Winston Churchill and the Lusitania

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Churchill could at times be ruthless. But he was not murderous. theres a difference. He is also criticized for his lack of realism and meddling in affairs military, yet he also provided a great injection of lateral thinking to Allied military planning. He was a master of diplomacy, and in WWII in no small measure was responsible for grooming the US from a sleeping, uncaring giant, to a fire breathing tiger for the allied cause. There have been similar conspiracy theories about his foreknowledge of the Pearl Harbour attack....all poppycock.

I expect close examination of the Lusitania sinking will yield the same null results for the revisionists working quietly in the background to discredit him.

Churchill was far from perfect, but he was as near to perfect as a wartime leader for britain, as one could hope for.
 
Great post Parsifal. I'm in 100% agreement. I particularly like the distinction between ruthless (which is necessary in war) and murderous which has far deeper personal connotations.
 
I think much of general history, or the history taught in schools, seems to paint it's great leaders as saints that never seem to do anything wrong. It's not until you do some more research and start reading an honest portrayal of that person or events that you come to know the real person. I was never told anything about Thomas Jefferson or George Washington owning slaves in school, they are generally held up in American history as the perfect leader or president. Abe Lincoln may have suffered from severe depression. I am sure every leader had his share of personal demons and skeletons in his closet he had to deal with, but the average person who does not read or learn history for themselves will never know that, and continue believing all the propaganda that has come down through the years. No one is perfect, but as the past few posts have said, they may be the perfect person, even with flaws for the job they are needed for.
 
Ask an Australian veteran of the Malayan Campaign and he's likely to blame Churchill for the entire debacle and postulate that he abrogated his responsibilities to defend the Commonwealth. Similarly, many Indians merely see Churchill as the man who failed to do anything about the rice shortage in 1943 which resulted in famine and great loss of life.
Unfortunately said Australian veteran will be unaware that the government (all of it) had written to Dr. Evatt, and made the following promise,"If, however, contrary to prudence and self-interest Japan set about invading Australia or New Zealand on a large scale, I have the authority of the Cabinet to assure you that we should then cut our losses in the Mediterranean and proceed to your aid, sacrificing every interest except only the defence and feeding of this Island on which all depends."
Doesn't sound like abandonment to me. It might come as a surprise, too, to find out that we don't produce any rice in this country, and never have, so quite how we were supposed to divert ships from our convoys to deliver non-existent food, when stringent rationing was already in force, here, is something of a mystery.
There is a biography, on Churchill, written by Roy Jenkins, who, as a member of the Labour party, was adamantly opposed to everything that Churchill stood for, but is one of the most even-handed appraisals that I've ever read, and I thoroughly recommend it to anyone who has an open mind about the man.
Edgar.
 
At least at the government level, there was a loss of confidence in the british government ( represented by Churchill) in the early months of 1942. Britiain had given a lot of assurances that Singapore would not fall, that the Battle group would act as an effective deterrent to Japanese aggression and that the defences in malaya would hold. In response to those defeats, Australia dcided to withdraw two of its divisions of the AIF to Australia for home defence. Churchill really upset the apple cart when he unilaterally tried to divert tyhe convoys carrying these troops to Burma. He had no authority to do this. The agreements between the Austraqlian government and the british government were very specific, befor3e making major changes to deployment, the Aust5ralian government needed to give its permission. We did not want another gallipoli on our hand, and had already come very close to that in Crete. The attempted Burma diversion was an altogether different turn of events.

All these events, plus the loss of the entire Indies archipelago confirmed to the Australian Govt that they needed to pin their star to the Americans. It was not a complete split in relations, but it was a realization that Britian could not defend the far east
 
Edgar,

There's a huge gulf between perception and reality - the old adage "Never let the truth get in the way of a good story" seems appropriate. It's hardly surprising that witch hunts ensued following the Malaya/Singapore debacle when the supposed "impregnable" fortress surrendered rather meekly (at least that's the perception). Similarly, loss of rice shipments from Thailand and Malaya undoubtedly had a huge impact on the food supply problems in India.

