Lucky13
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As simple as that?
Wilde Sau, when, where, why....what machines?
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mikewint
Captain
"Wilde Sau" (Wild Boar) was the idea of pilot Hajo Herrmann as a method to counter the RAF's night bombing campaign. The Luftwaffe would fly its daytime defense fighter aircraft, mainly single seat Fw-190s and Me-109s, and seek out the British bombers by diving from above after spotting them silhouetted against the lights of cities.
The tactic was directly backwards from the usual method of defense when cities were to be "blacked out" during the nights in hopes that the RAF bombs would miss their targets. With the Wild Sau tactics, it was shown that the bombers could be most effectively spotted and attacked on nights when the skies were overcast and the bombers were coming in above the clouds. The British planes would stand out against the background lights and could be easily attacked from above, while the German planes would come out of the darkness, shooting without warning.
Prior to the introduction of Wilde Sau tactics, the Luftwaffe's night fighter methodology had relied exclusively on specially configured night fighter aircraft fitted with radar systems. The aircraft would orbit at designated points spread across the German countryside and, once targets were identified, they would be assigned headings and altitudes to fly by their ground radar controllers. Once near enough to the bomber, the fighter's own short range radar would allow the pilot to fly in close and see the fires of the bomber's engine exhausts or pick out the RAF bomber against the stars. The German night fighter then would use its guns to shoot the bomber down. The problem was that there were never enough specially fitted night fighters or ground controllers — and the British were coming in ever increasing numbers.
Thus, on July 3, 1943, Hajo Herrmann's Wilde Sau tactics would be introduced. That night, the British bombers targeted the city of Cologne. At first, the glow of the city below was a welcome aid to the British in their bombing runs, but then, the first of Hajo Herrmann's Wilde Sau fighters dove into the bomber stream from above. They claimed twelve bombers shot down that night, although the ground-based anti-aircraft guns shooting blindly into the night skies also claimed the same planes. Officials decided to allow the two forces to take credit for half each, but for the fighter pilots, they knew what they had achieved. The time of the Wilde Sau had come — and soon the Luftwaffe organized the Wilde Sau forces into a dedicated squadron, Jagdgeschwader 300.
The Wilde Sau attacks were continuously improved as experience mounted. This once radical idea became one of the key defensive tactics against British night bombing. The Wilde Sau tactics would reach their peak effectiveness during the Berlin bombing campaign on the night of August 22, 1943. The Wilde Sau pilots would claim 57 RAF bombers shot down.
For the RAF, the Wilde Sau tactics would result in many more aircraft and crews lost. Nonetheless, the RAF intensified its efforts. Just a few weeks after the introduction of the Wilde Sau tactics, the RAF would introduce an impressive innovation called "Window." It was low tech but highly effective, involving nothing more than throwing out small bundles of thinly cut strips of aluminum foil regularly while flying to and from the target. The "Window" foil strips were cut to the specific length to reflect the German radar frequencies. This left German radar operators with screens that showed an indistinct mass of white lines instead of clear indicators for each enemy aircraft flying through their zone. Without radar guidance, the regular night fighter forces were left flying randomly around in hopes of chancing across a bomber.
During World War II, the RAF countered the Luftwaffe's night fighters with women in the WAAFs who were fluent in the German language. German radar controllers too were almost exclusively women, as their voices could be better heard over the radio jamming. The RAF program code-named Corona employed specially trained women who would broadcast false heading and altitude instructions to German night fighter crews. German pilots were thus confused by conflicting orders being received while German and British controllers argued over the radio, trying to discredit each other. British bombers also carried a system called "Tinsel", which involved microphones in the engine cowlings to broadcast engine noise onto the night fighters' frequencies. Combined, this reduced radio to chaos. The Germans always thought that the RAF's women were flying over Germany. They did their best to shoot one down. They were never successful because actually, the British women were sitting in secret communications bunkers in southern England, using very high powered transmitters.
The tactic was directly backwards from the usual method of defense when cities were to be "blacked out" during the nights in hopes that the RAF bombs would miss their targets. With the Wild Sau tactics, it was shown that the bombers could be most effectively spotted and attacked on nights when the skies were overcast and the bombers were coming in above the clouds. The British planes would stand out against the background lights and could be easily attacked from above, while the German planes would come out of the darkness, shooting without warning.
Prior to the introduction of Wilde Sau tactics, the Luftwaffe's night fighter methodology had relied exclusively on specially configured night fighter aircraft fitted with radar systems. The aircraft would orbit at designated points spread across the German countryside and, once targets were identified, they would be assigned headings and altitudes to fly by their ground radar controllers. Once near enough to the bomber, the fighter's own short range radar would allow the pilot to fly in close and see the fires of the bomber's engine exhausts or pick out the RAF bomber against the stars. The German night fighter then would use its guns to shoot the bomber down. The problem was that there were never enough specially fitted night fighters or ground controllers — and the British were coming in ever increasing numbers.
