Winston Churchill and the Lusitania

[VBF-13]

Also that the German Embasy posted plain warnings of the submarine warfare potential and equally honest were the British warnings to the passengers that the "passenger" liner was loaded with 173 tons of munitions.

I'd say anybody who doesn't know about the first one doesn't know the first thing. Those passengers thumbed their noses at those warnings. She could outrun the subs, and if Vanderbilt, et al., was on her, that's good enough for them. There's the attitude, in a nut.

On the second one, where did you get that from? As far as I know, that's still shady, speculative.

 

[parsifal]

The situation in Germany going into 1917 was one of growing chaos, disorganization, and sickness all stemming from the blockade, and subsequently Germany's inability to provide its people with adequate provisions to sustain normal productive lives

.

Part I of my response

Actually not correct, or at least substantially not correct. There was nothing illegal, or even immoral with the British enforcing a total blockade for goods entering ports controlled by Germany. That included food. If Germany had been short of water, it would have been legitimate for the British to blockade that too. This is where the Americans of pre-1915 have a view that was uniquely their own. they strongly advocated the notion of freedom of passage on the high seas, including trade with the central powers in 1914. They acquiesced to the British applying the blockade rules of Germany ....a perfectly legal and moral position....outside the German territorial limits, particularly after it became clear that the germans were taking the interdiction on the high seas by neutral shipping as well, or rather, first.

Both countries were coming to terms with the concepts of total war, in which civilians were as much a target as the frontline armies. So, in my opinion, arguing that one side was moral whilst the other was not is a nonsense. Total war is by definition, valid to target civilians. But to restrain the worst effects of that, the western nations attempted to control the horrors and costs that might bring by introducing rules of engagement. The Hague convention and the London Treaty of 1907 and 1909 respectively were meant to do that. But Germany chose to ignore those rules, firstly by deliberately targeting civilians in France and Belgium, and then engaging in unrestricted warfare on the high seas, including the laying of mines in foreign and international waters. A definite no under her treaty obligations. As I stated earlier this gave the british justifiable and moral cause to expand the blockade to include those neutrals known to be trading with the enemy. There was never any question that food could not be included in the blockade, even the Americans thought it a justifiable strategy

British blockade strategy a summarised above was the result of a last minute change in the plan in July 1914. This second strategy was called the observational blockade and the observational blockade was again modified to become the 'distant blockade.' In this final revision, the two entrances into the North Sea were blockaded first between the Dover Straits and northern France, and then between Norway and Scotland . As Kemp noted, this final operational change was described in the new official War Plan as to have the movement of ships "be sufficiently frequent enough and sufficiently advanced to impress upon the enemy that he cannot at any time venture far from his home ports without such serious risk of encountering an overwhelming force." The distant blockade thus covered two operational concerns - stopping merchant ships from reaching German ports, and giving German Naval leaders visual stimuli that should they set sail, it was at their own peril. The Americans reluctantly accepted the notion of board and search within this zone, but initially the british only applied contraband rules to shipping whose manifests were bound for german ports. The british did not target food at all for the first 8 months which I will discuss a little later.

It is easy to assume that the British simply placed ships in strategic locations and waited for craft containing contraband to approach; or for Germany's High Seas Fleet to try escape the North Sea confines. The truth is much more complicated than that because the blockade was conducted on more than just the world's vast oceans. In reality the blockade was not even entirely a product of the Royal Navy. As Greg Kennedy contends, the blockade was only executed by the Royal Navy, but was administered and guided by the British Foreign Office The blockade was not applied universally from Day 1 as is so often proclaimed by the pro-German apologists. Not that britain would not have done that if they could, but simplt because the nature of their blockade at the beginning had to be far more targeted than that. The FO activities allowed the British to determine when ships were sailing and their destinations. The responses necessarily became targeted ones. In 1915-16, over 70% of German war making strategic materials being imported from overseas were intercepted whereas foodstuffs were being intercepted at the rate of less than 40% of imports. Up to 1916 it made no sense for Britain to apply with great rigour a blockade aimed at starvation. The blocking of strategic war materials however caused decisions to be made by the germans themselves that caused the majority of their food problems and the famines of 1916, brought on by the failed crop seasons of 1915 and 1916, changed all that.

To better demonstrate just how dependent Germany was on foreign goods we can look at what they were importing. During the years 1899-1913, on average nearly 77% of the total import tonnage was raw materials and chemicals needed to feed the tremendous growth in German industry including, and in particular, their armaments industry. A significant portion of these chemical imports were sodium nitrate, a compound used by most German farmers to replenish nutrients lacking in the poor quality soil found throughout the country, but also an essential ingredient to the making of certain industrial and military products . Another 17.5% of the imported tonnage was foodstuff, while the remaining 4-5% of German imports were manufactured goods. What we can gain from this information is that Germany was predominately a manufacturing nation, and was heavily dependent on foreign raw materials to produce finished goods. We can also see that Germany did produce the majority of its own food. A food blockade was not going to effective unless circumstances changed, but a raw materials blockade had every chance of success, hence the targeted response of the British through to the end of 1916.