Thanks for the tip re Jenkins' biography of Churchill. I must look for that one.
 
There is a biography, on Churchill, written by Roy Jenkins, who, as a member of the Labour party, was adamantly opposed to everything that Churchill stood for, but is one of the most even-handed appraisals that I've ever read, and I thoroughly recommend it to anyone who has an open mind about the man.
Edgar.

And for that very reason, I just added it to my Amazon list.
 
A rather simplistic thought but as an old school imperialist Churchill would hardly willingly abandon any part of the Empire.

I'm not,to put it mildly,a particular fan of many of the things that Churchill stood for. Roy Jenkins,incidentally one of the best and most progressive Home Secretaries that this country ever had, wasn't either but neither of us would deny Churchill his greatness.

Churchill arranged or connived in the sinking of the Lusitania. It's easy to write but noone has ever shown one single shred of credible evidence to back up the proposition. In plain english,it's a load of codswallop!


Cheers
Steve
 
And Enigma was not an issue in the Lusitiania sinking, as it had yet to be invented in 1915.

But I strongly doubt Churchill orchestrated the sinking to get the US into the war. Churchill didn't need to mount a false flag operation, he just had to wait until the Germans killed a load of American civilians, which was inevitable given German submarine policy
Ah, the "cargo" in terms of human status on the Lusitania was a biggie, though. ;)
 
A conspiracy theory on the Internet.....a first,

The U Boats were shooting and asking no questions. At some point they knew they would sink American ships but they believed they could win war before USA entry. If it wasnt the Lusitania it would be any other vessel.
Fact-check. The Lusitania wasn't an American ship.
 
Any ship(s) would of worked, it just so happened that the one that was sunk was the Lusitania and caused more than the necessary consternation and angry from the Americans to serve the aims of the British and the Allies at the time.
I don't know about the "just so happened" part. Anybody who could add two and two together knew this ship had a bullseye on it. The Germans did everything but publicize it by name. It sailed because they knew it could outrun the subs. The captain turned broadside to the sub that hit it after that sub had all but given up on it.
 
As VBF posted the Lus was a British ship and the British had loaded a Passenger ship with 173 tons of war munitions. More than 1,100 people died including 120 Americans.
Now if you think the death of that many people would have given Winston pause let's look back to 1914 and the First Lord of the Admirlity Churchill and his first campaign.