Thus, on July 3, 1943, Hajo Herrmann's Wilde Sau tactics would be introduced. That night, the British bombers targeted the city of Cologne. At first, the glow of the city below was a welcome aid to the British in their bombing runs, but then, the first of Hajo Herrmann's Wilde Sau fighters dove into the bomber stream from above. They claimed twelve bombers shot down that night, although the ground-based anti-aircraft guns shooting blindly into the night skies also claimed the same planes. Officials decided to allow the two forces to take credit for half each, but for the fighter pilots, they knew what they had achieved. The time of the Wilde Sau had come — and soon the Luftwaffe organized the Wilde Sau forces into a dedicated squadron, Jagdgeschwader 300.
The Wilde Sau attacks were continuously improved as experience mounted. This once radical idea became one of the key defensive tactics against British night bombing. The Wilde Sau tactics would reach their peak effectiveness during the Berlin bombing campaign on the night of August 22, 1943. The Wilde Sau pilots would claim 57 RAF bombers shot down.
For the RAF, the Wilde Sau tactics would result in many more aircraft and crews lost. Nonetheless, the RAF intensified its efforts. Just a few weeks after the introduction of the Wilde Sau tactics, the RAF would introduce an impressive innovation called "Window." It was low tech but highly effective, involving nothing more than throwing out small bundles of thinly cut strips of aluminum foil regularly while flying to and from the target. The "Window" foil strips were cut to the specific length to reflect the German radar frequencies. This left German radar operators with screens that showed an indistinct mass of white lines instead of clear indicators for each enemy aircraft flying through their zone. Without radar guidance, the regular night fighter forces were left flying randomly around in hopes of chancing across a bomber.
During World War II, the RAF countered the Luftwaffe's night fighters with women in the WAAFs who were fluent in the German language. German radar controllers too were almost exclusively women, as their voices could be better heard over the radio jamming. The RAF program code-named Corona employed specially trained women who would broadcast false heading and altitude instructions to German night fighter crews. German pilots were thus confused by conflicting orders being received while German and British controllers argued over the radio, trying to discredit each other. British bombers also carried a system called "Tinsel", which involved microphones in the engine cowlings to broadcast engine noise onto the night fighters' frequencies. Combined, this reduced radio to chaos. The Germans always thought that the RAF's women were flying over Germany. They did their best to shoot one down. They were never successful because actually, the British women were sitting in secret communications bunkers in southern England, using very high powered transmitters.
Erich
the old Sage
Wilde Sau was used by the following S/E units. JG 300, 301, 302. all of NJG 11, and 1./NJGr 10 and also it's 4 th staffel. the W. Sau tactic was also used by the twin engine units as well; the T/E LW units also deployed forms of Window as well even in the night fighter role.
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Lucky13
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Much obliged gentlemen! 
The Basket
Senior Master Sergeant
- 3,712
- Jun 27, 2007
Were Wilde Sau losses higher due to landing accident and what weather limits did they have?
How did they recover from airfields and I assume that the day fighters had little or no night flying equipment
How did they recover from airfields and I assume that the day fighters had little or no night flying equipment
Drill Sergeant
Recruit
Great information. Excellent detail.
Thanks!
Thanks!
In VFR conditions you don't need much equipment. Cockpit lights are an easy retrofit. Recognition lights aren't really necessary if you keep your aircraft separated by time and space, and any reasonably competent pilot can land without aircraft mounted landing lights as long as the runway is outlined with flarepots or runway lights. Used to go out and do that for giggles in a NORDO, VFR-only Cub.
Cheers,
Wes
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Lucky13
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How many Fw 190A-8/R11 was there?
Barrett
Senior Airman
There's an obscure but pretty good Canadian movie (1990s) called A Map of the Human Heart. All about an Aleut indian who becomes a Lancaster gunner. He meets an english gal and they have a real good time atop a barrage balloon...He's shot down by a Wilde Sau 190. Spec-tacular interior view of the rolling, burning Lanc.
I have a number of books on the RAF night war over Germany. I most recommend Nachtjagd: The Night Fighter Versus Bomber War over the Third Reich by Theo Boiten which developed from his thesis at the University of Groningen. Bill Gunston's Night Fighter is very good. Also, Confounding the Reich by Bowman and Cushing and Confound and Destroy by Martin Streetly. But I believe you will find that the Wild Boar tactics were accepted as a result of the use of Window (chaff or Duppel -- which should have a .. over the U). According to Boiten, both the Wild and Tame Boars claimed 200 kills for August 1943. Tame Boar used twin engine aircraft that were vectored in the bomber stream by R/T to swim with the bomber stream. The British won the bomber war at night primarily because of their better radar and the Mosquito intruders helped.