 

[mikewint]

Edgar, When Lusitania was built, her construction and operating expenses were subsidised by the British government, with the proviso that she could be converted to an Armed Merchant Cruiser if need be. A secret compartment was designed in for the purpose of carrying arms and ammunition. When war was declared the Lusitania was requisitioned by the British Admiralty as an armed merchant cruiser, and she was put on the official list of AMCs. Lusitania remained on the official AMC list and was listed as an auxiliary cruiser in the 1914 edition of Jane's All the World's Fighting Ships, along with Mauretania.
Buff, as I stated civilians killed in time of war is going to be unavoidable. If you work in a munitions plant, fighter/bomber plant, tank plant, ect. or live next to one for example then you are an unavoidable casuality if that plant is bombed. Placing a poison gas plant in the basement of a hospital is using civilians as a shield. If Lusitania were strictly a "Passenger ship" who put those "Passenger Munitions" on board?
Let's separate the Myth from the man here. No, Churchill did not deliberately cause the Lus to be torpedoed and sunk but he certainly created a climate in which it was bound to happen thus to turn neutral nations against Germany.
"A curse should rest on me," Churchill said, "Because I love this war. I know It's smashing and shattering the lives of thousands every moment and yet I can't help it. I enjoy every second."
VBF - her cargo had included an estimated 4,200,000 rounds of rifle cartridges, 1,250 empty shell cases, and 18 cases of non-explosive fuses, which was openly listed as such in her cargo manifest. The day after the sinking, The New York Times published full details of the ship's military cargo. Assistant Manager of the Cunard Line, Herman Winter, denied the charge that she carried munitions, but admitted that she was carrying small-arms ammunition, and that she had been carrying such ammunition for years. The fact that Lusitania had been carrying shells and cartridges was not made known to the British public at the time. In the 27-page additional manifest, delivered to U.S. customs 4–5 days after the Lusitania sailed from New York, and the Bethlehem Steels papers is stated that the "empty shells" were in fact 1,248 boxes of filled 3" shell, 4 shells to the box, totaling 103,000 pounds or 50 tonnes.

 

[Edgar Brooks]

Listing a ship as something doesn't mean it was actually used as such. The Lusitania never carried out any belligerent act, and (unless you know different) was never kitted out as an armed cruiser.
You make much of the British blockade, while ignoring the German blockade, and also conveniently ignoring that Zeppelin raids started in January 1915, hitting those famously military targets of Great Yarmouth, Sheringham and King's Lynn; any idea that the British public was going to accept gentlemanly treatment of the Germans was doomed from that moment.

 

[parsifal]

Part II

What changed this was twofold. Firstly the failed cropping seasons of 1915 and 16 forced Germany to the brink. Secondly, and more importantly, or paerhaps relevantly, it was the decisions made by the german leadership in response to the shortages of strategic materials that cause most of the suffering in Germany to the end.

During the first eight months of the war, the blockade only affected the German home front in minor ways that can be described as more of a nuisance than actually being harmful to the health of the German population. A part of the reasoning behind this was the fact that the 1914 harvest had been planted before the war started. Also as noted before, during the first four months of the war, Britain did not attempt to confiscate imports that were not military in nature. Thus during this period Germany was largely able to obtain food imports from foreign traders. The only real shortages that were of any consequence during this early stage were imported delicacies not native to Central Europe such as rice, corn, and coffee.

Changes in the availability of most food stocks began to reverberate throughout Germany late in the spring of 1916. The shortages seen here were the result of several issues. First by this point in the war the blockade had been in full operation for over a year, and was running at peak efficiency. Also the government needed to requisition large quantities of food to feed the military; and finally the blockade cut Germany off from most sources of chemicals like salt peter and cordite, both used as propellants in munitions. To solve the latter problem, German chemists devised substitutes from regular foods such as milk, vegetable fats, and certain oils. The effects of this discovery added greatly to the diminishing availability of fatty foods and milk for civilian purchase and was the major reason for the shortages in those areas. By the actions they had taken themselves, the germans had contributed to the shortages, and firmly placed foodstuffs as a legitmate military target. Unless we are going to argue that britains principal blockade 9to 1916) was illegal because it denied access to vital strategic war making materials , ther is no basis to the argument that the blockade led directly to the starvation issue. After 1916, it becomes irrelevant, because after that time the germans were using foodstuffs for military production. necessary compounds from any other source. Therefore a direct line can be drawn to the blockade for causing many of the shortages seen in late 1915 and early 1916.


Moreover after 1917 the argument becomes academic, because after that date the US entered the war, and brought about a total blockade for Germany. again, Germany's decision to reinstitute unrestricted attacks on shipping was the root cause of this.

The blockade was nasty, and it was effective. It contributed to the food shortages, but it did not cause them. The main causes of the German starvations were the war itself 9somethig they started) the failed crops of 1915-16, and finally the decisions made by the germans themselves concerning the use of proteins and fats in war production. Finally it is undeniable that the blockade influenced all these elements (except the decision to got war), but it was not the main reason for Germany's ills.