In 1914, young Winston Churchill was First Lord of the Admiralty. He was itching to get into WWI but it was primarily a land war. There had only been one major naval battle: Jutland. Before the Ottoman Empire had even entered the war, in October 1914, Churchill had ordered the naval bombardment of the Dardanelles. Like most British, Churchill considered the Turks to be inferior opponents with old munitions and guns that could not stand up to British firepower. In Feb. 1915 and again in March a combined British and French force sailed up the Dardanelles to bombard the Turkish defenses. The Turks easily push back the attack with British losses of 700 dead, 3 battleships sunk, and 3 others badly damaged. The vice admiral in charge of the attack told Churchill that he could not silence the forts without an infantry assault. And so was born the Gallipoli campaign.
General Ian Hamilton requested 150,000 troops Lord Kitchener allowed only half that number faced with the bloodbath on the western front. Only one veteran division, the 29th was sent. The Royal Naval division sent by Churchill was a hodgepodge of irregulars and marines. Green and untried volunteer soldiers from Australia and New Zealand 700 miles away in Egypt being trained to fight in France were co-opted.
In the predawn darkness of April 25 the landings began. At Helles the British delayed until 8AM and tried to land in broad daylight in front of Turkish guns dug in 50yds away. Of the first 200 troops only 21 made it to the beach. On V and W beaches 950 Lancashire Fusiliers landed. By nightfall 500 were dead and British losses equaled over 2000.
As to the ANZAC troops, they were to land at the Gaba Tepe headland; instead, they landed a mile further up the coast at what would be known as Anzac cove. By sheer force of will the ANZAC troops made it 1500 yards inland but a Turkish counter-attack drove them back. One Fifth of the ANZAC forces died that first day. Hamilton requested evacuation but was rejected by Churchill. Turkish, British, and ANZAC troops built trenches; sometimes only 10yds apart mostly out of corpses. By May 4 the Turks had lost 14,000 men and the ANZACs almost 10,000 men.
As the summer months wore on disease (flies drawn by the rotting corpses covered every surface), thirst, and lack of food took their toll. On Aug 6th in a last ditch attempt to break the stalemate the British landed troops further north at Suvla Bay. The Turks were caught completely off guard but Lieutenant General Stopford moved too slowly to exploit the landings and Turkish reinforcements made it to the high ground and the British were again stopped and the war of attrition continued. In the beginning of September, Hamilton again requested evacuation but Churchill removed him from command in October. Lord Kitchner visited in November and ordered the evacuation. Before this could begin, a massive rain and snow storm hit the battlefield. Hundreds more drowned in the shallow trenches that caved-in and flooded and thousands died of exposure, frostbite, and illness.
Churchill was held accountable for the debacle and lost his position in the War Cabinet and was excluded from the government.
Because of the conditions at the time casualties can only be estimated but most sources give:
British – 119,696 Australian – 26,094 New Zealand – 7571 Turkish – 218,000
 
Say what you like about Churchill we would have been screwed without him in 1940, by the time he came to be Prime minister he was a veteran of many screw ups from which he had learned. He certainly beat his adversary Adolf hands down.
 
Say what you like about Churchill we would have been screwed without him in 1940, by the time he came to be Prime minister he was a veteran of many screw ups from which he had learned. He certainly beat his adversary Adolf hands down.
Let's just call it he got by with a little help from his friends. They'd be serving thuringers and Spaten Optimator in the London pubs if he didn't.
 
I've always been one to look under the popular "hero's" skirt as it were
CHURCHILL IN HIS OWN WORDS

(During first World War): "Perhaps the next time round the way to do it will be to kill women, children and the civilian population."

Churchill on defending the morality of bombing from the air: "Now everyone's at it. It's simply a question of fashion – similar to that of whether short or long dresses are in."

"I do not understand the squeamishness about the use of gas. I am strongly in favour of using poisonous gas against uncivilised tribes."
Writing as president of the Air Council, 1919.

"It is alarming and nauseating to see Mr Gandhi, a seditious Middle Temple lawyer, now posing as a fakir of a type well known in the east, striding half naked up the steps of the viceregal palace, while he is still organising and conducting a campaign of civil disobedience, to parlay on equal terms with the representative of the Emperor-King."
Commenting on Gandhi's meeting with the Viceroy of India, 1931.

"I do not admit… that a great wrong has been done to the Red Indians of America, or the black people of Australia… by the fact that a stronger race, a higher grade race… has come in and taken its place."
Churchill to Palestine Royal Commission, 1937.

"The choice was clearly open: crush them with vain and unstinted force, or try to give them what they want. These were the only alternatives and most people were unprepared for either. Here indeed was the Irish spectre – horrid and inexorcisable."
Writing in The World Crisis and the Aftermath, 1923-31.

"The unnatural and increasingly rapid growth of the feeble-minded and insane classes, coupled as it is with a steady restriction among all the thrifty, energetic and superior stocks, constitutes a national and race danger which it is impossible to exaggerate… I feel that the source from which the stream of madness is fed should be cut off and sealed up before another year has passed."
Churchill to Asquith, 1910.

"One may dislike Hitler's system and yet admire his patriotic achievement. If our country were defeated, I hope we should find a champion as admirable to restore our courage and lead us back to our place among the nations."
From his Great Contemporaries, 1937.