The Basket
Senior Master Sergeant
- 3,712
- Jun 27, 2007
In the summer months then I would agree that it's possible to fly at night in clear weather.
What happens in winter in awful weather?
How did they illuminate their airfields in wartime at night?
What happens in winter in awful weather?
How did they illuminate their airfields in wartime at night?
Don't know. Probably flarepots.
Long answer below but they had field landing lights which were switched on and off.
I have several autobiographies of German night fighter pilots. I have not read anything written specifically about flying Wild Boars (bits and pieces maybe but not an entire book). For the JU88, Me110, HE219, etc. then the back seat person or persons was probably a navigator/radio operator. The German airfields would turn lights on when they received a signal from a plane in an approach pattern. Near the end of the war (I would guess roughly the last year or so), the German's suffered from what is translated as Mosquito Fever because of the Mosquito Intruders with centimetric AI radar. Landing then became a major risk for the Germans because the intruders would lurk near the fields and attack when the German night fighter was on its final approach. Regarding the Wild Boar, on page 115 of Boiten's book, he writes that "The number of Wild Boar pilots killed in actions rose dramatically from September 1943, mainly because they had to operate in the adverse autumn weather conditions." I think even the single seat fighters had homing devices and of course (if away from interference) could be found on ground radar. I picked up Nachtjagd and immediately found an account of a Me-262 pilot who downed a Mosquito on his last mission (he wrote it was in the second half of April 1945). Berlin was burning and but only he a one other 262 Night Fighter were flying. He radioed for the airfield to fire flares and found the airfield (they had landing lights on) but he barely made it back because of fuel starvation (he reports that he was aloft for 1 hour and 23 minutes which was a record for an operational Me-262 Night Fighter) -- the pilot was a Lt. Kurt Lamm (page 225 through 227). Losses for the German night fighters are reported as 4800 damaged or destroyed in action, but 6200 damaged or destroyed due to non-operational causes. I am assuming that Boiten is using the terms for what I normally see as combat versus operational losses. Dangerous work. I think if you look at WW2 overall for the U.S. and Great Britain (where we probably have the most complete data), operational losses (flying into a mountain for example) were as high or higher than combat losses.
I have several autobiographies of German night fighter pilots. I have not read anything written specifically about flying Wild Boars (bits and pieces maybe but not an entire book). For the JU88, Me110, HE219, etc. then the back seat person or persons was probably a navigator/radio operator. The German airfields would turn lights on when they received a signal from a plane in an approach pattern. Near the end of the war (I would guess roughly the last year or so), the German's suffered from what is translated as Mosquito Fever because of the Mosquito Intruders with centimetric AI radar. Landing then became a major risk for the Germans because the intruders would lurk near the fields and attack when the German night fighter was on its final approach. Regarding the Wild Boar, on page 115 of Boiten's book, he writes that "The number of Wild Boar pilots killed in actions rose dramatically from September 1943, mainly because they had to operate in the adverse autumn weather conditions." I think even the single seat fighters had homing devices and of course (if away from interference) could be found on ground radar. I picked up Nachtjagd and immediately found an account of a Me-262 pilot who downed a Mosquito on his last mission (he wrote it was in the second half of April 1945). Berlin was burning and but only he a one other 262 Night Fighter were flying. He radioed for the airfield to fire flares and found the airfield (they had landing lights on) but he barely made it back because of fuel starvation (he reports that he was aloft for 1 hour and 23 minutes which was a record for an operational Me-262 Night Fighter) -- the pilot was a Lt. Kurt Lamm (page 225 through 227). Losses for the German night fighters are reported as 4800 damaged or destroyed in action, but 6200 damaged or destroyed due to non-operational causes. I am assuming that Boiten is using the terms for what I normally see as combat versus operational losses. Dangerous work. I think if you look at WW2 overall for the U.S. and Great Britain (where we probably have the most complete data), operational losses (flying into a mountain for example) were as high or higher than combat losses.
Crimea_River
Marshal
As far as books go, highly recommend this two volume work by Lorant and Goyat:
michaelmaltby
Colonel
.... runs wild and hunts with her nose ... very persistently ... always hungry
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Lucky13
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Vildsvin as we call them in the old country ....
I wondered if it was like a heifer, a cow that hasn't calved. They are worse than a bullock,
I have a former colleague and both he and his wife are German speakers. I will ask but just looking on the net, I think Sau is used for both Sow and Swine (regardless of sex). It is evidently also slang for a perfidious person (pervert, etc.). There are lots of wild pigs in Western North Carolina where I grew up. Some are domestic pigs gone feral but also in the late 19th century, I read years ago in a hunting magazine, had imported wild game including Russian Boar. I think we also have the native wild pigs or peccary. Anyway, you don't want to mess with wild pigs although I have known people who hunted them with pistols or even bows. I imagine a sow with piglets to protect would be an unpleasant encounter.