 

[nuuumannn]

n 1911, Churchill became First Lord of the Admiralty, and, during the crises that followed, used every opportunity to fan the flames of war. When the final crisis came, in 1914, Churchill was all smiles and was the only cabinet member who backed war from the start. Asquith, his own Prime Minister, wrote: "Winston very bellicose and demanding immediate mobilization . . . has got all his war paint on."

You can argue all you like about Churchill's warlike tendencies and how mad the Dardanelles fiasco was, Mike, but he was the right man in the job at the time; he had a very real understanding of strategy and tactics and throughout his military career could see a very different view of things to the established status quo. You can also state that his desire for war was merely war mongering, but he had a deep sense of justice and injustice. As for references to genocide in times of war; he was a man of his time; he might have been discussing it, but others were perpetrating it while he looked on in horror. He was also one of the very few who could see a way out from the stalemate on the Western front - few others in such a position had the temerity to enact a diversion on the scale of the Dardanelles campaign - after all, if it didn't receive approval from the war cabinet and the office of the Prime Minister, it wouldn't have gone ahead.

To analyse the Dardanelles correctly isn't just to highlight Churchill's suggestion of it, nor his wholehearted support for it. Remember, Kitchener among others was all for the idea and it had gained considerable mileage in discussion in the Admiralty before the war started. The concept was extraordinarily far sighted and amounted to the biggest combined land, sea and air operation to that time; its failure cannot be laid squarely on Churchill's shoulders - that's pandering to historical judgements that aren't entirely accurate.

It failed for many reasons, not necessarily down to a lack of understanding of the Turks either. It is not so commonly realised that it very nearly succeeded too. The naval attack against the forts just about exhausted the Turks' armament supply and if it weren't for de Roebeck deciding to withdraw the fleet on 18 March after three battleships were sunk by an unspotted minefield, the fleet could have easily made its way through the Narrows and into the Sea of Marmara unmolested. The British mine sweepers being manned by civilians who had never experienced operations under gun fire was also a factor that led to the British/French/Russian fleet withdrawal. Keyes wanted to launch the naval offensive again after 18 March, but de Roebeck was unconvinced. His hesitance gave the Turks time to resupply through Bulgaria. The incompetence of leadership in the land campaign was immense, to say the least. All factors Churchill had little influence over, not being present in the Aegean himself.

Jutland was also not the only major naval battle; there were significant naval battles throughout the war; before Jutland, Heligoland, Dogger Bank, Coronel and the Falklands etc; there were naval operations that resulted in gun fights in the Mediterranean and Aegean Seas throughout the war. The belief that naval activity was confined to one battle in the North Sea is again ignoring history and choosing an angle. And as far as Jutland was concerned, the Royal navy won the tactical and strategic battle, despite losing a greater number of ships and personnel - afterwards, the strategic situation hadn't changed as the Germans had wanted it to; the naval blockade was still in place and the Grand Fleet, despite its losses was more than capable of fighting Jutland Round Two as Jellicoe expected to do so the next day, unlike the High Seas Fleet, back on the Jade River licking its wounds.

This victory for the British had far reaching consequences and it is often ignored how effective the blockade was in inciting disillusion among the German populace for the war. It brought about a very real moral and mental defeat of the German people; the army could have fought on, but for what? Germany was starving to death.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blockade_of_Germany

Anyway, It's very easy to demonise Churchill based on his failures, very easy and so many have done it, Mike; join the queue. But he possessed genius in equal measure and his success places him above those failures, however monumental - in essence he was human; a brilliant but fundamentally flawed man of his time.

 

[pbehn]

Whatever people say about Churchill, we needed him. The British would have folded if we had some Bertie Wooster character at the helm.

 

[mikewint]