"The best argument against democracy is a five-minute conversation with the average voter."
 
The American reaction to the Lusitania was not a Churchill construct. He was as shocked as anyone at the German behaviour. In respect of the specific incident, the Admiralty aactually warned the Lusitania several days before the event and recommended she stay out of the danger area. It is no secret that the ship was also carrying munitions, but this was at US insistence. moreover, for the purposes of applying the rules and conventions of warfare on the high seas, the quantities of stores being carried on the ship at the time were insufficient to lift her out of the category of passenger liner. There were rules concerning attacks on passenger vessels, and many people were shocked to find that the germans, in their application of their "unrestricted warfare" on shipping included in this blanket breach of treaty obligations, attacks on passenger ships.

So what are the rules of warfare on the high seas:


Declaration of Paris, 1856

In 1856 and afterward, numerous states, including the United Kingdom, Austria-Hungary, France, Prussia, Russia, Prussia (then Germany after 1870) Sardinia and the Ottoman Empire, ratified the Declaration of Paris. It regulated the relationship between neutral and belligerent and shipping on the high seas when the signatories were fighting each other, but not when fighting non-signatory nations. The United States withheld its formal adherence until 1857.

The Rules (in summary)
Part IV, Art. 22 of the Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armaments, relates to submarine warfare. It states as follows:

"In their action with regard to merchant ships, submarines must conform to the rules of international law to which surface vessels are subject.
In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to stop on being duly summoned, or of active resistance to visit or search, a warship, whether surface vessel or submarine, may not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant vessel without having first placed passengers, crew and ship's papers in a place of safety. For this purpose the ship's boats are not regarded as a place of safety unless the safety of the passengers and crew is assured, in the existing sea and weather conditions, by the proximity of land, or the presence of another vessel which is in a position to take them on board"
.

20th century

All sides signed treaties (the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907) subscribing to rules of prize warfare before World War I and they were also in effect during World War II. During 1914-1917, Germany adhered to the prize rules until it declared unrestricted submarine warfare, but it failed to clarify the position regarding passenger liners, which was regarded as a special case. During World War II, Germany adhered to the prize rules for the first 2 months of the conflict in 1939 before turning again to unrestricted submarine warfare. The USN applied unrestricted submarine warfare during the Pacific War from the beginning. In addition, the Royal Navy and the Soviet Navy employed unrestricted submarine warfare during World War II against Germany (the RN from March 1940, the Soviets from September 1941) in the Skagerrak and the Baltic Sea, respectively.

In 1912, British Admiral Sir John "Jackie" Fisher, by then a retired First Sea Lord, presented a paper to the Cabinet. He developed the argument that submarines would find adherence to prize rules impossible for practical reasons: a submarine could not capture a merchant ship, for it would have no spare manpower to deliver the prize to a neutral port; it could not take survivors or prisoners, for lack of space: "there is nothing a submarine can do except sink her capture." If a merchant ship were armed, as was permitted by a conference in London in 1912, then a submarine was under more pressure to destroy a ship. He asked, "What if the Germans were to use submarines against commerce without restriction?"

This last comment was thought to be unsupportable. Winston Churchill, in particular, then First Lord of the Admiralty, supported by senior naval opinion, said it was inconceivable that "this would ever be done by a civilised power." However, it was Fisher who was proven correct. Churchill was the head of the Admiralty when the captain of the Lusitania was advised not to enter the disputed ocean area. Something the Lusitania's skipper ignored. Its understandable that he would. nobody expected the germans to behave in quite the way they did

Donitz's decision to engage in such practices again in WWII got him into trouble, particulalry when he ordered in 1941 that not only would survivors not be saved, they should also be machine gunned by the Uboats, something that several US skippers are also known to have done in the pacific. Faced with the fact that navies on both sides of the conflict had engaged in such practices, the charges against Donitz had to be dropped. He went to prison for 10 years for other reasons. The 1912 treaty still stands, unaltered incidentally.
 
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