or how they were used is beside the point - they were employed because the heads of Fighter Command felt there weren't enough fighters. I feel like I'm repeating myself now...
That's my impression too. RAF Fighter Command pilots were flying three or four sorties a day. That suggests there is a massive pilot shortage, not a need for more aircraft.I disagree that Dowding would have taken anything just to make up the numbers of fighters. He was struggling for pilots as it was. In September both he and Park were adamant that they did not want more squadrons, i.e. more aircraft, they wanted more pilots to maintain numbers in those they already had. That I think is where our opinions differ.
Quality control issues.If somebody had worked out how to make pilots on a production line that would have been vastly more useful than a handful of aircraft that didn't fit into the RAF service and supply system.
Well in a way they did, but its harder to increase pilot "production" than aircraft production.If somebody had worked out how to make pilots on a production line that would have been vastly more useful than a handful of aircraft that didn't fit into the RAF service and supply system.
That's my impression too. RAF Fighter Command pilots were flying three or four sorties a day. That suggests there is a massive pilot shortage, not a need for more aircraft.
Message to returning WW1 soldiers; Shag and repeat. 1919-1920 our nascent pilots are hatched. 1935, flight training. 1939, Spitfire.If somebody had worked out how to make pilots on a production line that would have been vastly more useful
That's my impression too. RAF Fighter Command pilots were flying three or four sorties a day. That suggests there is a massive pilot shortage, not a need for more aircraft.
If not the Wildcat, what US aircraft would Britain welcome in the BoB? Curtiss P-40?
For Park a squadron had to mean something. If a squadron only had 12 pilots and 12 serviceable planes in the morning, by the time it had been scrambled 3 times what would be left for a fourth call?I don't know about a massive shortage, but there was a shortage. Once the stabilisation system was introduced following the 7 September conference at Bentley Priory a number of Class C squadrons was created. These only retained three operational pilots and were essentially non-operational training units. Evill, Dowding's Senior Air Staff Officer and right hand man, hoped that each C Class squadron would produce five operational pilots every week.
At that meeting, Park told Sholto-Douglas directly that it was better to have twenty one squadrons with twenty one operational pilots each in 11 Group than to have a larger number of understrength squadrons. In the end he had to settle for a minimum of sixteen operational pilots in an A Class squadron.