Bear with me, one at a time:
Edgar, now we're doing Zeppelins? So if I follow your logic A is justified because of B and C is justified because of D and E because of F and ect. until the Germanic Cain slays the Britisher Abel. Sounds like the present day Mid-East which by the way was also a Churchill creation. Cunard neglected to notify its passengers that (A) they were on a registered British warship and (B) it was loaded with 173 tons of munitions in a secret compartment. Without A B the sub captain had no right to simply fire a torpedo but in the place of that sub captain, I see a ship, looks like a passenger liner but is listed as an "Auxiliary Cruiser" and with Q-ships roaming around, I'd fire a torp too.
Who is more to blame, the man who sets the scene and baits it or the fool who blunders into it?
Nuuumannn, First let's review Gallipoli. Churchill was not on the scene giving direct orders BUT, the Apr 25th landings were a fiasco and by the end of that bloody day the British had lost well over 2500 and the ANZAC had lost 1/5 of their men. Ian Hamilton seeing the impossibility of it requested evacuation and CHURCHILL said NO. By May 4th losses were over 10,000. Through the summer heat, flies, rotting corpses, lack of water, and disease had taken a heavy toll. At the beginning of Sep Hamilton again asked for evacuation and CHURCHILL, comfy and cozy, in London, said NO and removed Hamilton from command. Finally in November Kitchener himself visited and ordered an immediate evacuation. Churchill was responsible for the lost of well over 153,000 British, Australian, and New Zealand lives not to mention 218,000 Turks.
Saying Churchill was the "right" man for the job I guess I'd have to agree, it takes a butcher to make a steak and one could make the same statement about Adolf.
The WWI Germans had lost their "Churchill", Otto von Bismarck. He'd been removed by a German who, through sheer stubborn blockheadedness fell into every trap and alienated just about every European nation: enter Wilhelm II. Although quick witted, he was also emotionally unstable and had a violent temper and was under the influence of his Prussian advisors. After the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand by a Bosnian Serb on June 28, 1914, Wilhelm offered his support to Austro-Hungary if it were to take action against the Serbians and the dominoes began to fall. As soon as Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, the Russians began to mobilize troops along both the Austrian and German borders. Seeing this, and recognizing that since France had not declared itself neutral, it would therefore come into the war on the side of Russia. Germany declared war on Russia on August 1 followed by a declaration of war on Russia's main ally France on August 3. When Belgium asserted its neutrality, by denying Germany the right to cross its territory, the Germans invaded anyway on August 4. Now here is where it gets tricky and Imperial Britain shows its hand.
The 1839 Treaty of London guaranteed Belgian independence as a collective agreement among several nations with the exception of Germany which had not been allowed to become a nation by the Four Powers until 1871. Legally the treaty called for a collective, not an individual response. Legalities aside Britain had the excuse it needed and had been looking for and the countries leadership took it. Imperial Britain could not allow Germany to once again defeat France and change the cozy "Spheres of Influence" worked out by the Four Powers. Had it not been for the Four Powers Imperial delusions, WWI may never have been fought in the first place. If Britain had not intervened, and Germany had defeated France in a European war, the circumstances that bred Hitler would never have eventuated. A German victory would have refashioned the face of Europe, with the next big war likely to have been a clash between Germany and the rising tide of Communism in the east. World War II would have been avoided. And with nothing to hasten the fall of the old imperial powers, the way would not have been so clear for the United States and the USSR to emerge as the two contending superpowers of the second half of the twentieth century

 

[Edgar Brooks]

now we're doing Zeppelins? So if I follow your logic A is justified because of B and C is justified because of D and E because of F and ect. until the Germanic Cain slays the Britisher Abel.

Obviously you don't (deliberately?) follow; we have a nation which violates the neutrality of Belgium and Luxembourg, sinks, without warning, ships crewed by civilians (the Merchant Navy has never been part of the military,) chucks bombs on civilian "targets," bombards coastal towns with its ships, and then it (and its apologists) has the brass nerve to complain about RN ships operating a blockade of its shores, and intercepting "neutral" ships.

If Britain had not intervened, and Germany had defeated France in a European war, the circumstances that bred Hitler would never have eventuated.

It would seem that it isn't just Germany which doesn't recognise what the word "ally" means. You really need to look at the Kaiser, and his behaviour before the war; he wanted war with Britain, because of some engendered hate that had consumed him over a perceived slight, and you really believe that, with France defeated, he'd have stopped there? Please, don't be so naïve; he would have found some excuse to have a go at us, and mobilisation in 1914 put a stop to all that farrago of nonsense.

 

[mikewint]

Obviously you don't (deliberately?) follow; we have a nation which violates the neutrality of Belgium and Luxembourg, sinks, without warning, ships crewed by civilians (the Merchant Navy has never been part of the military,) chucks bombs on civilian "targets," bombards coastal towns with its ships, and then it (and its apologists) has the brass nerve to complain about RN ships operating a blockade of its shores, and intercepting "neutral" ships.

Please read again the very line you yourself quoted. i.e.: A because of B because of C... It's the selfsame argument that is still keeping the Mid-East and Balkans stirred up today. It is an endless argument, totally pointless, and endless with no real solution.

 

[nuuumannn]

Churchill was responsible for the lost of well over 153,000 British, Australian, and New Zealand lives not to mention 218,000 Turks.

No, Mike, he wasn't.

Mike, tell me something I don't know about Gallipoli. From as far back as I can remember it has been a part of my country's conscience, but to blame Churchill for these losses is utter silliness and betrays a distinct lack of knowledge by you of the machinations of the campaign as a whole; like I said, he's an easy target. You're forgetting one thing, initially the campaign was to be a solely naval operation led by Churchill and the Admiralty, with the idea of storming the Dardanelles by sea and then attacking Constantinople, without a land invasion. initially Carden, the man on the street at the time, was asked by Churchill about the feasibility of storming the Dardanelles and Carden stated that it could be done and Churchill took this on board after much consultation with the War Council.

One factor that is almost universally ignored in current overviews of the history of the campaign is that admirals knew how difficult it was to breach land based fortresses using naval guns because the fall of shot couldn't be gauged as easily as it could against a vessel at sea, but a solution was at hand in the form of wireless carrying aircraft, as put forward by Maurice Hankey, Secretary of the War Council. Churchill, being Churchill agreed and it was decided that aviation assets in support of naval bombardment were to be sent to the Dardanelles. Initially Carden suggested the French seaplane carrier Foudre, whose Nieuport VI aeroplane had been temporarily used aboard the cruiser HMS Doris in support of land offensives by navy troops against Turkish positions in the Sinai and Suez, especially after an abortive invasion of the Suez canal by the Turks, which was successfully repelled by the British and French after said seaplane spotted the Turkish advance, thus proving the worth of aerial reconnaissance. Churchill, not wanting to leave the aerial aspect in the hands of the French, sent the seaplane carrier Ark Royal to Carden. These offensives show that Carden was already engaged in combat operations in the Aegean and Mediterranean before the campaign and Churchill trusted his knowledge of the situation there.

Let's look at things outside of Churchill's jurisdiction. After Carden fell ill and was succeeded by de Roebeck and the 18 March fiasco, Kitchener pressed for a land invasion and so it became a joint army/War Office and naval/Admiralty operation. Hamilton stuffed it up in the first instance, so had things gone to plan initially with the land invasion, losses would not have been so high. The invasion would have taken place earlier than 25 April had the boats sailing from Alexandria in Egypt to Mudros carrying supplies for the invasion hadn't been packed properly. When they got to the invasion beaches, Hamilton found the useful stuff was all packed at the bottom, so what did he do, send the ships back to Alex to have them all repacked, so the useful stuff was at the top! Meanwhile, the wily Turks, realising what was about to happen, began reinforcing what had previously been a sparsely defended coastline. Then the ANZACs landed too far to the north of Gaba Tepe. Such incompetence of leadership was not uncommon.

You also are probably not aware that Churchill actually opposed the appointment of Hamilton in his role, despite being a close personal friend; Churchill didn't believe Hamilton had the right stuff to carry out an amphibious assault of that nature, he was a cavalry officer whom Churchill had served under at the North West Frontier in India, but he was chosen by Kitchener to lead the assault - this is where your dislike of Churchill is allowing your knowledge of the situation to slip - Hamilton was not subservient to Churchill; he had no say over the conduct of the land invasion.

Here is a caption from a little book I picked up on the campaign recently for the wee sum of $20, for which it is probably worth a lot more, about Hamilton and Kitchener;

"A degree of ruthlessness was required to order his subordinates to act, to dismiss those who were patiently inept, yet, such was Hamilton's nature that he only advised, and having given a broad outline of his strategy left the implementation of it entirely to his generals. He urged instead of ordered and believed that a suggestion of an obvious course of action was sufficient, not realising that his subordinates lacked drive or the intelligence he possessed. Even when this became obvious, he was unwilling to impose his own command; alone of the generals he appreciated the significance of the unopposed landing at 'Y' Beach, and was in a position to order an immediate reinforcement and advance which might well have achieved the objective of the landing at a stroke; yet he declined to act. He remained far from the scene of the action, aboard ship and later on Imbros, and this divorce from the realities of the campaign perhaps contributed to the over optimistic tone of his reports. Brave, charming and almost universally liked, Hamilton was essentially a weak commander given a task beyond his abilities and resources."

"If Hamilton bears some of the blame for the mismanagement of the campaign, much of it must be accorded to Field Marshal Lord Kitchener of Khartoum, Secretary of State for War." "His actions over the Dardanelles campaign were ill conceived, he delayed sending the military forces, then sent them terribly unprepared, kept them short of supplies and reinforcement, and appointed the wrong generals."

So much for Churchill being responsible, then.

 

[mikewint]

It would seem that it isn't just Germany which doesn't recognise what the word "ally" means. You really need to look at the Kaiser, and his behaviour before the war; he wanted war with Britain, because of some engendered hate that had consumed him over a perceived slight, and you really believe that, with France defeated, he'd have stopped there? Please, don't be so naïve; he would have found some excuse to have a go at us, and mobilisation in 1914 put a stop to all that farrago of nonsense.

Oh, I totally understand. It was those interlocking treaties and alliances that forced a continental brushfire war to grow into a world-wide war which solved nothing. Wilhelm II was a fool that the British played like a fiddle. Willy could hardly "hate" the British, he was after all the Queen's grandson and he counted on those familial ties to keep the British out of the war. He failed to really understand the true depths of British imperialism. Let's review:
The late nineteenth century was the last major era of imperialist expansion. All the great European powers were involved. Africa was rapidly carved up between the main European powers and harsh conditions were imposed on independent states that could not be conquered outright, such as China. Eventually every available territory was claimed as a colony by one or other of the major European powers.
By the turn of the twentieth century Germany was a rising force in the world eager to acquire an empire comparable to Britain. In 1871 the Germans achieved their dream of unification which had been strongly resisted by France who preferred a weak and divided Germany. By 1884 Germany had put together an overseas empire, but a small one compared to those administered by Britain and France. The scramble for African colonies had been driven by the idea that a nations economic survival depended upon it being able to offload surplus products into overseas possessions. Thus German imperialists argued that Britain's dominant position in the world gave it an unfair advantage in international markets, thus limiting Germany's economic growth and threatening its security. Britain meanwhile was determined to continue its expansionist plans because it foresaw a possible decline in its share of the world's export trade with the rise of competition from Germany, America, and France.
During the Bismarck period, the Iron Chancellor managed to gain what he wanted by subtle means, without overt confrontation. However when the young, inexperienced, and impatient Wilhelm II was made Kaiser the situation started to spiral out of control. Britain put pressure on Germany to limit the size of its naval fleet in the North Sea and hemmed in the Germans on land by their treaties with France and Russia. France was also trying to oust the Germans from their territory, Alsace-Lorraine, acquired by the Germans in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. All these pressures fed German resentment until the moment it exploded.
In 1902 Britain signed a new alliance with Japan to prevent German expansion in that area. The British assured Germany that their alliance with France and Russia were only about ending old disputes and had nothing to do with joining those nations in the event of war. Assurances aside, the fact remained that Britain had allied itself with two nations convinced that Germany was their enemy. The Germans were worried.
In the first Moroccan Crisis of 1905, Wilhelm II supported Moroccan independence, thus removing them as a French protectorate. Britain had to choose between supporting French ambitions or the German move toward an independent Moroccan state. In response Britain entered into military consultations with the French and delivered a blunt "Hands off" message to Germany.
Meanwhile in South Africa, the British (unsanctioned but a good example of the British left hand not knowing what the right was doing) Jameson raid into the Transvaal was repulsed. Ever the diplomat, Wilhelm II sends a telegram to the President of the Transvaal, the infamous Kruger telegram:
"I express to you my sincere congratulations that, without appealing to the help of friendly Powers, you and your people have succeeded in repelling with your own forces the armed bands which had broken into your country, and in maintaining the independence of your country against foreign aggression."
Sent from British telegrapher to telegrapher along British telegraph wires through British relay stations, the telegram soon became public and was printed in British newspapers. British public opinion turned quickly against the Germans in what was seen as an attempt to interfere in a British sphere of influence.
By the time of the second Moroccan crises Britain was firmly on the French side and Germany was encircled by hostile forces. In 1912 Britain added fuel to the smoldering fire by signing a naval agreement with France pledging to defend the French coast along the channel and the Atlantic. More fuel was poured on in 1913 with the formation of the British Expeditionary Force, which comprised six divisions created to fight on the continent.
British imperial ambitions simply could not afford for France to be defeated in another war with Germany. For that would make Germany the strongest nation in continental Europe, at a time when that country, was attempting to gain control of the oceans and expand its sphere of influence into the Balkans and Turkey. Britain's leaders clearly felt that they had to join France in standing against Germany sooner or later; they simply awaited the right pretext.

 

[GrauGeist]

Obviously you don't (deliberately?) follow; we have a nation which violates the neutrality of Belgium and Luxembourg, sinks, without warning, ships crewed by civilians (the Merchant Navy has never been part of the military,) chucks bombs on civilian "targets," bombards coastal towns with its ships, and then it (and its apologists) has the brass nerve to complain about RN ships operating a blockade of its shores, and intercepting "neutral" ships.

Yes, Yes...poor Britain

Never mind that a passenger ship was allowed to carry munitions aboard, placing the passengers in harm's way. Regardless if it was torpedoed or not...

It would seem that it isn't just Germany which doesn't recognise what the word "ally" means. You really need to look at the Kaiser, and his behaviour before the war; he wanted war with Britain, because of some engendered hate that had consumed him over a perceived slight, and you really believe that, with France defeated, he'd have stopped there? Please, don't be so naïve; he would have found some excuse to have a go at us, and mobilisation in 1914 put a stop to all that farrago of nonsense.

Now if we can put aside the notion that Britain was just sitting up there watching the world fall apart prior to WWI, we'll see that it wasn't just those evil, nasty bastard Germans stirring up trouble.

It was ALL OF EUROPE. Europe (this includes the Ottomans by way of Austrian alliance) was one bigass powder keg waiting to go off. You had backroom deals and intertwined alliances being made by Britain, France, Russia, Germany, Austria, Belgium, Italy and on and on and on. It should have been extremely obvious that amongst all this posturing, brokering, positioning and saber-rattling, that eventually someone would blink and war would be the immediate result.

If you want to point fingers at the Kaiser, perhaps it's because Britain joined the French and Russians as an ally, when Germany already had a bone to pick with either one - this is why Germany pushed through Belgium when war broke out: to knock out France before Russia could mobilize per General Schlieffen's plan.

It is interesting that the Bulgarian - Serbian conflict didn't set the whole place on fire in 1912, as the Balkans were a hotbed of trouble and it actually comes as no surprise that WWI did, in fact, start in that region when Archduke Ferdinand was assassinated. If the assassination attempt had failed, then something else would have lit the fuse on that powder keg.

 

[buffnut453]

Buff, as I stated civilians killed in time of war is going to be unavoidable. If you work in a munitions plant, fighter/bomber plant, tank plant, ect. or live next to one for example then you are an unavoidable casuality if that plant is bombed.

That's a fine hair to split. They're still civilians. And what of Hiroshima and Nagasaki? Or napalm attacks on Vietnamese villages? Sorry, mate, but either killing civilians in wartime is acceptable given the scope and scale of the conflict (WWI and WWII were as close to Clausewitz's definition of Total War as we've ever come) and ROE of the time or it's not.

One thing that confuses me - if the armaments carried on Lusitania were openly declared on the cargo manifest, why the secret storage room? Isn't there a logical disconnect there? Or was the room large enough to house something more sinister than small arms? Then again, if the room was that large, how was it possible for it to remain "secret"? The twisted logic is ludicrous, as it is with most conspiracy theories.

Let's be realistic...the loss of 4 million rounds of small arms isn't going to make any dent in Britain's wartime capacity. That's hardly enough for a decent offensive in WWI. And yet that is supposed to be the big bait Britain used to tempt Germany into sinking a liner? Really? Surely, given some time to consider, the German Navy could figure out that sinking an ocean liner was going to cause a furore that would outweigh any military benefits? The logical decision by the Germans would be NOT to sink the Lusitania. However, the fog of war creeps in, the Lusitania and the U-boat happen to meet (by accident, not by design) and a trigger-happy U-boat captain orders torpedoes to be fired. Not a conspiracy, not a heinous act by a Machiavellian Britain and a suitably gullible Germany...just a screw-up of the kind that happens in war which, sadly, resulted in the loss of so many lives.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Obviously you don't (deliberately?) follow; we have a nation which violates the neutrality of Belgium and Luxembourg, sinks, without warning, ships crewed by civilians (the Merchant Navy has never been part of the military,) chucks bombs on civilian "targets," bombards coastal towns with its ships, and then it (and its apologists) has the brass nerve to complain about RN ships operating a blockade of its shores, and intercepting "neutral" ships.

It would seem that it isn't just Germany which doesn't recognise what the word "ally" means. You really need to look at the Kaiser, and his behaviour before the war; he wanted war with Britain, because of some engendered hate that had consumed him over a perceived slight, and you really believe that, with France defeated, he'd have stopped there? Please, don't be so naïve; he would have found some excuse to have a go at us, and mobilisation in 1914 put a stop to all that farrago of nonsense.

If the Merchant Navy is carrying munitions and war supplies then it is a valid target. Regardless if it is crewed by civilians.

 

[buffnut453]

It was ALL OF EUROPE. Europe (this includes the Ottomans by way of Austrian alliance) was one bigass powder keg waiting to go off. You had backroom deals and intertwined alliances being made by Britain, France, Russia, Germany, Austria, Belgium, Italy and on and on and on. It should have been extremely obvious that amongst all this posturing, brokering, positioning and saber-rattling, that eventually someone would blink and war would be the immediate result.

If you want to point fingers at the Kaiser, perhaps it's because Britain joined the French and Russians as an ally, when Germany already had a bone to pick with either one - this is why Germany pushed through Belgium when war broke out: to knock out France before Russia could mobilize per General Schlieffen's plan.

I don't disagree with your statements about the European powder keg but please explain to me how the actions taken by individual nations differ from international relations today? Are there not backroom deals and treaties made, all of which are done in the best interests of the participants based on their perceived needs? The Cold War was another such pressure-cooker, though we thankfully had gained some more experience/maturity and nobody was crazy enough to launch a nuke...but the Cuban Missile Crisis and constant fears of regional conflict flaring into World War III just illustrate that exactly the same thing was happening 50 years after WWI.

Unfortunately, the same issues are present in international politics today. Was Iraq invaded for a justifiable reason? What about the political pressure being applied to Iran over nuclear weapons, primarily by nations who possess enough nukes themselves to wipe Iran off the map. We have become a little smarter and realized that global trade is more profitable than global war...but that doesn't mean there aren't potential powder kegs today...like Ukraine!

 

[parsifal]

Never mind that a passenger ship was allowed to carry munitions aboard, placing the passengers in harm's way. Regardless if it was torpedoed or not...

We have to deal with technicalities here. The truth is that the war was amoral in its totality, so to that extent Ive got no beef to pick. Your making a valid point on that score. The difficulty I have here is the sweeping assumption (and an incorrect one I might add) that the Lusitania carrying what is referred to as "incidental cargo" somehow made it a bigger target than it was. Aside from the fact that the 170 tons of explosives was a slight ordinance risk, it made it no more legal what happened to the ship than if it wasnt carrying explosives.

The Germans had every right to sink combatant warships, and every right to stop detain and hold under arrest any ship within the declared area shown to be carrying contraband. If it chose to sink the merchant ship, it had an obligation under the Hague convention of 1907 and the treaty of London to make the crew and passengers safe. Placing them in a lifeboat was specifically deemed as not making the civilians safe.

With only 170 tons of explosive carried the amount of cargo being carried by the LUSITANIA was too small to qualify her as a warship, and too small to say she was a ship engaged in the transport of contraband traffic. If the law had been observed correctly, the germans would have needed to get the crew and passengers off the ship and onto another ship, appoint a prize crew and take the ship into custody. An impossible task.

Trying to apply the law realistically, the Germans should have stopped the vessel, put the crews and passengers into lifeboats, and then sunk the ship, not because she was carrying explosives, but simply because she was british. Whilst not completely lawful, in my opinion such action would retain the moral high ground. Everybody assumed that at the least the german navy would at least do the morally correct thing, and this, it was assumed would make them not attack passenger ships like the LUSITANIA. It was too difficult to retain the moral high ground, because lives of innocent civilians would be at risk. The world under-estimated just how ruthless the germans were.

The Germans had declared a policy of unrestricted warfare within a declared area which meant they would sink any vessel within that area, on sight. Nobody believed that they (the Germans) would be so morally bankrupt as to extend that policy to passenger ships. But they did, and with the loss of the LUSITANIA, the world learnt a bitter lesson. It set into train a reaction, which led to incidents like the Baralong, but the root cause of the descent into barbarism was the unrestricted warfare declaration

 

[parsifal]

If the Merchant Navy is carrying munitions and war supplies then it is a valid target. Regardless if it is crewed by civilians.

After the declaration of the combat zone in 1915, any ship entering that zone was a target. That in itself was of questionable legality, but has no moral baggage in my opinion. The declaration of unrestricted warfare is a bit harder for me to come to terms with. Germany never repudiated her obligations under the 1907 hague convention, and that placed on her an obligation to preserve the safety of civilians on any ship. It might be deemed that the LUSITANIA was carrying contraband because of the cargo she was carrying, though thats not my understanding. If she had been searched, the ship should have been declared as carrying an incidental cargo and taken into custody.

Of course there is an element of unreality to all of that . It was not possible for the Uboats to follow such ridiculous procedures, as Fisher predicted. But what they could have done is stop and search and at least ensure the passengers were in the lifeboats and as safe as was practicable, which is what many uboats actually did in both wars 9until in the 2nd war Donitz ordered no such assistance or warning be given) . The Germans didnt do that, U-20s skipper Schwieger elected to launch torpedoes with no warning. On that basis the carrying of explosives had no impact on the german decision to sink the LUSITANIA. They didnt know what she was carrying

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

After the declaration of the combat zone in 1915, any ship entering that zone was a target. That in itself was of questionable legality, but has no moral baggage in my opinion. The declaration of unrestricted warfare is a bit harder for me to come to terms with. Germany never repudiated her obligations under the 1907 hague convention, and that placed on her an obligation to preserve the safety of civilians on any ship. It might be deemed that the LUSITANIA was carrying contraband because of the cargo she was carrying, though thats not my understanding. If she had been searched, the ship should have been declared as carrying an incidental cargo and taken into custody.

Of course there is an element of unreality to all of that . It was not possible for the Uboats to follow such ridiculous procedures, as Fisher predicted. But what they could have done is stop and search and at least ensure the passengers were in the lifeboats and as safe as was practicable, which is what many uboats actually did in both wars 9until in the 2nd war Donitz ordered no such assistance or warning be given) . The Germans didnt do that, U-20s skipper Schwieger elected to launch torpedoes with no warning. On that basis the carrying of explosives had no impact on the german decision to sink the LUSITANIA. They didnt know what she was carrying

I wasn't speaking of the Lusitania, so...

 

[GrauGeist]

I don't disagree with your statements about the European powder keg but please explain to me how the actions taken by individual nations differ from international relations today? Are there not backroom deals and treaties made, all of which are done in the best interests of the participants based on their perceived needs? The Cold War was another such pressure-cooker, though we thankfully had gained some more experience/maturity and nobody was crazy enough to launch a nuke...but the Cuban Missile Crisis and constant fears of regional conflict flaring into World War III just illustrate that exactly the same thing was happening 50 years after WWI.

Unfortunately, the same issues are present in international politics today. Was Iraq invaded for a justifiable reason? What about the political pressure being applied to Iran over nuclear weapons, primarily by nations who possess enough nukes themselves to wipe Iran off the map. We have become a little smarter and realized that global trade is more profitable than global war...but that doesn't mean there aren't potential powder kegs today...like Ukraine!

Bear in mind that the "Great War" was the last war of a bygone era. It was the end of the great age of exploration, of military adventure and establishing colonies in mysterious far-off lands. It was thought to be a short clash, and everyone would "be home by Christmas".

Unfortunately, the Golden age was overtaken by the technological age and Pandora's box was opened. It was a war that sank humanity to new depths, threw away the "book of chivalry" and unleashed horrors that were soon to be repeated on an even larger scale in the form of WWII.

In the 70 years since, the world has grown smaller and the lessons learned mean that a war of that scale cannot be repeated without dire consequences. There have been wars since WWII but even if you combine all military actions of the last 70 years, that won't equal the material, manpower or monetary cost of WWII.

There were close calls during the Cold War, sure...the Cuban Missile Crisis, the confrontation between Chairman Mao and President Eisenhower over Taiwan, etc. But then those were no different than other confrontations in the past, where diplomacy kept a cool head and averted disaster, it's just that the stakes were higher.

In this modern environment, there is still saber rattling, such as China antagonizing Japan, North Korea constantly provoking South Korea, Putin's bullsh!t and the ongoing turmoil in the middle-east...but the days of WWI cannot revisit this day and age because the geo-political climate is far different.